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ABSTRACT
Articles discussing computer and data security topics
are scattered over a very large number of sources which
publish articles on security on an irregular basis. This
makes it quite difficult for the security consultant, the
internal auditor, the computer user, the data processing
manager, the business executive, or anyone else to find out
what has actually been done in this field without doing
extensive, time-consuming, literature research. To ease
this problem there currently exist approximately seven
computer security bibliographies containing from 50 to 250
entries. Although they are all less than three years old,
only one has annotations over a few sentences in length, and
only two use any sort of classification or index scheme.
The one bibliography with paragraph length annotations is
primarily concerned with very technical aspects of hardware
and software access control. Most of the other
bibliographies are also concerned with only certain subsets
of security problems. This paper is apparently the first
attempt to produce a bibliography covering all aspects of
computer and data security, and having annotations that more
than superficially describe each article's content.
This bibliography contains 1,022 entries. About half
these entries are extensively annotated, another quarter
being superficially annotated, and the rest being
unannotated. All extensively annotated entries are rated as
to their current usefulness and uniqueness. A subject index
of 160 items is provided for referencing purposes. The
introduction to this bibliography briefly discusses:
privacy, security, and integrity; threats of data misuse;
physical, procedural, and hardware/software security;
development and scope of the bibliography; the subject
index; outstanding articles and books; computer security
firms; and the future. A list of 34 firms selling computer
security services or equipment is presented following the
bibliography.
Thesis Supervisor: Stuart E. Madnick
Title: Assistant Professor of Management Science
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I. INTRODUCTION
Before discussing the development and content of this
bibliography, a brief introduction will be given on
"computer and data security" for the benefit of those
unfamiliar with the subject. Two other excellent
introductions to computer security can be found in Browne
(bibliography reference number 1370) and Hoffman (4560).
These introductions are quite different from the following
discussion and can serve as excellent complementary
readings.
PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND INTEGRITY.
It is quite important that one be fully aware of the
difference in the meanings of the words privacy, security,
and integrity. One of the better definitions of privacy is
given by Alan F. Westin in his classic book entitled PRIVACY
AND FREEDOM (9940).
"Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups,
or institutions to determine for themselves when,
how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others... The individual's desire
for privacy is never absolute, since participation
in society is an equally powerful desire. Thus
each individual is continually engaged in a
personal adjustment process... in the face of
pressures from the curiosity of others and from
the process of surveillance that every society
sets in order to enforce social norms."
The privacy question largely involves ethical and moral
questions of how much and under what circumstances
information may legitimately be stored on an individual.
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The introduction to Annette Harrison's bibliography (4280)
is an excellent summary of many current "privacy protection"
problems.
IBM (2220) defines data security as "the protection of
data from accidental or intentional disclosure to
unauthorized persons and from unauthorized modification."
This definition is applicable whether or not computers are
used to process the data. Although data security
considerations need not always be concerned with computers,
computer security considerations are always concerned with
data. For without data the computer is a useless tool.
Almost all commonly used definitions of computer security
incorporate some form of data security definition. The
following computer security definition was constructed from
several other popular definitions.
Computer (and data) security is a problem of
comprehensive control involving physical,
procedural, and hardware/software protective
measures which are used to insure that data
privacy decisions are enforced, and to protect
against accidental or intentional destruction of
the computer and its data.
Good integrity means that the computer hardware and
operating system are performing according to design
objectives; that data files contain accurate and complete
data; that personnel are honest and obey security
procedures; and that computer programs perform legitimately
and without error. Integrity is primarily concerned with
fraud and error problems while security is primarily
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concerned with the protection of privacy decisions. Because
integrity and security considerations are frequently
identical, almost all authors include integrity
considerations in their use of the word "security". This
bibliography attempts to provide a comprehensive list of
articles on security (and integrity). However, only the
most recent and useful articles and books on privacy are
included.
THREATS OF DATA MISUSE.
Seven bad things can happen to data. It can be:
accidentally disclosed to unauthorized persons;
intentionally disclosed to unauthorized persons;
accidentally and unknowingly modified; intentionally and
secretly modified; accidentally destroyed; intentionally and
illegitimately destroyed; and temporarily denied access by
its rightful users. Data safeguards should exist if the
data is valuable. However, these safeguards are unlikely to
exist if the disclosure, modification, or destruction of the
data is not harmful to the data caretaker. Intentional data
threats will exist if the data is valuable, either in terms
of physical or mental well-being, to the person who
discloses, destroys, or alters it. Data threats can also be
viewed as being either internal or external to the computer
system. One way of distinguishing between internal and
external threats is to classify all threats as internal if
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and only if they could realistically be controlled by the
computer hardware or operating system. Some computer
manufacturers are now devoting a considerable amount of
money to designing computers less susceptible to internal
threats. External threats require procedural and physical
safeguards and are largely the responsibility of the
computer user.
There are several important differences between data
stored in magnetic form within a computer or on removable
files, and data stored in manila envelopes. The most
important of these differences is that no physical access is
required to destroy, secretly modify, or steal the
computerized data. Modifications to the computerized data
will produce no detectable erasures. Extremely large
amounts of computerized data can be destroyed, modified, or
stolen in a very small amount of time. Obtaining evidence
for legal prosecution of those who misuse computerized data
is often more difficult unless special safeguards are
implemented. For these reasons one would think that most
organizations would protect their computerized data with as
much or greater effort than they used to protect that same
data in pre-computer days. Unfortunately, this is not often
the case.
There are several other reasons why computerized
information is rapidly requiring more and better methods of
protection. All types of organizations are becoming
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increasingly dependent on computer data processing for their
continued operations. Not only are more organizations using
computers for financial accounting, but computers are being
increasingly relied upon for inventory control, sales
forecasting, order entry, etc.. There has been a
significant increase in the use of remote-access,
time-shared computers which are vulnerable to a whole range
of new threats. In addition, a larger segment of the
population has become familiar with computer technology and
the ways in which it may be used for criminal means.
PHYSICAL, PROCEDURAL, AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE SECURITY.
To get a better idea of the differences among these
three methods of providing security, quickly scan the items
within the "specific safeguard" section of the subject
index. Although this classification of 54 specific
safeguards may be somewhat arbitrary, it should quickly
become apparent that adequate computer and data security
cannot be obtained if any one of these three methods of
providing security is ignored. Physical security is
required for preventing common types of sabotage; procedural
security is needed to detect and prevent most clever types
of data input and program fraud, and for providing adequate
backup; and hardware/software security is essential in
time-shared computers for preventing unauthorized access to
sensitive computer-stored data. For local-access
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batch-processing computer systems very good procedural and
physical safeguards can solve most security problems. Basic
operating system safeguards for errorless computer operation
and a secure log of console commands are nearly adequate
hardware/software protective measures. However for
remote-access, time-shared computers, sophisticated
hardware/software privacy safeguards are crucial.
DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE OF THE BIBLIOGRAPHY.
Most of the entries in this bibliography were found by
conducting an extensive literature search at the Harvard and
MIT business libraries and at the MIT engineering library.
Reference sources such as THE BUSINESS PERIODICALS INDEX,
FUNK AND SCOTT INDEX OF CORPORATIONS AND INDUSTRIES,
READER'S GUIDE TO PERIODICAL LITERATURE, IEEE TRANSACTIONS
ON COMPUTERS, COMPUTER AND CONTROL ABSTRACTS, DATA
PROCESSING DIGEST, ACM COMPUTING REVIEWS, and COMPUTER
ABSTRACTS were used. Bibliographies at the end of some
articles led to additional entries being found.
COMPUTERWORLD newspaper (2170) was responsible for a very
large number of security articles.
While performing this literature search the following
computer security bibliographies were found: 0770, 1370,
2080, 5530, 7630, 9400, and 9920. This bibliography
contains most, but not all, of the entries in these other
bibliographies. One reason for this is that most of these
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bibliographies were found near the end of the literature
search and the addition of a few more entries was not
considered important. Another reason for not using these
bibliographies as sources was the possible violation of
copyright laws. Three of these bibliographies (0770, 5530,
7630) still have a value not made obsolete by this
bibliography.
Articles dealing solely with personal privacy issues
are not included in this bibliography. Articles dealing
with both privacy and security issues, or having major
computer security implications, are included. An exception
was made to include a few classic articles and books on
privacy. Those who are primarily interested in privacy
issues should consult the following bibliographies: 0310,
4270, 4280, 4560, and 9600.
Time did not permit careful reading of all entries in
this bibliography. Approximately half of the entries were
carefully read and annotated. Another quarter were briefly
scanned and annotated, or annotated from another author's
extensive comments. Only the carefully read entries were
rated as to their current usefulness and uniqueness.
EXPLANATION OF THE SUBJECT INDEX.
The subject index was first developed after this author
had read approximately 50 different articles on computer and
data security. As additional entries were read the index
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was modified by adding to and subtracting from various parts
of it. Whenever significant changes were made, an attempt
was made to go back and reindex the relevant previously read
entries. However, it is possible that the initially read
entries, near the beginning of this bibliography, are not as
well indexed as the more recently read entries.
This bibliography is stored in a computer to make later
updating relatively easy. The primary purpose of the
subject index is to make possible computer searching of
entries by their subject content. Although manual use of
the subject index is somewhat cumbersome, the index's value
was considered sufficient to justify its being left in this
hard copy publication.
To keep the subject index from becoming too large and
unmanageable, the classification of computer security
subjects was done at a fairly low level of detail. An
attempt was made to offer two levels of detail by using
"general" and "specific" categories for the threats and
safeguards. All articles were indexed by at least one of
the general threat or general safeguard indices. Additional
subject indices for specific safeguards, specific threats,
computer environment, and miscellaneous subjects were used
only if the article had more than superficially discussed
that specific subject. Determining when the discussion on a
particular subject was no longer superficial and worthy of
being indexed requires a somewhat arbitrary decision to be
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made. Therefore, one should not put too much faith in the
accuracy and uniformity of the entries' indices.
The specific safeguard indices can be used as a high
level checklist of currently available safeguards. All the
safeguards discussed in over 400 articles easily fit into
this safeguard classification scheme. However, the grouping
of these 54 specific safeguard indices into the three
general areas of physical, procudural, and hardware/software
safeguards was somewhat arbitrary because several of these
indices can easily fit into more than one general area. For
more detailed checklists on physical and procedural
safeguards see Krauss (5490) or Van Tassel (9400). A
comprehensive checklist for hardware and software safeguards
apparently does not yet exist.
The specific threat indices in the subject index are
useful for referencing bibliography entries but serve rather
poorly as a checklist of threats. Most currently available
threat checklists are really checklists on methods of
security system penetration. It is important to distinguish
between "threats" such as programmer fraud and stealing
proprietary software, which are the potential and actual
actions of people, and "methods of penetration" such as
software trapdoors, wiretapping, and password discovery.
Although a complete list of methods of penetration would be
quite useful as a security checklist, it would be far too
lengthy to be useful as a subject index for this
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bibliography. For this reason only a general high level
classification of specific threats was used for indexing
purposes.
The list of computer and data environment indices
covers four different dimensions: type of information, use
of information, type of computer system, and user
environment. These dimensions were selected because they
were found to have considerable value in referencing the
entries. However, they were selected somewhat arbitrarily,
and it is possible that other dimensions could have been
used with equal success. The miscellaneous indices were
used because several useful security subjects could not be
fit into a framework which only included specific
safeguards, specific threats, and computer environment
classifications.
The rating of all carefully read entries as to their
current usefulness and uniqueness is not an absolute
indicator of their value. All the entries may be valuable
to the novice, but only a few may interest the expert
security consultant. The ratings only attempt to separate
the generally useful entries from the less generally useful
ones within a particular computer security subject. The
more advanced, more unique, and more detailed articles were
generally given higher ratings. It should also be noted
that these ratings were determined solely by this author.
Their accuracy and uniformity are subject to error.
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OUTSTANDING ARTICLES AND BOOKS.
Approximately 70 of the 600 rated entries were rated as
"good" and another 40 rated as "excellent". The following
paragraph lists thirty different security subjects, with
each subject being followed by one or more numbers that
indicate which of these 110 "good" or "excellent" articles
are primarily concerned with that subject. This will enable
easy location of a few good articles on the thirty different
subjects without having to use the more cumbersome subject
index. However, the following paragraph is not nearly as
accurate or as comprehensive as the subject index.
General discussions of threats and/or safeguards (1370,
4280, 5540, 9400, 0170, 0660, 0670, 0950, 2220, 4560, 5160,
5980, 6480); actual examples of computer crimes and
disasters (5400, 5900, 8570, 9080, 9100); computer fraud
(0160, 1600); programmer operating system penetration
(0300); employee threats (5640); physical security (4350,
5490); data structure safeguards (1680); hardware/software
access control (0770, 2230, 3950, 6550, 6560, 7020, 7100,
0850, 1030, 1710, 2240, 2430, 3550, 6010, 6110, 6810, 7050,
9120, 9580, 9840); operating system integrity (0330, 0920,
1030); cryptography (1720, 3790, 5320, 6390, 8550, 8850,
9260); existing equipment and system descriptions (7020,
0850, 1710, 2240, 9840); insuring statistical
confidentiality (4230, 4590); management responsibilities
(4740); assigning security responsibilities (3530, 0650);
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auditing control (1980, 5530, 0650, 2610, 6590, 8690, 9190);
independent internal control group (8690, 9400); operations
control (7840); backup (2090); emergency, contingency and
recovery plans (2090, 1080); insurance (1220); computer room
environment control (6830); equipment vulnerability to
radiation and magnets (0670, 6130, 9200); wiretapping
(5450); voting systems (3160, 8300, 8570); security cost
effectiveness (8410, 9280, 9850); implementing a security
program (1360, 8770, 8970); system certification (1070,
9850); obtaining services from security consulting companies
(2010, 5250, 6150); checklists (1070, 5490, 5530, 9400);
security frameworks (9280); legal matters (0550, 3850, 3520,
3540); government regulation (8180, 9560, 9940, 9950, 5960,
8790); privacy issues (1690, 4270, 4280, 7490, 9560, 9940,
1250, 1710, 1890, 4520, 6400, 8790); and computer security
research surveys (1690, 7490, 8410, 9950, 1250, 6030, 8300).
COMPUTER SECURITY FIRMS.
Following the annotated bibliography is a list of 34
companies selling computer security services and/or
equipment. The list is probably not very comprehensive, but
no references to other security firms could be found.
Harold Witzer (9920) included with his annotated
bibliography a list of 66 companies that sell locks,
surveillance systems, alarms, and guard services. However,
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none of those 66 companies appear to have any expertise in
dealing with computer related security problems.
The brief comments on these 34 listed companies were
obtained from the same source used to locate the company
name and address. No direct company contacts were made to
obtain additional information. Before choosing one of these
34 firms to perform a security survey, it is recommended
that articles by Mandell (6150) and Johnson (5250) be read.
Mandell warns of hiring security consultants that also sell
security equipment. Some have been known to greatly
exaggerate threats in order to sell their equipment.
THE FUTURE.
Considerable research work still needs to be done
before all major problems related to computer and data
security are solved. However, many organizations could
greatly lessen their existing vulnerability to security
threats if they just used some of the many currently
available cost-effective safeguards. Now that the recent
wave of bombing scares has subsided, perhaps many
organizations will take a more rational, less physical
security oriented approach to security, and devote more
attention to threats of unauthorized information disclosure,
errors, and fraud. Employees are rapidly becoming the
biggest security problem (see entry 5640).
Most of the security problems surrounding physical
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safeguards have already been delineated and several large
physical safeguard checklists currently exist (see Krauss
5490). Although numerous procedural safeguards exist,
research still needs to be done to develop coherent methods
of integrating different subsets of these procedural
safeguards into cost-effective security programs. The
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (1980) is taking
a major step in this direction. Kuong (5530), Krauss
(5490), and Van Tassel (9400) have developed extensive
checklists of procedural safeguards, but their methods of
implementing these safeguards appear to be somewhat
arbitrary.
Researchers are just beginning to develop good
frameworks for considering hardware/software safeguard
trade-offs. Graham (3950) has developed an excellent
framework for comparing and evaluating different
access-control systems. AFIPS (1070) has started a
comprehensive program with a long-range goal of developing
computer system certification procedures. Manuals with
checklists and procedures to follow will cover topics such
as operational audits, performance reviews, acceptance
tests, system reliability, and data collection. If AFIPS
succeeds in its goal of system certification, it will have
solved one of the major remaining problems of computer and
data security. Until just recently, computer equipment
manufacturers have been accustomed to designing only very
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minimal hardware/software safeguards into their equipment.
However their attitudes are rapidly changing. IBM plans to
spend $40,000,000 over the next five years to develop
hardware and software means of controlling access to
sensitive computerized data. It appears that very secure
and economical hardware/software access control systems will
become a reality in the near future. The major problem lies
not in developing a secure access control system, but in
developing an economically acceptable one.
Another major remaining problem to be solved in the
near future is the development of a coherent method for
integrating not only procedural safeguards but also physical
and hardware/software safeguards into a cost-effective
security program. In order to develop security programs
with significantly improved performance and lower cost, it
will be necessary to quantify, measure, and establish
numerical values for various types of threats and
safeguards. Collection and analysis of relevant statistics
on threats and the affect of safeguards on these threats
will be a necessary first step.
In the area of legal controls much has been proposed
but Congress has taken little action. Two important books
by Alan F. Westin (9940, 9950) have done much to put the
privacy problem into proper focus. Just recently a federal
government advisory committee has recommended a new code for
fair information practice, backed up by strong laws (8180).
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Perhaps "Watergate" will provide the necessary catalyst for
Congress to pass these needed laws on personal information
privacy. Even though attainment of 100% secure systems
appears unlikely, the future looks very bright for new
improvements in computer and data security measures.
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II. SUBJECT INDEX TO THE ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY.
A. PUBLICATION FACTS.
aa Book.
ab Magazine or journal article.
ac Newspaper article.
ad Report or paper (university, business or government).
ae Presentation at a workshop, conference, symposium, or
meeting.
af Unpublished or miscellaneous material (such as sales
brochures, bulletins, reference indexes, etc.).
ag AFIPS Conference Proceedings.
ah Communications of the ACM.
ai Computerworld.
aj RAND Corporation reports.
ak IBM publications.
al MIT publications.
B. ACTUAL EXAMPLES OF COMPUTER SECURITY CRIMES AND DISASTERS.
ba Theft.
bb Fraud.
bc Destruction.
bd Hardware and software error.
be Human error.
bf Degradation of service.
bg Theft, fraud, destruction, and errors.
C. GENERAL SAFEGUARD CATEGORIES.
ca Computer hardware and software safeguards (research
literature).
cb Computer hardware and software safeguards (practical
literature).
cc Management control and operating procedure safeguards.
cd Physical and architectural safeguards.
D. GENERAL THREAT CATEGORIES.
da Theft (Disclosure of sensitive or valuable data to
those without ligitimate, authorized needs-to-know).
db Fraud (Secret alteration of valuable data or perform-
ing illegal acts where data alteration isn't needed).
dc Destruction (Partial or complete destruction of data
and/or equipment by intent or accident).
dd Hardware & software error (includes programmer errors).
de Human error.
df Degradation of service.
dg Theft, fraud, destruction, and errors.
E. SPECIFIC SAFEGUARDS.
Computer hardware and software safeguards.
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ea Identification and authentication of remote users.
eb Data structure and data management techniques.
ec Hardware access control (practical solutions).
ed Software access control (practical solutions).
ee Access control (theoretical-experimental solutions).
ef Access control below file level.
eg Residue control.
eh File integrity (programs and data)
ei Operating/security system integrity and protection.
ej Processing restrictions.
ek Computer audit programs.
el System monitoring and logging of significant events.
em Checkpoint/restart procedures.
en Exception kandling.
eo Hardware & operating system error controls (diagnostic
routines, parity checks, graceful degradation, etc.).
ep Data transmission security.
eq Cryptography, data scrambling, and data compression.
er Desensitizing information by introducing errors, data
separation, etc..
es Insuring statistical confidentiality.
Procedural Safeguards.
fa Organization of the firm and EDP related groups.
fb Management responsibilities.
fc Assigning security responsibilities.
fd Information classification and/or value determination.
fe Authorization of individuals to access specific data.
ff Auditing.
fg Independent internal control group.
fh Acquisition and validation of input information.
fi Validation of programs.
fj Program and data updating procedures.
fk Retention of information (obsolescence).
fl Control of sensitive printouts through destruction.
fm operations control.
fn Schedules for all production jobs.
fo Documentation standards and procedures.
fp Library control of tapes, cards, disks; and good
housekeeping procedures.
fq Separation and rotation of duties.
fr Personnel advancement opportunities and grievance
procedures.
fs Personnel policy on security-related behavior (estab-
lishing, enforcing, and discipling).
ft Personnel integrity investigations.
fu Personnel security education and training.
fv Backup (files, documentation, personnel, and sites).
fw Emergency, contingency, and disaster recovery plans.
fx Aperiodic testing and updating of security system.
fy Insurance.
fz Legal contracts.
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f1 Trade secrets and copyrights.
Physical and architectural safeguards.
ga Computer room architecture.
gb Computer room environment control.
gc Equipment & storage media durability or reliability; &
accessory protective devices (plastic covers, safes).
gd Backup power supplies.
ge Fire alarms and extinguishers.
gf Physical access controls (alarms, guards, locks, etc.).
gg General discussion of safeguards.
gh Existing system and equipment descriptions.
H. SPECIFIC THREATS.
Threats internal to computer system.
ha General discussion of internal data access threats.
hb Espionage.
hc Copying & selling proprietary software or databases.
hd Illegally reading private information of others.
he Combining authorized data to produce unauthorized
information.
hf Accidental disclosure of restricted information.
hg Malicious destruction of others' data.
hi Accidential destruction of others' or one's own data.
hj Embezzlement.
hk Data input fraud.
hl Operator fraud.
hm Programmer fraud.
hn Program user fraud.
ho Fraudulently altering others' data to lessen one's
non-financial liabilities.
hp Data input errors.
hg Operator errors.
hr Programmer errors.
hs Program user errors.
ht Operating system error.
hu Hardware errors.
hv Hardware or software implementation delays.
hw Negligence.
Human threat.
ia Operator.
ib User of "canned" programs.
ic High-level language programmer.
id Assembly language programmer.
ie Maintenance personnel.
if Manager.
ig Authorized file user.
ih Authorized computer system user.
ii Unauthorized computer system user.
PAGE 23
Threats external to computer system.
ja General discussion of external threats.
jb Labor strikes.
jc Physical theft of tapes, cards, etc..
jd Radiation.
je Wiretapping.
jf Bombs, magnets, and other means of sabotage.
jg Fire, water, dust, static electricity, earthquake,
tornato, etc..
jh Air conditioning, and power failures.
K. COMPUTER AND DATA ENVIRONMENT.
Type of Information.
ka Personal information stored on others.
kb One's private information stored exclusively for
one's own use.
kc Information stored for renting and royalty.
Use of information.
kd Accounting and financial.
ke Manufacturing.
kf Marketing and sales (mailing lists).
kg Research and development.
Type of computer system.
la Batch processing (multiprogramming).
lb Time sharing (multiprogramming, remote real-time-
interactive access).
User environment.
ma EDP Service bureaus (facilities management, "canned"
program services, or selling only computer time).
mb organizations owning and selling access rights to
large "personal information" databanks.
mc Banks, credit agencies, insurance companies, and
other financial institutions.
md Federal government.
me Local government.
mf Legal and law enforcement.
mg Medical.
mh Military.
mi Transportation.
mj Educational.
mk Voting systems.
N. MISCELLANEOUS.
na Recovery from computer errors, crimes, and disasters.
nb Security expense versus requirements, and security
cost effectiveness.
nc Reliability, flexibility, efficiency, and non-monetary
costs of security.
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nd obtaining services from security consulting companies.
ne Computer security apathy.
nf Implementing a security program.
ng Areas currently being researched, or needing future
research.
nh Security frameworks.
ni Security checklists.
nj Private legal matters, and management's legal
responsibilities.
nk Manufacturers' responsibility in providing safeguards.
nl Government regulation.
nm Privacy issues.
nn General survey articles.
no Computer security research surveys.
np other bibliographies and references.
ng Classified articles.
X. ESTIMATE OF ARTICLE'S CURRENT USEFULNESS & UNIQUENESS.
x1 Poor.
x2 Fair.
x3 Good.
x4 Excellent.
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III. ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
*(0010)*68*ae*ba*bb*cc*ep*hj*kb*kd*ni
Aaron, William. "Embezzlement - Detection and Control."
Speech before the NATIONAL RETAIL MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION
EDP CONFERENCE, 1968.
Examples of computer misuse are given. Several
security weak points in keeping financial records are
described. Also, a checklist of security controls is
presented.
*(0020)*70*ab*cc*fd*hd*kb*mh*nb
Abdian, A. G.; and Klienfelter, P. "Transfer of
Security-Classified Information." JOURNAL OF CHEMICAL
DOCUMENTATION, November 1970, pp. 224-226.
The safeguarding of security-classified information
and the dissemination of this information are
fundamentally conflicting requirements of the Defense
Department Documentation Center. Complex and costly
techniques must be used to achieve a satisfactory balance
between these requirements. Areas of special difficulty
or new interest are described. Also, the cost impacts of
processing security-classified information are summarized
with respect to several information processing functions.
*(0030)*70*ac*ai*cb*da*db*ed*gh*kb*kd
"Accounting System Uses 'Lock and Key' to Prevent Payment
Default, Copying." COMPUTERWORLD, 20 May 1970.
The article discusses a software product that
prevents default of payment and unauthorized copying of
software packages.
*(0040)*68*ae*cc*dd*de*eh*fn*mg*nm
Acheson, E. D. (ed.). RECORD LINKAGE IN MEDICINE. E. and S.
Livingston, London, 1968.
This is a publication of proceedings of a
conference. Methods are described to insure that
incorrect medical records are not accessed by the doctor.
Some comments are also made on medical ethics.
*(0050)*67*ab*cb*cc*dg*nf*ni
Adams, D. L. "Planning Checklist for a Computer
Installation." DATAMATION, June 1967, pp. 37-39.
*(0060)*72*ab*cb*ek*ff*gh
Adams, D. L.; and Mullarkey, J. F. "A Survey of Software."
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY, September 1972, pp. 39-49.
*(0070)*69*ab*ba*bb
Adelson, Alan M. "Computer Bandits." TRUE, February 1969,
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p.50.
*(0080)*65*ab*bb*db*hj*ka*kb
Adelson, Alan M. "Embezzlement by Computer." SECURITY WORLD,
September 1965.
*(0090)*68*ac*bb*cc*db*en*ff*hj*hm*if*kd*x2
Adelson, Alan M. "Whir, Blink, Jackpot! - Crooked Operators
Use Computers to Embezzle Money from Companies." THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL, 5 April 1968, p. 1.
Several interesting examples of actual computer
embezzlements are described. One manager in charge of
back-office operations at Walston and Company, a New York
brokerage firm, electronically siphoned $250,000 out of
the company between 1951 and 1959. By the time the theft
was finally uncoveiged, the man had become a vice
president. Some very common safeguards are also
suggested.
*(0100)*69*ad*cc*cd*mh*na
"ADP Installation Emergency Planning (Continuity of
Operations)." AD-705 341, National Technical Information
Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151, December 1969, 101
pp-
This is a task group report for the Department of
Defense ADP Policy Committee.
*(0110)*70*ac*ai*bc*dc*jf*mj
"Aftermath of Sir George Williams University Computer Center
Destruction in February, 1969." COMPUTERWORLD, April
1970, p. 1.
A computer center is destroyed by students over the
racial prejudice of one professor. Students' intent was
to use control of computer center as a bargaining
strength. Lack of administration action angered the
students.
* (0120) *71*ac*ai*bd*be*dd*de*kd
"Agency Collects Bills Previously Paid." COMPUTERWORLD, 3
March 1971.
*(0130)*67*ad*cc*cd*da*db*dc*hb*kb*mh*nb*nc*nf*nh*x2
"Air Force Systems Command Manual: System Security
Engineering." AFSC Manual No. 207-1, Headquarters Air
Force Systems Command, Andrews Air Force Base,
Washington, D.C. 20331; or Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC. 20402,
28 December 1967, $.60.
The program formulated by this manual is intended to
increase the effectivemess of the Aerospace Systems
Security Program by focusing proper attention on the
security of a system (computer, communications, missle,
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etc.) in time to permit its consideration during the
basic definition/design effort. Although the manual
doesn't specifically discuss "computer" systems, parts of
it are pertinent to computer security. of the manual's
six chapters, chapter five is by far the most useful for
computer systems. It presents a comprehensive and
detailed model for analyzing threats such as theft,
fraud, and sabotage. The model insures that all aspects
of potential and actual threats are adequately
investigated. It makes use of logical diagrams
utilizing, AND, OR, INHIBIT, and EXCLUSIVE-OR logical
gates.
*(0140)*70*ac*ai*bb*cb*db*ho*ih*kd*mc
"'Alert' Program Spots Credit Ring." COMPUTERWORLD, 9
December 1970, p. 1.
A bank's computer security system discovered that a
New York haberdasher was involved with stolen credit
cards.
*(0150)*60*ab*bb*db*hj
Allan, J. A. "Embezzlement by Electronics." ACCOUNTANTS
MAGAZINE, April 1960, pp. 253-255.
*(0160)*71*ab*ba*bb*cc*da*db*el*ff*fg*fq*fs*hj*hk*hm*kb
*kd*nf*ni*x4
Allen, Brandt R. "Computer Fraud." FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE, May
1971, p. 38.
First, the author reveals the magnitude of the fraud
problem: 69,000 people were arrested for fraud in 1970;
fraud and embezzlement losses exceed by a wide margin
corporate robbery, burglary, and shoplifting losses;
fraud losses exceed $1 billion annually; and 1.2% of all
business failures (over 100 in 1969) were due to fraud.
The number of fraud cases involving computers is sharply
increasing. Four basic approaches to computer fraud are:
manipulation of input data, developing improper computer
programs, alteration of data files, and illegal
transmission of teleprocessed information. Twelve
interesting fraud examples are described to clarify these
approaches. The author claims that the computer enhances
opportunities for fraud and increases the problems of
prevention. His reasons briefly are: new types of
people, centralization of data, lack of human
intervention, computer difficult to understand, changes
made without a trace, and degraded audit trails. Surveys
are cited which show the vast majority of embezzlements
occur in the area of disbursement. Payroll accounts for
less than 5% of the total. Recognizing certain danger
signals from personnel behavior is also discussed.
Finally, the following fraud prevention checklist is
discussed: background checks, rotation of duties,
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production schedules, run control log, program change
schedule, master file control, I/O checking by separate
group, comparison of actual and planned performance,
rigid password control, and an internal audit group.
*(0170)*72*ab*bg*cc*cd*dg*ha*hc*hd*hg*hi*hj*hk*hm*jf*jg
*kd*nn*x3
Allen, Brandt R. "Computer Security - PART 1." DATA
MANAGEMENT, January 1972, pp. 18-24.
The author states that the five major hazards to the
computer complex are fire, water, theft, fraud, and
sabotage. He then discusses each of these hazards in
detail and presents a large number of accidents, crimes,
and disasters that could occur in each hazard area. Of
these hazards, fire is generally considered the most
serious. Some valuable information is given on the
vulnerability of magnetic tapes to fire and water. The
discussion on fraud is almost identical to that found in
an earlier article by Allen, entitled "Computer Fraud".
Part 2 of this article, in the February issue, discusses
precautions that management should employ to insure
security of the computer and its data.
*(0180)*72*ab*bc*cc*cd*dg*el*ff*fp*fs*fv*ga*gd*gf*jg*kb
*nb*ni*xl
Allen, Brandt R. "Computer Security - PART 2." DATA
MANAGEMENT, February 1972, pp. 24-30.
The increasing use of on-line real-time computer
systems, the tendency toward greater integration software
and databases, and the increasing centralization of
hardware are all making the security problem much more
difficult. Common safeguards are briefly described for:
physical security (flooding, riot, power, building
location and architecture); software backup (data files,
application programs, documentation, emergency drills);
hardware backup (firms join to buy backup system); and
operations (production schedules, run control log,
program change control, master file control, I/O control,
operations review, password control, internal audit
group). Part 1 of this article can be found in the
January issue of DATA MANAGEMENT.
*(0190)*68*ab*bg*cc*cd*dg*fg*fn*fv*hm*hq*hr*jf*kb*kd*nb
*ne*x2
Allen, Brandt R. "Danger Ahead. Safeguard Your Computer."
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, November 1968, pp. 97-101.
Every company's management should ask itself what
would happen if its computer center was completely
destroyed, and is the same protection given to data in
computer files as was given in pre-computer days.
Examples are given of environmental disasters, mechanical
failures, operator errors, program errors, theft, fraud,
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and sabotage. It is suggested that management compare
the cost of complete and permanent computer disruption
with the cost of complete protection. The author then
gives some reasons for computer security apathy and
recommends a few safeguards such as: controlled access to
the computer room, scheduling of production jobs, file
duplication, improved program design, and use of an
internal security group.
*(0200)*71*ae*cb*cc
Allen, Brandt R. "New Developments in Computer Security."
MDI SEMINAR REFERENCE MANUAL, 1971.
* (0210) *70*ac*ai
"All's Well That Ends Well." COMPUTERWORLD, 16 December
1970, p. 4.
*(0220)*67*ab*cc*dc*fw
Allsbrook, D. N. "Planning an Emergency Preparedness
Program." BURROUGHS CLEARINGHOUSE, December 1967, p. 30.
*(0230)*70*ac*ai*bd*be*dd*de*mc*nj
"American Express Sued for $25,000." COMPUTERWORLD, 16
December 1970, p. 4.
*(0240)*71*af*cc*db*hj*kd
Amir, M. "Computer Embezzlement: Prevention and Control."
COMPUTER BULLETIN, November 1971.
* (0250) *67*ab*cc
Anderson, Arthur F. "Company Security Practices." THE
CONFERENCE BOARD RECORD, October 1967.
*(0260)*68*ab*cc*fy
Anderson, Arthur F. "Computer Insurance." THE ACCOUNTANT, 6
April 1968.
* (0270) *68*ab*cc*da*db*dc*fp
Anderson, Arthur F. "Records Protection in the Age of EDP."
THE OFFICE, October 1968.
*(0280)*69*ae*cc*fb
Anderson, B. G. "The Systems Executive's Responsibility in
Guarding the Data Resource." American Management
Association Conference on Security and Catastrophe
Prevention Management of the Computer Complex, November
1969.
*(0290)*72*ad*cb*ec*ed*ei*gg*kb*mh*ng
Anderson, James P. "Computer Security Technology Planning
Study." AD-758 206, National Technical Information
Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151, October 1972, 43
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pp., $3.00.
This report presents the results of a planning study
on computer security requirements for the U.S. Air Force.
The study concludes that research and development is
urgently needed to provide secure command/control and
support systems for the Air Force.
*(0300)*72*aa*ca*cb*dg*fd*ea*ec*ed*ee*ef*eh*ei*ej*el*ep
*eq*fi*fv*fx*gg*gh*ha*hd*hf*hg*hi*hr*ht*hu*lb*mb*nc*ng
*nk*nn*x4
Anderson, James P. "Information Security in a Multi-User
Computer Environment." ADVANCES IN COMPUTERS, Morris
Robinoff ed., Academic Press Inc., 111 Fifth Avenue, New
York, New York 10003, 1972, pp. 1-35.
This excellent article is primarily concerned with
the threat to information posed by programmers who can
gain access to a multi-user system and exploit known or
suspected weaknesses in the operating system. The author
essentially combined and summarized the contents of
approximately 25 important articles on hardware and
operating system security, as well as having added his
own valuable ideas. Throughout this article, many
different types or methods of illegal data access are
mentioned, with feasible hardware and software
countermeasures usually being proposed. Most of the
article is quite technical and understanding it requires
a fair knowledge of how computers process information.
Some of the more interesting comments in this
article are presented below. The possibility of
incomplete design is one of the major problems in
information security in multi-user systems. Due to the
very wide variability in the environment, equipment,
stored information, and user populations, no single set
of measures can be specified to insure multi-user system
security. Several factors must be considered in
categorizing data value. The issue of privacy relates to
disclosure policy regardless of.the kind of data or the
environment it arises in. Because OS/360 uses locations
within the user address space to store addresses of
privileged operating systems routines, it is an easy
system to exploit. The major source of security problems
in contemporary operating systems is that systems
designers are only remotely aware of potential malevolent
penetration threats. The principle problems of file
encryption are similar to those of password protected
files. A pseudo-user program that periodically attempts
to violate memory bounds and execute instructions
reserved for the supervisor state is recommended.
Wiretapping has not been a major problem. Information
security is a problem of providing sufficient barriers
and controls to force a prospective penetrator into
attacks that carry a high risk of detection and/or have a
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very large work factor.
An outline of this article is given below. The
Computer Security Problem (technical threats, backup
data, types of multi-user systems); Techniques of System
Access Control (password design considerations and
distribution); Computer Characteristics Supporting
Security (multiprogramming hardware, program isolation
methods, privileged mode, I/0 characteristics, virtual
machines); Operating System Functions Related to Security
(common services, output routing, sources of problems);
Problems of File Protection (models for shared
information and hierarchical access control); Techniques
of File Protection (OS/360, encryption); Techniques for
Security Assurance (pseudo-tester, audit trails, program
validation); and Communications Problems (wiretapping,
encryption equipment).
*(0310)*72*ab*md*nm*np**x3
Anderson, Ronald E.; and Fagerlund, Ed. "Privacy and the
Computer: An Annotated Bibliography." COMPUTING REVIEWS,
November 1972, pp. 551-559.
This is a 'selected' annotated bibliography of 102
articles. It is the most complete and up-to-date
bibliography on privacy and computers. The articles are
divided into three sections dealing with general privacy
issues, government information systems, and U.S.
congressional hearings. Only 10 of the 102 articles are
concerned with computer security issues, and they can
easily be found in other references. Eight other privacy
bibliographies are mentioned at the beginning of this
privacy bibliography. For the person primarily
interested in privacy issues, Annette Harrison's two
bibliographies covering the period prior to 1967 and
1967-1969, are excellent complementary references.
*(0320)*71*ac*ai*bb*nj
"Antitrust Suit Charges Rearrangement of Data."
COMPUTERWORLD, 24 March 1971, p. 4.
*(0330)*69*ac*ai*bc*dc*hg*jf*kb*mh
"Anti-War Protestors Erase 1,000 Dow Tapes." COMPUTERWORLD,
3 December 1969, p. 1.
Damage done by war protestors at Dow Chemical's
plant in Midland, Michigan is reported on.
*(0340)*65*ab*cb*cc*dg*ff
Arkin, A. "Computers and the Audit Test." JOURNAL OF
ACCOUNTANCY, October 1965, p. 44.
* (0350) *66*ab*cc*fy
"Are Your EDP Operations Insured?" MANAGEMENT REVIEW, August
1966; or MODERN OFFICE PROCEDURES, May 1966.
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Insurance is available to cover losses to any or all
hardware, and source data. Business interruption and
business continuation coverage is also available.
*(0360)*67*ad*aj*cc*da*mb*nk*nm
Armer, Paul. "Social Implications of the Computer Utility."
P-3642, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California 90406,
August 1967.
This article is mostly concerned with privacy
issues. There is a conflict between the individual's
right to privacy and society's right to know. The author
discusses a group of rules, safeguards, penalties, and
remedies to insure that individuals and organizations
will be able to maintain an appropriate level of privacy.
* (0370) *70*ab*cb*da*ed*gh*kg*mj
Astin, A. W.; and Boruch, R. F. "A 'Link' File System for
Assuring Confidentiality of Research Data in Longitudinal
Studies." AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH JOURNAL, 1970,
pp. 615-624.
*(0380)*71*ab*da*db*hj
Astor, Saul D. "An Investigator Talks of Embezzlement and
Robbery." THE OFFICE, September 1971.
*(0390)*68*aa*cc*dg*ff*kd*mc
AUDITING BANK EDP SYSTEMS. Bank Administration Institute,
1968.
*(0400)*72*ab*cc*ff
"Auditing Computer Systems." MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING,
September 1972, p. 26.
*(0410)*67*ab*cc*ff
"Auditing Fast Response Systems." EDP ANALYZER, June 1967.
*(0420)*65*aa*cc*dg*ff*kd
AUDITING WITH THE COMPUTER. University of California Press,
Berkeley, California, 1965.
*(0430)*70*ab*dc*ge*jg*xl
"Automatic Fire Protection System Protects Continental's EDP
Units." INSURANCE, 1 March 1970, p. 36.
Automatic fire protection systems can be adapted
easily and inexpensively for older buildings.
Continental Airline installed a C02 extinguishing system
which can detect and extinguish a fire within seconds
without risk to personnel or damage to records. The
system is also architecturally concealed.
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*(0440)*67*ae*ag*cb*ed*ee*el*kb*lb*x1
Babcock, J. D. "A Brief Description of Privacy Measures in
the RUSH Time-Sharing System." AFIPS CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS, Spring Joint Computer Conference, Vol. 30,
1967, pp. 301-302.
The RUSH (Remote Users of Shared Hardware) system
includes some 80 modules of processors operating in a
time-sharing mode on an IBM System/360, model 50. Since
IBM was not planning to implement security techniques in
their early OS/360 distributions, the author decided to
build protection software for the RUSH monitor using the
basic facilities of data management processors in OS/360.
Some of the protection devices are: a LOGON statement
that includes master and sub--account identifiers, and a
password; optional password protection for reading and
modifying files; a Remote Job Entry mode that prescans
all control language statements and file calls, and only
allows a user to access his own files; the full OS/360
memory protection features; and no acceptance of assembly
language programs. However, this article is largely
obsolete and presents only simple, very basic protection
schemes.
*(0450)*71*ae*ag*cb*da*db*de*ed*ej*gh*ho*hp*ka*lb*mf*x1
Baca, R. L.; Chambers, M. G.; and Pringle, W. L. "Automated
Court Systems." AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Fall Joint
Computer Conference, Vol. 39, 1971, pp. 309-315.
This article is primarily concerned with describing
the Harris County Subject-in-Process System which is a
completely automated remote-access criminal record
system. A short section at the end of the article
briefly describes privacy and security safeguards of the
system. Some of these are: input routines that check for
unreasonable input data; password protection for files;
requiring that privileged modifications to the data take
place at specific terminals during only certain periods
of the day; and periodically creating backup tapes for
storage at a remote location.
*(0460)*70*ac*ai*cc*mb
"Backround Information Provided on Data Banks."
COMPUTERWORLD, 30 December 1970, p. 10A.
* (0470) *ac*ai*cc*fv*fz*x2
"Backup Contracts Call for More Thought Than Good
Handshake." COMPUTERWORLD, 25 August 1971, p. 4.
Informal arrangements between users to use each
others hardware in emergencies can lead to major
problems. Determining who is liable if the backup system
doesn't perform properly is highly dependent on the
circumstances in each situation. Formal contracts are
suggested as well as periodic checking to insure that
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hardware changes at the computer center or backup site
haven't made the backup site unuseable.
*(0480)*71*ab*bg*hc*hd*hg*ia*ii*jc*je*lb*ne*nk*x2
Bacot, Eugene. "Trapping Data Bank Busters." BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION (Great Britain), January 1971, pp. 16-19.
The article is primarily concerned with data thefts
by electronic and physical access of files. The author
attempts to persuade the reader that current British
computer security is appallingly low. He describes many
risks that the security-lax user will be exposed to.
Approximately fifteen actual theft, fraud, and disaster
examples are given. The article doesn't discuss anything
particularily new or unusual, but it may reduce the
security apathy of some readers. No specific safeguards
are recommended.
* (0490) *61*ad*cb*dc*jg*na
Baker, H. R.; Bolster, R. N.; and Leach, P. B. "Surface
Chemical Methods of Displacing Water and/or Oils, and
Salvaging Flooded Equipment: Part 6 - Field Experience in
Removing Seawater Salt Residues From Aircraft Cockpits
and AVIONICS Equipment." Report 5680, Naval Research
Laboratory, Washington, D. C., 1961.
Some of the information in this report would be of
help in salvaging flooded computer equipment.
*(0500)*67*ab*cd*dc*jg*na
Baker, H. R.; Leach, P. B.; Singleterry, C. R.; and Zisman,
W. A. "Cleaning by Surface Displacement of Water and
Oils." INDUSTRIAL AND ENGINEERING CHEMISTRY, June 1967.
Summarizes methods for removing oily coatings or
water from electronic equipment.
*(0510)*71*ae*cb*el*gh
Baker, P. S. "CCBS 10/50 Monitor Cataloguer." DIGITAL
EQUIPMENT USERS SOCIETY FALL SYMPOSIUM, Digital Equipment
Corporation, Maynard, Massachusetts, November 1971, pp.
5-9.
The cataloguer provides security for its users by
maintaining control over demountable storage media. The
cataloguer monitors: allocation of demountable peripheral
storage devices, device status, and generation and
maintenance of volume labels. Two mount commands are
available to supplement existing control mechanisms and
to relieve the user of having to be aware of device
availability,
*(0520)*73*ab*ah*cb*el*gh
Balzer, R. M. "An Overview of the ISPL Computer System
Design." COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, February 1973.
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*(0530)*71*ab*cb*cc*cd*db*dc*fb*kb*kd*mc*x2
"Banks May Face Trouble with DP Disasters." DATA MANAGEMENT,
May 1971, pp. 46-47.
This article quotes Jerome Lobel, vice president of
Dataguard Systems, as saying, "Exposure of many banks to
EDP disasters is increasing so rapidly that nothing short
of a miracle will save some banks from financial
catastrophe." Lobel believes a large percentage of
exposed cases are kept secret. A systems approach is
recommended where a careful evaluation is made in each of
these areas: computer hardware, software and operations;
physical security; and control of personnel. It is also
recommended that the bank's board of directors be made
aware of computer security problems, that one person be
in full charge of security, that recovery plans be
developed, and that exposed frauds be reported to the
police and not be kept secret.
*(0540)*70*ab*cd*ga*ja*mc
"Banks Spending for Computer Security in the Wild West."
INFORMATION WEEK, 12 October 1970.
West coast banks are upgrading their computer
security programs. Money is mostly being spent on
physical safeguards.
*(0550)*68*ab*ah*cc*dg*fb*ff*fz*fl*hc*hr*hs*kd*ma*nj*nk
*nn*x4
Banzhaf, John F. III. "When Your Computer Needs a Lawyer."
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, August 1968, pp. 543-549.
Liability for negligence, torts (such as slander of
credit), and expressed or implied warranties are
discussed. Their legal complications are explained so
that owners, operators, users, and lessors of computers
may be alerted to potential legal problems. The article
focuses on troublespots in contracting for EDP services,
in deciding whether or not to automate certain
operations, in automating financial records, and in
complying with legal regulations of record keeping.
Patent, copyright, and trade secret protection are
discussed along with the problem of storing copyrighted
material in computer information systems. Although the
law on some EDP matters, particularly patents, has
changed significantly since this article was written,
this article is still extremely relevant and valuable.
The article points out many legal pitfalls and safeguards
that should be known by those responsible for EDP
operations or for developing new systems.
*(0560)*67*ad*aj*cc*da*ka*mb*nl*nm
Baran,, Paul. "The Coming Computer Utility: Laissez-Faire,
Licensing or Regulation?" P-3466, RAND Corporation, Santa
Monica, California 90406, April 1967.
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The computer utility is discussed with respect to
its growth and the environment that will support the
growth. Future applications, economic pressures, and
dangers of the utility are also discussed. The
protection of privacy problem is considered and several
regulatory mechanisms are described. Some future policy
choices are analyzed. The article is somewhat
out-of-date with current technology and policy choices.
*(0570)*65*ad*ag*aj*cb*cc*da*hd*ii*lb*ka*mb*nk*nl*nm*x2
Baran, Paul. "Communications, Computers, and People." AFIPS
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Fall Joint Computer Conference,
Vol. 27, Sect. 2, 1965, pp. 45-49; or P-3235 RAND
Corporation, Santa Monica, California 90406, November
1965,
Full electronic-switching telephone networks of the
future will provide very flexible and cheap
communications. This will make computer information
utilities and their interconnection much more
economically justifiable. Personal privacy might be
greatly threatened because it would be possible to obtain
someone's employment, health, scholastic, legal, tax,
etc. records from a computer terminal connected to the
nearest telephone. The author suggests that security
problems be considered now, before illegal access of
computerized information becomes commonplace. Software
patch-ups at a later date may be more costly and less
effective than an initial good security design. The
author believes that laws will be ineffectual. They have
had little affect on eavesdropping, and government
regulations will needlessly invade the privacy of the
business sector. He proposes an open list of several
safeguards such as cryptography for data transmission and
storage, and auditing of data accesses and file operating
programs.
*(0580)*64*ad*aj*cb*ep*eq*xl
Baran, Paul. "On Distributed Communications: IX. Security,
Secrecy, and Tamper-Free Considerations." RM-3765-PR,
RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California 90406, August
1964, 39 pp.
This report is the ninth of an eleven part series
detailing a proposed digital data communications system
based on a distributed network concept and to be used by
the military. The report, although quite valuable in
1964, is largely out-of-date with current cryptography
techniques. Much of the report discussed detailed
implementation techniques based on now obsolete hardware.
The few still relevant parts of this report can be better
understood by reading more current articles.
*(0590)*68*ad*aj*cc*fu*mj*ne*nm
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Baran, Paul. "On the Engineer's Responsibility in Protecting
Privacy." Report, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica,
California 90406, May 1968.
This report states that computer systems could be
designed to provide better security, but aren't because
most safeguards are expensive. Since there is no
organization enforcing a code of ethics among engineers,
the engineering school curriculums must be modified to
include courses on privacy and social responsibilities.
*(0600)*67*ad*aj*ba*cb*cc*mg*nm
Baran, Paul. "Remarks on the Question of Privacy Raised by
the Automation of Mental Health Records." P-3523, RAND
Corporation, Santa Monica, California 90406, April 1967.
The problem of privacy of medical health records for
both personal and statistical purposes is discussed.
Major changes in the use of medical records over the next
twenty years are predicted, and the resulting privacy
problems are considered. Medical information systems
will become more integrated in the future, and adequate
safeguards must be developed now so unmanageable privacy
problems won't arise. Some examples of illegal access to
medical records are given.
*(0610)*68*ac*cb*cc*cd*mb*ne
Barr, R. "Lack of Computer Security Held a Boon to Big
Brothers." ELECTRONIC NEWS, 13 February 1968, p. 35.
*(0620)*70*ad*cd*dc*jg
Barritt, J. S. "Fire Protection for Computer Rooms."
INSURANCE ACCOUNTING AND STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION, 1970.
*(0630)*67*ae*ag*cb*da*dd*de*ed*fv*gh*hr*lb*x2
Barron, D. W.; Fraser, A. G.; Hartley, D. F.; Landy, B.; and
Needham, R. M. "File Handling at Cambridge University."
AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Spring Joint Computer
Conference, Vol. 30, 1967, pp. 163-167.
The authors describe in detail the file handling
facility of the Cambridge University Titan computer. A
file owner can extend some or all of seven privileges to
one or more specified part owners. Privileges can be
acquired by any non-specified individual who can quote an
alphanumeric key specified by the file owner. A file
user can be acting in one or all of these capacities:
owner, part owner, key holder, and general user. All
files are classified as either archives files, working
files, temporary files, or system files. The eight
million word disk storage is augmented with magnetic tape
because of the limited disk storage, and to hold backup
copies of files (copied every twenty minutes) in case of
file destruction from system failures.
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*(0640)*71*ab*cb*cc*da*db*ed*fs*hd*lb*x2
Bartram, Peter. "Software Security." DATA SYSTEMS, December
1971, pp.16-17.
Privacy and security issues, although related, are
concerned with very different matters. Privacy involves
moral and ethical questions, and security is concerned
with purely technical safeguards. Computer security
threats can be categorized by the techniques of abuse or
by the level of organization required by the criminal to
violate the system (accidental disclosure, unskilled
casual entry, entry by skilled technician, ... , entry by
organizations with massive funds). Five safeguards are
recommended: computer staff given clear idea of
professional standards expected of them, cryptography for
remote transmission, system threat monitoring, password
system for access control, and physical processing
restrictions. The British Computer Society feels that an
individual should have the right to see his files by
paying only a small service fee to cover expenses.
*(0650)*70*ab*cb*cc*db*en*ff*fl*kb*kd*lb*nf*x3
Bates, Robert E. "Auditing the Advanced Computer Systems."
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING, June 1970, pp. 34-37.
In most second generation computing systems,
auditors were not concerned with initial EDP design and
development. However, third generation systems will
require auditor involvement from the initial design
proposals through implementation and system testing. The
responsibilities of the auditor should include: ensuring
that no functional areas have been inadvertently omitted;
reviewing system design (as it progresses) for
completeness; determining that adequate measures are
taken to insure appropriate documentation, debugging, and
quality assurance; insuring documentation is complete and
meets standards; insuring that there are adequate
malfunction handling procedures; and examining the
process of inputing and disseminating data. Several
differences between second and third generation
environments are also discussed.
*(0660)*70*ab*bg*cb*cc*cd*dg*ei*el*fb*fd*ff*fv*fx*fy*ga
*gg*hd*hu*ii*je*kd*lb*nb*nh*x3
Bates, William S. "Security of Computer-Based Information
Systems." DATAMATION, May 1970, pp. 60-65.
The purpose of this article is to acquaint business
managers with information system vulnerabilities, and to
present a framework upon which an organization may build
and develop to suit its specific requirements. An
organization should ask itself: what would be the cost of
replacement of current computerized data, are the assets
accounted for by the EDP system safe from theft and
fraud, are current, safely located backup files kept, do
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contingency plans exist, and what are the short term
effects of files lost without backup? Several examples
of actual computer crimes and disasters are given. The
security framework views safeguards as providing the
following rings of protection: (1)physical, hardware, and
software safeguards; (2)backup files, documentation, and
sites; (3)auditing and safeguard testing; and
(4)insurance. A number of common physical, hardware, and
software safeguards are briefly described. The author
believes that top management involvement with security is
essential.
*(0670)*72*ab*bg*cb*cc*cd*dg*ea*ec*ed*ei*el*eq*gg*hc*hg
*ja*jd*je*jf*jh*lb*nh*nn*x3
Beardsley, C. W. "Is Your Computer Insecure?" IEEE SPECTRUM,
January 1972, pp. 67-7 8 .
This article is a good summary of 10-20 other
security articles. Fourteen examples of computer crimes
and disasters are given. Joe Wasserman's and Willis
Ware's frameworks for viewing computer security threats
are described. A good discussion is given on the myths
of magnetic tape vulnerability to magnets. Even the
largest magnets must usually be placed within five inches
of a magnetic tape to damage it, but small magnets can
destroy tapes. Temperature and humidity are usually
greater threats than magnetism. A discussion on
electromagnetic monitoring claims that monitoring
radiation from a distance greater than three feet is
impractical in most situations. A good summary of
numerous user identification techniques and their
relative advantages is presented. A brief discussion
(taken from Garrison's paper) is given on three different
EDP cryptography techniques and their relative
advantages. Some hardware and procedural techniques for
insuring operating system and production program
integrity are given. Finally, physical security
considerations, threat monitoring, auditing, and
personnel integrity are briefly covered.
*(0680)*67*ac*cb*cc*gg*ka*lb*md*nl*nm
Behrens, Carl. "Computers and Security." SCIENCE NEWS, 3
June 1967, pp. 532-533.
This article summarizes the AFIPS 1967-SJCC
proceedings on computer security. The dangers of a
proposed national databank and security problems peculiar
to time-sharing systems are discussed. Lawmakers and the
general public are becoming concerned with privacy
issues. Federal regulations may be the result.
*(0690)*68*ae*cb*ep*gh*mh
Bellino, J. A.; Purzychi, A. Z.; Costello, L. B.;
Dzierzawski, D. "RFI Suppression and Mil-Std-188B
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Conversion of Model 28 Teletype Apparatus." PROCEEDINGS
OF THE ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY SYMPOSIUM, 1968, p.
16-22.
*(0700)*70*ab*cc*da*fl*kb
Bendel, David. "Trade Secret Protection of Software." GEORGE
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW, July 1970, pp. 909-957.
*(0710)*66*ac*cc*da*hd*mc*md*nm
Bengelsdorf, I. S. "Computers Taking Over Tax Collection:
Your Financial History Recorded on Tape." LOS ANGELES
TIMES, 3 April 1966, Sect. A, p. 1.
The author briefly describes the upcoming
computerization of the IRS. Questions are asked as to
whether similar automation will occur in educational,
military, medical, political, and employment fields. How
will the privacy of personal information be protected?
* (0720) *72*ab*ah*al*cb*ec*ed
Bensoussan, A.; Clingen, C. T.; and Daley, R. C. "The
MULTICS Virtual Memory: Concept and Design."
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, May 1972.
This article will give the reader a clear
understanding of why virtual memory is inherently safer
than conventionally addressed memory.
*(0730)*71*ab*cd*dc*jg*mh*mi
Bentley, R. R. "Uninterruptible Power Supply Protected NASA
Computer During Earthquake." COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION,
May 1971, p. 33.
The computer complex in NASA's Jet Propulsion
Laboratory continued to aid returning Apollo 14
astronauts during one of California's strongest
earthquakes.
*(0740) *70*ae*bc*cc*cd*jg*na
Berg, Philip J. "Data Center Disaster." GUIDE 30
PROCEEDINGS, GUIDE International Corporation, 1 Illinois
Center, 111 East Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60601,
27 May 1970.
Mr. Berg tells how Applied Data Research survived a
plane falling into its computer room.
*(0750)*70*ad*bc*cc*cd*jg*na
Berg, Philip J. "The Plane Facts About Data Accidents."
APPLIED DATA RESEARCH INC., Princeton, New Jersey, May
1970.
How Applied Data Research survived a plane falling
into its computer room is the subject of this article,
*(0760)*71*ac*ai*bc*cc*dc*fv*x2
Berg, Philip J. "User Tells How 'Lucky' Accident Brought
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Awareness." COMPUTERWORLD, 30 June 1971, p. S6.
A burst water pipe taught a Washington data center a
lesson about backup. The following list is proposed as
the minimum requirements in order to minimize physical
damage and expenses in case of a disaster: create backup
files, provide safe storage for these files, test the
backup system periodically, avoid program
interdependancy, purge useless material but make
absolutely sure it is useless, document procedures
comprehensively, and try to make backup arrangements with
a local facility having similar equipment. The author
also states that the entire backup system could be
automated.
*(0770)*72*ad*ca*cc*lb*nn*np*x3
Bergart, Jeffery G. "Computer Security, Access Control, and
Privacy Protection in Computer Systems." Master's Thesis,
Moore School of Electrical Engineering, University of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, August 1972, 87
pp-
This a selected annotated bibliography of some 85
important works in the field of computer security. The
bibliography is organized into the following sections:
Privacy Protection and Access Control (general
discussion, abstract models, working systems, and
hardware protection); Computer Security (general
discussion, cryptography, bibliographies); Business and
Management Overview; and Social and Legal Implications.
A majority of the articles are in the first section.
Most of the articles are academic and research oriented.
The annotations average 200 words in length but vary from
40 words to over 1000. The quality of the annotations
also varies considerably. The author shows how one work
is related to and influenced by other works, and this
adds considerable value to the bibliography. This thesis
should be very useful to computer engineers and systems
designers, but its value to non-technical individuals is
questionable.
*(0780)*72*ad*ca*cc*lb*nn*np*nz*x3
Bergart, Jeffery G.; Denicoff, Marvin; and Hsiao, David K.
"An Annotated and Cross-Referenced Bibliography on
Computer Security and Access Control in Computer
Systems." AD-755 225, National Technical Information
Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151, November 1972, 57
pp., $4.50.
This report is really Jeffery Bergart's master's
thesis entitled "Computer Security, Access Control, and
Privacy Protection in Computer Systems". The only
differences between the report and the thesis are the
title and purchase price. The thesis annotation
summarizes the contents of this publication.
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*(0790)*71*ab*cc*da*dc*fy
Bergman, H.W. "A Vital Records Security Program." BEST'S
REVIEW: Life/Health Insurance Edition, September 1971.
*(0800)*71*ab*cb*cc*cd*fx
Berson, T. A. "Sleuthing Your Data Center." COMPUTER
DECISIONS, June 1971, p. 6.
*(0810)*70*ac*ai*bc*dc*hg*mc*ne
"Best Data Sabotage Plan Wins." COMPUTERWORLD, 14 October
1970.
Two Harvard graduate students, upset by abuses of
credit card companies and impersonal billing systems, are
sponsoring a contest to devise the best method of
destroying computerized information. The October 28
issue reported that the contest was cancelled due to lack
of interest.
*(0820)*67*ab*cc*dc*dd*de*fz*ka*kd*ma*nl*nm*x1
Bigelow, Robert P. "Legal and Security Issues Posed by
Computer Utilities." HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, September
1967, pp. 150-161.
The legal considerations of computerizing or not
computerizing business operations, important
considerations in writing a contract with an information
utility, security of computerized files, likely privacy
threats and regulation if various organizations merge
their customer databanks, antitrust aspects of
competitors using the same information utility, and
future government regulation are all discussed.
Unfortunately, most of this article is now obsolete.
Some utility contract considerations are; who will own
the developed programs; will documentation be supplied;
will firm be protected against copyright infringement
claims when using information supplied but not owned by
the utility; how often can programs be updated; is
program performance guaranteed; is the utility liable for
delayed program development, what hours of the day will
service be available; and is the utility liable if it
loses the firm's records or fails to provide service
because of a disaster.
*(0830)*68*ab*cc*fz*fl*nl
Bigelow, Robert P. Legal Aspects of Proprietary Software."
DATAMATION, October 1968.
A survey of copyrights, patents, contracts,
trademarks, and trade secrets is given. However, a large
part of this article is now out-of-date.
*(0840)*69*ab*cc*dd*de*fz*hf*hi*ka*ma*mb*nj*nl*nm*x2
Bigelow, Robert P. "Some Legal Aspects of Commercial Remote
Access Computer Service." DATAMATION, August 1969.
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This article is largely an updated version of an
earlier 1967 article by Bigelow entitled "Legal and
Security Issues Posed by Computer Utilities" in the
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW. However, this article tends to
take more of a service bureau viewpoint. Its primary
purpose is to review some of the legal problems which may
arise in the establishment and operation of a remote
access service bureau. Some of these problems are:
ownership of developed programs, liability for continuous
availability of service, warranty on database accuracy,
guarantee of no illegal information access by other
users, protection against users getting free computing
time, civil suits by individuals whose private
information was wrongly exposed, and possible future
government regulations. A distinction is also made
between computational and informational service bureaus.
Some parts of this article are now outdated.
*(0850)*65*ad*cb*da*ec*ed*eh*ej*el*gg*gh*hd*lb*mh*nb
*x3
Bingham, Harvey W. "Security Techniques for EDP of
Multi-Level Classified Information." RADC-TR-65-415, Rome
Air Force Development Center, Griffis Air Force Base, New
York; or AD-476 557, National Technical Information
Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151, December 1965, 195
pp-
This is the final report of an eight month study by
Burroughs Corporation for the U.S. Air Force. The report
is essentially a very detailed and highly technical
description of a proposed multiprogramming,
multiprocessing, time-shared computer system designed to
concurrently process multi-level classified information.
The study and report did not consider long distance
communications problems and cryptography. The system was
to be implemented on a Burroughs D825 computer.
Some of the recommended hardware safeguards include:
dual mode processors with privileged instructions; system
interrupt required to enter the control mode; flag bits
for control of memory words; address checks against
access-differentiated memory bounds; parity checks on
intermodule data transfers; I/O processors that verify
connections, check memory addresses against bounds, and
confirm security classification of record headers;
physical keys needed for terminal operation; bulk file
control of physical record integrity; lock control over
write permission; and flag bit setting to permit
supervisor establishment of control programs. Some
recommended software safeguards are: checking of access
requests against user security profiles, verification of
memory bounds and blanking, redundant programming, and
monitoring/logging of job execution and I/O operations.
An analysis is made of the cost of software protection in
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terms of additional instructions and executions, and of
hardware protection in terms of "equivalent flip-flops".
Tables exist for all the hardware and software techniques
considered.
This report is somewhat out-of-date, but is still
worth reading by those concerned with designing secure
computer systems.
*(0860)*69*ab*cc*fc*ff*fg
Binns, James. "Why Man to Man Defense for EDP Audit
Control?" DATA MANAGEMENT, October 1969.
The need for cooperation between the programming and
auditing departments is discussed.
*(0870)*70*ac*ai*cd*dd*gd*jh
"Blackouts Inevitable." COMPUTERWORLD, 2 September 1970, p.
1. .
*(0880)*71*ab*cd*dd*gd*jh
Blumenthal, F. "Do You Love Your Computer? Keep It Warm."
PARADE, 4 April 1971, p. 24.
The need for backup power sources is discussed.
*(0890) *63*ab*cc*ff*kd*la
Boni, Gregory M. "Impact of Electronic Data Processing on
Auditing." THE JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY, September 1963.
This article discusses EDP auditing procedures
before the time-sharing era. Although the article is
out-of-date, parts of it are still valuable.
* (0900) *70*ae*cb*ea*ed*ef*lb
Booth, D. F. "File Security for a Shared File, Remote
Terminal System." CONFERENCE ON COMPUTERS: PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION, Queen's University, Kingston,
Ontario, Canada, May 1970.
*(0910)*70*ac*ai*bb*db*hl*hm*ii*mh
"Bootleg Bribe Buys Computer Time." COMPUTERWORLD, 30
September 1970.
A civilian bribed a government employee with a few
bottles of liquor to obtain a run on a secret Pentagon
computer.
*(0920)*72*ae*ag*cb*db*dd*ei*gh*ht*lb*ng*x3
Borgenson, Barry R. "Dynamic Confirmation of System
Integrity." AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Fall Joint
Computer Conference, Vol. 41., 1972, pp. 89-96.
This paper is concerned with techniques for
detecting computer system malfunctions. It is quite
technical and requires a good understanding of computer
technology to be fully understood. Concurrent
confirmation of a system's integrity means that the
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integrity of the system is being monitored concurrently
with each use. Dynamic confirmation of a system's
integrity identifies parts of the system that must have
continuous integrity, and the integrity of the rest of
the system is then confirmed only periodically.
For a general-purpose, time-sharing system, the
method of checking processors non-concurrently is very
powerful because simple, relatively inexpensive schemes
will suffice to guarantee the security of a user's
environment. The disadvantage of dynamic confirmation is
that some faults that could contaminate a user's
information may not be detected. The dynamic
confirmation concept has its most applicable use in
design of fault-tolerant systems. Fault-tolerant systems
are designed using a "solitary fault" assumption, and a
large part of this paper is devoted to showing this
assumption is viable. The last half of this paper
describes in detail the integrity confirmation features
of the University of California "PRIME" computing system
which has 5 processors and 13 memory blocks.
*(0930)*69*ad*cc*da*ka*mj*nm
Boruch, Robert F. "Eduation Research and the Confidentiality
of Data." ACE Research Reports, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1969.
Privacy issues related to the "ACE" databank which
stores biographical data on college freshmen are
discussed.
*(0940)*71*ab*cb*da*hd*kb*kg*mj
Boruch, Robert F. "Maintaining Confidentiality of Data in
Eduational Research: A Systematic Analysis." AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGIST, May 1971, pp. 413-430.
*(0950)*72*ae*ag*cc*da*de*eh*eq*fh*fj*hd*he*1s*ka*mb*ng
*nl*nm*x3
Boruch, Robert F. "Security of Information Processing:
Implications From Social Research." AFIPS CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS, Fall Joint Computer Conference, Vol. 41,
1972, pp. 425-433.
Many social research programs are characterized by
stringent requirements that identifiable data collected
on the subjects of research be kept confidential. The
increasing number of sensitive and controversial research
efforts have caused social researchers to become
increasingly interested in legal, administrative, and
technical safeguards. This paper discusses in detail
some security problems and safeguards in social research
which are relevant to information processing activities.
The author suggests that a rough continuum of
computerized personal record databanks be considered. At
one end is an "auditing function" where identifiable
records serve as a basis for making evaluative judgments
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about an individual. At the other end is the "research
function" where the records serve as a basis for
appraising a group's condition with respect to some
social theory. Security requirements will vary along
this functional continuum. Some of the safeguards used
by social scientists are: physical separation of
identifiers and statistical data into separate files with
each file having code numbers that are matched to the
other file code numbers through a secret cross-reference
dictionary; introducing random errors into the personal
records without jeopardizing the integrity of the total
data for statistical use; and using remote terminals or
having the respondent punch his responses out on a
special card to reduce the number of personnel who must
handle the input data. The author feels that a national
data registry and development center would be of
significant value in reducing redundancy in collection
and maintenance of data and in providing the researcher
with information on the likelihood of privacy problems.
Some security areas in need of future research are
briefly suggested.
* (0960) *72*ab*cc*da*he*mj
Boruch, Robert F. "Strategies for Eliciting and Merging
Confidential Social Research Data." POLICY SCIENCES,
September 1972, pp. 375-397.
*(0970)*71*ab*cb*cc*cd*dg*eq*ff*fq*fv*hd*hq*hr*lb*x1
Bournazos, Kimon; and French, Norman E. "Information
Management and Privacy in Business." DATA MANAGEMENT,
July 1971, pp. 18-23.
First, a brief discussion is given on safeguards for
natural disasters, fraud, and sabotage. A few examples
are then presented which indicate sophisticated EDP
auditing methods will be able to perform audits far
better than those now performed by manual checks. The
following causes for human error are given: monotonous
work, poor lighting, glaring work surface, improper
seating, crowded working areas, inadequate ventilation,
and poor temperature control. Some examples of company
confidential files are: market research data, company
business plans, pricing intentions, future projects, and
employee personnel records. The last half of this paper
briefly describes some cryptography methods and presents
a specific method for implementation.
*(0980)*65*ab*cc*ff
Boutell, Wayne. "Auditing Through the Computer." JOURNAL OF
ACCOUNTANCY, November 1965, pp. 41-47.
*(0990)*65*aa*cc*dg*ff*kd
Boutell, Wayne. AUDITING WITH THE COMPUTER. The University
PAGE 47
of California Press, Berkeley, California, 1965, 181 pp.
This is one of a small number of books that deal
with the relationship between the CPA and the computer.
*(1000) *66*ab*cc*ff
Boyle, E. T. "What the Computer Means to the Accounting
Profession." JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY, January 1966, pp.
56-67.
*(1010)*72*aa*dg*ha*lb
Bradley, John. THE VULNERABILITY OF THE DIGITAL COMPUTER.
Looseleaf, National Computer Research Institute,
Washington, D. C., 1972, $140.00.
* (1020) *64*ab*cc*fm
Brandon, D. H. "Computer Operations Standards." COMPUTERS
AND AUTOMATION, September 1964, pp. 32-36.
*(1030)*73*ab*cb*dg*ec*ed*ee*ef*ei*el*em*en*fi*ha*hi*hm
*ng*ni*x3
Branstan, Dennis K. "Privacy and Protection in Operating
Systems." COMPUTER: Magazine of the IEEE Computer
Society, January 1973, pp. 9-17.
This article summarizes the discussions presented at
an IEEE workshop on privacy and protection in operating
systems. The workshop was held in Princeton, New Jersey
on June 12-14, 1972. The following topics were discussed
in detail: designing a secure operating system on present
hardware, designing new hardware protection facilities,
weaknesses of current systems' protection features, and
methods of continually monitoring a secure system.
Dennis Tsichritzes discussed the University of Toronto's
Project SUE, a two year effort to implement a secure
operating system on an IBM 360 computer. He also
presented an interesting list of twelve unresolved
questions concerning secure operating system design
criteria. James Anderson and Daniel Edwards studied
several current operating systems and discussed the
following threats: clandestine code changes, residue,
incomplete parameter checking, security bypass
mechanisms, asynchronous input/output, user interrupts,
and "Trojan Horse" attacks. Michael D. Schroeder
discussed the "memoryless subsystems" and "mutually
suspicious cooperating subsystems" protection problems.
C. V. Srinivasan presented his framework for a theory of
protection. The Cambridge University protection
mechanism, the University of California's PRIME Project,
and MIT's MULTICS system hardware protection were also
discussed. A few conclusions reached from other
presentations are briefly stated below. Security
"add-on" packages, password systems, audit trails, output
labeling, and single access controls all offer some
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protection, but could be easily bypassed by clever
programmers. Protected restart capability and dynamic
reconfiguration of hardware after "soft" system failures
are mandatory for good protection. Users should have a
decision on how to protect their information.
Another workshop on social issues, physical
protection, and methods of user verification was held
during December 1972.
*(1040)*71*ab*bb*bc*da*db*dc*ga*gf*ii*jf*jg*x1
Bray, Melvyn. "How Safe Is Your System?" DATA SYSTEMS,
December 1971, pp. 12-15.
This article briefly discusses some computer threats
and appropriate countermeasures. Some considerations in
implementing a fire prevention program are presented.
Several different types of burglar alarms are also
briefly described. Finally, computer bombings, fraud,
and illegal data access by remote terminal are mentioned.
*(1050)*70*ab*cc*da*fl*hc*x2
Breyer, Stephen. "Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs."
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, December 1970, pp. 281-351.
When this article was written Congress was
considering a major expansion of the 1909 copyright act.
Proposals before Congress to lengthen the copyright
protection period and increase its scope in the areas of
computer programs and photocopying are considered in
length. The author concludes that: the current copyright
period is too long; making single xerox copies of
magazine articles or extracts from books should be
legalized; small groups should be able to store
copyrighted material in computers for research purposes;
and computer programs should not receive copyright
protection. Pages 340 to 350 demonstrate that computer
program copyright protection is largely worthless for the
majority of system, application, and general purpose
programs. However, some of the arguements used against
copyright protection may now be invalid.
*(1060)*68*ad*cc*da*fe*fh*fj*fk*hd*nh*nm
Brictson, R. C. "Some Thoughts on the Social Implications of
Computers and Privacy." SP-2953, Systems Development
Corporation, 2500 Colorado Avenue, Santa Monica,
California 90406, 14 March 1968.
This article discusses: the public's fear of
computers, a framework for inquiry into the privacy
problem, responsibilities of business and government for
insuring privacy, examples of computer privacy issues,
and recommendations for improving privacy of computerized
information. The framework considers information from
the following viewpoints: acquisition, access,
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dissemination, retention, revision (updating, rejoinder,
and redress), destruction, and time cycles. A
professional code of ethics is proposed. It is
recommended that databank owners be required to specify
the databank's benefits, potential risks, safeguards,
countermeasures, penalties, and sanctions.
*(1070)*72*ac*ai*cb*cc*cd*dg*nf*ng*nh*ni*nm*x4
Bride, Edward J. "AFIPS System Certification Would Help
Protect Public." COMPUTERWORLD, 5 April 1972, p. 1.
AFIPS has started a program to establish recommended
"system review procedures" for large-scale computing
systems. The first system review manual will deal with
security and privacy issues. It was to be drafted in
late 1972 and tested in early 1973. This manual will
establish checklists for users and designers to follow,
and is likely to be divided into three sections
concerning: ideal concepts, questions to ask, and
mistakes or consequences to avoid. Later manuals will
cover topics such as: operational audits, performance
reviews, acceptance tests, system reliability, and data
collection. Overall system certification is one
long-range goal of this program.
*(1080)*71*ac*ai*cc*cd*dc*fw*jg*x3
Bride, Edward J. "After the Fire, Where Do You Put the New
System?" COMPUTERWORLD, 13 October 1971, p. 1.
The contingency plan for disaster should include a
recovery location that could be used at least
temporarily. Checks should be made to insure that this
recovery location has sufficient electrical power, air
conditioning, working space, physical security, and user
convenience. The fire protection plan should include the
following steps: prevention, detection, shutting down
procedures if sufficient time is available, personnel
evacuation, and fighting the fire. Several specific
"shutting-down" considerations are listed.
*(1090)*70*ac*ai*be*cc*de*ff*hr*kd*me
Bride, Edward J. "Audit Trails Lost in Computerization."
COMPUTERWORLD, 29 April 1970.
Daytona Beach, Flordia computerized its records but
did not allow for sufficient information to be printed
out. Audit trails were not possible, and a complete
audit could not be performed.
*(1100)*71*ac*ai*bb*be*cc*hk*hp*hv*ka*la*me*mf*x2
Bride, Edward J. "Bad Imput Causes Court Errors."
COMPUTERWORLD, 13 October 1971, P. 1.
A Philadelphia computer information system that
automatically sends warnings, warrants, or summons to
persons having received traffic violation tickets has
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been plagued by file updating delays, data input errors,
and data input fraud.
*(1110)*71*ac*ai*ba*fv*jc*mc*x2
Bride, Edward J. "Bank's Tapes Stolen for Ransom."
COMPUTERWORLD, 20 October 1971, p. 4.
$1.8 million in cancelled checks plus two reels of
magnetic tape were stolen in a shipment between two Bank
of America offices. The robbers offered to return the
checks and tapes for ransom but backup tapes foiled thier
plan.
*(1120)*71*ac*ai*dc*dd*de*fw*mc*ne*x2
Bride, Edward J. "Businesses Not Security-Conscious."
COMPUTERWORLD, 12 May 1971, p. 1.
The proceedings of the American Bankers' Association
Automation Conference are briefly summarized. Only 60 of
the 1,500 people present attended a security session, and
only half of these attendees had, or were developing, a
formal disaster recovery plan. The frequencies of
occurrence of various security problems were said to
occur in the following descending order: human errors,
power failures and brownouts, hardware failures, civil
disorders, and fires. "Conversion fiascos" were said to
be the major source of long-range problems.
*(1130)*71*ac*ai*bd*cd*gd*jh*me*x2
Bride, Edward J. "City DPers Seek Power Crisis Funds."
COMPUTERWORLD, 7 April 1971, P. 1.
The New York city government may be forced to spend
millions of dollars to protect its computing equipment
from frequent electrical power reductions and failures.
Adequate power is essential for some operations like the
police departments' SPRINT dispatching system.
*(1140)*73*ac*ai*cc*dg*fc*ff*kd*x1
Bride, Edward J. "Auditor-DPer Cooperation 'Only Way' to
Prevent Fraud." COMPUTERWORLD, 13 June 1973, p. 10.
Reeling from criticism surrounding the recent Equity
funding scandal, auditors called on their colleagues to
participate in computer systems design, and demanded
similar action from their DP counterparts. Paul Ton, a
consultant with Arthur Anderson & Company, believes that
the DP manager should assume the role of the auditor.
This would assure better systems design, and the
increased communication between departments would reduce
distrust. DP technicians should ask auditors what
controls they want implemented to assure qood security.
Thomas Samson, partner with Arthur Young & Com.pany,
claimed that DP managers, not auditors, are responsible
for control procedures. This article gives the
impression that auditors want more involvement from DP
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personnel so that they can avoid having to learn more
about computer systems,
*(1150)*71*ac*ai*bb*bd*db*dd*fi*hv*mk*na*x2
Bride, Edward J. "Critique of Detroit Fiasco: ACM Releases
DP Voting Report." COMPUTERWORLD, 20 October 1971, p. 1.
This article briefly summarizes the contents of a
guide by ACM on avoiding problems likely to occur in
switching to computerized voting systems. The guide is
based on an ACM investigation of the delays and
discrepancies in the 1970 Detroit elections. No
feasibility study was performed before computerizing
Detroit's voting system; equipment ran at about 10% of
capacity; and organized conspiracy could not be ruled
out. The public's apathy on this matter caused ACM to do
the investigation.
*(1160)*70*ac*ai*bc*bd*dc*dd*jf*me
Bride, Edward J. "DP Center Invaded." COMPUTERWORLD, 15 July
1970, p. 1.
The Massachusetts State Welfare Office was invaded
by unhappy welfare recipients who claimed the computer
was responsible for check distribution delays. The
invaders left after a three hour seige of the computer
center. No damage was done.
*(1170)*71*ac*ai*cd*dc*ge*jg*x2
Bride, Edward J. "DP Centers Find New Fire Extinguishing
Agent System." COMPUTERWORLD, 10 March 1971, p. 6.
Halon 1301 is becoming a popular fire extinguishing
agent. Unlike carbon dioxide, Halon 1301 has a low
toxicity so personnel need not be evacuated during a
fire. Either smoke detectors, thermal switches, or
temperature-increase devices can be used to cause release
of the extinguishant.
*(1180)*71*ac*ai*cc*dg*fz*ma*nj*x1
Bride, Edward J. "Few Rules on Software Liability Said to
'Frustrate' Users, Hamper Contracts." COMPUTERWORLD, 26
May 1971, p. 6.
Poor performance of software is making it difficult
to fit the liability of software suppliers into today's
legal system. There are very few specific rules
regarding software liability. It is suggested that
contracts be written so both sides will know their legal
liabilities. A user must expect to pay for the
protection he receives from a contract.
*(1190)*70*ac*ai*cb*cd*da*db*dc*gf
Bride, Edward J. "Firms Offer Card, Key Systems for Data
Security." COMPUTERWORLD, 26 August 1970.
Key reader devices are described which can limit
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access to the computer room or limit control of the
computer to operators possessing a properly coded plastic
key.
*(1200)*72*ac*ai*cb*cc*ng*ni*x2
Bride, Edward J. "FJCC Explores Data Protection."
COMPUTERWORLD, 6 December 1972, p. 1.
Committees, agencies, societies, and corporations
will all be taking advantage of the AFIPS Fall Joint
Computer Conference by presenting reports on the problems
of data security. A working session will discuss a
300-400 item questionnaire for judging a system's
security. Overlapping efforts of other organizations are
viewed as beneficial.
*(1210)*73*ac*ai*cb*dg*ed*fb*gh*ng*x2
Bride, Edward J. "IBM, Security Test Sites Vie on Software
Strength." COMPUTERWORLD, 13 June 1973, p. 1.
This article describes the highlights of three
security sessions at the 1973 National Computer
Conference. Although the first results of IBM's five
year, $40 million security study won't be available until
next spring, some preliminary results were discussed. It
was suggested that the IBM Resource Security System (RSS)
will cost users about two percent in overhead costs. But
an official from one of the four test centers said the
security software degraded response time anywhere from
eight to twenty-five percent. However, IBM has no plans
to make RSS available as a product or free package. RSS
is installed at all of the sites in an operational mode,
rather than in a test or research environment. Two known
"holes" continue to exist in the RSS software, but TRW,
one of the test sites, has managed to plug 108 weak
spots.
Richard Mills of First National City Bank suggested
that the discussion on security was too technically
oriented, and should instead focus on auditing, planning,
monitoring, and physical controls. He asked, "Are we
building steel doors in paper walls?" Dr. Edwin Golding
of the U.S. Treasury Department stated that the weakest
link in a secure system is the employee who can be
compromised. Several other panel members agreed with
Golding's statement. Peter Browne of State Farm Mutual
stated that computer users and manufacturers both have
responsibilities in solving security problems. The user
responsibilities include: security awareness, risk
management, management control, physical security, and
auditing. Several security checklists were also
presented.
*(1220)*72*ac*ai*cc*dg*fy*hf*hg*lb*x3
Bride, Edward J. "Insurance May Be Cheaper Than Security."
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COMPUTERWORLD, 6 September 1972,p. 3.
A group of computer security experts feels that
users of time-shared systems may find it cheaper to
insure their data than to protect it by developing
software safeguards. It's noted that current safeguard
techniques can not insure good protection from a
malicious penetrator. Unintentional disclosure of
information is occurring less frequently. Some members
felt that building new safeguards into systems is the
proper next step, while others felt that correct
implementation of currently available techniques would be
sufficient. It was noted that most users aren't aware of
their security requirements.
*(1230)*71*ac*ai*cc*dg*fy*fz*ma*mb*x2
Bride, Edward J. "Lawyer's Warning: Let Customer Beware in
Computer Contract." COMPUTERWORLD, 13 January 1971, p. 1.
Many service bureaus attempt to have their customers
sign contracts that free the service bureau from
liabilities resulting from: processing errors, incomplete
utility programs, delays in processing, and even
negligence. Most service bureaus can obtain insurance
against lawsuits, but they usually pass the cost onto
customers requiring legal protection. The cost of
insurance protection may be justifiable, especially for
users located in areas where only one bureau is
economically available.
*(1240)*71*ac*ai*ba*da*ha*ii*lb*ma*nj*x2
Bride, Edward J. "Milestone Near in Program Theft Case."
COMPUTERWORLD, 21 July 1971, P. 4.
A former Information Systems Design employee faces
trial for allegedly tapping that firms computer over
telephone lines to steal a plotting program valued at
$15,000 to $25,000. The program was needed to win over
an Information Systems Design customer to the defendant's
new employer,
*(1250)*72*ac*ai*cc*da*fh*fj*hd*ka*mb*nl*nm*no*x3
Bride, Edward J. "NAS Warns of Despair in Privacy Invasion
Fight." COMPUTERWORLD, 25 October 1972, p. 4.
This article reviews a 500 page National Academy of
Sciences report written by Alan Westin and Michael Baker.
The report firmly states the need for databank controls,
but also claims that the privacy problem is not as bad as
most civil libertarians believe. 55 organizations with
highly advanced computer applications were studied. It
was learned that in most cases computerization of
personal files has not yet resulted in significantly
greater privacy intrusion. Most companies still rely on
paper files for sensitive information storage. However,
the computerized files were receiving more extensive use,
PAGE 54
and some files would not have been feasible without use
of the computer. The authors warn that today's worst
danger is the public's attitude that the fight for a
reasonable personal privacy/public need-to-know
relationship has been lost. The report predicts
increased ease of data sharing among organizations, and
recommends several laws and regulations be implemented.
*(1260)*73*ac*ai*cb*cc*cd*dg*mh*x1
Bride, Edward J. "Navy Users Told 100% Security
Unreachable." Computerworld, 16 May 1973, p. 1.
Commander Jan Prokop, director of the ADP Equipment
Selection Office in the Navy Department, told those
attending The Fifth Annual Data Processing Seminar, of a
joint Navy user group, that 100% secure computer systems
will probably never be developed, and users should spend
their money where it will do the most good in particular
situations, such as physical access control and security
clearances for personnel. He also described the
following remote access threats first developed by H. E.
Peterson and R. Turn: browsing, masquerading, trap doors,
between-the-lines entry, and piggy-back entry.
*(1270)*71*ac*ai*bd*cd*dd*gd*jh*x1
Bride, Edward J. "New Brush With Power Mess, DP Users
Without Backup Lucky." COMPUTERWORLD, 25 August 1971, p.
1.
Some computer users have indicated that they have
lost files during prior power brownouts and failures, but
luckily the lost files were not of critical importance.
Significant voltage fluctuations can cause dropped bits
of information, loss of data in core, or even physical
damage to the computer. Two voltage monitors for
computers are commercially available. IBM's 370 series
has a voltage regulator in its hardware which protects
against short fluctuations in voltage. Most computers
have an automatic power-down feature to protect hardware
circuits when line voltage gets too low.
*(1280)*72*ac*ai*cc*he*md*nm
Bride, Edward J. "Panel Warned of SS Number Trend."
COMPUTERWORLD, 30 August 1972, p. 1.
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is
studying the implications of a trend toward the use of
the social security number as a universal identifier.
*(1290)*70*ac*ai*bc*cd*dc*fv*ga*hi*jd*md*x2
Bride, Edward J. "Radar Wipes Out IRS Tapes: Consultant
Cites Poor Ground." COMPUTERWORLD, 30 December 1970, p.
1.
Thousands of tax records were erased by an airport
radar that was located within 200 yards of a new IRS
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computer center. Significant amounts of information were
forever lost because many destroyed files had no backup.
*(1300)*71*ac*ai*bd*cd*dd*gc*gd*jh*x1
Bride, Edward J. "Stoppages Beset Dartmouth T/S."
COMPUTERWORLD, 3 February 1971, P. 1.
The Dartmouth Time Sharing System was inoperative
for two days because no power supply testing device was
available. A spare power supply was incorrectly wired.
Voltage transients were introduced into the system when
this spare power supply was tested. Dozens of integrated
circuits were destroyed.
*(1310)*71*ab*bb*db*fh*if*ka*mc*nm*no*x1
Brooke, Phillip. "Protection of Privacy Vital in any
Improved Bank Computer Program." AMERICAN BANKER, 6 May
1971, p. 1.
This article reviews a National Academy of Science's
project headed by Alan Westin. For a Review of the 500
page final report on this project see "NAS Warns of
Despair in Privacy Invasion Fight," by Edward Bride in
the October 25, 1972 issue of COMPUTERWORLD. Westin
studied 55 different organizations for this project,
including three banks. He claims that banks keep
personal data on marital stability, drinking habits,
expenditures, and sexual preferences. When some New York
banks were recently legally blocked from getting access
to personal arrest records, they engaged in bribing
police officers to get the information. However, banks
were not found to be collecting more personal information
for computerized files than they kept for paper files.
*(1320)*72*ab*cc*ff*ni
Brown, H. L. "Auditing Computer Systems." MANAGEMENT
ACCOUNTING, September 1972, pp. 23-26.
The article contains a questionnaire for determining
the usefulness of computer generated reports.
*(1330) *69*ab*cc*ff
Brown, H. L. "Current Problems of Real-Time Auditing."
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING, May 1969, pp. 53-54.
*(1340)*68*aa*cc*dg*ff*kd
Brown, H. L. EDP FOR AUDITORS. John Wiley and Sons, 1968.
*(1350)*71*aa*cb*cc*cd*eo*fk*fq*fr*fv*np
Brown, William F. (ed.) COMPUTER AND SOFTWARE SECURITY.
Advanced Management Research International Inc., 280 Park
Avenue, New York, New York 10017, 1971, 208 pp., $29.50.
This book essentially contains the proceedings of
AMR's seminar on computer security. Physical security,
implementing a security program, legal matters, backup,
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insurance, auditing, software safeguards, and
cryptographic techniques are all covered in varying
levels of detail. A bibliography is also included.
*(1360)*72*ab*cb*cc*cd*dg*fy*gg*nb*nf*x3
Browne, Peter S. "Blueprint for Computer Security Drawn by
State Farm Specialist." THE NATIONAL UNDERWRITER:
Property and Casualty Insurance Edition, 16 June 1972,
pp. 47-49.
A six step methodology for implementing a computer
security program is given. The six steps are: (1)
determine the configuration of hardware and software,
list and flowchart the major processing tasks, and list
the current operation and control procedures; (2)
determine the value of equipment, media, and
documentation; (3) perform a "threat analysis" by trying
to find all possible risks to your installation; also
determine for each major file the cost to your company if
that file was destroyed, disclosed, or modified; (4) set
specific requirements for the protection of data,
programs, and other assets, and for the timeliness of
each major task; (5) estimate the cost of reducing the
current level of vulnerability; and (6) select a set of
economical and effective safeguards.
Any company, no matter how small, should have at
least one person responsible for data processing
security. Top management support is also necessary. It
would be wise for a company's security personnel to visit
other EDP installations before attempting to design their
own program. Five protection strategies are given. They
are: isolation (passwords, guards), encryption,
deterrence (auditing, system monitoring), insurance, and
delegation (using a service bureau). Use of insurance is
best where adequate protection is very expensive and the
threat probability is very low.
*(1370)*72*af*cb*cc*lb*np*nn*x4
Browne, Peter S. "Computer Security - A Survey." DATABASE:
Quarterly Newsletter of ACM's Special Interest Group on
Business Data Processing (SIGBDP), Vol. 4, No. 3, Fall
1972, pp. 1-12.
This article contains an excellent 4 page
introduction on various aspects of computer security.
The introduction discusses where the current
state-of-the-art lies; what is most commonly being done
in practice; and what needs to be done in the near
future. The following security topics are also briefly
mentioned: definitions of security, privacy, and
integrity; batch versus time-sharing environment; user
identification and authorization; the security 'objects'
(people, data, etc.) of a system; system monitoring;
cryptology; designing security into the computer versus
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implementing security controls outside the computer; need
for classification of threats; recovery plans; security
checklists; existing systems; and future areas of
research.
A partially annotated bibliography of 228 articles
follows the introduction. The articles in this
bibliography cover almost every aspect of computer
security. Some are highly technical while others are
very basic and non-technical. A large number of these
articles are from symposiums, workshops, and conferences
of the ACM. Many other articles are from nebulous
publications that wouldn't normally be found without a
good deal of searching. Several valuable books are also
included. As of January 1973, this was probably the best
and most comprehensive computer security bibliography.
Unfortunately, only part of the bibliography is
annotated, and most annotations are quite brief. The
author often did not supply enough publication
information to enable the reader to easily obtain a
desired article.
*(1380)*71*ae*cc*da*db*gg*nm*nn
Browne, Peter S. "Data Privacy and Integrity: An Overview."
ACM Special Interest Group on File Description and
Translation (SIGFIDET) Workshop, 11 November 1971.
This article is the predecessor to "Computer
Security - A Survey" by Browne.
*(1390)*71*ae*cb*ee
Browne, Peter S.; and Steinauer, Dennis. "A Model for Access
Control." ACM Special Interest Group on File Description
and Translation (SIGFIDET) Workshop, 11 November 1971,
pp. 241-262.
The file authorization problem is discussed, and a
conceptual model based on the work of Weissman is
developed. The authors believe that Friedman's
compartmentalization scheme for grouping data with
similar access restrictions, Graham's hierarchical
classification scheme using concentric rings, and
Lampson's domain mechanisms for grouping capabilities of
objects are not satisfactory solutions to the access
control problem.
*(1400) *65*ab*cb*cc*gg
Buckley, John L. "Computers, Automation, and Security." LAW
AND ORDER, March 1965.
*(1410)*65*ab*cb*cc*dg*mf
Buckley, John L. "The Future of Computers in Security and
Law Enforcement - Part 1." LAW AND ORDER, August 1965,
pp. 36-38.
The advantages and disadvantages of using computers
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as security devices or in law enforcement are discussed.
Future applications and the security problems which
result from using computers are examined.
*(1420)*65*ab*cb*cc*dg*mf
Buckley, John L. "The Future of Computers in Security and
Law Enforcement - Part 2." LAW AND ORDER, September 1965,
P. 48.
The advantages and disadvantages of using computers
as security devices or in law enforcement are discussed.
Future applications and the security problems which
result from using computers are examined.
*(1430)*00*ae*cd*dc*jg
"Burning Facts." SAFE MANUFACTURERS NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
366 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10017.
This is a brochure defining the specifications of
safes used to protect various non-paper computer I/O
media.
* (1440) *71*ac*ai*cc*cd*gg
"Burns Takes Security Seriously." COMPUTERWORLD, 13 January
1971, P. 14.
*(1450)*70*ab*cc*cd
Burt, K. H. "Computer Center Security, Protecting the
Achilles Heel." BANK ADMINISTRATION, April 1970, pp.
36-39.
* (1460) *69*ad*ca*ea
Busch, G. E. "Applications of Electro-Optical Fingerprint
Correlators." PROCEEDINGS OF CARNAHAN CONFERENCE ON
ELECTRONIC CRIME COUNTERMEASURES, University of Kentucky,
Lexington, Kentucky, 1969, pp. 90-97.
*(1470) *70*ad*cb*da*el*he*mh
Bushkin, A. A. "A Technical Context for Multi-Level Security
in a Multiplexed Computer System." SEMINAR ON PRIVACY:
LEGAL AND TECHNICAL PROTECTION IN THE COMPUTER AGE,
October 1970, 12 pp.
Basic requirements for a secure system are
described. Some of these requirements are: program
readable hardware configuration status switches; known
responses for all possible operation codes; and
need-to-know lists for each file. The problem of
constructing top secret information from reading only
secret information is then examined. Finally, ten design
guidelines for a monitoring system are proposed.
*(1480)*73*af*cc*np*x2
BUSINESS PERIODICALS INDEX. The H. W. Wilson Company, New
York, New York, 1958-, (Monthly, with annual cumulations
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every June).
This is a cumulative subject index to English
language periodicals in the fields of accounting,
advertising, public relations, automation, banking,
communications, economics, finance, insurance, labor,
management, marketing, taxation, and trades. The desired
articles can be found under the subject index "Computers
- Security Measures". Each annual cumulation contains
about 2,000 entries on computers and electronic data
processing, and about 25 on computer security measures.
Most of the security entries are concerned with
management controls and operating procedures. These
entries are typically from sources such as THE OFFICE,
BUSINESS HORIZONS, BANKING, DATA MANAGEMENT, DATAMATION,
BUSINESS WEEK, FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE, HARVARD BUSINESS
REVIEW, and ELECTRONIC NEWS.
*(1490)*69*ac*cc*da*hd*ii*x2
"Business Spies Still Busy." INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT, June
1969, pp. 58-59.
The major focus of business espionage has shifted
from trade secrets to mergers and acquisitions. Drug,
chemical, and financial companies are particularly
vulnerable. Estimated U.S. espionage losses are 2 to 5
billion dollars annually. Some of the types of
information business spies attempt to obtain are: who
owns the target-company stock, where do they live, what
has been the stock's trading pattern, past business
deals, personal grudges among management, management
weaknesses, and the company's countermeasure plans to
prevent takeover. The weakest part of most company
security systems are the employees. One company found
that more than 10% of its engineering job applicants had
falsified their educational credentials. Any data stored
on a remote-access, time-shared computer can be illegally
accessed by most skilled business spies. Microphones and
transmitters about the size of a pin head can now be
easily obtained.
* (1500) *71 *ac*ai*cc*de*ne
"Businesses Not Security Conscious." COMPUTERWORLD, 12 May
1971, p. 1.
*(1510)*73*ae*cb*dd*ec*ed*ei*ht
Buzen, J. P.; Chen, Peter P.; and Goldberg, Robert P.
"Virtual Machine Techniques for Improving System
Reliability." PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM WORKSHOP ON VIRTUAL
COMPUTER SYSTEMS, 26 March 1973.
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*(1520)*70*ac*ai*bb*db*hp*kb*kd*mc
"Calculated Computer Errors Manipulate Three Banks'
Security; $1 Million lost." COMPUTERWORLD, 25 March 1970,
p. 1.
$1 million was embezzled from two New York banks by
four men. A bank employee arranged to make check
deposits appear as cash deposits. These fake cash
deposits were used to cover checks quickly drawn from one
bank and deposited in the other bank.
* (1530) *71*ab*bc*cd*dc*ga*jg
"California Earthquake." COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION, May 1971,
p. 33.
*(1540)*71*ac*ba*da*hc*ii*lb*ma*x1
"Californian Charged With Data Snatching From Rival
Computer." WALL STREET JOURNAL, 4 March 1971, p. 13.
A former Information System Design employee was
caught tapping that firm's computer over telephone lines
to steal a plotting program valued at $15,000 to $25,000.
The program was needed to win over an Information Systems
Design customer to the defendant's new employer.
*(1550)*71*ab*bb*cb*cc*cd*dg*ha*ne*x1
"Can Your Computer Keep a Secret?" INDUSTRY WEEK, 1 February
1971, pp. 46-48.
This article attempts to briefly point out many
different types of threats to computers and computerized
data. It tries to convince the reader that more than
superficial security measures are necessary for adequate
protection. The article is filled with brief comments by
Harvey S. Gellman and Dennis Van Tassel, two computer
security experts. Several actual cases of fraud are also
briefly described. The paper is directed to those who
are unaware of the importance of computer security.
Nothing new or unusual is presented.
* (1560)*70*ac*ai*da*mb*nm
"Canada Builds Debtor Data Bank." COMPUTERWORLD, 30 December
1970, p. 1.
*(1570)*68*ab*cd*da*dc*gf
Cantor, Lon. "Electronic Intrusion Alarms." ELECTRONICS
WORLD, September 1968, pp. 44-46.
*(1580)*70*ac*bc*bd*be*cc*dc*dd*de*fz*hr*ht*hu*hv*kb*ke
*kf*mi*nj*nk*x2
Carley, William M. "On the Defense: Computer Companies are
Hauled into Court by Flurry of Lawsuits." WALL STREET
JOURNAL, 30 November 1970, p. 1.
Several recent, interesting examples are given of
computer manufacturers and software developers being sued
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for delivering systems to customers that wouldn't work or
worked incorrectly. In three of these examples, the
customer's business was thrown into chaos. In two other
examples, compensation was also being requested for poor
maintenance service and delayed delivery. In one case,
TWA is suing Burroughs for $70 million for providing an
unreliable, incomplete, and defective passenger
reservations system. The suit alleges that Burroughs
misrepresented itself as a pioneer with extensive
experience in developing such systems. Burroughs claims
that the system meets all of TWA's contract requirements.
Computer companies have been successfully sued in about
half of the cases brought into court. However, computer
companies like to settle out of court if at all possible,
and they almost always try to avoid publicity.
*(1590)*71*ab*cd*ga*gf*mc*xl
Carlson, Paul. "A Bank Protects Its 'Memory'." BANKING,
April 1971, pp. 38-39.
Elaborate physical safeguards taken by the Bank of
California to protect its new computer service center are
described. Some of these safeguards are: TV screening of
the parking lot, all building entrances, and sensitive
EDP areas; electronically controlled doors, many being
bulletproof and having a mantrap design; guard control of
all sensitive areas; maximum security vaults; and very
sensitive fire detection systems. The same building is
also used to handle currency.
*(1600)*69*ab*bb*cc*db*el*en*ff*fg*fn*hj*hk*hl*hm*hn*if
*kb*la*x3
Carmichael, D. R. "Fraud in EDP Systems." THE INTERNAL
AUDITOR, May 1969, pp. 28-38.
This article was written to make internal auditors
aware of the possibilities of fraud in EDP systems. It
demonstrates that access to valuable assets is not
necessary to commit fraud. The three basic methods of
EDP fraud are: console intervention, irregular program
and master file maintenance, and manipulation of input
data. These three methods are discussed in detail, and
three actual plus six hypothetical examples are given.
The actual examples are discussed in depth. Manipulation
of input data requires the least specialized knowledge,
is the easiest to accomplish, and occurs more frequently
than the other methods of EDP fraud. Possible fraud
techniques that could be performed by a computer
operator, a programmer, a system supervisor, and other
personnel are considered. The following safeguards were
proposed to prevent those techniques: a computer or
manual log of all console operations - reviewed by an
independent party; standard operating procedures for
every type of processing interrupt; an initial count and
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later recounts of the number of input documents; standard
authorizing procedures for program modifications;
separation of operating, systems, and program personnel;
a special independent control group to verify output on a
sample basis; and sequential prenumbering of all
documents.
*(1610)*70*ac*ai*mf*ng
Carney, P. L. "Police Say Mafia's DP Use Impedes Crime
Prevention." COMPUTERWORLD, 2 December 1970, p. 1.
Police officials discuss the probability of
organized crime utilizing computers through front
organizations and service bureaus.
*(1620)*70*ac*ai*bb*da*db*kq*mf*x2
Carney, P. L. "'Suspected Campanies' on Crime Commission
Lists." COMPUTERWORLD, 30 December 1970, p. 1.
A survey of seventy-two known Mafia connected
businesses in the Chicago area indicates that none are in
the computer manufacturing or service industry. In fact,
none of these companies owned a computer, but ten percent
used service bureaus. It is alleged that the Mafia owns
two CDC computers in New Jersey. The Mafia could make
good use of a computer system. Information transmission
could be made more secure, and business records could be
manipulated more easily as well as stored more securely.
*(1630)*70*ac*ai*cc*dc*fp
Carr, Peter F. "Datafile Reconstruction Insurance Left to
Unaware." COMPUTERWORLD, 19 August 1970.
*(1640)*70*ac*ai*cd*da*db*dc*gf
Carr, Peter F. "Limiting Access to Centers Called a Major
Problem." Computerworld, 24 June 1970, p. 1.
*(1650)*70*ac*ai*cc*dc*fv*ne
Carr, Peter F. "Most DP Centers Lax in Arranging Backup
Facilities." COMPUTERWORLD, 15 July 1970, p. 4.
Robert Jacobson is quoted on techniques for planning
a computer backup program.
*(1660)*69*ab*da*je
Carroll, John M. "Bugging the Big Brains," EXECUTIVE,
December 1969, p. 46.
*(1670)*71*ab*ba*bb*cb*cc*cd*da*db*dc*ea*el*fq*fv*ga*gg
*hd*hj*je*jf*lb*xl
Carroll, John M. "How Safe is Your Computer?" BUSINESS
QUARTERLY, Autumn 1971, pp. 86-89.
Computer hazards are classified as: physical
attacks, electronic subversion, remote penetration, and
electronic surveillance, The following common safeguards
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are recommended: locate the computer room on an upper
(not top) floor without exterior walls; the tape library
should be in a separate room with a librarian always
present; keep a log of all personnel in the computer
room; keep three generations of backup of valuable tapes;
separate and rotate personnel duties; write programs in
high-level languages and copiously document; validate
program integrity; use one-time passwords or a call-back
system for remote access terminals; monitor all
significant events; and encipher sensitive transmitted
data. Security safeguards are expensive not only in
monetary terms, but also in terms of storage space,
processing time, personnel inconvenience, and morale.
This paper was directed at managers generally unfamiliar
with security issues. Nothing really new is presented.
*(1680)*70*ab*ae*cb*cc*da*eb*ee*eh*er*ha*hd*hf*ng*nm*x3
Carroll, John M. "Privacy and the Computer." DATA SYSTEMS
NEWS, August/September 1970, p. 10; or PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONFERENCE ON INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH IN COMPUTER
SCIENCE, University of Manitoba, 8 June 1970, pp. 27-74.
This paper presents a unique mathematical attempt to
quantify certain aspects of privacy. The data for the
mathematical model was obtained from forty-six
questionnaires sent to federal and local governments,
insurance and finance companies, etc.. Six modes of
privacy invasion (direct intrusion, indirect intrusion,
violation of confidence, exchange of information given
willingly, inadvertent disclosure, and small-sample
disclosure) and nine types of file modification (create K
new files, destroy K existing files, add or delete
questions to K files, split or merge K files, copy K
files, exchange contents of K file pairs, restricted
disclosure of selected portions of records) were studied.
Some of the results are: elimination of some personal
data files is the best way to enhance individual privacy;
splitting up existing databanks into numerous low-density
files will decrease privacy unless each of these
low-density files is subject to regulation every bit as
stringent as that imposed upon the original databank;
deletion of information from files will contribute
significantly to individual privacy; differential file
access policies are not particularly effective; the most
serious threat is proliferation of personal files
followed by exchanging personal data among files,
extracting data to augment other files, and increasing
the amount of information stored. The reader should be
warned that Carroll's privacy model has these debatable
assumptions: there is a single probability of disclosure
assigned to each file, and high-density files are
potentially better regulated.
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*(1690)*72*ae*ag*cb*cc*da*ea*ed*eh*hd*he*ka*mb*mc*md*mf
*mg*mj*ng*nm*no*x4
Carroll, John M. "Snapshot 1971 - How Canada Organizes
Information About People." AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS,
Fall Joint Computer Conference, Vol. 41, 1972,
pp.445-452.
This paper summarizes the results obtained by a
Canadian Task Force on the magnitude and composition of
personal data in public and private sectors, and the
means by which such data are gathered, processed, stored,
and disseminated. Over 2,500 questionnaires were mailed
with the response rate being greater than fifty percent.
The returned information was analyzed from each of these
viewpoints: characteristics of the response base;
characteristics of files; collection of data; custody,
dissemination, and exchange of information; extent of
computerization; characteristics of machines; utilization
of computers; assessment of computerization; and rights
of subjects. The organizations were classified as
nurturing (concerned primarily with well-being of
individual), business (dealing with the individual on a
give and take basis), and authoritarian (interested
primarily in insuring the individual conforms to
society's norms). Some of the study's conclusions are:
utilization of computers for handling personel records is
relatively low both in the number of records computerized
and the amount of information in each record; economics,
rather than technical feasibility or data availability,
has limited wholesale creation of databanks; most
respondents had adequate safeguards for their centralized
batch operations; a large amount of information
exchanging is occurring; and international information
exchanging is significant.
The Privacy and Computer Task Force Report is
available for $2.50 from Communications Canada,
Information Services, 100 Matcalfe Street, Ottawa,
Ontario. For a comparable study of U.S. organizations
read a book by Alan F. Westin and Michael A. Baker
entitled DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY.
*(1700)*71*ae*ag*ca*da*eb*ee*nb*ng*x2
Carroll, John M.; McHardy, Larine; Martin, Robert; and
Moravec, Hans. "Multi-Dimensional Security Program For a
Generalized Information Retrieval System." AFIPS
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Fall Joint Computer Conference,
Vol. 39, 1971, pp. 571-577.
This paper gives a very detailed description of a
generalized information retrieval system - "GIRS". The
system was written in FORTRAN and implemented on a PDP-10
computer. A multilevel protection scheme uses one or
more passwords that determine: which of ten available
processing functions can be used, which records can a
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user access, and which portions of records (items) can be
accessed. By experimenting with this generalized
information retrieval system, it is hoped that optimal
trade offs between security and economy can be determined
for a broad range of retrieval applications.
*(1710)*ab*ba*cb*cc*da*db*ea*ed*ej*el*eq*gh*hd*ia*ii
*je*kb*lb*ma*ne*nk*no*x3
Carroll, John M.; and McLellan, P. M. "The Data Security
Environment of Canadian Resource-Sharing Systems." INFOR:
Canadian Journal of Operational Research and Information
Processing, March 1971, pp. 58-67.
Peterson's and Turn's list of information
confidentiality threats in a time-sharing system is
briefly described. Then several specific examples are
given on how to illegally penetrate a PDP-10/50 system.
The following countermeasures were presented: access
control, processing restrictions, privacy
transformations, monitoring procedures, and integrity
management. Each of these countermeasures was further
broken into 5 to 14 subcomponents, and each subcomponent
was very briefly explained. An investigation of the
effectiveness of these countermeasures against threats to
the PDP-10/50 revealed: theft of hard copy printouts and
card disks is the most severe threat, and the
confidentiality of passwords is tenuous. A survey of 5
time-sharing computer manufacturers, and a survey of 16
Canadian time-sharing users revealed the following facts:
all manufacturers were concerned about security; most
manufacturers felt that present hardware and software
techniques were inadequate and were conducting research;
the password was the most common access control device;
two manufacturers offered password protection at the file
level; communication links are viewed by manufacturers as
a major weakness; there appears to be no customer demand
for cryptography; 7 of the 16 computer users did not use
password access control protection; 5 of these used only
an account number and the other 2 used name - account
number - project number access control; none of the 16
users used one-time passwords, cryptography, or file
level passwords; and in 9 of 16 user systems the
operating staff and other users have the ability to read
a user's files at will. These 16 users represented about
75 percent, by volume, of Canada's time-sharing services.
Clearly, security precautions are lax among Canadian
time-sharing computer users.
*(1720)*70*ae*ag*cb*da*ea*ec*ed*eq*hd*lb*ng*x3
Carroll, John M.; and McLelland, P. M. "Fast 'Infinite-Key'
Privacy Transformation for Resource-Sharing Systems."
AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Fall Joint Computer
Conference, Vol. 37, 1970, pp. 223-230.
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The first three pages of this paper are a summary of
another article by the same authors entitled, "The Data
Security Environment of Canadian Resource-Sharing
Systems". The remaining five pages discuss in detail the
authors' unique method of generating an infinite-key
cryptographic transformation. The authors chose the
infinite-key method over the short-key method because the
former offers greater security and requires less storage.
(For a discussion on the trade-offs between infinite-key
and short-key methods read "Privacy and Security in Data
Banks" by W. A. Garrison.) The authors used the additive
congruential random number generation method and two
generators to generate the infinite-key. They
implemented this on a PDP-10/50 system and compared the
results with those of a mixed multiplication congruential
method proposed by IBM. Their method was significantly
superior to the IBM method. Another unique advantage of
Carroll's and McLelland's method is that the user can
easily specify, within a wide range, different levels of
encoding security. The less secure levels will use less
processing time for encoding/decoding and therefore will
be less expensive to use. The exact infinite-key used
depends on the user performing a pre-specified mental
transformation (known only to him and the computer) on a
word given to him by the system when he "logs on". The
speed of the new cryptographic transformation method is
sufficient to keep up with normal data transfers between
most processors and peripheral devices. The method can
be implemented on almost any computer for a hardware cost
of approximately $10,000.
* (1730) *73*ad*cc*cd*dc*gg*nf
"Catastrophe Prevention Management of the Computer Complex."
American Management Association, Management Systems and
Science Division, 135 West 50th Street, New York, New
York 10020, (Seminar).
AMA has no plans to publish the proceedings of this
seminar. It has been given several times in 1971 and
1972. Write to the above AMA address for more
information.
*(1740) *72*ab*cc*fb
Chapin, N. "Successful Planning Techniques for Data
Processing Managers." DATA MANAGEMENT, September 1972,
pp. 35-38.
*(1750)*70*ab*cc*db*de*hk*hp
Charlton, W. L. "The Interaction of Clerical and Punching
Processes in Data Input." THE COMPUTER BULLETIN, October
1970, pp. 345-346.
*(1760)*66*ad*cc*da*hd*ka*mb*md*nm
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Chartrand, R. L. "Information Concerning the Proposed
Federal Data Center." TK 6565C, SP 112, The Library of
Congress Legislative Reference Service, Washington, D.C.,
10 August 1966.
This report reviews the recommendations for
establishment of a federal data center given by the
Ruggles report and the Dunn critique of the Ruggles
report. A list of safeguards against accidental
disclosure is also given.
*(1770)*68*ae*cb*cc*dg*ni
"Checklist for Evaluation of Data Processing Systems." NCUMA
CONVENTION, Phoenix, Arizona, 1968.
*(1780)*72*ab*cd*dc*ge*x2
Cholin, Roger R. "Halon 1301 and Computer Fires." DATA
MANAGEMENT: Conference Issue, Vol. 10, September 1972,
pp. 75-77.
Halon 1301 is a gaseous fire extinguisher agent that
is ideal for use in computer rooms. It doesn't have the
toxicity of carbon dioxide extinguishants nor is it
harmful to electronic equipment as are water
extinguishants. This paper describes a series of tests
by Underwriters Laboratories which prove that the
decompostition of Halon 1301 into HF and HBr at 900
degrees fahrenheit will not harm operating computers.
Several other extinguishing characteristics of Halon 1301
are given.
*(1790)*71*ab*bg*cb*cc*cd*dg*fp*fv*fy*fl*ge*gf*gg*gh*hd
*je*jf*jg*nb*nn*x2
Chu, Albert L. C. "Computer Security: The Corporate Achilles
Heel." BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, 1 February 1971, pp.
32-38.
This article presents a broad and brief overview on
most aspects of computer and data security. It is
essentially a summary of approximately fifteen to thirty
other security articles. No topics are covered in depth.
Fifteen examples of actual computer crimes and disasters
are briefly described. Computer and data security is
said to involve an interface of physical security,
personnel security, procedural security, audit controls,
and insurance. Two completely automatic tape storage and
delivery systems are described. Short discussions are
given on: computer room architecture, physical access
control, fire extinguishants, backup files, embezzlement,
trade secrets, wiretapping of remote access terminals,
security responsibility, and security cost. This would
be a good introductory article for those completely
unfamiliar with the problems of computer and data
security. COMPUTER SECURITY MANAGEMENT by Dennis Van
Tassel is a good introductory book on this subject.
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*(1800)*71*ab*da*md*nm
Chu, Albert L. C. "The Need to Know - The Right to Privacy."
BUSINESS AUTOMATION, June 1971, pp. 31-35.
This article gives a broad review of the conflict
between society's need for fast access to accurate
information and the individual's right to maintain a
sufficient amount of personal privacy.
*(1810)*73*ac*ai*cc*da*lb*mb*mf*nl*nm*x1
"Citizens' Committee Formed to Oversee Crime Net Privacy."
COMPUTERWORLD, 3 January 1973, p. 1.
The Massachusetts Privacy and Security Council, made
up of lawyers and interested citizens, is one of the
first, if not the first, citizens' review-type panel to
oversee privacy considerations in police information
systems. One of their first tasks is to determine
whether Massachusetts will tie into the FBI's criminal
history system.
*(1820)*60*ab*cc*da*db*dd*ff*kd*la
Clive de Paul, C. "Problems of Auditing Data: The External
Auditor and Computers." THE COMPUTER JOURNAL, 1960.
* (1830) *72*ab*cd*dc*ge*jg*mc
"C02 Fire Extinguisher System Protects Computer Center."
MAGAZINE OF BANK ADMINISTRATION, October 1972, p. 90.
This is an example of one bank's approach to
protecting its computer installation from fire.
*(1840)*72*af*ak*ca*da*eq
Cocke J.; and Raviv, J. "Data Compaction and Security
System." IBM TECHNICAL DISCLOSURE BULLETIN, Vol. 14, No.
8, January 1972, pp. 2427-2430.
The article describes a varible state coding system
that can simultaneously serve the needs of data
compaction and data security. The system makes a
character-by-character random selection of encoding
tables for compacting and encoding input data.
*(1850)*71*ae*cb*cc
Codd, E. F.; and Dean, A. L. (eds.) "Data Description and
Control." ACM Special Interest Group on File Description
and Translation (SIGFET) Workshop, 11 November 1971,
*(1860)*72*ab*cb*da*db*ea*lb
Coiner, L. M. "Controlled Access System Uses Mag Cards to
Restrict Entry for Tighter Security." ADMINISTRATIVE
MANAGEMENT, December 1972, p. 14.
*(1870)*70*ab*cc*dd*fi*fo
Collins, D. B. "Documentation and Debugging." DATA
MANAGEMENT, September 1970, pp. 107-115.
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* (1880) *71*ab*cb*da*ed*ef*eh*lb
Collmeyer, A. J. "Data Base Management in a Multi-Accessed
Environment." COMPUTER, Magazine of the IEEE Computer
Society, November 1971, pp. 36-46.
A Data Base Management System is defined as a
network of logical subsystems where each of the
subsystems performs a special function consistent with
its role in the network. The problems of shared files
are discussed, and three approaches to file sharing are
developed. The difference between these approaches are
emphasized so as to make comparison between them easier.
Because the security problem is of critical importance in
a multi-accessed environment, a brief discussion of file
integrity and file security is included.
*(1890)*69*ae*ag*cb*cc*da*de*eh*fd*fh*fs*fu*hd*ih*ka*mb
*md*nc*nf*nm*x3
Comber, Edward V. "Management of Confidential Information."
AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Fall Joint Computer
Conference, Vol. 35, 1969, pp. 135-143.
This article is primarily concerned with protecting
the privacy of information stored in large databanks.
Only procedural safeguards are considered in depth. The
following key factors are considered which could serve as
a foundation for a basic privacy control system: criteria
for deciding what constitutes an unwarrented invasion of
privacy; the difference between private and confidential
information; areas sensitive to intrusion; intercompany
data integration; data verification; data classification;
potential threats to privacy; and system design
considerations and procedural safeguards for minimizing
privacy violations. The author drew the following
conclusions from analyzing the above key factors: the
integrity and security of any personal information system
will ultimately depend on human factors; personnel
standards, a strong policy, and discipline are necessary;
the individual must have the right to inspect and correct
his file; a realistic data purge policy is required;
training and policy education of all system users is
needed; and a databank licensing scheme needs further
consideration.
*(1900)*68*ab*cc*df*dg*fy*fz*kb*ma*x1
"Companies With Outside EDP Services Warned of Particular
Risks." MANAGEMENT SERVICES, November 1968, pp. 12-13.
The following four types of risks are common enough
to warrant insurance protection if they are not
adequately covered in the service bureau contract: loss
of cards, tapes,and valuable records; fraud loss
resulting from collusion between company and service
bureau personnel; errors and omissions; and business
interruption losses resulting from delayed data
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processing.
*(1910)*65*ad*al*cb*ed*gh*lb*xl
"The Compatible Time-Sharing System: A Programmer's Guide."
P. A. Crisman (ed.), MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
1965.
MIT's Compatible Time-Sharing System is described.
It has a file system organized as a tree structure and
provides for sharing of files through links between
branches of the tree. The access modes are read, write,
protected, or any combination thereof. These modes may
be assigned at the time the link is established, on a
user-by-user basis.
*(1920)*69*ae*cc*cd*da*db*dc*fs*ga*mh
Compton, Laurence B. "The Air Forces' Internal Control
Program for Personnel and Physical Facilities." American
Management Association Conference on Security and
Catastrophe Prevention Management of the Computer
Complex, November 1969.
*(1930)*71*ab*bc*cc*cd*dc*gf*jf*x1
"The Computer: A Target." DUN'S REVIEW, January 1971, pp.
34-36.
This article shows that most businesses have grossly
inadequate safeguards to prevent sabotage of their
computer installation. Two sabotage examples are briefly
described, and several reasons are given as to why better
protection is unquestionably necessary. However, the
statement "a small quarter-size magnet can destroy 50,000
tape reels in minutes" is a gross exaggeration.
*(1940)*73*ab*np*x2
COMPUTER ABSTRACTS. Technical Information Company, Martins
Bank Chambers, P.O. Box 59, St. Helier, Jersey, British
Channel Islands, 1957-, (Monthly, with annual cumulative
index).
Each monthly publication reviews about 300 articles.
U.S. government reports, patents, and books are also
reviewed. Although the publisher is located in Britain,
almost all the entries are from American journals and
magazines. A subject index containing "privacy" and
"security" indices enables easy location of security
articles. However, only about one or two articles on
computer security can be found in each monthly issue.
*(1950)*73*af*cc*np*xl
COMPUTER AND CONTROL ABSTRACTS. Institution of Electrical
Engineers and Institute of Electrical and Electronic
Engineers Inc., 345 East 47th Street, New York, New York
10017, 1966-, (Monthly, with semi-annual cumulations).
This publication abstracts thousands of articles on
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computers every month. A significant number of the
articles abstracted are from foreign countries. The
abstracts are divided into four subject regions entitled:
Systems and Control Theory, Control Technology, Computer
Programming and Applications, and Computer Systems and
Equipment. These abstracts are very well written and
average about ninety words in length. Unfortunately,
only seventy articles on computer security were
abstracted in the period 1966-1973. These seventy
articles are a mixture of highly technical and very
non-technical material. A majority of them can easily be
found in other reference sources. However, about fifteen
of these articles were from other countries such as
England, Germany, The Netherlands, and Austrailia, and
they were not located in any other reference source.
* (1960) *70*ac*ai*bc*cd*dc*jf
"Computer Bomb Damage Studied." COMPUTERWORLD, 9 September
1970.
*(1970)*70*ac*ai*cc*cd*dg*no
"Computer Center Security System Surveyed." COMPUTERWORLD,
14 June 1970, p. 1.
*(1980)*71*aa*cc*db*dd*de*eh*el*fe*ff*fg*fh*fi*fn*fp*fq
*fv*fx*hj*kb*kd*nf*no*x4
COMPUTER CONTROL GUIDELINES. Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants, Auerbach Publishers, 1101 State Road,
Princeton, New Jersey 08640, 1971, 136 pp., $10.00.
This excellent book is the result of a very large
study performed by the Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants. It is complete, well written, and
handsomely organized into seven chapters and twenty-five
control objectives. Each control objective is discussed
from the viewpoint of minimum control standards. Minimum
control standards are defined and specific control
techniques are classified under the appropriate
standards. Other control standards, beyond the minimum
ones, are presented where appropriate. The seven
chapters of the book are entitled: Pre-Installation
Controls, Organizational Controls, Development Controls,
Operations Controls, Processing Controls, Documentation
Controls, and Outside Data Center Controls. Two examples
of the twenty-five control objectives are: insure the
adequacy of management trails, and insure the
completeness of data processed by the computer. A
sixteen page summary of objectives, minimum control
standards, and techniques is also given. A second book
resulting from the same study will soon be published. It
will deal with minimum audit standards, and acceptable
techniques for evaluating these audit standards.
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*(1990)*70*ab*cb*cc*dg
"Computer Data Protection." INDUSTRIAL SECURITY, No. 4,
1970, pp. 20-29.
* (2000) *69*ab*ca*lb*ng*x2
"Computer Designs Tamperproof Computer." DATA MANAGEMENT,
September 1969, p. 55.
The Advanced Research Projects Agency of the U.S.
Department of Defense has provided a two and one half
year grant to Case Western Reserve University in
Cleveland for research and development of a coherent
structure for computer system design. Developing this
coherent structure will be the first step toward a
computerized design system for designing a new race of
reliable and secure computers. Edward L. Glaser is head
of the design team which includes engineers,
mathematicians, graduate students, and a PDP 10/50
computer.
*(2010)*72*ab*np*x3
COMPUTER DIRECTORY AND BUYERS' GUIDE: 18TH ANNUAL EDITION.
COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION, Berkeley Enterprises (publ.),
815 Washington Street, Newtonville, Massachusetts 02160,
30 August 1972, 180 pp.
This issue categorizes almost all U.S. data
processing service and manufacturing companies as to the
types of services and products offered. On page 83,
under the sub-heading "security systems and equipment"
there are listed approximately forty companies. Of these
forty companies, eight are primarily security equipment
manufacturers, and seven are primarily computer security
consultants. The other twenty-five firms only have
secondary interests in security.
*(2020)*70*ac*ai*bb*cc*db*hj
"Computer Frauds Seen as Danger to EDP Operations."
COMPUTERWORLD, 26 August 1970, p. S-5.
*(2030)*70*ab*cc*cd*dg*gg*mc*nf*x1
"Computer Growth Calls for Security in Banks." DATA
MANAGEMENT, September 1970, p. 156.
This news bulletin briefly summarizes a speech by
Richard F. Cross before the Second National Conference on
Bank Security. Mr. Cross states that computer security
involves: (1) placing a value on the computer operation,
(2) a thorough analysis of all possible threats, and (3)
insurance coverage. Protection involves an interface of
physical security, personnel security, procedural
security, audit controls, and insurance. (Apparently, Mr.
Cross has left hardware and software protection
considerations to the computer manufacturer.) Several
specific safeguard techniques were then discussed. Some
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of them are: site selection and construction, air
conditioning, personnel access to computer room, employee
loyalty and honesty, and backup emergency plans.
*(2040)*70*ab*cd*df*gd
"Computer Power in Small Packages." ELECTRONIC WORLD, 5
January 1970, p. 51,
The paper describes a self-contained power
distribution console using circuit breakers and voltage
regulators to provide continuous power to a computer
installation.
*(2050)*71*ab*cd*dc*ga
"Computer Protection - Highlights of Protection for Data
Processing Rooms." THE SENTINEL, Factory Insurance
Association, Boston, Massachusetts, November 1971.
*(2060)*68*ac*bb*bc*be*db*dc*de*x1
"Computer Room Disaster Sent Companies Scrambling to Protect
Precious Files." WALL STREET JOURNAL, 14 Novermber 1968,
p. 1.
The dangers of fire, flood, sabotage, and fraud have
been overlooked by many companies rushing to automate
bookkeeping chores. A Los Angeles credit firm lost
$10,000 when a service technician accidently erased a
disk containing 80,000 accounts. A disgruntled army
officer caused an army computer to erase itself shortly
after he retired. One computer was destroyed when a fire
in the room below caused the computer room floor to
collapse.
*(2070)*69*ab*cc*cd*dg
"Computer Security." INDUSTRIAL SECURITY, December 1969, pp.
18-37.
*(2080)*72*ad*cc*cd*np*x2
"Computer Security, Backup, and Recovery: A Selected
Bibliography." Canning Publications Inc., 925 Anza
Avenue, Vista, California 92083, 20 January 1972, 8 pp.
This bibliography contains entries for 59
periodicals, 11 books or proceedings, 10 reports, and 3
seminars. Nearly all of these entries are concerned with
physical security or management control and operating
procedure security. Most of these entries can be found
in other reference sources. None of the entries are
annotated.
*(2090)*72*ab*bg*cc*dg*fd*ff*fg*fi*fj*fk*fp*fq*ft*fv*fy
*hg*hj*kb*kd*la*nf*x4
"Computer Security: Backup and Recovery Methods." EDP
ANALYZER, January 1972, pp. 1-15.
The following aspects of computer security are
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discussed in a complete and easily readable manner: Data
and Program Backup (classifying programs and files,
causes of backup being ineffective, items needing backup,
recovery points, daily backup systems,
grandfather-father-son procedures, several examples of
actual backup systems, software package for supporting
backup); Hardware Backup (alternate site prospects,
identification of critical jobs, checking equipment
configuration and operating system used at backup site,
type of agreement with party providing backup, threats to
backup site, storing backup files at backup site);
Internal Control (embezzlement and fraud, malicious
damage, separation and rotation of duties, personnel
security checks, examples of malicious damage by
disgruntled employees); Insurance (equipment coverage,
media coverage, extra expense coverage, business
interruption coverage); and Funding the Computer Security
Program (security is expensive, evaluate the problem, get
top management involved, develop a plan, search for
funding). Problems associated with remote access
terminals are not discussed because they were covered in
the May 1970 issue of EDP ANALYZER entitled "Security in
the CDB". This report is the second of a two part
series. The first part entitled "Security of the
Computer Center" is in the December 1971 issue.
*(2100)*70*ab*cb*cc*cd*gh*ma*xl
"Computer Security is Sensitive Area." INDUSTRY WEEK, 5
October 1970, pp. 13-14.
A few General Electric managers are quoted on
statements relating to the security of their $100 million
time-sharing service which currently serves 150 major
U.S. firms. If one of G.E.'s three centers would be
completely destroyed, the data would still be physically
available at one of the other two centers. G.E. feels
that the smallest worry a customer should have is whether
his data is safe. No specific safeguards were mentioned.
*(2110)*73*ab*bb*db*hj*hk*hm*if*ii*mc*x2
"The Computer Thieves." NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE, 18 June 1973, pp.
109-112.
Four examples of recent computer related crimes are
presented. In one example, a chief teller at a branch of
New York's Union Dime Savings Bank embezzled away more
than $1.5 million over three years simply by manipulating
inactive accounts in the bank's computer. He was caught
by accident when police investigating another case found
that the teller was betting as much as $30,000 daily
through a bookmaker. In another example, a person
devised a technique to order expensive communications
equipment directly from a Pacific Telephone and Telegraph
computer simply by using his touchtone telephone. He was
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so successful he set up a ten man company to sell the
equipment, and only got caught when his employees became
dissatisfied and turned him in.
A disturbing fact is that most of today's computer
criminals are caught by accident. The extraordinary
complexity of many of today's computer programs is at
least partially responsile for this. The typical
computer criminal works with accomplices and doesn't have
any characteristics to distinguish himself from fellow
honest employees.
*(2120)*70*ab*cc*cd*dg*gg*xl
"Computer Vulnerability - A New Business Risk." THE NEW YORK
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT, March 1970, pp. 237-239.
The rapid growth in EDP over the past decade has
created a new business risk - computer vulnerability.
Hazards which most EDP systems are subject to are:
environmental disaster, mechanical failure, operator
error, program error, theft, fraud, and sabotage.
Security has been achieved in the past because a limited
number of people understood EDP. This will not be true
in the near future. It is suggested that management
implement the following safeguards: insure that all
programs have sufficient internal and external checks;
maintain duplicate files; control physical access to
computer room; and organize an independent security
control group.
*(2130)*72*ab*bb*cc*db*ff*xl
"Computers Breed New Type of Criminal." DATA MANAGEMENT,
August 1972, p. 36.
U.S. business fraud losses are now $1 to $3 billion
annually. An increasing number of cases are involving
the computer. Three brief examples are given. In one
example, an EDP manager was handicapping horses and
running a bookmaking operation on his company's computer.
Most fraud can be prevented by vigilant internal
controls. Rotating duties, maintaining logs, controlling
passwords, and periodic personnel investigations are also
useful.
*(2140)*69*ab*bb*cc*db*ff*mc*xl
"Computers: Embezzlement From Banks." CERTIFIED ACCOUNTANTS
JOURNAL, November 1969, pp. 639-640.
Two examples of bank fraud are given. In one
example, an EDP manager stole $81,000 by instructing the
computer to write checks to fictitious persons. In the
other example, a manager in charge of bank operations
stole $250,000 by having the computer transfer funds from
an interest revenue account to his employee stock plan
account. Separation and rotation of duties and frequent
auditing by specially trained computer auditors are
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recommended.
*(2150)*70*ac*bb*db*hj*if*mc*xl
"Computers outfoxed, But Not the Police, in Check-Kiting
Caper: Theft Exceeding $880,000." WALL STREET JOURNAL, 13
March 1970, p. 15.
A fraud case involving a former branch manager from
Bankers Trust Company, a vice president of National Bank
of North America, and three brothers is discussed.
Deposit slips were made out as cash transactions when
only checks were deposited. The computers then assumed
that the accounts contained sufficient funds to cover
checks subsequently drawn because cash transactions were
recorded as immediate deposits. In the final month
before the fraud was detected, $9 million worth of checks
had been kited between the two banks.
*(2160)*67*ab*cb*cc*da*db*dc*gg*hd*lb
"Computers: Safeguarding Time-Sharing Privacy: An All-Out
War on Data Snooping." ELECTRONICS, 17 April 1967, pp.
157-,159.
Various safeguards used to prevent unauthorized
access in time-sharing systems are presented.
*(2170)*73*ac*ai*bg*cc*cd*nm*np*x4
COMPUTERWORLD. Computerworld Inc., 797 Washington Street,
Newton, Massachusetts 02160, 1967-, (Weekly).
This weekly newspaper has articles on computer
security and computer privacy in almost every issue.
There are frequent stories on actual occurrence of
sabotage, fraud, and disastrous accidents.
*(2180)*70*ac*ai*bb*bc*db*cc*cd*da*db*dc*ed*ff*fy*ga*hc
*ma*x2
"Computerworld: 1970 Environment and Security Supplement."
COMPUTERWORLD, 26 August 1970, 8 pp.
This supplement contains several articles covering
subjects such as fraud, auditing, insurance, disaster
prevention, software protection, and service bureaus.
*(2190)*71*ac*ai*cb*cc*cd*dg*ja
"Computerworld: 1971 More Supplement." COMPUTERWORLD, 30
June 1971.
This supplement contains several articles covering
subjects such as physical security (fire protection,
power sources, etc.), control over the computer's
environment, and unauthorized access through remote
terminals.
*(2200) *73*ab*np*xl
COMPUTING REVIEWS. Association for Computing Machinery, 1133
Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York 10036, 1960-,
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(Monthly, with annual cumulative index).
This periodical comprehensively covers the
literature on computing and its applications. More than
a thousand selected volunteer specialists provide
critical evaluations of domestic and foreign books,
technical papers, popular articles, films, and video
tapes on every aspect of computing. Over 200 serial
publications are scanned regularly for pertinent
materials. Approximately one article concerning computer
and data security can be found in each issue.
*(2210)*72*aa*cb*cc*cd*dg*fs*ga*gg*lb
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY TECHNIQUES (England). National
Computing Centre Ltd., Manchester, Lancashire, England,
21 November 1972.
This conference was held in London on November 21,
1972. Presentations were given on the following six
topics: data control, security in a multi-user
installation, database security, personnel and
organizational controls, computer data security in
perspective, and physical security. Papers are available
on these presentations, but only in condensed form.
*(2220)*69*ak*cb*cc*da*db*ea*ed*ei*ej*el*en*eq*fb*fc*fe
*fu*fx*lb*nb*nc*x3
"The Considerations of Data Security in a Computer
Environment." G520-2169-0, IBM Corporation, White Plains,
New York, 1969, 36 pp.
This brochure is a guide to provide general
management, systems designers, and operations management
with various data security considerations in order to
assess and minimize potential problems, Approximately
three fourths of the brochure is directed toward systems
designers. General management and operations management
security considerations are each discussed in only three
pages. Some of the more interesting and important
security considerations are briefly stated below. Key
factors in determining the extent of protection required
are: equipment configuration, degree of data sensitivity,
computer hardware, computer room architecture, acceptable
reduced system efficiency, employee loyalty, involvement
of outsiders, and the company's experience with security.
One of the most important elements in a security program
is that it be tested and audited regularly at random
intervals. This testing and auditing should provide a
review of the system's: current effectiveness, continuing
appropriateness, level of complexity, checks and balances
in staff assignments, training procedures for new users,
and operation under special circumstances (meeting
deadlines or correcting system errors). Accessing
sensitive data may require identification of the person,
terminal, and program. For identification of remote
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terminal users a magnetic-coded badge appears to have the
best overall characteristics. The need for data security
is dynamic, and an ever-present danger of "over-security"
exists. Detailed analysis of audit logs make it possible
to fine-tune each security technique and/or redesign
files to further protect sensitive data to meet the
installation's unique needs. Program testing has one of
the greatest potentials for security exposure, System
security routines and the associated tables are to a
sensitive data processing installation as the vault
combination is to a bank. At least one person per shift
must be designated responsible for maintaining security.
A condensed outline of this brochure is given below.
General management security considerations (interrelated
factors, review techniques); systems designers security
considerations (identification, design of authorization
techniques, data file protection, audit procedures,
program testing, communication lines); operation
management security considerations (physical security,
operating procedures, personnel).
*(2230)*72*ab*ah*ca*ed*ef*gh*ha*lb*nc*ng*x4
Conway, Richard W.; Maxwell, William L.; and Morgan, Howard
L. "On the Implementation of Security Measures in
Information Systems." COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, April
1972, pp. 211-220.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the nature
of flexibility in a security conscious operating system
and to relate the costs of security implementation and
enforcement to that flexibility. Security decisions for
a particular databank system may be recorded in a
"security matrix" model where the columns of the matrix
correspond to particular data items in the system, and
the rows of the matrix correspond to potential users of
the system. Each element in the matrix d(i,j), is a
decision rule specifying the conditions under which user
"i" is entitled access to the data item "j" and the
actions that "i" is permitted to perform upon "j". Most
of today's security systems are either a column model,
where there is only one data item and a simple yes/no
decision based on a password, or a diagonal model, where
each file is uniquely identified with a particular user.
In a real system the security matrix could become
prohibitively large. However, the size could be reduced
and made practical by: defining virtual users each
representing a collection of users with identical
security authorization; simplifying the entries in the
matrix to only yes/no indicators; or by careful analysis
of when and how the matrix should be interrogated. The
authors feel that this third approach offers some real
promise in reducing the cost of implementing such a
security matrix.
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First, a distinction needs to be made between access
decision rules that are data dependent and data
independent. Restricting a user from ever seeing a field
named SALARY is a data independent decision rule, while
restricting him to salaries less than $10,000 is a data
dependent decision rule. The point to be made is that
data independent decisions can be enforced by examining
the request and appropriate matrix element just once - at
translation time, whereas data dependent decisions need
to examine the request and appropriate matrix element for
each repeated access during execution time. Most writers
and designers have recognized that data dependent
decisions can only be enforced at execution time, and
have planned the enforcement of all security decisions in
this way. Since execution time enforcement is about ten
times more expensive, this has given the false impression
that all security enforcement is very expensive.
The authors also take a brief look at the following
three security conscious systems: Hoffman's student
health system at Stanford University; MIT's MULTICS
system; and the ASAP file maintenance system used by the
authors as a test system for their matrix model concept.
The authors conclude that a general purpose operating
system, such as OS/360, could be quite easily modified to
add the matrix security model, but all enforcement would
have to be done in execution time. To implement some
translation time enforcement, the capabilities of the
source language, such as COBAL or FORTRAN, would have to
be somewhat restricted.
*(2240)*72*ae*ag*cb*da*ed*ef*gh*la*x3
Conway, Richard W.; Maxwell, William L.; and Morgan, Howard
L. "Selective Security Capabilities in ASAP - A File
Management System." AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Spring
Joint Computer Conference, Vol. 40, 1972, pp.1181-1185.
The ASAP security system is mainly designed to
prevent the casual user from gaining access to
information he should not see. The determined
professional would have little trouble going around these
security measures. ASAP only supervises all requests for
information entry, update, and retrieval which are
written in the ASAP language. ASAP uses a dictionary
that contains for each authorized user: a password
identification, a description of the file subset
accessible to him, and a description of the processing
actions that he is permitted to execute. Every ASAP file
can be divided into non-hierarchical security classes
such as: personal/biographical information, financial
information, and new product information. Each
non-hierarchical security class is further divided into
different levels of restricted access by use of a boolean
expression that describes by content those records in the
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file which a user is permitted to access. For example, a
user may be restricted to access all personnel files of
employees earning less than $15,000 (and) being employed
less than five years with the company (and) working
overtime. ASAP security tests are applied at the source
language level. The authors believe that security
checking at compile time is cheaper than at execution
time. ASAP does not provide any execution time access
control for use in a time-sharing environment.
*(2250)*69*ac*cc*cd*dc
Cook, A. D. "EDP Defends Against Disaster." ELECTRONIC NEWS,
29 December 1969, p. 33.
*(2260)*71*ab*cc*fm
Cook, C.; and Inoue, M. S. "Computer Center Operations
Analysis." DATA MANAGEMENT, November 1971, p. 24.
* (2270) *68*ae*cb*ed*ei*el*lb
Corbato, F. J.; and Saltzer, J. H. "Some Considerations of
Supervisor Program Design for Multiplexed Computer
Systems." IFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, 1968.
*(2280)*65*ae*ag*cb*gh*lb*x2
Corbato, F. J.; and Vyssotsky, V. A. "Introduction and
Overview of the MULTICS System." AFIPS CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS, Fall Joint Computer Conference, Vol. 27,
1965, pp. 185-196.
This paper attempts to give a detailed discussion of
MULTICS design objectives as they relate to major areas
of the system. The paper is not very technical and can
be understood by those with a minimal knowledge of
computers. Protection of private files and isolation of
independent processes were considered to be of critical
importance when designing the system. System programming
is done with the same facilities, tools, etc., available
to the ordinary user. The file system was designed with
the presumption that there will be mishaps, so an
automatic file backup mechanism was provided. It was
expected that the ultimate limitation on the user of the
system will be the knowledge which he has of it.
*(2290)*70*ac*ai*cc*dc*fy*jf*mj
"Costlier Protection Hits Campus Centers." COMPUTERWORLD, 5
August 1970.
California college computer centers are having a
difficult time getting disaster insurance because of
recent campus unrest. A prerequisite for obtaining
coverage appears to be twenty-four hour guard protection.
*(2300)*72*ab*cc*da*nm
Countryman, Vern. "Computers and Dossiers - Part II."
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COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION, February 1972.
*(2310)*72*ac*ai*bb*db*hd*if*kf*me*nj*x1
"County Supervisor is Sued Over Use of DP Mail Lists."
COMPUTERWORLD, 5 July 1972, p. 1.
An Orange County, California supervisor was charged
with misuse of county computer data services in his
reelection. He allegedly requisitioned a mailing list of
county employees and used the printouts of names and
addresses to mail political material.
*(2320)*69*ae*cb*cc*cd*fe*ea*eh*ff*lb*mg*nm
Courtney, R. H. Jr. "Data Security and Privacy." THE 6TH
ANNUAL NATIONAL COLLOQUIUM ON INFORMATION RETRIEVAL,
Medical Documentation Service, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, May 1969, pp. 9-14.
This paper is concerned with the security and
privacy of data in remote-access, time-shared computer
systems. Data security is considered to have the four
fundamental components: authorization, identification,
system integrity, and auditing.
*(2330)*71*ad*ak*cb*cc*cd*lb
Courtney, R. H, Jr. "Forty Commonly Found Deficiencies in
the Security of Data Processing Activities." IBM Data
Security and Privacy Systems Development Division, 30
June 1971, 14 pp.
A list of the forty most commonly found security
deficiencies is given. The author, who is the head of
IBM's Data Security and Privacy Systems Development
Division, tries to play down the sensationalism used by
some consultants in the computer security consulting
business. He suggests that magnetic cards be used to
replace passwords for remote terminal access. He doesn't
see any significant difference between accidently and
intentionally destroyed data.
* (2340) *72*ab*cb*cc*da*db*mc
"The Credit Card Explosion," BUSINESS AUTOMATION, April
1972, p. 26.
*(2350)*67*ab*cc*cd*da*hd
Cross, Richard F. "Safeguarding Classified Information."
INDUSTRIAL SECURITY, August 1967.
*(2360) *71*ab*cc*cd
Cross, Richard F. "Tighter Security for Computers."
INDUSTRIAL SECURITY, August 1971, pp. 86-89.
*(2370)*68*ad*ak*cb*ed*gh*x1
"CP-67/CMS User's Guide." Report 320-2015, IBM Cambridge
Scientific Center, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139, July
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1968.
One of IBM's efforts to provide file access control
is described. Files may be released to all other users
in one of four modes: read only; read/write; read only
and erase after one read; and read/write and erase after
one read. However, the manual notes that all modes may
not be implemented.
*(2380)*70*ab*ca*da*eq*xl
"Cryptic Computers." SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, January 1970, p.
52.
This article briefly summarizes a speech by Ralph
Skatrud entitled "A Consideration of the Application of
Cryptographic Techniques to Data Processing" given at the
1969 Fall Joint Computer Conference. Mr. Skatrud
proposed two methods for implementing cryptographic
protection systems in computers, One method is a
polyalphabetic substitution technique that employees a
number of continuously changing cipher alphabets. The
other method is a digital matrix transposition technique
that reads data into a matrix by rows and out by columns,
under the control of random digits stored in the
computer. Both methods are theoretically unbreakable
since only a one-time code is used.
*(2390)*73*ab*cb*eq
THE CRYPTOGRAM. The American Cryptogram Association, Rogot,
E.&E. 9504 Forest Road, Bethesda, Maryland 20014.
(Bimonthly).
*(2400)*70*ac*ai*ca*da*eq*gh*hc*hd*lb
"Cryptographic Package May End 360 Program Thefts."
COMPUTERWORLD, 24 June 1970.
*(2410)*69*ab*cc*da*ka*mg*nl*nm
Curran, W. J.; Stearns, B.; and Kaplan, H. "Privacy,
Confidentiality, and Other Legal Considerations in the
Establishment of a Centralized Health-Data System." NEW
ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE, 31 June 1969.
The authors give specific proposals for the
safeguarding of information in a medical databank.
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*(2420)*71*ab*cb*dd*eo*ep
Dale, Dixon R. "Controlling Data Transmission Errors." DATA
DYNAMICS, July 1971, pp. 18-22.
*(2430)*65*ae*ag*al*cb*eb*ed*fv*gc*ht*hu*lb*na*x3
Daley, R. C.; and Neumann, P. G. "A General Purpose File
System for Secondary Storage." AFIPS CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS, Fall Joint Computer Conference, Vol. 27,
1965, pp. 213-229.
If computer files are to be shared among various
users in a way which can be flexibly controlled,
safeguards against the following threats should be
provided: masquerading; accidents or maliciousness by
authorized and unauthorized users; self-inflicted
accidents; hardware or system software failures;
unauthorized tampering of system safeguards; and
excessive use of safeguards. This paper describes a
basic formulation of a file system designed to meet these
threats. The formulation provides the user with a simple
means of addressing an essentially infinite amount of
secondary storage in a machine-independent and
device-independent fashion. The file system was designed
to be independent of machine characteristics. All
physical addressing is done by the file system. The user
is only aware of symbolic addresses.
Section 2 of this paper presents a hierarchical tree
structure of files which permits flexible access control
in the file system. File directories exist at every
intersection of the tree's branches. Files exist at the
tips of all the outer-most branches which do not divide
into higher level branches. Each branch contains read,
execute, write, append, and trap access controls which
may or may not allow a user to access branches,
directories, and files further up the tree. The trap
control essentially calls a subroutine which can make any
checks on the potential user that the file owner desires.
A link command is available for providing access links
between any nonadjacent branches.
Section 3 discusses a file backup system. This
backup system makes secondary storage appear to the user
as having infinite storage space. It also provides
salvage and catastrophe information-reloads in case of
machine breakdown, system failure, or sabotage.
Section 4 describes the basic file and backup
systems presented in the preceeding sections as
implemented in MIT's MULTICS system. The MULTICS system
program modules and their interrelationships are
explained. The modular design helps achieve the system's
machine independence.
*(2440)*70*ac*ai*cb*dg
"Dangers to Software Security Assessed." COMPUTERWORLD, 26
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August 1970, p. S-2.
*(2450)*67*ab*db*hj*kd
Dansiger, Sheldon J. "Embezzling Primer." COMPUTERS AND
AUTOMATION, Noverber 1967, pp. 41-43.
*(2460)*68*ab*cc*da*fz*hc*ma
Dansiger, Sheldon J. "Proprietary Protection of Computer
Programs." COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION, February 1968, p.
32.
The author seems to have doubts about the
effectiveness of non-disclosure agreements with respect
to sold and leased programs. He feels that only by
keeping these programs from the premises of the customer,
such as through time-sharing, will the necessary
protection be obtained.
*(2470)*66*ae*ag*cb*ep
Dantine, D. J. "Communications Needs of the User for
Management Information Systems." AFIPS CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS, Fall Joint Computer Conference, Vol. 29,
1966, pp. 403-411.
*(2480)*70*ae*cb*cc
"Data Base Management System Requirements." JOINT
GUIDE-SHARE DATA BASE REQUIREMENTS GROUP, GUIDE
International Corporation, 1 Illinois Center, 111 East
Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois, 60601; or SHARE Inc., 25
Broadway, Suite 750, New York, New York, 10004, 11
November 1970.
Idealized requirements for a database management
system are proposed. Security and integrity are
important parameters.
*(2490)*72*ad*cb*cc*cd
"Data Center Security Guidelines." GSD 28-070, GUIDE Data
Center Security Project, GUIDE International Corporation,
1 Illinois Center, 111 East Wacker Drive, Chicago,
Illinois 60601, February 1972.
*(2500)*71*ae*cb*cc
"Data Management System Requirements." Construction
Management System Action Group (CMSAG): Data Management
Committee, 23 June 1971.
Specific requirements for data security and
integrity are discussed.
*(2510)*73*ab*cc*np*x2
DATA PROCESSING DIGEST. Data Processing Digest Inc., 6820 La
Tijera Boulevard, Los Angeles, California 90045, 1955-,
(Monthly, with annual cumulative index).
Every month this magazine summarizes about twenty
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current data processing articles found in various
magazines and reviews several recently published books.
The magazines annually summarizes or reviews about seven
or eight articles and books on computer security. The
article summaries are not too valuable because they are
quite often as long as the original article, which can
usually be located quite easily in its original source.
However, the book reviews are very useful.
*(2520)*71*ab*cc*dc*dd*de*fy*x2
"Data Processing Errors and Omissions Insurance." BANKING,
April 1971, p. 38.
The only known sources for data processing errors
and omissions insurande are: Crum and Foster Companies;
Fireman's Fund American; Lloyd's of London; Reliance
Mutual; and Saint Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company.
The rates and coverage offered by these companies appears
to be quite similar. A list of exclusions that apply to
this type of insurance is also given.
* (2530) *70*ac*ai*dd*hr*kd*nl
"Data Processing May Receive Scrutiny at FTC Hearing on
Credit Card Billing." COMPUTERWORLD, 21 October 1970.
The Federal Trade Commission plans to investigate
abuse of customers by computerized billing system errors.
* (2540) *69*ad*ak*cc
"Data Processing Techniques for Management Control of
Electronic Data Processing," F20-0006-0, IBM Corporation,
White Plains, New York, September 1969.
*(2550)*ac*ai*cc*da*ka*mb*mf*nm*x1
"Data Security and Control Must Go Hand in Hand."
COMPUTERWORLD, 19 January 1972, p. 10.
State officials now are attacking an FBI regulation
which requires that a computer linked to the National
Criminal History System must be used only for law
enforcement purposes. These officials insist that
adequate hardware and software security can be built into
a shared system. This COMPUTERWORLD editorial disagrees.
It agrees with J. Edgar Hoover's statement, "If law
enforcement or other criminal agencies are to be
responsible for the confidentiality of the information in
computerized systems, then they must have complete
management control of the hardware and the people who use
and operate the system".
*(2560)*70*ab*cb*cc*dg*ea*ec*ed*ef*ej*er*fe*ff*fi*gh*ha
*je*kb*lb*nf*x2
"Data Security in the CDB." EDP ANALYZER, May 1970, pp.
1-14.
This article is primarily concerned with security
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threats and safeguards in a remote-access, time-shared
computer environment. It draws heavily on literature
from the. 1967 Spring and 1969 Fall Joint Computer
Conferences, "Computers and Privacy: A Survey" by L. J.
Hoffman, and "Considerations of Data Security in a
Computer Environment" by IBM. First, security techniques
in Continental Airlines' reservation system and
experiences of Professor E. L. Glaser, a skilled computer
penetrator, are discussed. Then a list of different
types of remote-access, time-shared computer threats
(developed by H. E. Peterson and R. Turn) and a list of
sensitive, common business files are presented. The
following countermeasures are briefly discussed: access
management (passwords, terminal-identification, Hsiao's
user authority items, a brief but quite informative
description of the ADEPT-50 system); file design (several
levels of access controls, physical separation of files,
failure of write operation to completely erase previously
recorded data); hardware/software techniques (main memory
read and write protection, parity checks, interrupt
problems, non-privileged state, certification of
systems); communication protection (encryption, dedicated
lines, aperiodic check for bugs of the Watergate
species); reliability, auditability, integrity (audit
trails, validation of program changes); and general
security procedures (good security systems shouldn't be
weakened by disclosing their techniques, backround checks
on employees, assignment of responsibility for every
sensitive file). Finally, a list is given of safeguards
to implement if highly sensitive data must be stored in a
remote-access, time-shared computer.
*(2570)*00*af*cb*da*ep*eq*gh
"DATA SEQUESTOR - Product Description Sheet." Model JJC-3,
Ground Data Corporation, 4014 N. E. 5th Terrace, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida 33308.
This device provides encrypted communication for
remote terminal users. An encoder is provided at the
terminal site and a decoder at the computer site. The
device can simultaneously handle several different
encrypted lines all with different keys. However, the
user keys are stored in the computer system and their
accessibility will limit the protection available from
this device.
*(2580)*00*af*cb*da*ep*eq*gh
"DATACODER - Product Description Sheet." Model DC-110,
Datotek Inc., 8220 Westchester, Dallas, Texas 75225.
A device located at the terminal site for protecting
transmission and storage of information is described.
The device was designed to be used only for encoding
"text-only" files. Numeric fields of a record must not
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be encoded for computation since the device exists only
at the terminal and no decoding is possible at the
computer site. An example shows a payroll file with the
employee names encrypted, and their social security
numbers and salaries left uncoded.
*(2590)*69*ab*cb*cc*da*dd*de*gg*hd*ka*mb*md*nm*x2
Davidson, Timothy A. "Computer Information Privacy." THE
OFFICE, August 1969, pp. 10-17.
A few advantages and disadvantages are given
concerning a proposed federal data bank which will merge
all available statistical data now collected by some
twenty government departments. Some considerations are:
no laws exist on malicious use of personal information;
data centralization might produce subjective information
on opinions and beliefs; most data on individuals is now
collected from unreliable investigators. However,
centralized files could tighten the present loose
information practices. Some general privacy threats are:
securing personal information without the subject's
consent; using information without regard to its accuracy
or for purposes other than those consented to by the
subject; and showing little interest in preventing
unauthorized access to data under one's control. The
rest of this article briefly summarizes the following
security topics discussed at the 1967 Spring Joint
Computer Conference: Peterson's and Turn's list of
computer threats, software monitoring, and cryptography.
* (2600) *71*ab*cc*cd*dg
Davis, A. G. "Security of the Computer Center." INDUSTRIAL
SECURITY, April 1971, p. 20.
*(2610)*68*aa*cc*cd*ff*fq*fp*fv*kb*la*ma*nn*x3
Davis, Gordon B., et al. AUDITING AND EDP. American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants Inc., 666 Fifth
Avenue, New York, New York 10019, 1968, 344 pp., $12.00.
This book is the result of efforts by a special
auditing EDP task force of AICPA members with broad
experience in EDP auditing. The book has the following
purposes: (1) to guide CPAs in auditing business
enterprises which use computers for record keeping; (2)
to provide a starting point in building a consensus of
expert opinion on auditing practices for examining such
companies; (3) to suggest the utility and applicability
of different auditing methods where experience is still
lacking; and (4) to provide source materials for training
and information purposes.
There are fifteen chapters entitled: The Auditor and
the Computer, Preferred Practices in Organization and
Management of the EDP Function, Documentation of the Data
Processing System, Hardware Features for Control Over
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Equipment Malfunctions, Control Over Input and Output,
Programming Control Over Processing, Safeguarding Records
and Files, Evaluating Internal Control, The Audit Trail
in an EDP System, Auditing a Computer System Without
Using the Computer to Test the Data Processing System,
Using the Computer to Test the Records Produced by a
Computer System, Auditing Advanced Data Processing
Systems, and The Training of the CPA for Auditing EDP.
This is a very important book, especially for
auditors, but it has become somewhat obsolete in recent
years. Only chapter 7, Safeguarding Records and Files,
is directly concerned with computer security.
*(2620)*70*ac*ai*cb*cc*cd*dg*ma
Davis, Morton S. "Service Bureaus Need to Improve Data
Security." COMPUTERWORLD, 26 August 1970.
Security problems from both the customer's and the
service bureau's viewpoints are discussed.
*(2630)*71*ae*cb*cc*da*db*eh*hd*lb
Dean, Albert Jr. "Data Privacy and Integrity Requirements
for On-Line Data Management Systems." ACM Special
Interest Group on File Description and Translation
(SIGFIDET) Workshop, 11 November 1971.
*(2640)*69*ad*cb*cc*lb*ma
DeLair, W. E. "Security Responsibilities of a Time-Sharing
Company." Transdata Corporation, 25 October 1969.
*(2650)*73*ac*ai*cc*db*fi*mk*x2
"Democrats Set Up Guide to Safeguard Elections in 1972."
COMPUTERWORLD, 23 May 1973, p. 5.
A workbook passed out by the Democratic Party states
that the parties and party workers remain the most
important deterrent to election frauds and errors. There
have been cases of consistent errors in election results
from punch-card ballot counting, but there has not been a
case of fraud that has led to a criminal conviction.
Several procedural safeguards are given. Two of them are
concerned with computerized systems. The source programs
should be made available to computer specialists to check
for possible areas of fraud. An election night core dump
should be made and later compared to the approved source
and object code listings.
*(2660)*71*ab*cb*cc
Denning, Peter J. "Third Generation Computer Systems."
COMPUTING SURVEYS, December 1971.
Several universal concepts of computer and data
protection are presented.
*(2670)*65*ab*cb*hd*hi
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Dennis, Jack B. "Segmentation and the Design of
Multiprogrammed Computer System." JOURNAL OF THE ACM, Vol
12, October 1965, pp. 589-602.
*(2680)*66*ab*ah*al*ca*ee*x2
Dennis, Jack B.; and Van Horn, E. C. "Programming Semantics
for Multiprogrammed Computation." COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
ACM, March 1966, pp. 143-155.
The paper is rather technical and requires a good
understanding of computer programming. It defines and
discusses approximately twenty-five metarinstructions
that incorporate powers found mostly absent from
contemporary programming languages, but essential to
computation processes in multi-programmed computer
systems. These powers relate to parallel processing,
protection of separate computations, program debugging,
and user sharing of memory segments or other computing
objects, The meta-instructions form a language whose
sophistication is approximately midway between assembly
language and advanced algebraic language.
A computation is thought of as proceeding within
some "sphere of protection" specified by a "list of
capabilities". Each capability list locates by means of
a pointer some computing object and indicates the actions
that the computation may perform with respect to that
object.
*(2690)*66*ad*cb*cc*cd*da*dc*fk*fl*gc*hd*jd*lb
Dennis, Robert L. "Security in the Computer Environment."
SP-2440/000/01, System Development Corporation, 2500
Colorado Avenue, Santa Monica, California 90406; or
AD-640 648, National Technical Information Service,
Springfield, Virginia 22151, August 1966.
This is a digest of presentations made at the
Conference of Research Security Administrators. Insuring
that information is secure in a time-shared computer;
protecting magnetically stored data; avoiding loss of
classified information through electronic radiation; and
destroying old confidential information are discussed.
* (2700) *62*ab*cc*dc*fy
"Describes Coverage Specially Designed for EDP Equipment."
THE NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, 20 July 1962.
*(2710)*70*ac*ai*cc*mk
"Detroit's Canvassers Axe Punch Card Vote." COMPUTERWORLD,
25 November 1970, p. 1.
*(2720)*70*ap*cc*dd*fp*gc*hp
Devitt., R. G. "Cut Expenses by Taking Care of Your Tape."
COMPUTER DECISIONS, October 1970, p. 42.
The article describes a tape handling and
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maintenance program to increase the reliability of
magnetic tape.
*(2730)*68*ab*cc*da*db*el*ff*lb
Diamond, T. D.; and Krallinger, J. C. "Controls and Audit
Trails for Real-Time Systems." INTERNAL AUDITOR, November
1968,
*(2740)*72*ab*bc*be*cc*cd*dg*fu*gg*x1
Dickey, C. Lewis. "Securing the Computer." JOURNAL OF
SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT, February 1972, pp. 8-10.
Causes of losses fall into one of these six
categories: accident and natural disasters, environmental
problems, EDP equipment malfunction, human error,
sabotage, and theft. (The author has not considered
fraud.) The following preventive and corrective measures
are briefly discussed: site selection and design;
physical access regulation; system control (exception
reports, input verification, programming halts, backup
files, and updating); personnel control (security
education and assigning responsibility); testing the
security system; and insurance. Each company should
first determine the value of its EDP operation and then
provide the appropriate safeguards based on this value.
*(2750)*68*ab*ah*cb
Dijkstra, E. W. "The Structure of 'THE' Multi-Programming
System." COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, May 1968, pp.
341-346.
*(2760)*66*ab*cc*cd*dc*dd*de*fv*la*x1
Dillon, Gregory M. "How Much Protection for Magnetically
Recorded Data?" SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES JOURNAL, September
1966, pp. 30-33.
The concentration of many businesses records on
magnetic media stored in one location, and the
concentration of clerical "know-how" in complex computer
programs make protection of this compactly and centrally
stored information absolutely necessary. The author
describes, in detail, steps taken by the treasurer's
department of DuPont Company to provide adequate backup
without incurring excessive copying and storage expenses.
However, a large part of the article is out-of-date and
some statements are no longer true.
*(2770)*68*ac*ai*bb*db*mc
"Diners Club Fraud Involved Printout." COMPUTERWORLD, 18
September 1968, p. 1.
*(2780)*70*ac*ai*cb*cc*ne
"Dissatisfaction Expressed with Data Security."
COMPUTERWORLD, 11 November 1970, p. 3.
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* (2790) *69*ae*cb*eb
Dixon, P. J. "Generalized Data Management Functional
Requirements." FILE ORGANIZATION: SELECTED PAPERS FROM
FILE 68 - AN I.A.G. CONFERENCE, Amsterdam, 1969, pp.
302-309.
*(2800)*69*af*cb*ei
Dobieski, A. W.; and Wong, R. E. "Optimal Blocking Tactics
for Border Security Systems." BULLETIN OPERATIONS
RESEARCH SOCIETY OF AMERICA, Vol. 17, Suppl. 1, 1969, p.
B109.
*(2810)*71*ab*cb*cc*dd*de
Doll, Dixon R. "Selecting an Error Control Technique." DATA
DYNAMICS, August 1971, p. 6.
*(2820)*71*ab*bc*dc*jf*jg
Donati, F. R. "Computers and Catastrophes." DATA MANAGEMENT,
December 1971.
* (2830) *72*ab*cb*da*eq*xl
Donn, Edward S. "Secure Your Digital Data." THE ELECTRONIC
ENGINEER, May 1972, pp. 5-7.
Extensions in the art and science of pseudorandom
binary-sequence generation now make it practical to
encrypt information thoroughly before transmission or
storage. Diagrams are given on shift registers used for
encoding and decoding. Security of the encrypted message
increases as the length (in flip-flops) of the
pseudorandom bit generating shift register increases.
*(2840)*69*ab*cd*dd*gd
Donnelly, G. J. "Non-Interruptible Electrical Power for a
Large Computer System." ELECTRICAL CONSTRUCTION DESIGN,
1969, pp. 31-35.
The rapidly increasing dependence of business
decision making and record keeping on data processing
systems has created a need for maximum reliability of
these systems. System electrical power considerations
are discussed.
*(2850)*67*ab*cc*da*f1
Donovan, Robert. "Trade Secrets." SECURITY WORLD, April
1967, pp. 12-18.
*(2860)*65*af*cc*ff*lb*mc
Downs, M. T.; Harlow, W. A.; and Hudson, C. W. "On-Line
Banking Auditing." NAA Bulletin, January 1965, p. 57.
*(2870)*73*ac*ai*bb*be*cc*db*de*fj*hk*hp*ka*me*x1
"DP Cited for Drop in Welfare Rolls." COMPUTERWORLD, 25
April 1973, p. 1.
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Tighter management and computerization have caused a
drop of 17,292 cases in New York's welfare rolls during
February. This was a $777,000 monthly savings. The
computer reduced agency errors and eliminated many
duplicate payments.
*(2880)*71*ac*ai*bb*db
"DP Fraud - Mum's the Word." COMPUTERWORLD, 24 March 1971,
p. 6.
*(2890)*72*ac*ai*bc*bf*cd*dc*df*ia*jf*x2
"DP Operator Arrested: Sabotage Was the Problem,"
COMPUTERWORLD, 2 August 1972, p. 1.
A computer operator was charged with
short-circuiting the National Farmers Union Corporation
computer system at least fifty-six times in the past two
years. But before he was caught, the firm and Burroughs
spent $500,000 trying to find the problem which was
assumed to be a computer hardware or power line problem.
The average down time for the fifty-six instances was
eight hours. The operator caused the shorts by putting a
metal object between open circuits in the computer's
internal disk file.
*(2900)*68*ab*cc*da*el*hn*lb*mc
Drattel, Alan. "Corralling Credit Data." BUSINESS
AUTOMATION, February 1968, p. 40.
Credit Bureau Services of Dallas, Texas is
automating their processing of credit information.
Company management believes the automated system will be
more secure than the old manual system, because now only
the computer terminal operators will have access to the
information (?) whereas before any employee could obtain
access. Daily computer-produced reports will be produced
on each operator's activities. These operators will also
be required to take periodic polygraph tests.
*(2910) *71*ac*ai*da*hd*nm*no
Drattell, Alan. "Survey Shows Privacy Held Less Secure."
COMPUTERWORLD, 30 June 1971.
*(2920)*69*ab*cc*da*fl*hc*xl
Duggan, Michael A. "Software Protection." DATAMATION, June
1969, pp. 113-116.
This article briefly discusses the proceedings of a
workshop sponsored by Growth/Change Seminars on March 3,
1969 in Chicago. Traditional areas of software
protection such as patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade
secrets, and contracts are discussed. Most of the
article is obsolete, but the following list of safeguard
considerations is still useful: will the safeguard
prevent or discourage successful theft; will it provide
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evidence to punish theft after the fact; will it prevent
meaningful duplication or imitation; is the safeguard
easy or hard to implement; what is to be protected - the
idea, the technique, or the expression; is the software
self-protecting due to its dynamic nature; and why is the
protection sought?
*(2930)*69*ae*ca*ea
Dyche, J. W. "Positive Personnel Authentication by
Handwriting." PROCEEDINGS OF CARNAHAN COMFERENCE ON
ELECTRONIC CRIME COUNTERMEASURES, University of Kentucky,
Lexington, Kentucky, 1969, pp. 114-126.
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*(2940)*71*ab*cc*fc*ff*ni
Edds, J. A. "EDP Without Tears." BUSINESS QUARTERLY,
(Canada), Spring 1971, pp. 26-34.
* (2950) *70*ac*ai*gg
"EDP Centers Seen Largely Ignorant of Data Protection."
COMPUTERWORLD, 19 August 1970, p. 8.
* (2960) *66*ad*al*cb*eq*lb
Edwards, D. J. "On-Line Cryptanalytic Aid System (OCAS)."
MAC TR-27, Electrical Engineering Department, MIT,
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139, May 1966.
*(2970)*64*ad*cd*dc*ge*x2
"Electronic Computer Systems 1964." National Fire Protection
Association, 60 Batterymarch Street, Boston,
Massachusetts 02110, $.60.
This pamphlet provides useful information on fire
protection for the computer center.
*(2980)*00*af*cc*dd*de*fp
"Electronic Data Processing and Omissions." Insurance
Policy, Chubb and Son Inc., 90 John Street, New York, New
York 10038.
*(2990)*70*ab*cd*da*dc*gf*gh*mc*x1
"Electronic Security in the Computer Room." BANKING, May
1970, p. 86.
The importance of computer room security for State
Street Bank and Trust Company of Boston is described. A
physical access control system utilizing magnetic encoded
cards is briefly described. The system is sold by
Holobeam Inc., of Paramus, New Jersey.
*(3000)*70*ae*cb*cc*gg*lb
Ellis, Terrance. "Time-Sharing Security." American
Management Association Catastrophe Prevention Seminar, 15
April 1970,
*(3010)*68*ad*cb*cc*da*gh*mh*nq
Ellis, William B. "Security Procedures for the RYE System."
NSA: C924, National Security Agency, 23 December 1968,
(classified).
*(3020)*67*ab*bb*bd*cc*db*dd
"Employees Accused of Illegal Computer Use." DATAMATION,
December 1967, p. 78.
Five employees of the Chicago Board of Education
were accused of using the Board's computer to operate
their own service bureau.
* (3030) *67*ad*cb*fd*gh*mh*ng*x2
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Enger, Isadore; Merriman, Guy T.; and Bussemy, Ann L.
"Automatic Security Classification Study."
RADC-TR-67-472, Rome Air Force Development Center,
Griffis Air Force Base, New York, October 1967.
This is a report on the feasibility of using
computers to automatically assign security
classifications to government documents. Initial results
showed computer assigned security levels agreed only 54%
of the time with manual assigned security levels.
However, the techniques used may still have some future
value.
* (3040) *67*aa*cc*da*dc*hb*kb
Engberg, Edward. THE SPY IN THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND THE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY. World Publishing Company, Cleveland,
Ohio, 1967.
Ethical and legal implications of industrial
espionage are discussed. Methods and devices used by
industrial spies, and countermeasures that can be used
against them are described.
*(3050)*70*ac*da*db*dc*hd*hg*jf*ka*mc*nm
Ernest, M. L. "What Else Will Computers Do To Us." WALL
STREET JOURNAL, 21 October 1970.
This article mentions several social dangers that
can result from companies carelessly using poorly
designed computer information systems. Also discussed
are: depersonalization, vulnerability, and talent bias;
privacy threats of a national information databank; the
dangers in monetary transfers using computers; and
computer sabotage by industrial spies.
* (3060) *67*ae*ag*cb*da*ed*nc*x2
Evans, David C.; and Leclerc, Jean Yves. "Address Mapping
and the Control of Access in an Interactive Computer."
AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Spring Joint Computer
Conference, Vol. 30, 1967, pp. 23-30.
The authors believe that present interactive
computing systems are mainly adaptations of conventional
computing systems and are far from ideal in many
respects. This paper describes a much improved mechanism
developed by the authors for protection, address mapping,
and subroutine linkage. The particular limitations of
present computing systems to which this paper is directed
are: the limiting or controlling of access to specified
regions of physical memory or to specified units of
information; the denying of all direct access to
input/output equipment by user programs; the required
modification of procedures by program to bind segments
together for a computing process; and the lack of a
convenient means for handling semi.independent computing
processes which should operate concurrently with only
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limited interaction.
A mapping mechanism is described by which procedures
are bound to their parameters at execution time without
modification or relocation. Existing address mapping
schemes do not provide all of the desired capability.
Their most serious defect is that access to a segment of
information solely depends on that segment when it should
depend on the access path to that segment. The authors'
system provides access path control for access of
information. This enables strong selective control of
access to information, dynamic binding capability at run
time, and elimination of arbitrary restrictions on access
to I/O equipment. These improvements do not result in
substantial cost increases in hardware or software.
Most of the system concepts discussed in this paper
were developed by others, but the authors' integrated
system design of these concepts is original. Although
the paper was very useful in 1967, it is now somewhat
obsolete.
*(3070)*71*ad*ak*cb*ec*gh
Evans, J. R.; and Roossien, J. W. "File Protect Circuit and
Method." IBM Corporation, White Plains, New York, 15 June
1971.
This article describes a file protection circuit for
disk storage control units which prevents users from
reading unauthorized information from a disk. Each
transfer from a sequentially addressable buffer within
the storage control unit is monitored. A blocking
mechanism is used to prevent the transfer of data fields
when it is determined that the data requested is
unauthorized.
PAGE 97
* (3080) *72*ad*cb*ei
Fabry, R. S. "Dynamic Verification of Operating System
Decisions." Computer System Research, University of
California, Berkeley, California, February 1972, 14 pp.
*(3090)*68*ad*ca*ed*ef*el
Fabry, R. S. "Preliminary Description of a Supervisor for a
Machine Oriented Around Capabilities." COO-614-64,
Institute of Computer Research Quarterly Report No. 18,
University of Chicago, Sect. 1, August 1968, pp. 1-97.
* (3100) *72*ab*cc*ff
Fadell, J. F. "The Auditor of the Future." BANKERS MAGAZINE,
No. 2, 1972, pp. 76-80.
*(3110)*70*ac*ai*dd*de*ka*mc*nl*nm
"Fair Credit Bill Would Protect Against False Billing."
COMPUTERWORLD, 12 August 1970.
*(3120)*68*ad*ak*cb*ed*gh*lb*x1
Falkoff, A. D.; and Iverson, K. E. "APL/360: User's Manual."
IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center, 1968.
One of IBM's efforts to provide file access control
is described. The owner of data may specify a password,
which is the same for all users, to control access to a
work space.
*(3130)*73*ac*ai*be*cc*de*fh*fj*hp*ka*mf*nj*x2
"False Arrests Spark Police Mea Culpa." COMPUTERWORLD, 6
June 1973, p. 6.
After several false arrest suits were filed, the San
Francisco police department publicly apologized for
inaccuracies in its computer system used to identify
wanted persons. The errors appear to be due to human
oversight rather than a faulty computer or computer
program. One suit is asking for $1,500,00 in damages.
The latest suit was brought by a couple who were
wrongfully arrested, roughed up, and held for eighteen
hours. Their car was stolen two years ago, but it was
later returned. The computer system hadn't recorded the
return, and the couple was arrested for auto theft.
*(3140)*67*ab*cb*cc*cd*da*gg*nm
Fanwick, Charles. "Computer Safeguards: How Safe Are They?"
SDC MAGAZINE, System Development Corporation, 2500
Colorado Avenue, Santa Monica, California 90406, July
1967, pp. 26-28.
This entire issue of SDC MAGAZINE is concerned with
computer security and data privacy. The privacy issue is
discussed at length. The security issue is given much
less coverage.
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*(3150)*66*ad*cb*da*gg*hd*ka*mb*nl*nm
Fanwick, Charles. "Maintaining Privacy of Computerized
Data." SP-2647, System Development Corporation, 2500
Colorade Avenue, Santa Monica, California 90406, 1
December 1966.
This report discusses the individual's right to
privacy, databank threats, and legal and technological
safeguards for individual privacy protection.
*(3160)*70*ab*cb*cc*db*ei*el*ff*fi*fk*fx*ia*id*mk*x3
Farmer, James; Springer, Colby; and Strumwasser, Michael J.
"Cheating the Vote-Count System." DATAMATION, May 1970,
pp. 76-80.
In June of 1969, the authors made public the results
of a feasibility study on the vulnerability -of computer
vote-counting systems to fraudulent software
modification. Their conclusions were: the operating
system is vulnerable to modification and could permit
changes without physical access to the user vote-count
program; a vote bias routine would be difficult to detect
during the counting process; a valid logic and accuracy
test requires a sophisticated computer program or very
large amounts of computer time; many vote fraud
techniques require only one person's illegal action; and
none of the techniques considered would be detected by a
casual observer even if he had an extensive EDP
background.
The results of this earlier study were unconvincing
to some computer professionals because the study did not
demonstrate whether such fraud could be performed on
systems commonly in use or how much effort would be
needed. This paper describes a further investigation by
the authors in which they developed a minature
votercounting system and applied fraudulent techniques to
it. The results of this second investigstion confirmed
conclusions drawn from the initial study. The authors
then briefly list several procedural and software
safeguards that can be used to minimize the chance of
undetected fraud in present vote-counting systems.
*(3170)*72*aa*bg*cb*cc*cd*dg*gg*ha*ja*nb*nc*nf*ni*nn
Farr, M. A. L.; Chadwick, B.; and Wong, K. K. COMPUTERS AND
THE PROFESSIONAL - SECURITY FOR COMPUTER SYSTEMS.
National Computing Centre Ltd., Manchester, Lancashire,
England, 1972, 172 pp.
This book lists threats to computer systems and
suggests possible hardware, software, personnel, and
computer environment safeguards. It was written to give
initial guidance to those concerned with protecting their
computer center. The appendix includes a cost effective
matrix that briefly summarizes the effects of various
techniques as applied with negligible, low, or high cost
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to different threats.
*(3180)*71*ac*ai*cb*cd*dd*gc*hu*jg*x2
"Fast Circuits May be More Prone to Failure from Everyday
Shock." COMPUTERWORLD, 20 January 1971, p. 1.
The faster the circuitry in your computer, the more
susceptible it is to errors or failure caused by normal,
everyday electric shock. Properly regulated humidity can
decrease the likelihood of static problems. It is
recommended that computer designers avoid using circuitry
faster than what is required for the computer's
application. The most common static problem was found to
be caused by arcs to ungrounded toggle switches. Several
basic grounding rules in installation planning are given.
*(3190)*70*ac*ai*ba*bb*da*db*hd*ii*lb*ma*nj
"FBI Accuses Youth of Tapping T/S Service, Copying Data
Files." COMPUTERWORLD, 29 July 1970, p. 1.
A Cincinnati youth faces a five year prison term for
unauthorized use of a commercial time-sharing system.
*(3200)*69*ab*ba*cc*da*jc
"FBI Tracks Wandering Wang." BUSINESS AUTOMATION, April
1969, p. 38.
The theft of a $2,500 Wang computer from Argonne
National Laboratories is discussed.
* (3210) *71*ad*cb*eb
"Feature Analysis of Generalized Data Base Management
Systems." CODASYL Systems Committee Report, Available ACM
Headquarters, May 1971.
*(3220)*70*ac*ai*be*cc*db*de*hp*md
"Federal Employee Receives $27,054 Courtesy of Computer
Assisted Error." COMPUTERWORLD, 14 October 1970.
A federal government employee received a $27,000
check that was supposed to have been given to a painting
contractor. The employee cashed the check and spent
$8,000 before the error was detected. The mispayment
resulted from a clerical error.
*(3230)*72*ac*bd*be*cc*dd*de*mc*md*x1
"Federal Reserve Computer Error Caused Puzzling Money
Mark-Up Steps." WALL STREET JOURNAL, 18 February 1972, p.
19.
The Federal Reserve sold a large amount of treasury
bills, causing some money specialists to wonder whether
the Fed had changed its easy-money policy in mid-flight.
However, the Fed's computer system had given out
incorrect information, causing Reserve officials to
believe that there were less reserves in the banking
system than actually was the case.
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*(3240)*71*ad*ak*cb*eq
Feisel, H.; Notz, W. A.; Smith, J. L. "Cryptographic
Techniques for Machine to Machine Data Communications."
RC 3663, IBM Corporation, White Plains, New York, 27
December 1971.
*(3250)*70*af*cc*da*es*he
Fellegi, I. P. "On the Question of Statistical
Confidentiality." ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN
STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION, 1970, (Unpublished).
*(3260) *72*ab*cc*da*es*he
Fellegi, I. P. "Question of Statistical Confidentiality."
JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION, 1972,
pp. 7-18.
*(3270) *71*ae*cc*fy
Felser, G. M. "How Much Longer Will Your Humpty Dumpty Stay
on the Wall?" EDP DISASTER PROTECTION WORKSHOP: 18TH
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, 1971.
The article discusses EDP insurance matters.
*(3280) *68*ab*cc*fm
Fenske, R. W. "The Full Control of Operations in Data
Processing." COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION, April 1968, p. 16.
*(3290)*71*ab*cc*fz*ma
Fenwick, William A. "Marketing EDP Services: Reviewing the
Legal Considerations." COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION, November
1971.
Several security safeguards to protect the
confidentiality of data are discussed.
* (3300) *65*ad*cb*eq
Fiellman, R. W. "Computer Solution of Cryptograms and
Ciphers." SRC-82-A-65-32, Case Institute of Technology
Systems Research Center, 1965.
*(3310)*70*ad*al*ca*cd*ed
Fillat A. L.; and Kraning, L. A. "Generalized Organization
of Large Data-Bases: A Set-Theoretic Approach to
Relations." MAC TR-70, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts
02139, June 1970.
Some of the limitations of the ring structure for
file access control in MIT's MULTICS system are
discussed.
*(3320)*68*ab*cb*cc*ek*ff*gh
Findlay, J. C. "Auditing Computer Records." JOURNAL OF
INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING, October 1968, pp. 484-486.
The "auditape" computer audit program is described.
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*(3330)*68*ab*cd*dc*ge*jg
"Fire Defenses for Computer Rooms." OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS,
December 1968.
Precautionary steps to guard against heat, fire,
smoke, and water damage are described.
* (3340) *72*ab*cd*dc*ge*xl
"Fire Protection for EDP Centers." INFOSYSTEMS, September
1972, pp. 40-41.
This article describes the "Firecycle" water
extinguishing system used at Bell Canada's Don Mills
Center and a carbon dioxide extinguishing system used at
the main EDP center of Owens-Illinois in Toledo, Ohio.
Nothing unusual is presented. The superior Halon 1301
extinguishing system is not discussed.
* (3350) *62*ad*cd*dc*ge*jg
Fire Protection for Essential Electronic Equipment." RP-1,
Federal Fire Council, Washington, D.C. 20405; or AD-?,
National Technical Information Service, Springfield,
Virginia 22151, March 1962.
This pamphlet is quite comprehensive and should be a
valuable guide for those concerned about fire protection.
*(3360)*70*ab*bc*cd*dc*ga*gf*jf*mj*x1
"Firebombs Damage a Computer Center." THE OFFICE, August
1970, pp. 42-43.
This article describes damage done to the Fresno
State College Computer Center when demonstrating students
tossed three gasoline bombs through two unprotected
windows. A list is presented of fifteen new physical and
procedural safeguards taken by the center.
*(3370)*67*ac*ba*bb*da*db
"Fiscal Losses." ELECTRONIC NEWS, 6 December 1967.
* (3380) 73*ae*cb
Fletcher, John. "Octopus Software Security." 7TH ANNUAL IEEE
COMPUTER CONFERENCE, March 1973.
* (3390) *00*ad*cc*me*nm
Fogarty, Michael S. "Issues of Privacy and Security in the
Urban Information System." Northwest Regional Educational
Laboratory, Oregon.
The costs and benefits of a large urban computerized
data bank are described. Privacy issues are also
discussed.
*(3400)*69*ab*cc*cd*da*db*xl
"Foiling the Computer Spy." SUPERVISORY MANAGEMENT, April
1969, pp. 40-42.
This short article superficially discusses several
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types of threats and safeguards such as physical access
control (guards, alarms), pressurized cables, and some
specific auditing techniques.
*(3410)*72*ac*ai*cc*da*hw*mb*nm*x1
"Follow Traditional Security Methods, Canadian Says."
COMPUTERWORLD, 22 November 1972, p. 3.
The title of this article only pertains to the
article's first sentence where Robert Stanbury, Canadian
Minister of Communications, states that traditional
precautions such as personnel selection are at least as
important as sophisticated lock and password systems.
The rest of the article gives some of Stanbury's thoughts
on the conclusions reached by a Canadian Task Force
studying privacy issues related to computerized
databanks. He believes that the privacy issue is under
control, although it could develop into a crisis if
databank owners don't show some restraint. The task
force found that most firms do not store their most
sensitive information in computers.
*(3420)*69*ab*cc*cd*da*gf*hb*x2
"Fortifying Your Business Security." THE OFFICE, August
1969, pp. 39-52.
This article is primarily concerned with physical
access control for preventing thefts and espionage
activities. Computers and data processing are not given
any special attention. Some of the items discussed are:
closed circuit TV; bugging devices; exterior fencing and
lighting; various mechanical and electrical locks;
alarms; and alarm monitoring. Advantages and
disadvantages were given for the following alarm devices:
contact switches, capacity alarms, motion detectors,
photoelectric alarms, ultrasonic alarms, audio systems,
radar and microwave motion detectors, automatic telephone
dialers, and vibration detection system. Unauthorized
visitors are probably one of the biggest causes of office
thefts. Any firm with over $500,000 in annual gross
sales should consider itself a target for industrial
espionage.
* (3430) *70*ab*dc*ge*jg
Ford, Charles. "Halon 1301 Fire Extinguishing Agent." FIRE
JOURNAL, November 1970.
For information about Fenwal's Halon systems, write
Fenwal Inc., 400 Main Street, Ashland, Massachusetts
01721.
*(3440)*71*ab*cc*da*fh*hd*ka*mb*nl*nm*x2
Foster, Caxton C. "Data Banks - A Position Paper." COMPUTERS
AND AUTOMATION, March 1971, pp. 28-30.
The author first attempts to show that there are
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some very real dangers associated with today's personal
databanks. Several threats such as machine failure,
logical errors, wiretapping, unauthorized access, and bad
input data are discussed. The most difficult problem to
control will be the overzealous administrator who can,
and must, because of his job, have access to the
databanks at will, The author proposes twelve legal and
regulatory safeguards that must be implemented if an
individual's privacy is to be truly protected. Some of
these safeguards are: the right not to answer
non-pertinent questions; the right to access and
challenge data; the right to restrict distribution of
one's personal data; government regulation of databanks
with periodic testing; approval of all merged databanks;
and required notification of all individuals whose
personal data is stored in a databank. Maintaining a
databank should be made a legal privilege, not a legal
right.
*(3450)*68*aa*cb*cd*da*db*hb*nm
Foster, J. E. ELECTRONICS AND PRIVACY: SECURITY ASPECTS.
Avco Lycoming Division, Stratford, Connecticut, March
1968.
This article discusses how electronic devices can be
used for protecting privacy instead of just invading it.
Technology in defensive devices has usually lagged behind
that of offensive devices. Privacy and security need to
be given more attention when designing electronic
devices.
* (3460) *73*ab*cc*ff
Francis, F. A. "An Integrated Approach to Computer Audits."
THE INTERNAL AUDITOR, January 1973.
*(3470)*72*ac*ai*cb*da*ep*eq*je*lb*x2
Frank, Ronald A. "Phone Lines Prone to Compromise."
COMPUTERWORLD, 6 December 1972, p. 19.
Some AT&T company policies and hardware safeguards
pertaining to information security are discussed in this
article. The company only allows wiretapping ordered by
a court and only if further ironclad documentation and
assurances are given. There is little hard proof that
unauthorized wiretapping is occurring in any significant
amount. A firm named Datotek Inc. supplies encrypting
devices for protecting remote communications with
computers. These devices can be rented at a price
between $150 and $250 per month.
*(3480)*72*ac*ai*cb*dg*ea*lb*ma*x1
Frank, Ronald A. "T/S Vendors Stress Security of Terminal,
Net, CPU." COMPUTERWORLD, 6 December 1972, p. 21.
The author states that, "While most users fall short
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of encrypting all their data, elaborate measures are
implemented by all time-sharing vendors to protect their
user's information." One should be skeptical about this
statement because most literature on service bureaus
indicates that their security safeguards are quite
inadequate. In fact, the only safeguards discussed in
this article are a few applications of simple passwords.
*(3490)*69*ab*bb*cc*db*ff*hj*kb*kd*ne*nj*x1
Freed, Roy N. "Computer Fraud: A Management Trap." BUSINESS
HORIZONS, June 1969, pp. 25-30.
This article attempts to alert management to legal
and other dangers of continuing to use computers for
business accounting without taking adequate precautions
against embezzlement. Several examples of computer
embezzlement are briefly described. Each corporate
officer has a legal duty to his company to exercise the
care in performance of his duties that a "reasonably
prudent" man would devote to his own business. Moreover,
he is legally obligated to reimburse his corporation for
all losses resulting from his failure to exercise such
care. Coporate officers who sign securities registration
statements are liable to stockholders under Section II of
the Securities Act of 1933 for misleading omissions of
fact. When adequate internal controls are missing and
haven't been compensated for in an audit, CPA's must so
state this in their opinions or risk legal liability
under SEC law. A few simple accounting control
procedures for detecting and preventing embezzlement are
briefly described.
*(3500)*69*ad*cc*fz
Freed, Roy N. "Get the Computer System You Want." HARVARD
BUSINESS REVIEW, November 1969, pp. 99-108.
Guidelines for computer contracting are presented.
*(3510)*69*aa*bg*cc*dg*fy*nj
Freed, Roy N. MATERIALS AND CASES ON COMPUTERS AND LAW.
Boston University Bookstore, Boston, Massachusetts, 1969.
* (3520) *70*ae*ag*cc*df*dg*fz*ma*nk*x3
Freed, Roy N. "The Role of Computer Specialists in
Contracting for Computers - An Interdisciplinary Effort."
AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Fall Joint Computer
Conference, Vol. 37, 1970.
The complexity of computer-communications technology
requires computer specialist involvement in the
negotiation and structuring of legal contracts relating
to computer systems. This paper suggests means for
making such involvement as fruitful as possible for all
parties concerned.
Computer specialists must be called upon to identify
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the pertinent facts in contractual transactions, which
might include: the nature of the customer's needs;
technical aspects of the products or services considered
to fill their needs; and types of business approaches
available to secure those products or services. They
must also: prepare specifications covering the supplier's
performance; select ways for determining whether
performance is satisfactory (acceptance tests) ; identify
possible needs for maintenance; determine the likelihood
that a particular program will be enhanced; determine
items that could comprise a specific software package;
evaluate the risk that a particular proprietary package
will be stolen; point out jeopardies to file information
in time-sharing applications; propose means for
preventing unauthorized access; and identify any other
needs for legal protection. The lawyers'
responsibilities include: verbalizing the details of
relationships; reducing complicated arrangements to
writing; and prodding the parties for an identification
of potential circumstances that require advanced
treatment.
A critical factor is the need to make the customer
truly independent from the supplier after a sound
committment period of a reasonable length of time and
even during that period if the supplier falls down on his
contractual obligations. It is also essential that
substantially all of the written agreement, if not the
entire agreement, be readily understandable by
non-technical individuals.
*(3530)*72*ab*cc*df*dg*fb*fc*ff*fg*fk*fn*fp*fs*fu*fw*fx
*kd*mc*nb*nc*nf*nj*nn*x4
Freiser, J.; and Snelling H. T. "Bank Management's Role in
EDP Security." THE BANKERS MAGAZINE, Winter 1972, pp.
78-83.
The advice given in this article can be useful to
any organization making use of computers, not just the
banking industry. The authors state that total security
responsibility cannot be incumbent on the EDP manager
because he serves as intermediary or caretaker of vital
data at only one stage in a complex process. They
believe that the responsibility for security should
ideally be shared at five levels, each with a differing
involvement, level of sophistication or technical
expertise, and point of view. The user (level 1) should
be primarily responsible for advising the EDP security
coordinator (level 5) of: the value of the file; its
sensitivity; probable consequences if the file is
destroyed, modified, or exposed; and consequences if it
cannot be processed. The user should be aware that the
reconstruction cost of the file is often smaller or
larger than the value of the file to the firm! EDP
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management (level 2) should be responsible for: all
aspects of physical security; reliability (e.g. air
conditioning and power supply); EDP personnel including
training and supervision; low-level backup decisions such
as additional peripheral equipment needs; tape, disk, and
other storage media; and operating procedures. A records
retention group (level 3) should be responsible for
developing standards based on the firm's specific needs
as well as legal requirements, the most important being
the Internal Revenue Service. This group should also:
examine the firm's on-site and off-site file backup
needs; develop emergency, contingency, and disaster
recovery plans; and aperiodically test these plans. The
audit team (level 4) should be responsible for
determining the integrity of all important files. This
is normally an after-the-fact, detection-oriented
safeguard. The audit team should also examine and give
opinions on any possible weaknesses they feel exist in
the security program. Computer security personnel (level
5) should be responsible for most of the planning,
coordinating, and implementing of the EDP security
program. They should have expertise in EDP technology
and financial audit techniques, and have legal council
available on an "as needed" basis.
The authors list the following twelve "instant
security-audit" techniques which a non-technical
executive can examine, even on a walk-through basis, to
determine the need to allocate more resources to
improving security: showcase data center, the open shop,
bad housekeeping, inadequate physical and environmental
precautions, low employee morale, supervision and
training, rotation of duties, lack of adequate file and
documentation control, lack of file and site backup,
absence of comprehensive operating procedures, absence of
security audits, and a mechanical gadgets approach to
data security. A few suggestions are given for improving
the cost/effectiveness of EDP security. It should be
realized that not all security safeguards are pure
financial drains. Many result in effectiveness and
efficiency improvements that alone may justify their
cost.
*(3540)*72*ab*bd*cc*df*dg*fz*ma*nj*nk*x3
Friedman, R. C. "EDP and the Law." DATA MANAGEMENT, August
1972, pp. 14-15.
During the next few years the EDP industry could be
involved in numerous lawsuits arising from increased
liability within the vendor-user-public relationship.
This article investigates two recent and important legal
actions. One of these indicates that vendor liability
will soon extend beyond pure hardware/software
performance to include damages resulting from a
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malfunction of their hardware or software. This
liability may also extend one step further to make the
vendor responsible for damages sustained by clients of
the computer user as a result of vendor hardware/software
errors. The above liabilities now exist for other
manufactured products and may soon be extended to the EDP
industry. In the other recent legal action, a Colorado
court established an important legal precedent in ruling
that a company is legally responsible for actions of its
computer, as if those actions were that of humans. The
author suggests that vendor-user written contracts be
reviewed and that very explicit enumeration of
responsibility for consequential damages be made.
Performance standards should also be made part of this
contract. Users who deal with the public are faced with
a greater chance of a lawsuit, and they need even more
careful examination of their liabilities.
*(3550)*70*ad*ak*ca*cb*ed*ee*ef*ei*ej*fe*lb*nc*ng*x3
Friedman, T. D. "The Authorization Problem in Shared Files."
IBM SYSTEMS JOURNAL, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1970, pp. 258-280.
The author defines "authorization" as determining
whether a user who is correctly recognized by the
computer system should be allowed to access information
he desires. In most of the literature on computer
security, Friedman's "authorization" is referred to as
"computer access control", and authorization refers to
granting access rights through human interaction outside
the computer system. However, Friedman's definition will
be used in this annotation. This paper considers
authorization (Friedman's definition), as far as
possible, apart from specific access mechanisms or
operating systems. It also suggests directions for
future study and research. Information protection is
considered only with regard to secondary storage in
general-purpose, time-sharing systems. The authorization
problem within main storage is not considered.
The authorization problem can be viewed as a matrix
where the columns of the matrix represent particular data
items in the system, the rows represent users of the
system, and each element, d(i,j), in the matrix
represents a decision rule specifying the conditions
under which user "i" is entitled to access the data item
"j" and the actions that "i" is permitted to perform upon
"j". Authorization is not so much a theoretical problem
as one of implementation efficiency. A matrix mapping
function, easily implemented in specialized applications,
may be unmanageable in most general-purpose, time-sharing
systems.
Unauthorized access may be disabled during log-on
when the user requests information, when the system
selects the information, or when the system transmits the
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information. Each disable period allows different
protection capabilities. A program can, in common
situations, require more or less access privileges than
the person who invoked it. An ideal authorization
mechanism should: not disclose information to
unauthorized parties; not be "breakable" by persons
understanding its operation; allow data owners to easily
specify allowed access; allow all common file processing
operations; not significantly increase response time;
place few restrictions on the operating system; not
require users to remember long lists of passwords; and
not depend upon continuous attention of a security
officer.
The author then proposes a hypothetical
authorization system which considers the above ideal
characteristics. The system includes: isolation of the
authorization mechanism from the operating system; access
limitation where files can only be accessed by means of
the authorization system; adjacent tagging where access
control tags are kept adjacent to the data itself; a
single-tag rule where a new tag replaces an old one
instead of adding a second tag; and compartmentalization
where all data similarly restricted to certain users are
assigned a common protection tag. The above
characteristics are then expanded in an illustrative
authorization model. A possible drawback of this system
is that the protection information is stored with the
data. Hoffman, Hsiao, and Manola believe that protection
information should be separated from the data.
*(3560)*67*af*cb*da*eq
Friedman, W. F. "Cryptology." ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
Chicago, Illinois, Vol. 6, 1967, pp. 844-851.
* (3570) *70*ab*cc*ff
Fritzemeyer, J. R.; and Spinelli, C. C. "Auditing Accounts
Receivable by Computer - A Case History." JOURNAL OF
ACCOUNTANCY, April 1970.
*(3580)*73*af*cc*np*xl
FUNK AND SCOTT INDEX OF CORPORATIONS AND INDUSTRIES: SECTION
1 - INDUSTRIES AND PRODUCTS. Predicasts Inc., 200
University Circle Research Center, 11001 Cedar Avenue,
Cleveland, Ohio, 1962-, (Annually).
This index covers company, product, and industry
information from over 750 financial publications,
business-oriented newspapers, trade magazines, and
special reports. Computer security articles can be found
under the index "computer services" (numbered 73991 or
more recently 73700) and sub-indicies "computer service
bureaus", "computer software", "sociological factors",
and "information services". Each annual publication
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contains about fifteen references to computer security
articles. Most of these articles come from DATAMATION,
INDUSTRY WEEK, and COMPUTERWORLD.
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*(3590)*70*ab*cb*cc*fe*hd*ka*mg*nm*x2
Gabrieli, Dr. E. R. "Right of Privacy and Medical
Computing." DATAMATION, April 1970, p. 173.
This article summarizes the proceedings of a four
day conference (October 2-5, 1969) on "The Use of
Computers in Clinical Medicine". The conference was
sponsored by Continuing Medical Education, State
University of New York at Buffalo. The purpose of the
meeting was to formulate some privacy related
recommendations, rather than to reiterate already known
arguments. A 200 to 400 word summary is given on each of
twelve speeches presented at the conference. Some of the
more interesting comments will be presented below.
The release of medical information should be based
on: the purpose of the request, the nature of the
information requested, who is requesting the information,
and the need for the patient's written consent. Adding
privacy safeguards to present computer systems should
cost about $15,000 in one-time storage costs and about
two to ten percent in additional operating time. The
crux of objections to health databanks is that inevitably
there will be pressure for the release of this
information. The pressure could be from employers,
credit agencies, police, private investigators, etc..
Would the databank administrator be sufficiently
independent to withstand such pressures? Legal justice
and scientific progress frequently demand use of medical
data at the expense of personal privacy. In some states,
private communication between the patient and doctor is
not considered privileged in court. Until these problems
are solved, it is ridiculous to try to build a basis for
privacy in massive databanks.
* (3600) *70*ab*cc*fc*ff
Gage, R. W. "A Leadership Opportunity for the Internal
Auditor." THE INTERNAL AUDITOR, July 1970.
*(3610)*56*aa*cb*da*eq
Gaines, H. F. CRYPTANALYSIS. Dover Press, New York, 1956.
This book describes in great detail cryptanalytic
techniques that can be used to break ciphers.
* (3620) *72*ab*ah*cb*ed*el
Gaines, R. Stockton. "An Operating System Bases on the
Concept of a Supervisory Computer." COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
ACM, March 1972.
*(3630)*67*ab*cc*da*fe*fs*hd*ka*mf*nl*nm
Gallati, Robert R. J. "Criminal Justice Systems and the
Right to Privacy." PUBLIC AUTOMATION - OUTPUT, July 1967.
Some limitations for criminal justice databanks, and
a six-point policy program for providing data security
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and protecting individual privacy are discussed.
*(3640)*70*ad*cc*da*ka*lb*mf*nm
Gallati, Robert R. J. "Security and Privacy Consideration in
Criminal History Information Systems." Technical Report
2, Project SEARCH, California Crime Technological
Research Foundation, 1108 14th Street, Sacramento,
California 95814, July 1970.
This report was written to serve as a reference on
privacy and security matters dealing with criminal
history information systems (especially Project SEARCH).
*(3650)*67*ae*ag*cb*cc*da*gg*hd*ka*lb*mf*nm
Gallati, Robert R. J. "Security and Privacy Policy." Speech
Presented at AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Spring Joint
Computer Conference, 1967.
The results" of studies by the New York State
Identification and Intelligence System (NYSIIS) are
presented. The studies analyzed problems of security and
privacy relating to New York's state-wide computerized
criminal information system. This system serves over
3600 agencies in six different areas of criminal justice
administration. Solutions are offered for consideration,
with a view of aiding others in finding insights into
similar problems.
*(3660)*72*ab*bc*cd*dc*gc*hi*jd*jg*x2
Gans, Rudolph, F. "Magnetic Pollution: Is it for Reel?"
INFOSYSTEMS, December 1972, p. 52.
Although it takes a relatively strong magnetic
signal to erase or degrade a magnetic tape, there are
many documented cases which show that the accidental loss
of magnetic tape data is a common problem. Lighting,
magnets, radar, and power generating equipment all
present problems to magnetically stored data. The author
states that tape transports are available for partially
protecting magnetic tapes. Only containers made of
special magnetic alloys can offer protection, and no
containers can offer 100% protection. Plastic or other
fiber material transports offer no protection. However,
even if protective containers are used, good housekeeping
procedures must be enforced if protection is to be
achieved.
*(3670)*66*ab*cb*cc*da*db*dc*fi*hc*kb
Garland, Robert F. "Computer Programs - Control and
Security." MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING, December 1966.
Some good techniques to protect computer programs
are given.
*(3680)*71*ae*cb*dd*de*el*ke*mh
Garrett, J. W. "Security Considerations in Process Computer
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Interface Design." PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE ON THE USE OF DIGITAL COMPUTERS IN PROCESS
CONTROL, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, February 1971, pp. 24-29.
The architecture of a computer-process interface and
its relation to system security are discussed. Good
architecture can be achieved by defining failure modes
and designing the interface to detect and minimize the
effect of these failures. This improved architecture
need not increase the price of the system. Many validity
checks and error traps should be performed by the
software, but adequate hardware inputs must be present to
give software the ability to recognize all serious errors
and failures.
*(3690)*70*ad*cb*ea*ec*ed*ej*el*ep*eq*ff*gg*gh*ng*nh*nl
*nn*x2
Garrison, William A.; and Ramamoorthy, C. V. "Privacy and
Security in Data Banks." AD-718 406, National Technical
Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151,
November 1970, 120 pp.
This paper is primarily concerned with presenting
and comparing hardware and software techniques for
preventing illegal access to information stored within
the computer. The paper is a good summary of about
twenty other papers, but it doesn't appear to contain any
original or uncommon ideas. Four of seven chapters
require some technical knowledge of computers to be
adequately understood. A large number of data access
safeguard techniques are presented. However, none are
discussed in any depth. Throughout the paper the authors
have attempted to list or classify the different:
advantages to pooling information; types of legal and
administrative safeguards; data access threats; types of
information stored; types of databank users; functions of
a secure databank; identification techniques; types of
information activities; file processing restrictions;
memory protection techniques; surveillance functions; and
cryptography techniques. Four cryptography techniques
are compared on a cost, coding efficiency, memory
requirement, and security level basis. The current
status of the Cambridge University File Protection
System, the Berkeley Computer Corporation - Model 1
System, the RUSH Time-Sharing System, and the ADEPT-50
Time-Sharing System are described and compared. Some
possible areas of future research are also suggested.
* (3700) *71*ae*cb*da*ed*ef*hc*ka*mg*nm
Geblat, M.; and Hsiao, David. "Privacy Measures and Data
Accessibility in a Medical System." FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING
OF THE SOCIETY FOR EPIDEMIOLOGIC RESEARCH, 21 May 1971.
This article describes the Cardiovascular Research
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Databank System designed by the Moore School of
Electrical Engineering, University of Pennsylvania.
Users of the system are given access control authority
items. Protection can be implemented down to the field
and record level. A file owner can also write a special
access control program to screen all persons who attempt
to use his file.
*(3710)*73*ab*cb*da*eq
Geffe, P. R. "How to Protect Data With Ciphers That are
Really Hard to Break." ELECTRONICS, 4 January 1973, pp.
99-101.
Many ciphers in use today are based on encoding
techniques that are vulnerable to solution by linear
equations. A non-linear encoding scheme will provide a
much more secure cipher.
*(3720)*70*ab*ba*bb*cc*cd*dg*ha*ne*x1
Gellman, Harvay S. "Crime in Industry: Using the Computer to
Steal." VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, 15 December 1970, pp.
152-155.
This article attempts to briefly point out many
different types of threats to computers and computerized
data. It tries to convince the reader that more than
superficial security measures are necessary for adequate
protection. Sixteen examples of computer fraud, theft,
and destruction are given. The article is directed to
those people who are unaware of the importance of
computer security. It is exactly the same as two other
articles by Gellman entitled "How the Computer can be
Used to Rob You Blind" in RISK MANAGEMENT and "Using the
Computer to Steal" in COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION. Nothing
new or unusual is presented.
*(3730)*71*ab*ba*bb*cc*cd*dg*ha*ne*x1
Gellman, Harvey S. "How the Computer can be Used to Rob You
Blind." RISK MANAGEMENT, August 1971.
This article attempts to briefly point out many
different types of threats to computers and computerized
data. It tries to convince the reader that more than
superficial security measures are necessary for adequate
protection. Sixteen examples of computer fraud, theft,
and destruction are given. The article is directed to
those people who are unaware of the importance of
computer security. It is exactly the same as two other
articles by Gellman entitled "Using the Computer to
Steal" in COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION and "Crime in
Industry: Using the Computer to Steal" in VITAL SPEECHES
OF THE DAY. Nothing new or unusual is presented.
*(3740)*71*ab*ba*bb*cc*cd*dg*ha*ne*x1
Gellman, Harvey S. "Using the Computer to Steal." COMPUTERS
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AND AUTOMATION, April 1971, pp. 16-19.
This article attempts to briefly point out many
different types of threats to computers and computerized
data. It tries to convince the reader that more than
superficial security measures are necessary for adequate
protection. Sixteen examples of computer fraud, theft,
and destruction are given. The article is directed to
those people who are unaware of the importance of
computer security. It is exactly the same as two other
articles by Gellman entitled "How the Computer can be
Used to Rob You Blind" in RISK MANAGEMENT and "Crime in
Industry: Using the Computer to Steal" in VITAL SPEECHES
OF THE DAY. Nothing new or unusual is presented.
*(3750) *00*ad*cc*db*f1
"General Information on Copyright." Copyright Office,
Washington, D.C. 20540.
This circular gives introductory information for
obtaining a copyright. Another circular on obtaining
computer program copyrights is also available upon
request.
*(3760)*00*aa*cb*cc*cd*da*hb*lb
Gerhard, William D. NETWORK OF COMPUTERS. National Security
Agency, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755.
Thirty pages of this book are devoted to computer
security. Nothing really new or unique is discussed.
*(3770)*72*ac*ai*bb*cc*db*hm*mj*x2
"Ghosted Programs for Sale." COMPUTERWORLD, 22 March 1972,
p. 1.
The practice of hiring outsiders to write term
papers has spread into the computer science department at
the University of Michigan. At least one firm, Creative
Research, performs programming services for students.
For a relatively small and simple program the fee is from
$10 to $15. Creative Research acts as a middleman
operation by contracting advanced computer students and
local business programmers to do the programming. These
programmers usually use the university computer for
program testing and debugging. Since they can implement
working programs more efficiently, they are able to use
the student's unused allotted programming time for their
own purposes.
*(3780)*73*ab*bb*cc*db*hj*mc*xl
"Ghostly Insurance." TIME, 16 April 1973, p. 90.
The Equity Funding Corporation scandal, one of the
largest scandals in U.S. history, is briefly described.
The firm created fictitious insurance policyholders, put
them on their books, and sold the phoney policies to
other companies in the business of reinsurance. Under
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this arrangement the reinsurer pays the company that sold
the policy $1.80 for every $1.00 it gets in premiums the
first year. The buyer hopes to make a profit on premiums
of later years, while the seller continues to service the
policy. Up to $1 billion of Equity's $6.5 billion in
insurance is expected to be fake, At later stages of the
scandal, large groups of Equity Funding employees knew of
and participated in the scandal. The computer played a
major role in deceiving outside auditors.
*(3790)*72*ab*cb*da*eq*gh*nk*x4
Girsdansky, M. B. "Cryptology, the Computer, and Data
Privacy." COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION, April 1972, pp.
12-19.
This article first presents a description of the
Vigenere and Vernam encipherment techniques, and a loop
system for producing extra long keys for these two
techniques. This is followed by an excellent very
detailed discussion of how and under what circumstances
these ciphers can be broken. Bryant Tuckerman, an IBM
researcher whose work is the basis for much of this
article, found that most Vigenre and Vernam techniques
can be broken with surprisingly little effort. The
multiple-loop system provides surprisingly little
additional security to these two techniques. Methods
used to break these ciphers are also explained in some
detail. The first part of this article should definitely
be read by those seriously interested in cryptography.
The author states that surprisingly secure ciphers
can be produced with the successive application of
relatively simple substitution and transposition methods.
An IBM cryptographic system named "LUCIFER" is then
explained in some detail. This system is based on
successive application of substitution and transposition
methods developed by IBM's Horst Feistel. The system was
implemented using a combination of hardware and software
developed by William A. Notz and J. Lynn Smith. It
encodes and transmits data in 128 bit blocks, can be
attached to any terminal, and is compatible with all
System 360 equipment.
*(3800)*71*ad*ak*cb*da*eq*gh*ng
Girsdansky, M. B. "Data Privacy: Cryptology and the Computer
at IBM Research." IBM RESEARCH REPORTS, Vol. 7, No. 4,
IBM Corporation, White Plains, New York, 1971.
This report describes research being done by IBM to
devise unbreakable ciphers. Most conventional
encipherment schemes are easily broken with the aid of a
computer. The LUCIFER hardware encryption device is also
described.
*(3810)*67*ae*ag*cb*da*ed*gh*lb*x2
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Glaser, Edward L. "A Brief Description of Privacy Measures
in the MULTICS Operating System." AFIPS CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS, Spring Joint Computer Conference, Vol. 30,
1967, pp. 303-304.
All references to data are made by symbolic name and
never by physical address. Each file has an associated
access-control list defining authorized users. The
log-in routine not only includes passwords, but can also
include special log-in algorithms. A combination of
hardware and software safeguards is used to prevent the
user from gaining access to privileged instructions. The
operating system activities are separated in program
modules which help to minimize illegal disclosure of the
entire system. The system can record extensive audit
trails on any specified user or program.
*(3820)*68*ae*cb*cc*dg*gg
Glaser, Edward L. "The Safeguarding of Information: A User's
View." PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION
FOR INFORMATION PROCESSING (IFIP) CONGRESS: Supplement
Booklet 1, (Amsterdam: North Holland), August 1968,
pp.13-16.
*(3830)*65*ae*ag*cb*el*gh*lb*xl
Glaser, Edward L. "Systems Design of a Computer for
Time-Sharing Applications." AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS,
Fall Joint Computer Conference, Vol. 27, 1965, pp.
197-202.
The modifications of a General Electric 635 computer
for MIT's MULTICS System are described in this article.
A totally new I/O control unit was designed, as well as a
new high speed drum system for secondary storage, But by
far the most significant change was the introduction of a
new form of addressing logic incorporating segments and
pages. The system also utilizes three distinct modes of
execution. Most of the paper is devoted to discussing,
memory allocations and addressing schemes. The paper is
quite technical and only indirectly concerned with
computer security.
*(3840)*71*ab*ba*da*hd*lb
Godbout, W. "Computer Theft by Computer." SECURITY WORLD,
May 1971.
*(3850)*72*ab*cc*da*fl*nc*ng*x4
Goldberg, David. "Legal Protection of EDP Software."
DATAMATION, May 1972, pp. 66-70.
The author, a lawyer, describes various advantages
and disadvantages of using patents, statutory copyrights,
common law copyrights, and trade secrets for protecting
computer software. He concludes that none of these
provide adequate protection, although a combination of
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common law copyright and trade secret protection appears
to offer the best alternative under current law. Pending
legislative and non-legislative developments are also
analyzed. The author feels that a proposal by IBM,
although not pleasing in every detail, offers a highly
desirable form of protection. IBM's proposal is for a
registration system. Protection duration would be for a
relatively short period, and liability would be incurred
for unauthorized duplication, translation, or use.
Although the author's discussion on patents is obsolete,
the remaining 95% of this article is still quite
relevant. Because of the quickly changing nature of the
subject, there are few, if any, other articles that are
both more comprehensive and more up-to-date (as of May
1973).
*(3860)*72*ad*ak*cb*da*dc*dd*eb*ed*ht*hu*na
Goldberg, S. L.; and Woodrum, L. J. "Data Security and
Recovery Techniques." IBM TECHNICAL DISCLOSURE BULLETIN,
Vol. 14, No. 11, April 1972, pp. 3286-3287.
Most existing computer error detection and
correction techniques are only capable of correcting a
single bit or byte. The author describes a storage
method that can recover an entire disk track of destroyed
data. This storage method can also protect against
unauthorized access of the data.
*(3870)*70*ae*cb*da*eb*gh
Goldstein, Robert C.; and Strnad, Alois J. "The MacAIMS Data
Management System." ACM Special Interest Group on File
Description and Translation (SIGFIDET) Workshop, 1970.
*(3880)*73*ab*cc*fb*fm*nc
"Good Management of Computer Operations." COMPUTERS AND
AUTOMATION, February 1973, pp. 20-24.
*(3890)*73*ab*ba*bd*cb*da*ep*eq*hb*kb*x1
Goode, George E. "Security for Teleprinters and Data
Communications." DATA MANAGEMENT, January 1973, pp.
21-26.
There is a greater need for data security for the
following reasons: growth in communications, increased
competition, increasing pressure applied by governments,
growth of crime, and easier availability of electronic
snooping devices. Sales information, financial
information, legal negotiations, plans for expansion,
production data and problems, geographical exploration,
personnel data, and payroll data are targets of
industrial espionage. Examples are given of sensitive
information getting into the wrong hands either by
accident or by fraud. These examples appear to be unique
to this article. However, the firms involved were not
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revealed.
The author, president of Datotek Inc. (a seller of
cryptographic equiptment), uses the remaining two-thirds
of this article to describe a device his firm markets,
which encodes and decodes data transmitted between
teleprinters. The device is described only in very
general non-technical terms. Its true security and
efficiency can not be determined from this article.
*(3900)*70*ae*cb*da*gg*hd*lb*mb*nm
Goodfellow, B. B. "Projections of the Impact of Technology
on the Development of Large Data Base Information
Systems." CONFERENCE ON COMPUTERS: PRIVACY AND FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario,
Canada, May 1970.
*(3910)*64*ab*cc*db*ff*kb*kd*xl
Goodman, John V. "Auditing Magnetic Tape Systems." THE
COMPUTER JOURNAL, July 1964.
Very little of the article is applicable to systems
other than fully magnetic tape systems.
*(3920)*70*ab*cc*da*fd*hd*ka*mb*nl
Gotlieb, C. C. "Regulations for Information Systems."
COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION, September 1970, pp. 14-17.
The author suggests that information systems be
classified. He also examines the goals, methods, and
costs of information system regulation.
*(3930)*70*ab*ba*cc*da*jc*md*me
"Government Offices Lose Things Too." THE OFFICE, August
1970.
* (3940) *71*ad*cb*dg*ed*ei
Graham, G. Scott. "Protection Structures in Operating
Systems." Master's Thesis, Department of Computer
Science, University of Toronto, Canada, August 1971.
*(3950)*72*ae*ag*ca*dg*ee*ei*ej*el*gh*nc*nh*x4
Graham, G. Scott; and Denning, Peter J. "Protection
Principles and Practice." AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS,
Spring Joint Computer Conference, Vol. 40, 1972, pp.
417-429.
An abstract access control model is developed which
provides a basis for comparing and evaluating quite
different access control systems. It can also be used
to: isolate the elements of protection; formulate methods
for proving the correctness of a protection system; and
identify nontechnical issues required to complement the
technical ones.
The model is based on a security matrix where the
columns of the matrix correspond to particular objects,
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"X", to which access must be controlled (files, devices,
subjects), and the rows correspond to particular
subjects, "S", which are active entities whose access to
objects must be controlled. Each element of the matrix,
A(S,X), corresponds to a particular set of rules in which
subject "S" is permitted access to object "X" and the
actions that "S" is permitted to perform upon "X". The
authors present a set of eight commands which the access
control monitor uses to modify the security matrix. The
entire protection system is viewed as a set of subjects,
monitors, and objects. The subjects can access the
objects only through the monitors. All monitors (file
system, memory addressing hardware, terminal manager) can
read the security matrix, but only the access control
monitor can modify it. Beside the very common
subject-object attributes of read, write, and execute,
several other very interesting attributes such as: copy
flag, transfer only, limited use, and indirect use are
described. Dennis and Van Horn's capability list,
Lampson's domains of capability, the MULTICS system's
access control list, and IBM's system of locks and keys
are all discussed in the context of this abstract model.
The model clearly shows where technical access control
safeguards can provide no protection and where legal and
procedural safeguards must be implemented.
This article is required reading for anyone
concerned with designing access control systems. It can
also be quite educational for other readers. However, it
is somewhat technical and requires a fair understanding
of internal computer operations.
*(3960)*68*ab*ah*al*cb*dg*ec*ed*ei*gh*x2
Graham, Robert M. "Protection in an Information Processing
Utility." COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, May 1968, pp.
365-369.
The problems of protecting both user and system
information during the execution of a process are the
primary concern of this article. The author feels that a
satisfactory protection mechanism should have the
following properties: any user should be able to deny
access by other users to all of his memory segments; it
should be easy for a user to control access privileges of
other users; layers of protection should be available to
apply a "need to know" philosophy to any degree; and
procedures should be able to be called across layers of
protection without any special programming on the part of
the calling procedure. Graham's concentric model for
access control is described along with the necessary
hardware and software properties needed to implement his
model. This model is the basis for access control in
MIT's MULTICS system. However, much has been done since
this article was written and several better access
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control concepts now exist,
*(3970)*69*ab*bc*cc*cd*dc*jf*mj*x1
Grant, C. B. "Will Students Wreck Your Computer Center?"
DATA PROCESSING MAGAZINE, May 1969, pp. 62-63.
This article describes the destruction of the Sir
George Williams University computer center by rioting
students. Several reasons why computer centers need more
protection are briefly discussed. The author then goes
into a rather emotional discussion on why all rioters are
the scum of the earth, and how we should revolutionize
our school admissions policies to admit anyone who wants
to attend.
*(3980)*68*ab*cc*db*de*ff*hk*hp
Greco, J. A. "Comments on the Structural Check of Input Data
in a Computer System." JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY, June 1968,
pp. 46-52.
*(3990)*66*aa*cc*da*db*dc*hb
Greene, Richard M. Jr. BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE AND ESPIONAGE.
Dow Jones-Irwin Inc., 1966.
*(4000)*71*ae*cb*cc*da*ha
Greenlee, Malcom B. "Privacy Considerations for Computer
Systems." ADVANCED MANAGEMENT RESEARCH SEMINAR ON
COMPUTER SECURITY, 1971.
*(4010)*69*ae*cc*da*fb*ka*mb*nj*nk*nl*nm
Greenier, E. J. Jr. "Computers and Privacy: A Proposal for
Self-Regulation." PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM, October 1969,
pp. 231-269.
Some legal problems in assuring the privacy and
security of computerized data are discussed. Recent
trends in the law of privacy are analyzed, and a
theoretical projection of possible future developments is
made. The author concludes that the computer industry
must start a program of self-regulation if it is to
continue to operate in the public interest. He suggests
that this program be modeled after the highly successful
National Association of Securities Dealers.
* (4020) *68*ad*cb*dg
Grochow, J. M. "The Graphic Display as an Aid in the
Monitoring of a Time-Shared Computer System." MAC-TR-54,
MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139; or AD-689 468,
National Technical Information Service, Springfield,
Virginia 22151, October 1968, 82 pp.
This article is primarily concerned with explaining
the use and advantages of a graphic display as a medium
for dynamic observation of the processor state of a
time-shared system. The problem of data security is only
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briefly discussed.
*(4030)*68*ab*cc*db*dd*de*fi*hr
Gruenberger, Fred. "Program Testing and Validating."
DATAMATION, July 1968.
Some testing methods are described as well as some
of the most frequently made testing mistakes.
*(4040)*71*ab*ba*cc*cd*da
"GSA Tightens Office Building Security." THE OFFICE,
February 1971, p. 32.
*(4050)*71*ad*cb*cc*lb*md*nd
"GSA Time-Sharing RFP (Protection Requirements)." General
Services Administration: Federal Supply Service,
Washington, D.C., November 1971.
*(4060)*71*ab*bc*bd*be*cc*cd*dc*dd*de*jf*x1
"Guard that Computer." NATIONS BUSINESS, April 1971, pp.
84-86.
The purpose of this article is to convince the
reader that more than superficial safeguards are
necessary to provide adequate protection for the computer
and its magnetically stored data. Several examples of
computer and data destruction by sabotage or accident are
briefly described. Building location, fire protection,
air conditioning, access control, disaster plans, record
backup, and good housekeeping are some of the main points
that must be checked.
*(4070)*71*ad*ak*cb*cc*cd*dg*gg*nb*nf
"Guidelines for Protection and Control in a Computer
Environment," Report No. ?, IBM Corporation, Data
Processing Headquarters, Field Systems Center,
Poughkeepsie, New York, 1971.
This is a very useful manual on the subject of how
to develop and implement a comprehensive computer
security program.
*(4080)*70*af*cc*dg*fb*nj*x2
"The Guilt-Edged Computers. Part 1: The Plight of the
Insiders." ADP NEWSLETTER, The Diebold Group Inc., 430
Park Avenue, New York, New York, 29 April 1970.
This article is meant to be a warning to management
about establishing adequate controls and safeguards for
protecting their computer and essential,
magnetically-stored, business data. Reports of data
losses are increasing and so are cases of stockholder
suits on the grounds of mismanagement. Executives can be
personally liable for not establishing adequate internal
controls, and CPA's can be liable for not verifying that
adequate internal controls don't exist.
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*(4090)*68*ab*cc*fc*ff
Guiltinan, R. J. "EDP and the Auditor." CPA JOURNAL,
September 1968, pp. 639-641.
*(4100)*69*ab*cb*cc*dg*lb
Guise, Robert F. Jr.. "File Security." DATA SYSTEMS NEWS,
November 1969, p. 30.
File security in a time-sharing environment is
briefly discussed.
*(4110)*00*ad*cc*da*mb*nm
Guise, Robert F. Jr. "Security and Privacy." CTSS Position
Paper, Com-Share Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan.
The databank and privacy problem is discussed in
quite general terms. The author suggests that the
computer industry regulate itself.
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* (4120) *69*ab*ah*dd*ht*hu
Habermann, A. N. "Prevention of System Deadlocks."
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, June 1969, p. 373.
* (4130) *70*ab*cc*dc*fw
Hallinan, Arthur J. "Internal Audit of a Computer Disaster
Plan." THE INTERNAL AUDITOR, November 1970.
*(4140)*71*ac*cc*da*fe*hd*ka*lb*mf*nm*x2
Halloran, Richard. "Inquiry on Surveillance Hears State
Aide." NEW YORK TIMES, 11 March 1971, p. 26.
Robert Gallati, director of the New York State
Identification and Intelligence System, stated before
Congress that he believes personal information systems
can be properly safeguarded to protect the privacy of
individual citizens. Earlier testimony was in sharp
contrast to this. The rest of this short article
describes certain features of the New York system. It
employs 800 people and can be accessed through any of
3,600 terminals located in various criminal justice
agencies throughout New York. Privacy was protected by
limiting users of the system, restricting the information
programmed into the system, forbidding unauthorized
disclosure, permitting individuals to see their own
files, and only recording records of individuals
considered likely to be criminal repeaters. Certain
hardware and software safeguards were also developed.
*(4150)*70*ab*cc*da*ka*nl*nm*xl
Halsbury, The Earl of. "Lord Halsbury Speaks on Computer
Privacy." COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION, July 1970, pp. 42-43;
or THE COMPUTER BULLETIN, February 1970.
The author warns that all existing computer security
systems can be beaten. He urges that the individual be
given the right to see any information stored on him and
that the keeping of secret computerized files on
individuals be made illegal.
*(4160)*68*ab*cb*cc*db*kd*ni
"Halting the Electronic Hijacker." MODERN OFFICE PROCEDURES,
September 1968.
This article discusses computer fraud and gives a
checklist of controls.
*(4170)*73*aa*bg*cc*cd*dg*fy*gf*gg*ha*ja*ni
Hamilton, Peter. COMPUTER SECURITY. Auerbach Publishers, 121
North Broad Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19107,
1973, 384 pp., $9.95.
This book emphasizes the protection of innocent
people from computer abuse and misuse. It is divided
into nine chapters with the following titles: Computers
and Trends in Crime and Fire; The Vulnerability of
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Computers; Relating Security Theory to Computer
Vulnerability; Physical Security and Control of Access;
Security of Computer Personnel; Surveillance of People
and Property, Computer Security and Risk Management;
Checklist for the Security of a Company and Its Computer
Complex; and Subversion by Computer. Also discussed are
a variety of power ploys involving both operations abuses
and system destruction which could disrupt and render
helpless a computer-dependent society.
*(4180)*72*ac*ai*cc*da*ka*nj*no
Hanlon, Joseph. "British Study Discounts Computer Privacy
Threats." COMPUTERWORLD, 26 July 1972, p. 4.
The Younger Committee on Privacy found little hard
evidence that the computer was a threat to individual
privacy. A set of ten principles for handling personal
information is given. Criticisms of the report are also
included.
*(4190)*71*ac*ai*ba*cb*cc*da*ka*mg*x1
Hanlon, Joseph. "Diagnostic DP Impractical: M.D. Hits
Privacy Safeguards." COMPUTERWORLD, 30 June 1971, p. 2.
Dr. Leonard Cronkhite, General Director of
Children's Hospital Medical Center, stated in a
wide-ranging interview on "computers in health care" that
privacy safeguards for medical records are inadequate and
computerization will make the problem worse. He states
that a $20 bill will buy anything at Children's Hospital.
Most hospitals provide little or no safeguards for
personal data. Also, manufacturers have not made
available any reasonable safeguards.
*(4200)*69*ac*ai*nm
Hanlon, Joseph. "Need Seen for Ombudsman to Regulate All
Data Banks." COMPUTERWORLD, 13 August 1969.
Jerry Rosenberg's book THE DEATH OF PRIVACY is
reviewed in this article.
*(4210)*71*ac*ai*ba*cc*da*fl*ft*ka*mf*nm*x2
Hanlon, Joseph. "Security Breach Leads to Police Data
Theft." COMPUTERWORLD, 10 February 1971, p. 1.
Two policemen and several others have been charged
with selling confidential information, including data
from New York State's computerized criminal history file,
to eight detective agencies and two airlines. The
policemen did not tap the computer directly, but stole
data from manual files which contained data taken
legitimately from the computer. The companies paid $1 to
$4 for each name check. One detective has been accused
of making over $10,000 a year selling information. Much
of the data in the computer is transferred to paper files
in New York City, and security for these paper files is
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quite weak.
*(4220)*70*ac*ai*bc*dc*jf*mj*nj
Hanlon, Joseph. "Ten Students Convicted in 1969 Computer
Center Burning." COMPUTERWORLD, 29 April 1970.
The events leading up to the computer disaster at
Sir George Williams University are discussed. Certain
aspects of the trial are also covered.
*(4230)*71*ae*ag*cb*cc*er*es*fd*he*ka*mb*ng*nm*x4
Hansen, Morris H. "Insuring Confidentiality of Individual
Records in Data Storage and Retrieval for Statistical
Purposes." AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Fall Joint
Computer Conference, Vol. 39, 1971, pp. 579-585.
The goal of this paper is to summarize some aspects
and principles of confidentiality, and some implications
of these principles for computer-based storage systems.
The remarks will have special relevance for open
retrieval systems in which customers (the general public)
can retrieve any desired statistics, subject to a review
to insure that the output conforms to prescribed rules
designed to avoid individual disclosure. Much of this
paper draws on Census Bureau experience, This experience
shows that serious unresolved problems exist, which are
especially difficult for a system such as the proposed
federal data center.
Some resolved and unresolved questions concerning
rules for protecting confidentiality of individual
records are briefly presented below. Should disclosure
rules take into account information sensitivity? Some
information changes sensitivity with time and some does
not. Presumably it is not feasible to protect against
disclosure by collusion. It is difficult but possible
for a person with enough supplemental knowledge about an
individual to identify additional information about him.
Errors and differences in time reference increase
statistical confidentiality. Indirect disclosures are a
major source of difficulty, and they require that
priorities be made in determining which statistics will
be made available and which will not. This priority
problem is alone sufficiently serious enough to foreclose
development of a federal data center. Random
modification of data to avoid approximate disclosure
often reduces the usefulness of the data. Disclosure of
statistical information from samples of a much larger
database has proven highly successful in reducing the
probabiltiy of individual disclosures while not reducing
the data usefulness. The issue of disclosing disclosure
rules is unresolved. There is no basis for assuming an
all-powerful software system can preserve confidentiality
in a national statistical data center.
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* (4240) *70*ae*cc*da*me*nm
Hansen, Morris H. "Some Aspects of Confidentiality in
Information Systems." EIGHTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE
URBAN REGIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS ASSOCIATION, September
1970.
* (4250) *70*ab*ah*cb*cc*dg
Hansen, P. B. "The Nucleus of a Multiprogrammed System."
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, April 1970, p. 238.
*(4260) *71*ab*cc*ff
Harris, R. D. "EDP Systems Audits." DATA MANAGEMENT,
September 1971, pp. 64-71.
* (4270) *67*ad*aj*nm*np*x4
Harrison, Annette. "The Problem of Privacy in the Computer
Age: An Annotated Bibliography." RM-5495-PR/RC, RAND
Corporation, Santa Monica, California 90406, December
1967, 125 pp.
This is an excellent selected bibliography which has
annotations on more than 300 articles pertaining to all
aspects of the problem of privacy in the computer age.
Most of the entries are from the years 1965-1967. The
annotations are very well written and average about 100
words in length. Entries are categorized under sixteen
subject headings entitled: Business and Industry View of
Privacy; Cashless-Checkless Society and Privacy; Computer
Utilities, Time Sharing, and Privacy; Congressional View
of Privacy; Data Banks; Electronic Eavesdropping and
Wiretapping; Federal Statistical Data Center; Government
Agencies and Privacy; Legal and Law Enforcement View of
Privacy; Mailing Lists and Privacy; Miscellaneous News
Media Reporting on Privacy; Privacy Concern in Foreign
Countries; Religious Concern and Privacy; Social
Scientists' View of Privacy; System Security; and
Technologists' Views of Privacy. The 16 page
introduction gives a very good overview of current (1967)
problems in the field of computers and privacy. Only 24
of the 300 entries dealt with computer security issues.
This bibliography is a must for anyone interested in the
privacy-computer relationship.
*(4280)*69*ad*aj*nm*np*x4
Harrison, Annette. "The Problem of Privacy in the Computer
Age: An Annotated Bibliography -Volume 2."
RM-5495/1-PR/RC, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica,
California 90406, December 1969, 148 pp.
This is the second part of an excellent selected
bibloigraphy on the problem of privacy in the computer
age. See the Volume 1 annotation for additional
information. Most of the over 300 entries in this volume
cover the period 1967-1969. There is no overlap of
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entries in these two volumes. The entries are again
categorized under sixteen subject headings. An eight
page introduction gives a very good overview of current
(1969) privacy problems. Only 20 of the 300 entries in
this volume dealt with computer security issues. Again,
this bibliography is a must for those interested in how
computers are affecting individual privacy. The author
believes it is critically important that a balance be
struck between an individual's right to privacy and
society's right to know, before society's right is the
only one recognized.
*(4290)*68*ab*cc*ff
Harrison, J. P. "An Auditor's View of Data Processing." DATA
MANAGEMENT, September 1968, pp. 32-36.
*(4300)*68*ab*ah*cb*ec
Harrison, M. C. "Implementation of the SHARER 2 Time-Sharing
System." COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM. December 1968, p.
845.
This article describes a mechanism which allows the
execution of part of a program with its own memory
protection. The SHARER time-sharing system which uses
this feature is described.
*(4310)*69*ab*cc*dd*fi*hr
Harrison, William L. "Program Testing." DATA MANAGEMENT,
December 1969.
The author recommends that an independent testing
and evaluation group be formed for program testing
purposes.
*(4320)*68*ac*ai*db*mf
"Has the Mafia Permeated the Computer Community?"
COMPUTERWORLD, 28 August 1968, 11 September 1968.
Ways in which organized crime could benefit from
using the computer are discussed.
*(4330)*72*ab*cb*cc*dg*ff*fi*fp*nf*ni*x2
Hawkins, David H. "How Safe is Your Software?" COMPUTER
DECISIONS, June 1972, pp. 18-20.
This article was written for a reader with little
knowledge of computers and/or software security. The
author very briefly describes several common types and
levels of access control such as: passwords, classifying
users into security levels, read/write/execute control,
maintaining security tables, and threat monitoring.
Software security is no more safe than the operating
system, which is of questionable secureness for almost
all manufacturers. The author makes a few more
suggestions and then presents the following checklist:
are integrity checks made on system programmers and
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operations personnel; is access restricted according to
the level of employee; are key words frequently changed;
do procedures for monitoring security violations exist;
is the operating system secure; are restart and recovery
procedures used; are backup files kept; are changes well
documented; are periodic security effectiveness checks
made; and is cryptography used for data transmission?
*(4340)*72*ab*cb*dg*ff*fi*fp*nf*x2
Hawkins, David H. "Protecting EDP Systems from Fifth-Column
Attacks." MANAGEMENT REVIEW, October 1972, pp. 51-53.
This article is a condensed version of another
article by Hawkins entitled "How Safe is Your Software?"
in COMPUTER DECISIONS.
*(4350)*68*aa*cd*nb*x3
Healy, Richard J. DESIGN FOR SECURITY. John Wiley and Sons
Inc., New York, New York, 1968, 309 pp.
This book deals only with the physical aspects of
security and no particular attention is given to
computers. The material was designed to demonstrate how
the use of proper planning and design, as well as the use
of modern techniques and devices, can significantly
reduce costs and, at the same time, improve the
protection program. The book was intended to be of use
to security administrators, architects, plant engineers,
personnel managers, and anyone else concerned with the
protection of a firm's facilities.
*(4360)*69*aa*bc*cc*cd*dc*fw*gd*jf*jg*nf*nn*x2
Healy, Richard J. EMERGENCY AND DISASTER PLANNING. John
Wiley and Sons Inc., New York, New York, 1969, 290 pp.
All key aspects to be considered in a plan to cope
with disaster are discussed. This book is complete as a
general planning guide. It can also be used as a
reference document because it contains a wealth of detail
on many subjects. However, there are no explicit
discussions on computer disasters. The author has a
distinguished international reputation in the field of
emergency planning and industrial security. The book is
divided into twelve chapters with the following titles:
General Disaster Considerations; Emergency Plan Factors -
Peacetime Disasters; Emergency Plan Factors - Enemy
Attack; Nuclear Attack Effects; Nuclear Accidents;
Accidents Involving Hazardous Chemicals; Winds, Cyclones,
Hurricanes, and Tornados; Earthquakes; Floods; Homemade
Bombs - Bomb Hoaxes; Riots, Civil Disturbances, and
Demonstrations; and Psychological Reaction on People.
* (4370) *73*aa*cc*da*db*dc*hb
Healy, Richard J. PROTECTING YOUR BUSINESS AGAINST
ESPIONAGE. American Management Association Inc., 135 West
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50th Street, New York, New York 10020, 1973, $9.00.
*(4380)*71*aa*bg*cc*cd*dg*el*en*fb*fi*fy*gg*hb*hd*jd*je
*jf*jg*ka*lb*nf*nn*x2
Healy, Richard J.; and Walsh, Timothy J. INDUSTRIAL SECURITY
MANAGEMENT. American Management Association Inc., 135
West 50th Street, New York, New York 10020, 1971, 274
pp., $15.75.
This book discusses the size, trend, and character
of security loss risks. Explicit descriptions of the
ways in which losses actually occur and specific
countermeasure recommendations are given. The book is
divided into twelve chapters with the following titles:
The Security Gap, Organizing a Security Operation,
Essentials of a Security Program, Prevention of
Industrial Espionage, Riots and Civil Disturbances,
Computer Security, Prevention of Thefts and Frauds, Guard
Operations, Bombs and Bomb Hoaxes, The Systems Approach
to Security, Screening and Investigation of Applicants,
Effects of Changing and Social Environment on Security.
The twenty page chapter on computer security discusses:
fire, storage, industrial accident, natural disaster and
contingency plans, system malfunction, electronic data
theft, time-sharing system dangers, fraud and
embezzlement, espionage, physical access control,
operating procedure controls, program control, and
insurance. However, this chapter on computer security is
quite basic, and only the most common safeguards are
presented.
*(4390)*72*ab*cc*fm
Heeschen, P. E. "Auditing Data Processing Administrative
Activities." THE INTERNAL AUDITOR, November 1970, pp.
55-62.
*(4400)*70*ad*aj*cb*cc*da*gg*hd*ka*mg*nm
Hellman, John Jay. "Privacy and Information Systems: An
Argument and an Implementation." Master's Thesis,
Department of Electrical Engineering, MIT, Cambridge,
Massachusetts 02139; or P-4298, RAND Corporation, Santa
Monica, California 90406, 77 pp.; or AD-706 963, National
Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia
22151, May 1970.
The first part of this paper examines the social and
technical implications of information systems. The
author believes that information systems must incorporate
certain properties in their initial design in order to
safeguard man's privacy while still providing society
with the information it needs. For a secure system, the
cost of violating the system safeguards must be
considerably greater than the value of the information to
the violator. The second part of this paper applies
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safeguards derived in Part 1 to problems in medical
information systems. A drug information system, a
toxicological information system, and a patient medical
record system are each analyzed in relation to the
individual's right of privacy and society's right to
know.
*(4410)*69*ab*cc*cd*dg*xl
Hemphill, Charles F. Jr. "Preventing Damage to EDP Systems."
ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, April 1969, p. 14.
This article tries to convince the reader that more
than superficial safeguards are necessary for adequate
protection of computers and magnetically stored data. A
few hazards and some basic suggestions (backup files,
physical access control, separation of duties) are given.
*(4420)*71*aa*cd*da*dc*ga*gf*hb*jc*jf*jg
Hemphill, Charles F. Jr. SECURITY FOR BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY.
Dow Jones, Irwin Inc., Homewood, Illinois, 1971.
Only one chapter of this book is devoted to computer
security issues. However, the remainder of the book does
have some good ideas on physical security.
*(4430)*70*ab*cc*da*db*ff
Henderson, Reid. "Internal Control Safeguards for EDP." DATA
MANAGEMENT, September 1970.
*(4440)*71*ab*cb*cc*da*de*ka*nj*nk*nl*x2
Henderson, Robert P. "Computers and Privacy." ADVANCED
MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, July 1971, pp. 8-12.
The author, associate group vice-president of
Honeywell, shows that there is a large difference in the
meanings of the words "privacy" and "security". The
prime responsibility of computer manufacturers is to
provide computer hardware and software safeguards that
will enable the user to achieve the degree of security he
needs or desires. The manufacturer can also help educate
the user, but can't impose its technology or ethics on
the user. The author describes what is available today
and what will be available in the near future in the area
of security hardware devices and operating systems for
computers. In describing these available security
techniques, he presents in very general terms several
concepts used in MIT's MULTICS system.
In turning to privacy considerations, the author
believes that laws should be developed which give every
individual the right: to examine his own file and
challenge its contents; to know to whom and under what
circumstances this data can be released; and in some
cases to control the dissemination of his personal data.
Strict controls on the technology of databanks are not
wise because the technology is changing very rapidly and
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controls would soon be obsolete and hinder developments.
The author recommends that users conduct periodic audits
of their personal data files to erase obsolete and
irrelevant information. This article is very similar but
not identical to another article by Henderson entitled
"Controlling the Computer Threat to Privacy".
*(4450)*71*ab*cc*da*de*fs*ka*nj*nk*nl*x2
Henderson, Robert P. "Controlling the Computer's Threat to
Privacy." MICHIGAN BUSINESS REVIEW, November 1971, pp.
9-14.
The author associate group vice-president of
Honeywell, shows that there is a great deal of difference
between the words "privacy" and "security" as they relate
to computers. The prime responsibility of computer
manufacturers is to provide computer hardware and
software safeguards that will enable the user to achieve
the degree of security he needs or desires. Computer
room physical security, remote terminal access controls,
database access control, and audit-monitors are very
briefly discussed in simple language. Maintaining the
privacy of personal databanks is the responsibility of
the computer user. The user's responsibility is to use
adequate manufacturer provided hardware and software
safeguards, as well as adequate procedural and physical
safeguards. The staff of a computer center is almost
always the weakest link in a total security system. The
author believes that government certification of computer
operators, systems designers, and computer systems is
desirable.
Since there is currently almost no legal protection
against privacy invasion, the author suggests that
federal laws be passed to give all individuals the right:
to be informed of all files kept on them; to read their
file and challenge its contents (by legal means if
necessary); and to know who supplied any bit of
information on them. This article is similar but not
identical to another article by Henderson entitled
"Computers and Privacy".
*(4460)*69*ab*cc*cd*da*db*dc
"Highlights of a Security Plan Devised by Experts."
OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS, March 1969.
*(4470)*63*ab*cc*cd*da*fl*jc
Hiles, Richard A. "Paper Shredders." MODERN OFFICE
PROCEDURES, February 1963.
*(4480)*68*ab*cc*da*db*ff*kd
Hill, 0. A. Jr. "The Role of the Auditor With Respect to
Internal Control and Fraud." THE INTERNAL AUDITOR, May
1968.
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*(4490)*71*ad*cb*dc*dd*gc*jg
Hill R. D. "Note on Vulnerablility of Computers to
Lightning." General Research Corporation, 5383 Hollister
Avenue, Santa Barbara, California 93105, April 1971, 18
pp-
* (4500) *69*ab*cc*dc*fy
Hines, Harold H. Jr. Letter to the Editor. HARVARD BUSINESS
REVIEW, May 1969.
Insurance protection available for computers is
discussed.
*(4510) *71*ad*cb*ed*ef*gh
Hirsch, J. "Access Control and Retrieval Optimization
Functions of the Supervisor for an Extended Data
Management Facility (EDMF)." Report 71-21, Moore School
of Electrical Engineering, University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, April 1971.
Access control information is associated with each
user, in the form of authority items, instead of being
stored with each file. This enables the access control
information to be stored together in a system file
instead of being scattered throughout user files.
Centralized storage of access control information makes
updating much easier and probably provides for better
security. Data in the EDMF can be protected below the
file level. A "service status block" and a "file status
block" are used to reduce unnecessary access control
information. Manola's Master's thesis includes a more
current discussion of access control techniques for the
Extended Data Management Facility.
*(4520)872*ab*cc*da*db*hd*ka*ng*nl*nm*x3
Hirsch, Phil. "Computer Systems and the Issue of Privacy:
How Far Away is 1984?" DATAMATION, December 1972, pp.
90-93.
This article first discusses a report entitled
"Communications for Social Needs". Although the report
was reluctantly rejected by President Nixon, projects
described in the report are still under consideration.
The report proposed federal support for several new
applications of communications and computer technology.
One system would enable the Feds to turn on every radio
and TV in the country, supposedly to warn people of
impending disasters. Another system is for electronic
transmission of mail between cities. The report said
that all handling of the mail will be mechanized so
letters will not be read. However, it didn't say that
only a very simple computer program could detect and
print all mail to and from any individual. Recently,
control of the National Criminal History System was
removed from the states and given to the FBI. Such a
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highly centralized system is now considerably more
vulnerable to "executive manipulation" (i.e. Watergate).
The use of social security numbers as universal
individual identifiers is also discussed. Many
organizations have started using social security numbers
as identifiers anticipating that they will become
universal. Many feel this trend may have gone too far to
stop. The problem of a universal identifier is that it
enables computer files to be merged (legally or
illegally) with considerably less effort.
A three year privacy study, directed by Dr Alan F.
Westin, has just been completed. It concludes that
central databank developments are not as advanced as many
people believe. However, privacy laws must be developed
in the mid 1970's. Another study suggests there will be
nothing left to save if laws are not developed until the
mid 1970's.
*(4530)*70*ab*cb*cc*da*fe*fh*gh*ka*md*nl*nm*x2
Hirsch, Phil. "The World's Biggest Data Bank." DATAMATION,
May 1970, pp. 66-73.
This article traces the history of the U.S. Census
Bureau. The 1970 census is the first one that will be
able to separate statistics into very small areas such as
city blocks. Therefore, the issue of individual privacy
deserves important consideration. The article discusses
steps taken to safeguard this information. The bureau's
physical and software security safeguards are shown to be
quite inadequate. Nevertheless, the bureau is probably
physically secure due to its rather complex and awkward
operation. A few typical examples of census data being
legitimately used to the detriment of those who supplied
the data are discussed at length. The author feels that
the most effective method of halting undesirable use of
census statistics is to establish an independent federal
commission with the power to review all data tabulated
from census statistics.
*(4540)*71*ab*cb*cc*cd*dg*nb*x2
Hirschfield, Richard A. "Security in On-Line Systems - A
Primer for Management." COMPUTERS AND MANAGEMENT,
Septmeber 1971, pp. 15-17.
The purpose of this article is to point out some
problems in securing on-line systems and some potential
avenues of solution. The article is written for readers
who have little knowledge of computers and/or security
techniques. It is divided into four sections concerned
with: access control (physical security, passwords, file
access); data transfer control (computer logs of all
accesses, closed-loop verification of data transmission,
data encrypting); backup and recovery of files and
programs; and systems auditability (publishing security
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procedures, testing the security system, auditor
involvement in system design). Nothing really new or
unusual is presented.
*(4550)*71*ac*ai*cb*cc*da*db*ff*lb*x1
Hirschfield, Richard A. "True Jeopardy 'Inside', Auditor
Says." COMPUTERWORLD, 30 June 1971, p. S1.
The greatest exposure in on-line systems is
unauthorized access through remote terminals. Computer
logs, encrypting of data, closed-loop verification to
ensure error free transmission, and sufficient audit
controls and checks are recommended.
*(4560)*69*ab*ca*ee*ef*el*lb*ng*nl*nm*nn*x3
Hoffman, Lance J. "Computers and Privacy: A Survey."
COMPUTING SURVEYS, June 1969, pp. 85-103.
This classic article is a good survey of what has
been done in the area of computer system access control.
The article is divided into four sections entitled: the
privacy problem; legal and administrative safeguards;
technical methods proposed to date; and promising
research problems. The bulk of this article is concerned
with technical methods proposed to date.
The author believes that the most serious technical
problem, yet to be solved, is to find an economical
method of providing access control below the file level.
Hsiao's method is the first to do this, but the author
doubts the method is economical. Several other methods
of providing access control to users of shared data are
briefly described, and the limitations of each method are
stated. Also briefly discussed are: methods to identify
remote users; privacy transformations (cryptography);
threat monitoring; and processing restrictions.
An annotated bibliography of 69 articles is
included. Most of the articles are annotated quite well
in one or more paragraphs. However, only 15 of the 69
articles deal with computer security issues, and these 15
can easily be found in other references. The other 54
articles are concerned solely with privacy issues.
* (4570) *70*ad*ca*da*db*dc*ee*ef*nc*x2
Hoffman, Lance J. "The Formulary Model for Access Control
and Privacy in Computer Systems." Ph.D. Dissertation,
Report No. 117, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center,
Stanford, California; or AD-(?), National Technical
Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151, May
1970, 88 pp.
The author believes that data access control can be
performed more easily with real-time, access-control
computer programs written by the file owner than by
look-up tables or access-control bits stored with each
word. In his formulary model, data access is controlled
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by a set of procedures called formularies. The model
enables a file owner to control access to any level,
including the bit level. However, Hoffman's model
excludes the use of any tables and requires the user to
describe all his field, record, and file structures in
procedures. Other authors feel that the effort needed to
do this may be quite substantial, and implementation of
the model could be very costly.
*(4580)*71*ae*ag*ca*da*db*dc*ee*ef*nc*x2
Hoffman, Lance J. "The Formulary Model for Flexible Privacy
and Access Control." AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Fall
Joint Computer Conference, Vol. 39, pp. 587-601.
This article is a condensed version of Hoffman's
Ph.D. dissertation entitled "The Formulary Model for
Access Control and Privacy in Computer Systems".
* (4590) *70*ab*cb*da*es*he*x3
Hoffman, Lance J.;and Miller, W. F. "Getting a Personal
Dossier from a Statistical Data Bank." DATAMATION, May
1970, pp. 74-75.
A "statistical" databank is defined as one which
returns only summary tables on a group of persons which
have a given set of requested characteristics. Suppose
one wants to know whether Joe Doe earns over $50,000 per
year, and it is known personal information on him is in a
statistical databank. It is also known that he is 50
years old, has a Ph.D. degree, and lives in Boston.
Suppose the computer states that there are 45 people in
the databank that are 50 years old, with Ph.D. degrees,
and living in Boston. Now ask - how many of these 45
people earn over $50,000. If the computer returns the
answer "45", the desired information on Joe is obtained.
The author presents a simple algorithm which, with
enough work and sufficient information, can be used to
identify individuals in a statistical databank. They
recommend the use of threat monitoring to limit such
abuses though realizing that it is not an extremely
effective safeguard.
*(4600)*72*ab*cc*cd*dg*ff*nb*x2
Holland, Geoffrey. "Computer Security." ACCOUNTANCY
(England), March 1972, pp. 43-45.
This article attempts to draw attention to the
serious risks of deliberate and accidental security
violations. Some of the more interesting statements are
briefly summarized below. The resources of a computer
center can be divided into the following categories:
plant (physical hardware, building); consumable supplies
(cards, paper); data; software; and people. In addition,
security can be looked at from the following viewpoints:
prevention, detection, recovery, rectification, and
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compensation. In developing a good security program one
must first establish the potential losses in financial
terms and examine the exposure to risks. The user, the
systems and programming development staff, and the
operations staff all must play an active role in the
security program. Periodic security system testing is
vital because the computer environment is constantly
changing and because people soon become lax in their
security related behavior.
*(4610)*70*ae*cc*dg*ff*fv*hc*kb
Homes, F. W. "Software Security." 6373-60, American
Management Association Briefing Session, 15 April 1970.
Software security, proprietary programs, program
documentation, checkpoint recovery procedures, and audit
trails are all discussed.
*(4620)*69*ae*cb*cc*da*hd*ka*mb*mg
Holmes, W. S. "Privacy Techniques for Computerized Medical
Data Systems," USE OF COMPUTERS IN CLINICAL MEDICINE
SYMPOSIUM, School of Medicine, State University of New
York, Buffalo, New York, 2 October 1969.
Some security and privacy problems unique to the
medical environment are discussed, and a few general
computer safeguard techniques are presented.
*(4630)*70*ab*cc*da*ka*nl*nm
Horton, Frank. "Privacy Safeguards Urged." EDP WEEKLY, 21
September 1970, p. 3.
The author, a New York Congressman, feels that the
growth of large databanks presents a threat to individual
privacy. He urges legislation to prevent abuses by
databank owners.
*(4640)*71*ad*cb*dg*eb*ee*ef*eh*ha
Horton, M. "Reading, Writing, Creating, and Updating Records
and Files in a Generalized File Structure." Master's
Thesis, Moore School of Electrical Engineering,
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
1971.
* (4650) *70*ab*cc*ff
Horwitz, G. B. "EDP Auditing - The Coming of Age." JOURNAL
OF ACCOUNTANCY, August 1970, pp. 48-56.
*(4660)*70*ab*bb*cc*db*fq*hk*hl*md*x1
"How Bad Guys Thwart Computers." THE OFFICE, September 1970,
p. 32.
This article discusses several threats by dishonest
employees and saboteurs, Most of the discussion focuses
on the federal government. The government's biggest
computer problems have occurred in the Internal Revenue
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Service. Tax officials have discovered a minor flurry of
fraud among their employees. So far all the discovered
frauds have been committed by operators and clerks, not
programmers or analysts. The IRS now uses different
personnel for each of the following steps: systems
analysis, program preparation, original run testing, and
operating the computer.
*(4670)*65*ab*ba*da*hb
"How I Steal Company Secrets." BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, October
1965.
Methods supposedly used by an industrial spy are the
subject of this article.
*(4680)*68*ab*cc*da*hb
"How Safe are Your Business Secrets?" BUSINESS MANAGEMENT,
March 1968.
Several precautions are presented for protecting
business secrets.
*(4690)*71*ab*bc*cd*dc*gf*jf*mj*x1
"How Security Does Pay Off." THE OFFICE, September 1971, p.
22.
Sometimes minimal security measures can prevent
maximum losses. This is what happened at the University
of Kansas. The University decided to limit access to its
computer room by locking doors after certain hours and
restricting traffic in an adjacent hallway by locking the
door at one end. One night a bomb exploded and blew an
eight foot hole in one wall of the computer room. The
saboteur was apparently unable to obtain access to the
computer room. Three operators were slightly injured
because they thought the saboteur's anonymous phone call
was a hoax.
*(4700)*67*ad*cc*cd*da*hb
"How to Avoid Electronic Eavesdropping and Privacy
Invasion." Investigator's Information Service, 806 South
Robertson Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, 1967.
*(4710)*70*ab*cc*cd*da*hb
"How to Make Sure Nobody Knows Your Business." MODERN OFFICE
PROCEDURES, July 1970.
A survey on paper shredders is presented.
*(4720) *68*ab*cc*da*db*ff*hj
"How to Protect Against the Million Dollar Racket." MODERN
OFFICE PROCEDURES, March 1968.
A list of danger signals and safeguards, intended to
help detect and prevent embezzlement, is the subject of
this article.
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*(4730)*72*ab*cb*cc*cd*da*db*dc*ff*ge*gf*jc*jg
"How to Protect Your Computer from Theft, Fraud, Fire."
CHAIN STORE AGE: Executive Edition, August 1972, pp.
17-19.
*(4740)*71*af*cb*cc*cd*dg*fb*nb*nf*ni*x3
"How Vulnerable is the Computer System?" ADP NEWSLETTER, The
Diebold Group Inc., 430 Park Avenue, New York, New York,
8 March 1971.
Guarding against program errors, machine
malfunctions, and lack of clear cut audit trails is just
as important as guarding against theft, fraud, and riots.
Six steps are described which management must take to
properly address the computer security problem.
Management must: (1) be convinced that there is a
problem; (2) organize personnel to handle the problem,
fix responsibilities, provide authority, and back up
actions taken on behalf of security; (3) acquaint itself
with the security procedures that have been planned by
auditors and computer professionals to be competent to
ask them the "right" questions; (4) make the policy
decisions and assure that safeguard expenses are not out
of line with the risks involved; (5) get agreement on the
time table and costs of implementation, and establish
checkpoints and performance yardsticks; and (6) decide on
the insurance necessary to cover the remaining risks.
This article also contains a checklist of questions that
need to be asked and answered for each of several types
of security risks.
* (4750) *65*ab*cc*da*hb
"How Your Company Can Thwart a Spy." BUSINESS MANAGEMENT,
October 1965.
Methods of defense against professional industrial
spies are discussed.
*(4760)*71*ab*cc*cd*dg*fg*ni*x2
Howes, Paul R. "EDP Security: Is Your Guard Up?" MANAGEMENT
REVIEW, July 1971, pp. 29-32.
This article is divided into the following three
sections: physical security, file and program security,
and internal control systems. For each section, the
author briefly presents some examples and arguments to
show that security safeguards are essential. He presents
a checklist for each section which includes specific
safeguards that should, in most circumstances, be
implemented. The checklists are fairly complete, but
they don't include anything uncommon.
*(4770)*69*ae*cb*da*ea*ed*ef*ei*el*gh*ng
Hsiao, David K. "Access Control in an On-Line File System."
FILE ORGANIZATION: SELECTED PAPERS FROM FILE 68 - AN
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I.A.G. CONFERENCE, 1969, pp. 246-257.
The access control system of a Problem Solving
Facility (PSF) designed by the University of
Pennsylvania's Moore School of Electrical Engineering is
described. Some of the system's capabilities are:
records of files can be protected by specifying a logical
expression of index words and file names; file users can
be authenticated by providing inputs to an access control
program written by the file owner; control is available
for simultaneous multiple user access to shared files;
and capabilities in using a file can be stored with the
user rather than the file. The access control system is
protected by storing it with the operating system. Two
other articles by M. Gelblat and K. Nakaniski discuss the
use of this system for medical applications.
*(4780)*68*ad*cb*da*ea*ee*ef*el*gh*ha*ng
Hsiao, David K. "A File System for a Problem Solving
Facility." Ph.D. Dissertation, Moore School of Electrical
Engineering, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, 1968, 175 pp.; or AD-671 826, National
Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia
22151.
This paper discusses in detail the file access
control system of the Problem Solving Facility (PSF)
designed by the Moore School. This was the first working
system to provide access control below the file level.
The design objectives of the system were: to have the
capability to grow in terms of data, programs, and file
management functions; to protect the privacy of a user's
files; and to enable a file owner to gradually share his
information with others. The result was a system which
uses "authority items". These "authority items": provide
access control below the file level; allow storage of
access control information with the user not the files;
enable the file owner to write his own access control
program for authenticating users of his file; and keep
data records from having to be reprocessed when a user's
or file's access status changes.
Two later papers by Hsiao entitled "Access Control
in an On-Line File System" and "A Formal System for
Information Retrieval from Files" give a considerably
less detailed description of the same system.
*(4790)*71*ab*cb*eb*ee*x2
Hsiao, David K. "A Generalized Record Organization." IEEE
TRANSACTIONS, December 1971, pp. 1490-1495.
A generalized record organization is proposed from
which many fixed and variable length records of
hierarchical and network formats can be derived. In
developing the generalization, attempts are made to
characterize the record organization. By identifying the
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characteristics of the record organization, it is
possible to segregate, for storage, the global record
structural information from the local and nonstructural
information. Such a segregation can lead to more
efficient use of storage, ease of reorganizing the
records, and the possibility of multiple organizations
for the same set of records. A scheme for specifying the
generalized record organization is illustrated. The
implication for data security is that access control
information can be separated from the data. Therefore,
it is possible to determine the validity of a request
without bringing the data requested into main memory.
*(4800)*70*ab*ah*cb*da*ea*ee*ef*el*gh*ng
Hsiao, David K.; and Haravy, F. "A Formal System for
Information Retrieval from Files." COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
ACM, February 1970, pp. 67-73; (also correction to this
article), ibid., April 1970, p. 266.
*(4810)*70*ac*ai*bb*cb*cc*db*ft*hj*hm*kd*me
Huggins, Phyllis. "Computer Plays Big Role in Defrauding
Welfare Unit." COMPUTERWORLD, 7 October 1970.
Los Angeles County was defrauded of $50,000 in a
welfare check scheme that involved the Data Processing
Department of Public Services. Three employees and eight
others were indicted. The control system was
unfortunately designed on the assumption that EDP
personnel are honest.
*(4820)*71*ac*ai*bc*cd*dc*ga*jg*na*x2
Huggins, Phyllis. "Computers Show Resiliency After
Earthquake." COMPUTERWORLD, 17 February 1971, p. 1.
EDP centers withstood the 1971 Los Angeles-San
Fernando Valley earthquake with remarkably little
permanent damage. About half the EDP centers in the area
were back in operation by noon (the earthquake occurred
in the early morning), and almost all were in operation
by the next morning. This article very briefly describes
what happened at seventeen computer centers located in
the L.A. area. In one center the operator, for security
reasons, could only be let out by a guard. When the
quake struck, the frightened guard ran, leaving the
operator trapped. Luckily, the operator wasn't injured.
*(4830)*71*ac*ai*ba*cb*cc*da*hc*ii*kc*lb*ma*x1
Huggins, Phyllis. "Employee Charged in Program 'Theft'."
COMPUTERWORLD, 10 March 1971, p. 1.
Police armed with a search warrant raided a
University Computing Company service bureau in Palo Alto,
forcing the company to duplicate all its tapes and
punched cards, and to dump disk packs and core. A UCC
employee was then charged with grand theft. He was said
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to have illegally tapped an Information Systems Design
computer and stole a proprietary program valued at
$15,000 to $25,000. IDS first suspected the alleged
theft when unrelated punched cards appeared in the output
of one of its jobs. A search of telephone company
charges revealed that a call to IDS's computer had come
from UCC. The data lines between the two companies were
tapped, and this led police to the suspect.
*(4840)*70*ac*ai*bc*cd*dc*jf*mj
Huggins, Phyllis. "Programmer Thankful for 'Bug' During
Computer Center Bombing." COMPUTERWORLD, 27 May 1970, p.
1.
Protesting students threw three molotov cocktails
through a plate-glass window at Fresno State College and
destroyed its CDC 3150. Damages were near $1 million.
The operator had just left the room to consult a
programmer about a program "bug". Luckily, no injuries
resulted.
*(4850)*70*ac*ai*cd*dc*ga*gf*jf*mj
Huggins, Phyllis. "Rebuilt Fresno State DP Center Follows
Tight Security." COMPUTERWORLD, 8 July 1970.
The article discusses new security measures taken by
Fresno State College after their computer center was
totally destroyed by students using molotov cocktails.
*(4860)*00*ad*be*cb*cc*de*fi*hp*hr
"Human Error." AD-689 365, National Technical Information
Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151, 246 pp.
This is a very comprehensive treatment on the
subject of detecting and correcting data input errors.
*(4870)*72*ab*cc*fm
Hurtado, C. D. "A System to Measure EDP." JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS
MANAGEMENT, January 1972, pp. 32-35.
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*(4880)*72*ab*cb*dg*ng*nk*no*x2
"IBM Launches Program to Protect Access to Sensitive Data."
MANAGEMENT ADVISOR, July 1972, pp. 6-7.
IBM has embarked on a five year, $40 million program
to give the computer user the means to control sensitive
data in his system. The envisioned system will allow the
user to specify the amount of security protection
implemented. It will also likely contain advanced forms
of authorization and audit trails. The program is
attempting to answer these questions: what is a fair
measure of system secureness, what facilities should be
taken into account, what differences does the environment
make, how can levels of authorization be handled, what
constraints will data security place on users, what will
security cost in terms of performance and dollars?
*(4890)*72*ac*ai*cb*da*de*hd*ka*ng*nk*nm*no*x1
"IBM Plans $40 Million Study to Develop 'Secure' DP."
COMPUTERWORLD, 24 May 1972, pp. 1-2.
This article quotes T. Vincent Learson, IBM
chairman, in his keynote address to the recent Spring
Joint Computer Conference. The goal of IBM's five year,
$40 million research program is to give the customer the
means to control access to sensitive data in his system.
Learson also said that public policy must dictate how
much and what kinds of information shall be collected,
who shall have access to it, and for what reasons. He
feels that this data security project will have direct
effects on privacy legislation.
*(4900)*71*ac*bc*cc*dc*fw*jg*nk
"IBM Puts Volkswagen Back on the Road Three Days After a
Total-Loss Fire." WALL STREET JOURNAL, 21 April 1971,
(Advertisement).
*(4910)*68*ad*ak*cb*dg*ec*ed*ei*ej*gh
"IBM System/360 Operating System Concepts and Facilities."
GC28-6535, IBM Corporation, White Plains, New York,
November 1968.
This manual describes the protection architecture
present in IBM's 360 series.
*(4920)*68*ad*ak*cb*dg*ec*ed*ei*ej*gh
"IBM System/360 Principles of Operation." GA22-6821, IBM
Corporation, White Plains, New York, September 1968.
This manual describes the data access protection
architecture present in IBM's 360 series.
*(4930)*70*ad*ak*cb*dg*ec*ed*ei*ej*gh
"IBM System/370 Principles of Operation." GA22-7000, IBM
Corporation, White Plains, New York, June 1970.
This manual describes data access protection present
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in IBM's 370 series.
*(4940)*72*ac*cb*da*ka*ng*nk*nm*no*x1
"IBM to Seek Ways to Teach Computers How to Keep Secrets."
WALL STREET JOURNAL, 17 May 1972, p. 9.
IBM plans to spend $40 million over the next five
years to study techniques for assuring the
confidentiality of data stored in computers. This short
article presents a few statements made by T. Vincent
Learson, IBM chairman, before the Spring Joint Computer
Conference. Learson acknowledged that, "Public policy
must decide who is to have access to what information.
But the question of how to limit information access only
to those who are authorized to have it, begins with the
manufacturer of systems."
*(4950)*71*ab*cd*da*db*dc*gf*gh*x2
"Identi-Logic Spreads Security Blanket." DATAMATION, 1 May
1971, p. 66.
This article describes the Identi-Lock 1001 magnetic
card reader and lock system used for physical access
control. The system produces a hard record of the key
number, date and time of entrance and exit, and area
entered and exited. A pushbutton device can be
substituted for magnetic cards. A special magnetic card
that must be destroyed to be duplicated is also
available. Identi-Logic, a division of Eaton, Yale and
Towne Inc., produces the system. Identi-logic will also
determine "who should be where and when" for its
customers.
*(4960)*70*ab*cc*da*fh*he*ka*nm
"Identity Code for Individuals." THE OFFICE, June 1970.
This article discusses the use of social security
numbers as universal identifying codes for EDP
processing.
*(4970)73*ab*np*pb*xl
IEEE TRANSACTION ON COMPUTERS. Institute of Electrical and
Electronic Engineers Inc., 345 East 47th Street, New
York, New York 10017, 1968-, (Monthly, with annual
cumulative index).
Every issue contains roughly a ten page section
entitled "Abstracts of Current Computer Literature". A
description-in-context index with 'privacy' and
'security' as descriptors provides easy access to desired
articles. A cumulative index is usually published every
year. The abstracts average about 150 words in length,
are well written, and quite informative. However, only
about 25 articles on computer security were abstracted in
the years 1967-1972, and all of them could be easily
found in other references.
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*(4980)*71*ac*bg*cc*cd*dg*nd*x2
Immel, Richard A. "Whir, Click-Blooey! Sabotage, Accidents,
and Fraud Woes for Computer Center." WALL STREET JOURNAL,
22 March 1971, p. 1.
Several recent cases of computer sabotage, errors,
and fraud are described. The article presents the views
of several computer security experts who all agree that
computer security is dangerously lax in a large majority
of all computer installations. Some of these experts
blame part of the computer's vulnerability on
manufacturers who have failed to build security into
their systems. Louis Scoma of Data Processing Security
will put a team of consultants to work running through a
172 point checklist and preparing a survey report for
$3,000 to $5,000. Purchasing security equipment is the
expensive part. A double-door "buffer" system with
electronic locks, magnetic sensors, and closed circuit TV
can easily cost $25,000. Backup power systems cost from
$50,000 for a simple generator to over $1,000,000 for a
very elaborate system.
*(4990) *64*ab*cc*dc*fy*gc
"Importance and Complexities of EDP Units and Media Cause
Many Insurance Problems." THE NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, 17
July 1964.
*(5000)*68*ad*cb*dg*ep*nk
"In the Matter of Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented
by the Interdependence of Computers and Communication
Services and Facilities." Docket No. 16979, Responses to
the Federal Communications Commission, 5 March 1968.
This docket gives IBM's and BEMA's (Business
Equipment Manufacturers Association) views on protecting
private data stored in computers and transmitted over
common communications lines. The section of the docket
entitled "Security of Data Stored in Computers and
Transmitted Over Communications Facilities" discusses
both present and future techniques of security control,
and legal and policy considerations. Two attachments to
this response are "Major Economic Issues in Data
Processing/Data Communication Services" by Horace J. De
Padwin Associates and "Study of the Interdependence of
Computers and Communications Services" by Booz, Allen,
and Hamilton.
*(5010)*69*ab*bb*cc*db*fi*hj*hl*hm*kd*me
"Individual Responsibility." DATA SYSTEMS NEWS, February
1969, p. 4.
Computer programs at New York City's Human Resources
Administration were altered to illegally make out over
40,000 paychecks. The result was one of the largest
computer-related frauds discovered so far. The loss was
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near $2,700,000.
*(5020)*66*ad*cc*da*fe*fl*kb
"Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified
Information." DOD 5220.22-M, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., 1 July 1966.
This manual describes security procedures to be
taken by all organizations having Department of Defense
classified information. Nothing is explicitly said about
computers.
*(5030)*72*ab*cd*dc*dd*gc*gd*gf*mi*x1
"Inside Eastern's Data Center." BUSINESS WEEK, 5 February
1972, pp. 60-61.
This article describes physical security safeguards
taken by Eastern Airline's new data center. The center,
which will open in late 1972, is located in a new $8
million building near Miami airport. Computer hardware
worth $22,8 million is kept in the building. Eastern's
present computer center, located at Miami Airport, is
nearing its saturation point in handling 2 million
inquiries daily. Physical security measures include:
acres of open land around the building; an eight foot
chain-link fence; gates with electronic locks; metal
detectors at entrances; twenty-four hour guard protection
backup and, in some cases, double backup of all
electronic motors, fans, switches, and power sources; and
power from two external generating stations. The outside
power drives local generators to avoid power spike and
frequency change problems.
* (5040) *71*ab*cc*dc*fy
"Insurers Shy Away from EDP Coverage, Newsletter Says."
MANAGEMENT ADVISOR, July 1971, p. 6.
* (5050) *70*ab*cc*dc*fy*kf
"Insuring List is a Must for Mail Users." DIRECT MARKETING,
May 1970, p. 32.
*(5060)*67*aa*cc*dg*ff*kd
INTERNAL AUDITING OF ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS.
Institute of Internal Auditors, 1967.
*(5070)*65*aa*cc*da*db*ff*hj*kd
INTERNAL CONTROL IN ELECTRONIC ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS. Haskins
and Sells Inc., 1965.
* (5080) *00*af*cd*ed*ii
"Introduction to CODE." Sales Brochure, Economatics, 275
South Los Robles Avenue, Pasadena, California 91106.
A software program is described that mixes false
data with a user's input or output if he does not provide
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a correct user identification code.
*(5090)*72*ac*ai*ba*cc*da*f1*hc*ii*kb*ma*nj*x1
"ISD Awarded $300,500 in UCC Trade Secret Suit."
COMPUTERWORLD, 13 September 1972, p. 1.
Information Systems Design has been awarded damages
amounting to $300,500 in its civil suit against
University Computing Center and two of its employees.
The suit alleged that two UCC employees had illegally
accessed ISD's computer and stole valuable computer
programs.
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*(5100)*69*ac*cd*ga*ge
Jackson, W. A. "Fire Protection Systems." DATA PROCESSING,
March 1969.
A 10 point fire protection guide is presented.
*(5110) *72*ab*cc*ff
Jacobsen, G. G. "Auditing Aspects of Data Processing." DATA
MANAGEMENT, July 1972, pp. 17-19.
* (5120) *73*ac*ai*cc*dg*fb*nf*x2
Jacobson, Robert V, "Big-Time Security Analysis Needed."
COMPUTERWORLD, 27 June 1973, p. 19.
The small business that has just installed a
minicomputer is exposed to many of the security problems
of a large business and has special problems that large
businesses don't have. Separation of duties, reduced
dependence on the knowhow of specific individuals, and
ample personnel for assignment to emergency duties are
all more difficult to obtain in a small business with
only four or five EDP personnel. The author recommends
use of risk analysis where: the potential dollar expense
is estimated for loss of each computer application; the
probability of occurrence is estimated for each thing
that could go wrong; and the above two estimates are
combined to determine the most significant threats.
Although risk analysis is not easy to do, it pinpoints
what needs protection, and it helps the manager decide
what is a reasonable amount to spend. The small business
manager must keep himself involved in the EDP area. He
should also remember that most frauds are discovered
through a foolish blunder by the embezzler.
*(5130)*71*ae*cb*cc*cd*nb
Jacobson, Robert V. "Cost Effectiveness of Security
Measures." ABA NATIONAL AUTOMATION CONFERENCE, May 1971.
*(5140)*69*ae*cd*dc*fv*fw*ga*gf*nf
Jacobson, Robert V. "Planning for Back-Up Facilities."
COMPUTER SERVICES, A.Z. Publishing Company, May 1970, pp.
22-29; or American Management Association on Security and
Catastrophe Prevention Management of the Computer
Complex, November 1969.
Access control, site selection, and disaster
prevention are discussed. Four types of system failures
are described and recommended safeguards are given for
each. The author believes that selective backup may, in
many cases, be more practical than full backup when all
facts are analyzed.
*(5150)*70*ab*be*cc*cd*df*dg*fg*fv*fx*gf*hq*x2
Jacobson, Robert V. "Providing Data Security." AUTOMATION,
June 197Q, pp. 85-90.
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The author discusses each of the following
safeguards in some detail: timely and reliable operation,
backup files, making programs fail-safe, internal
data-control group, physical access controls, and
periodic testing of the security system. For each of the
above safeguards, numerous reasons are given to show that
implementation of the safeguard is highly desirable. A
protection matrix is also presented. The rows of the
matrix represent the computer system elements of
hardware, software, personnel, procedures, and
facilities. The columns represent the following hazards:
loss (destruction of hardware or data), defects (errors
and fraud), and illegal disclosure. Each element of the
matrix contains specific protective measures for the
pertinent computer system element and hazard.
*(5160)*70*ab*bb*cc*dg*ff*fg*fi*hj*if*kb*kd*x3
Jacobson, Robert V. "Providing Security Protection for
Computer Files." BESTS REVIEW: Life/Health Insurance
Edition, May 1970, pp. 42-44; or Property Edition, June
1970, pp. 44-46.
There are really only three ways in which a process
can go wrong: errors in the input data, errors in the
programs, or changes in the data files. Only two basic
kinds of files exist: those mainstream to the processing;
and those used for control, audit, and protective
purposes. Files are subject to the following hazards:
accidental erasure; loss by fire, sabotage, etc.; data
input errors; defective or altered programs; and
deliberately introduced errors. After briefly making the
above statements, the author discusses in some detail;
file backup; internal control groups; and program
validation and revalidation procedures. He believes that
there should be flow diagrams which show: relationships
between input data, files, processes, and output data;
and details of file structure and processes that allow
determination of what audit trails and controls are
available. One actual fraud case is discussed.
*(5170) *71*ac*ai*cd*dc*ge
Jacobson, Robert V. "Special Fire Needs for DP Users."
COMPUTERWORLD, 30 June 1971, p. S-1.
*(5180)*73*aa*cc*dg*ff*fm*kd
Jancure, E.; and Berger, A. (eds.) COMPUTERS, AUDITING, AND
CONTROL. Auerbach Publishing Company, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, 1973.
*(5190)*71*aa*cc*da*db*hj
Jaspan, Norman. THE THIEF IN THE WHITE COLLAR. J. B.
Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1971.
This book documents many of the reasons that cause
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employees, even at high management levels, to attempt
embezzlement. The motives cited are quite universal. In
the early days of the computer, many top executives hoped
the computer would provide better methods of internal
control. They felt that the computer could provide many
more ways of keeping control, its complexity would
discourage frauds, and the fewer accounting personnel
needed would lessen fraud attempts. Unfortunately, these
generalizations haven't proven to be true.
*(5200)*69*ab*cb*dc*dd*de*em*lb*nb
Jasper, David P. "A Discussion of Checkpoint/Restart."
SOFTWARE AGE, October 1969.
Problems encountered in time-sharing systems and
criteria for determining an optimal checkpoint frequency
are discussed.
*(5210)*70*ab*cc*dg*ff*fx*kd
John, Richard C.; and Nissen, Thomas J. "Evaluating Internal
Control in EDP Audits." THE JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY,
February 1970.
This article discusses several things that must be
checked when evaluating EDP internal controls.
*(5220)*69*ab*cc*cd*dg*fv*fy*kb*kd*mc*nf*x1
Johnson, C. B. "Protection Primer for EDP Records." BANKING,
December 1969, pp. 85-86.
The author briefly discusses the following data
protection methods: remote storage of important backup
files; three-generation backup; insurance; and fireproof
vaults. He believes that a combination of these methods
is necessary. Although insurance can be purchased to
provide computer coverage, its cost usually forces the
purchaser to obtain only minimal coverage that does not
begin to cover the actual losses resulting from
disasters. (An article by Edward J. Bride in the
September 6, 1972 issue of COMPUTERWORLD states that,
"Insurance may be cheaper than security".) The author
concludes by listing the following four steps in
developing a data protection system: determine the files
needing protection; determine the ideal combination of
safeguards; balance the ideal combination against its
cost; and periodically test the security of the
implemented system.
*(5230)*68*ab*cc*cd*da*hc*kb
Johnson, D. "Control and Prevention of Thefts of Proprietary
Information." INDUSTRIAL SECURITY, February 1968.
*(5240)*72*ab*cc*dg*fy*xl
Johnson, J. D. "Most Loss-Prone Computer Systems Seen as
Dangerously Underinsured." NATIONAL UNDERWRITER: Property
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and Casualty Insurance Edition, 12 May 1972, p. 24.
The article states that only an estimated 25% of
more than 60,000 computer installations have sufficient
security and insurance protection. This statement is not
supported or expanded on. A few basic safeguard measures
are recommended.
*(5250)*71*ac*ai*cc*cd*da*dc*fb*nb*nd*x3
Johnson, James H. "DP Security Needs Not Unusual."
COMPUTERWORLD, 11 August 1971, p. 8.
The concept that physical security must be tailored
for a computer center is a myth. Scare tactics are
sometimes used to exploit the corporate executive and
sell him unjustifiably expensive equipment. If your firm
doesn't have a security officer select two security firms
to bid on conducting a security study. Have each firm
prepare a report giving: a security plan, a recommended
list of suppliers for each item recommended, and an
estimate of the cost of complete installation. Purchase
the equipment on a competitive bid basis. If the
security firm isn't well known, question the background
of its personnel. Physical security for computers does
not require any special knowledge of EDP. Physical
security is simply physical security!
*(5260)*68*ae*ag*cb*db*dc*dd*eb*ed*eh
Jones, R. S. "Data File Two - A Data Storage and Retrieval
System." AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Spring Joint
Computer Conference, Vol. 32, 1968, pp. 171-181.
Data integrity was one of the major design
considerations of this system.
* (5270) *64*ab*cc*ff*ni
Joplin, B. J. "An Internal Control Checklist for EDP."
MANAGEMENT SERVICES, July 1964, pp. 32-37.
*(5280)*66*ab*cc*fc*ff
Joplin, H. B. "The Accountants Role in Management
Information Systems." JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY, March 1966.
*(5290)*68*ac*ai*bb*cc*db*hj*hk*hl*hm*ku
"Journal Warns of Dishonest 'Computer-Operators'."
COMPUTERWORLD, 17 April 1968.
This article refers to a WALL STREET JOURNAL article
on computer operator fraud. Some fraud cases are
described, but most do not deal with computer operators.
In one case, a brokerage firm employee modified a
computer program to mail dividend checks to his address.
He had stolen $18,000 before being caught. In another
case, a brokerage firm vice-president stole $250,000
before being caught.
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*(5300) *71*ab*cc*ff
Juranas, L. A. "Auditing in the Systems Design Environment."
THE INTERNAL AUDITOR, September 1971.
*(5310)*70*ac*bb*cc*db*hj*la
"Just Plain Grabbing is Becoming Old Hat to Securities
Thieves." WALL STREET JOURNAL, 26 October 1970.
The article discusses the increasing sophistication
of fund transfer and stock certificate frauds occurring
in Wall Street brokerage firms. The brokerage firms are
implementing better safeguards, but the embezzlers are
also expected to improve their techniques.
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*(5320)*aa*eq*nn*x3
Kahn, D. THE CODEBREAKERS. Macmillan Company, New York,
1967, 1164 pp.
This classic book is a chronicle of the entire
history of cryptology from over 4000 years ago up to
1966. Its author narrates the development of various
methods of making and breaking codes and ciphers, and
tells how these methods have affected men and history.
Mr. Kahn believes that 90% of the material in his book
has not been previously published in other books. He
also states that his book is not a textbook. He only
explains at length two basic methods of solution,
although many others are briefly sketched. The book
isn't completely exhaustive either, since considerable
foolish secrecy still surrounds World War II cryptology.
A useful glossary of cryptology terms can be found on
pages 13 through 16 of the introduction. Unfortunately,
there is no discussion of recent computer aided
cryptology systems.
*(5330)*66*ab*cc*da*de*ka*mb*nl*nm
Karst, K. L. "THE FILES: Legal Control Over the Accuracy and
Accessibility of Stored Personal Data." LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, Vol 31, Spring 1966, pp. 342-376.
*(5340)*69*ad*cb*cc*da*mb
Karush, A. D. "The Computer System Recording Utility:
Application and Theory." SP-3303, System Development
Corporation, 2500 Colorado Avenue, Santa Monica,
California 90406, March 1969.
* (5350) *69*ad*cb*da*db*el*ff
Karush, A. D.; and Larson, R. H. "Analysis and Measurement
of the AUDIT Recording Function." TM-4435, System
Development Corporation, 2500 Colorado Avenue, Santa
Monica, California 90406, August 1969.
*(5360)*71*ab*cc*ff
Kelly, W. E. "Computer Systems: Slaves or Masters?"
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING, October 1971, pp. 9-11.
*(5370)*73*ac*cc*da*fe*ka*mf*nm*x2
Kenney, Michael. "Sargent Told FBI Data System Will Include
Rights Safeguards." THE BOSTON GLOBE, 13 July 1973, p. 5.
U.S. Attorney General Elliot Richardson assured
Governor Sargent of Massachusetts that "appropriate
operational and legislative safeguards" will be put
around the FBI's national crime information system.
Governor Sargent had earlier said that Massachusetts
would not participate in the national crime information
system because it lacked internal, external, and
statuatory safeguards. Massachusetts' own criminal
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history system does have extensive safeguards.
Unfortunately, the federal government is now challenging
in court Massachusetts' right to limit access to its
system.
*(5380)*69*ae*cb*da*db*dc*ea
Kersta, L. G. "Voice Pattern Identification of Speakers."
PROCEEDINGS OF CARNAHAN CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC CRIME
COUNTERMEASURES, University of Kentucky, Lexington,
Kentucky, 1969, pp. 127-136.
*(5390)*71*ab*cc*fa*ff
Kessler, L. M. "Accounting Profession's Opportunities in EDP
- Today and Tomorrow." MANAGEMENT ADVISOR, May 1971, pp.
44-48.
*(5400)*72*ab*bb*cc*db*hk*ii*mc*x3
"Key Punch Crooks." TIME MAGAZINE, 25 December 1972, p. 69.
Five examples of computer fraud are discussed. The
following two are particularly interesting. A
Washington, D.C. man pocketed all the blank deposit slips
at the writing desks of the Riggs National Bank and
replaced them with his own electronically coded forms.
For the next three days every customer who used these
blank forms had his deposit credited to the culprit's
account. The thief reappeared, withdrew $100,000, walked
away, and has not yet been identified. In another case,
Jerry Schneider, a 21-year-old UCLA engineering graduate,
studied Pacific Telephone and Telegraph's computer by
posing first as a journalist and later as a customer. He
learned enough to place commercial orders for telephone
equipment simply by punching the right beep tones on his
own touch tone telephone. He then illegally ordered over
$1,000,000 worth of electronic equipment and sold it
through a dummy firm. Schneider was caught when one of
his employees in the dummy firm became dissatisfied with
his share of the loot and turned him in. Schneider
received a forty day jail sentence. He has recently
started his own computer security firm.
* (5410) *72*ab*cc*fc*ff
Keyes, E. G. "The Auditor's Role in New Systems
Development." THE INTERNAL AUDITOR, January 1972.
*(5420)*72*ab*cc*ff*fx
Kiefer, G. H. "Systems Auditing with Test Decks." MANAGEMENT
ACCOUNTING, June 1972, pp. 14-18.
*(5430)*73*ab*cc*ff
King, K. G.; Crowe, Chizek; and Welke, W. R. "Data
Processing and the Auditor." DATA MANAGEMENT, February
1973, pp. 13-16.
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*(5440)*69*ab*cc*dg*fp*gc*ge
Koefod, Curtis F. "The Handling and Storage of Computer
Tape." DATA PROCESSING MAGAZINE, July 1969.
*(5450)*73*ab*ba*cb*da*ep*eq*hb*je*kb*x3
Koehn, Hank E. "Are Companies Bugged About Bugging?" JOURNAL
OF SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT, January 1973, pp. 12-13.
Richard M. Nixon and his friends have provided us
with an excellent example of the invasion of privacy
through wiretapping. The apparent lack of concern over
wiretapping is probably due to the naive attitude that
wiretapping is only used against criminals. However,
widespread illegal use of wiretapping does exist.
Wiretapping may be illegal, but the equipment isn't.
Several large electronic supply houses readily sell
wiretap devices. Wiretapping is almost impossible to
prevent, and commercial telephone/telegraph lines are not
secure. The author suggests that cryptography and
scrambling devices be used to protect sensitive
communications. Their cost is not prohibitive. One very
interesting example is given of successful use of
cryptography. A local syndicate attempting to purchase
several city blocks for a real estate development
encrypted its computerized status reports that were
processed at a service bureau. Known unauthorized access
attempts failed to decipher the data.
*(5460)*72*ac*cc*da*fl*hc*nl*x2
Kohlmeier, Louis M. "Computer Work Isn't Patentable, High
Court Says." WALL STREET JOURNAL, 21 November 1972, p. 3.
The Supreme Court in a six to zero vote ruled that
computer programs are not patentable. This article
briefly describes some facts of the case upon which this
decision was made. Several quotes from the majority
opinion, written by Justice William 0. Douglas, are
given. Computer manufacturers were against patentability
because they felt it would hinder development of
programming and the future of computer sales.
*(5470)*69*ab*cb*ek*ff
Korn, S. W. "Pre-Packaged Computer Programs Expand Computer
Services." CPA JOURNAL, November 1969, p. 851.
*(5480)*69*aa*cc*dg*gg
Krauss, Leonard I. ADMINISTERING AND CONTROLLING THE COMPANY
DATA PROCESSING FUNCTION. Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey, 1969.
*(5490)*72*aa*cc*cd*dg*nf*ni*nn*x3
Krauss, Leonard I. SAFE: SECURITY AUDIT AND FIELD EVALUATION
FOR COMPUTER FACILITIES AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS.
Firebrand, Krauss and Company, PO. Box 165, East
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Brunswick, New Jersey 08816, 1972, 284 pp., $24.95
(loose-leaf).
250 pages of this workbook are devoted to rating
sheets covering 392 checkpoints for physical and
procedural safeguards. The odd-numbered pages are rating
sheets, and the even-numbered pages are left blank for
the user to enter comments. The rating sheets, organized
for quantitative scoring of an installation's secureness,
are divided into the following eight areas: physical
controls; operational controls; data, programs, and
documentation; backup; development controls; personnel;
insurance; and overall security program.
*(5500)*72*ad*ak*cb*da*dc*gf
Krewson, N. N.; and Tait, J. B. "Holographic Security Key."
IBM TECHNICAL DISCLOSURE BULLETIN, Vol. 14, No. 12, May
1972, pp. 3832-3834.
This article describes a device that can be used to
identify and authenticate remote terminal users, or
control access to a computer room. The key must be
placed in a certain position and then, in sequence,
turned to any of a number of positions in a prearranged
order. The key includes a window and a reflective
hologram. The key-receptacle includes a light source and
a light sensor.
*(5510) *70*ab*cb*da*eq
Krishnamurthy, E. V. "Computer Cryptography Techniques for
Processing and Storage of Confidential Information."
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONTROL, November 1970, pp.
753-761.
*(5520)*72*ab*cb*eq*gh
Kugel, H. C. "Three Cipher-Decipher Programs Make Good
OS/360 Demo's." CANADIAN DATASYSTEMS, April 1972, pp.
38-40.
*(5530)*73*aa*cb*cc*cd*dg*ni*np*x4
Kuong, Javier F. COMPUTER SECURITY, AUDITING AND CONTROLS -
A BIBLIOGRAPHY. Management Advisory Publications, P.O.
Box 151, Wellesley Hills, Massachusetts 02181, 1973,
$7.50.
The three hundred articles in this non-annotated
bibliography are classified into the following main
headings (and subheadings): EDP Auditing and Controls
(EDP Auditing - General Aspects, Auditing With the
Computer, Generalized Software Packages, EDP System and
Internal Auditing Controls, EDP Education for the
Auditor); Computer Security and Privacy (Physical
Security, Fraud and Theft, Privacy and Legal Aspects,
Insurance); EDP Planning and Operations Control;
Management Review and Evaluation of EDP; On-Line and
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Real-Time Systems; and Checklists and Guidelines. The
classification scheme is designed to simplify the task of
locating relevant articles, and the author concedes that
it is somewhat arbitrary. Only relevant articles already
generally available to the public in published form are
included in the bibliography. The author avoided listing
more articles than he felt could reasonably be
investigated within a practical time frame. Marginally
relevant articles are omitted. The bibliography is an
especially valuable reference source for computer
auditing and control articles since these articles are
scattered over a rather large number of sources which
publish these relevant articles on an irregular basis,
Kuong's bibliography covers the period from 1964 to
June 1973. He plans to publish semi-annual updates with
the first update being available in January 1974.
Subscription costs for these updates will be $30 per
year. Detailed guidelines and procedures manuals can
also be obtained through special arrangements with
Management Advisory Publications. Manuals can be
currently obtained for "EDP Security, Auditing and
Controls Planning" and "EDP Operations Center Auditing
and Evaluation". Comprehensive flow charts and
checklists are included in these manuals to facilitate
their use.
*(5540)*73*aa*cb*cc*cd*dg*fa*fb*ff*fx*nf*nn
Kuong, Javier F. COMPUTER SECURITY, AUDITING AND CONTROLS,
TEXT AND READINGS. Management Advisory Publications, P.O.
Box 151, Wellesley Hills, Massachusetts 02181, 1973 (in
preparation).
This book, currently in preparation, will contain a
text section and a selection of some of the most useful
and informative articles on computer security, auditing,
and controls. Topics to be covered include: EDP
auditing; computer security principles and procedures;
computer center management and control; systems internal
controls; and guidelines on how to conduct management
reviews of data processing activities. The author plans
to condense into one book the accumulated experience of
experts in the field, and knowledge gained from extensive
experience in conducting consulting assignments on
organizational and audit studies of DP installations.
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*(5550)*65*ab*cc*da*kb
Lachter, Lewis E. "Preventing Business-Secret Espionage."
ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, December 1965.
This article describes safeguards to prevent loss of
business secrets.
*(5560)*69*ae*ag*cb*ed*ei*gh*x2
Lampson, B. W. "Dynamic Protection Structures." AFIPS
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Fall Joint Computer Conference,
Vol. 35, pp. 27-38.
The author describes an access control scheme that
has been developed as part of the operating system for
the Berkeley Computer Corporation Model 1. This scheme
is mainly concerned with how information which specifies
protection and authorizes access, can itself be protected
and manipulated. Some fundamental concepts of Lampson's
model are briefly described below. "Objects" (files,
pages of memory, processes, domains, interrupt calls,
terminals, and access keys) are named by "capabilities"
which are names protected by the system. Users can not
create or modify capabilities arbitrarily. Thus
possession of a capability can be taken as prima facie
proof of the right to access the object it names. A new
kind of object called a "domain" is used to group
capabilities. Any process executing in some domain can
exercise all the capabilities belonging to that domain.
The only reason for creating a new domain is to establish
an environment in which a process may execute with
different protection than that provided by any existing
domain. To provide an adequate mechanism for transfers
between domains, the idea of a protected entry point or
"gate" is introduced. Normally all transfers are allowed
only at gates. To pass through a gate an appropriate
"access key" must be presented. These access keys are
themselves objects and can only be obtained in the same
manner that other objects are obtained.
After describing the above concepts, the author goes
into a detailed discussion on implementing his model.
The model allows two domains to work together with any
degree of intimacy, from complete trust to bitter mutual
suspicion. It also allows a domain to exercise firm
control over everything created by it or its
subsidiaries.
*(5570)*70*ae*cb*dd*ei
Lampson, B. W. "On Reliable and Extensible Operating
Systems." INFOTECH STATE OF THE ART PROCEEDINGS, 1970.
*(5580)*69*ad*bc*dg*ed*gh*lb
Lampson, B. W. "An Overview of the CAL Time-Sharing System."
Computation Center, University of California, Berkeley,
California, September 1969.
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*(5590)71*ae*cb*dg*ee
Lampson, B, W. "Protection." PROCEEDINGS - FIFTH ANNUAL
PRINCETON CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION SCIENCES AND SYSTEMS,
Department of Electrical Engineering, Princeton
University, Princeton, New Jersey, March 1971, pp.
437-443.
This paper discusses Lampson's theory on access
control. Much of his theory is based on concepts first
developed by J. B. Dennis and E. C. Van Horn, such as
"objects" possessing "capabilities".
*(5600)*67*ad*cb*ec*ed*ei
Lampson, B. W. "Scheduling and Protection in an Interactive
Multi-Processor System." Ph.D. Dissertation, University
of California, Berkeley, California, March 1967, 82 pp.
The following four types of protection are
described: protection of the system from users, users
from the system, users from themselves, and the system
from itself. The author recommends that authorization
for executing privileged instructions be determined, not
by job identification, but by the location of the job in
a special area of main memory. Four types of memory
hardware protection schemes are discussed. They are:
memory bounds registers which set limits on addressable
space; page memory protection where access control is
regulated by a page table; segmented memory protection
where pages are grouped into segments; and partitioned
memory protection where the entire main memory is divided
into separate areas.
*(5610)*68*ab*ah*cb*ec*ed*ei
Lampson, B. W. "A Scheduling Philosophy for Multi-Processing
Systems." COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, May 1968.
This article is essentially a brief summary of
important items in Lampson's Ph.D. dissertation.
* (5620) *66*ae*cb*ed
Lampson, B. W. "A User Machine in a Time-Sharing System."
IEEE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 54, No. 12, December 1966.
*(5630) *71*ab*cc*dc*fv*xl
Lang, William Jr. "Backup Files are a Must." ADMINISTRATIVE
MANAGEMENT, October 1971, p. 55.
The author states that grandfather-father-son backup
must be kept for important data files if a firm is to
survive a disaster in its computer installation. He
briefly explains how these backup files should be updated
and stored.
*(5640)*71*ac*ai*cc*dg*fb*fr*fs*ft*ia*ic*id*ie*jb*x3
Lange, Diane. "Employees Called Biggest Security Risk at
Centers." COMPUTERWORLD, 23 June 1971, p. 2.
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This article discusses a speech made by Robert E.
Wiper, educator and behavioralist, before the Computer
Protection/Insurance Workshop sponsored by BUSINESS
INSURANCE NEWS MAGAZINE and COMPUTERWORLD. As increased
physical protection has made access to DP centers more
difficult, employees are becoming the biggest security
risks. Many security measures undertaken by data centers
have placed the employees in a position where they are
more subject to attempts at bribery or extortion. Some
personality conditions that can create losses are:
members of anti-establishment groups; real or imagined
grievances against employers; employees with jobs that
have no future; and employees who have mismanaged their
personal goals and objectives. Mr. Wiper suggests that
behavior profiles be given to job candidates before
hiring them. He also strongly suggests that all DP jobs
have a path leading to a better job. Dead end jobs do
not help employee morale and could produce enough
dissatisfaction to result in a disaster. Authorization
control of employees should be replaced by goal-oriented
management.
*(5650)*70*ab*be*cc*de*fh*hp*hr*ka*x1
Lauren, Roy H. "Reliability of Data Bank Records."
DATAMATION, May 1970, pp. 88-89.
The author lists some typical databanks that the
average individual is likely to be part of, and gives two
examples showing that these databanks will often contain
errors. He suggests that more control over databank
errors is necessary, but doesn't say how this could be
done. The public needs to be convinced that databanks
can benefit them, but this may be difficult if databanks
only store negative information on individuals.
* (5660) *64*ab*ah*cc*da*db*f1
Lawlor, Reed C. "Copyright Aspects of Computer Usage."
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, October 1964.
This article is somewhat obsolete, but it still
serves as a good introduction to the copyright field.
* (5670) *70*ac*ai*bc*cd*dc*me*nk
"Leaky Center May Lose Vendor Support." COMPUTERWORLD, 7
October 1970.
Burroughs Corporation is threatening to discontinue
its services to the Jacksonville, Florida EDP Center. It
wants the center to move its EDP equipment to a safer
location.
*(5680)*70*ac*ai*cb*da*db*ed*eq*gh
Leavitt, Don. "Cipher/i Designed for Assurance of Total File
Privacy." COMPUTERWORLD, 10 June 1970.
A cryptographic software security package is
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described.
*(5690)*72*ac*ai*cb*da*ep*er*x2
Leavitt, Don. "Compression Shields Data While Operations
Improve." COMPUTERWORLD, 6 December 1972, p. 16.
Users who don't want to go as far as encrypting to
protect their data have other options such as data
compression. Compression packages function by collapsing
"extra" repeated characters, whether blanks or actual
data, into a single character (or bit) ahead of the
compression. Some packages go further and allow two
alphabetics or four numerics to be stored in a space
normally required for one character. Compression is used
to reduce storage requirements, but this saving in disk
and tape storage is offset by processing costs for
encoding and decoding the data. Compressed data is often
not normally recognized by a data thief. However, the
compression routines are often part of an installation's
operating procedure, and a persistent thief will not be
stopped by compressed files.
*(5700)*72*ac*ai*cb*da*eq*gh*xl
Leavitt, Don. "Encrypting Routines Offered, But Not Widely
Used." COMPUTERWORLD, 6 December 1972, p. 18.
This article contains a short general discussion on
cryptography. Some of the more interesting comments are
briefly stated below. Although various software houses
offer efficient cryptographic packages, there has been no
great demand for this type of support. One very serious
restriction on the use of encrypting lies in the
inability of some central processor units or other
equipment to accept all the characters generated by the
encoding routines. Some communications gear, for
example, reserve certain codes as control characters.
Encrypting adds very little time to the processing. One
vendor has a routine that can process 23,000 80-character
records per minute on an IBM 360/30. Also, most
encrypting routines require little storage. One routine
needs only 500 bites for the coding and 880 bites for
work space.
*(5710)*72*ac*ai*cb*da*ed*xl
Leavitt, Don. "Passwords Protect Data and Programs."
COMPUTERWORLD, 6 December 1972, p. 13.
Most of this article describes simple uses of
passwords that would be useful only to those unfamiliar
with computers. However, a few interesting statements
are made, and some of them are stated below. Some
software houses include controllable "self-destruct"
routines in their programs to block extended use of a
proprietary product on a pre-installation trial.
Sometimes variants of these routines are used if an
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authorized user fails to pay the agreed-upon rental or if
the package is stolen from a legitimate user. The author
does not describe any particular "self-destruct"
mechanisms, but he suggests that any user could
incorporate them into his programs. Database management
systems make it easier for a user to interface with his
data. They also provide access-control security because
users do not access data by its physical location and
must know the proper file name to access someone else's
file. Therefore, proper access-control over the
dictionary of file names will provide at least some
security.
*(5720)*73*ac*ai*bb*cc*db*hk*if*kb*kd*mc*x2
Leavitt, Don. "Physical DP Tampering Discounted in Bank
'Shuffle'." COMPUTERWORLD, 25 April 1973, p. 4.
An investigation into the embezzlement of funds from
the Union Dime Savings Bank has shown the theft did not
involve unauthorized computer hardware or software
changes. However, changes were made to computerizes
customer account records through unauthorized use of a
teller's terminal. These data input changes appeared to
be valid transactions to the computer programs. The
thief, a supervisor, circumvented the bank's dual control
system by gaining unauthorized access to both the
teller's terminal and the branch reserve cash supply.
Fortunately, the computer system's audit trail routines
will enable the bank to easily identify the defrauded
customer records.
*(5730)*73*ac*ai*bc*cb*cd*dc*fv*gc*jg*nk*x2
Leavitt, Don. "Tornado Levels DP Center, 90 Hours Later CPU
Is Up." COMPUTERWORLD, 18 April 1973, p. 1.
Rapid recovery was made possible according to
Charles Darnell, Lithonia Lighting's DP manager, by hard
work by his own staff, an impressive dedication to the
job by IBM engineers (even though the CPU was on a
third-party lease), and good audit trails provided by the
Environ/I-Total database management system. Most of the
article's focus is on the resulting damage and IBM's
support.
*(5740)*67*ab*cc*db*de*ff*hk*hp
Lee, D. F. "A Structural Check of Accounting Input Data in a
Computer System." JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING, June 1967, p.
54.
*(5750)*70*ab*ba*bb*cc*cd*da*db*fd
Lefer, H. "How to Shield Your Office Against Crime." MODERN
OFFICE PROCEDURES, April 1970, pp. 21-29.
Part of this article discusses security for EDP
installations. A method is given for determining what
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records are vital. Several fraud and theft examples are
also given.
*(5760)*69*ab*cc*da*fl*kc*nl*xl
"Legal Protection for Computer Programs." COMPUTERS AND
AUTOMATION, February 1969, pp. 12-13.
This is a position paper favoring legal protection
by patents for computer programs. It was adopted by the
Association of Independent Software Companies at their
first annual meeting on November 21, 1968. The paper
discusses advantages of patent protection, recent related
activity in the legislative and executive branches of
government, and an example supporting patent protection.
But in view of the December 1972 Supreme Court ruling
against software patents, this article is purely
academic. A more current discussion on this subject can
be found in an article by David Goldberg entitled "Legal
Protection of EDP Software" and printed in the May 1972
issue of DATAMATION.
*(5770) *71*ab*cc*ff
Leishman, R. 0. "The Computer as an Audit Tool." THE
INTERNAL AUDITOR, January 1971.
*(5780) *68*ad*ca*dg*ee
Lesser, V. R. "A Multi-Level Computer Organization Designed
to Separate Data-Accessing from Computation." CS90,
Computer Science Department, Stanford University,
Stanford, California, March 1968.
*(5790)*71*ac*ai*cc*dg*fz*ma
"Let Customer Beware in Computer Contracts." COMPUTERWORLD,
13 January 1971, p. 1.
*(5800)*69*ab*cc*df*dg*ff*fv*kb*kd*x2
Levine, R. A. "How to Protect Your EDP Records." NEW YORK
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT, May 1969, pp. 353-356.
The author gives a number of brief recommendations
for protecting EDP records through validation of
processing program operation, validation of input data,
and backup for files and equipment. A few of these
recommendations are given below. The processing should
include: a sequence check of files; a check of
computation results against predefined limits; an
accumulation and verification of input and output record
counts; and an accumulation and verification of hash
totals of numerical fields against totals stored in
trailer records. All output files should be
label-checked to determine if the file name and real
sequence correspond with the program requirements.
Planning should include appraisal of each piece of
equipment as to the effects of its failure on the
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over-all processing system. A son-father-grandfather
backup concept should be used with the grandfather copy
retained at an off-site location.
*(5810)*73*ab*cc*da*dd*de*hd*ka*x2
Lewis, Ephraim A. "A Myth-Destroying Study of Computers."
BUSINESS WEEK, 13 January 1973, pp. 9-10.
This article reviews a recently published book by
Alan F. Westin and Michael A. Baker entitled DATABANKS IN
A FREE SOCIETY. For a summary of this article, read the
annotation under the entry for the book.
*(5820)*71*ab*cc*ff
Lewis W. F. "Auditing On-Line Computer Systems." JOURNAL OF
ACCOUNTANCY, October 1971, pp. 47-52.
*(5830)*70*ab*bc*cd*dc*jg
"Light Plane Lights ADR's Fire." DATAMATION, January 1970,
p. 174.
This article describes an accident where an
out-of-gas, light plane crashed into Applied Data
Research, Inc. and started a fire which caused serious
damage to ADR's computer room.
*(5840)*70*ac*ai*cc*cd*dg*ft*ga*gf*x1
"Limiting Access to Centers Called a Major Problem."
COMPUTERWORLD, 24 June 1970.
Joseph Wasserman and Louis Scoma are quoted on
physical access problems. These two security consultants
feel that a showcase computer room is asking for trouble.
They recommend periodic six month EDP personnel
investigations and immediate dismissal of fired or
laid-off employees.
*(5850)*69*ae*ag*ca*da*db*gh*hb*lb*mh
Linde, R.; Weissman, C.; and Fox, C. "The ADEPT-50
Time-Sharing System." AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Fall
Joint Computer Conference, Vol. 35, 1969, pp. 39-50.
This paper describes the unique system architecture
of ADEPT-50. The ADEPT system operates on IBM System/360
computers. It is a general purpose system designed to
operate in a military context and to support a limited
number of large, compute and I/0 bound programs,
dependent upon large files of data. The system will
adequately serve a larger number of users if their
programs are small and if they limit their demands on the
systems resources. The user can have the same commands
for controlling his program as those used by the
executive program. The security techniques built into
the system are novel. They are described in detail in
"Security Controls of the ADEPT-50 Time-Sharing System"
by Clark Weissman. This Weissman article is also in
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volume 35 of the AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS.
* (5860) *69*ab*cc*ff
Lindgren, L. H. "Auditing Management Information Systems."
JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT, June 1969, pp. 22-27.
*(5870)*72*ab*cc*fc*fm
Lo Russo, P. M. "The Operations Manager's Job." DATA
MANAGEMENT, September 1972, pp. 32-34.
* (5880) *71*ab*cc*ff
Lobel, J. "Auditing in the New Systems Environment." JOURNAL
OF ACCOUNTANCY, September 1971, pp. 63-67.
*(5890)*69*ab*cc*ff*mc
Lombara, S. E. "Auditing Credit Cards Via Computer."
MAGAZINE OF BANK ADMINISTRATION, November 1969, p. 37.
*(5900)*70*ab*bc*cd*dc*jg*x3
"Looking at Fire Hazards," FIRE JOURNAL, May 1970.
Approximately twenty-five examples of actual
computer room fires are given. Losses ranged from $900
to $4,500,000 with the average well over $100,000. The
article should definately be read by those concerned with
fire protection of computer equipment.
* (5910) *71*ab*cc*df*fm
Lucas, H. C. "Performance Evaluation and Monitoring."
COMPUTING SURVEYS, September 1971, pp. 79-91.
*(5920)*69*ae*cb*da*db*dc*ea*gh
Luck, J. E. "Description of a Real-Time Completely Automatic
Speaker Verification System." PROCEEDINGS OF CARNAHAN
CONFERENCE OF ELECTRONIC CRIME COUNTERMEASURES,
University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, 1969, pp,
98-113.
*(5930)*72*ac*ai*bb*cc*if*ka*kf*me*nj*x2
Lundell, E. Drake Jr. "'Absent' DPer Cites City Misuse."
COMPUTERWORLD, 20 December 1972, p. 4.
After charging that the Honolulu mayor improperly
used the city's computers in a reelection bid, Larry
Stevens, a computer specialist, mysteriously disappeared
and is still missing after a two month police
investigation. In the meantime, Mayor Frank F. Fasi has
been reelected. On the day before he disappeared,
Stevens charged in a notorized statement that the Fasi
campaign organization had illegally used computer
equipment and programming manpower, valued at between
$50,000 and $100,000, at the expense of the taxpayers.
* (5940) *72*ac*ai*bc*cd*dc*jg*jh*na*nk*x2
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Lundell, E. Drake Jr. "Big Cleanup Beings After Agnes
Cripples DP Centers in 5 States." COMPUTERWORLD, 5 July
1972, p. 1.
Hundreds of computer systems were buried under tons
of water and mud as floods spawned by tropical storm
Agnes inundated the Middle Atlantic section of the
country, killing over 100 people and leaving thousands
homeless. This article briefly describes damage done to
a score of flooded installations. All the users
interviewed by COMPUTERWORLD were impressed with the aid
they were getting from vendors.
*(5950)*72*ac*ai*cb*cc*da*ka*mb*ng*nl*nm*x2
Lundell, E. Drake Jr. "Canadian Study Sees Role for United
Nations in Privacy Issue." COMPUTERWORLD, 20 December
1972, p. 2.
This article briefly reveals some of the findings
made by a Canadian Task Force studying the issue of
computers and their relationship to personal privacy.
One of the more interesting findings was that a great
deal of data about citizens of one country is presently
being stored in computer databanks in other countries.
The task force suggested that the United Nations might
provide an appropriate forum for consideration of this
problem. An overall government program to establish
rules for Canadian governmental databanks was proposed.
Other findings include: personal information is being
collected faster than most Canadians suspect, a large
amount of data interchange is occurring among firms, and
few safeguards are used.
The "Privacy and Computer Task Force Report" is
available for $2.50 from Communications Canada,
Information Service, 100 Metcalfe Street, Ottawa,
Ontario. For a more detailed discussion of this report
see an article by John M. Carroll entitled "Snapshot 1971
- How Canada Organizes Information About People" in the
1972 Fall Joint Computer Conference proceedings.
*(5960)*72*ac*ai*cc*da*db*ka*mb*nl*nm*x3
Lundell, E. Drake Jr. "Disclosure of Federal Dossiers
Proposed." COMPUTERWORLD, 28 June 1972, p. 1.
A bill, H.R. 9527 in the House and S. 975 in the
Senate, is described which would require all government
agencies maintaining dossiers on individuals to disclose
the existence of those files to the individuals
concerned. The bill, known as the Citizen's Privacy Act,
would: prohibit any one government agency from disclosing
an individual's file to anyone outside the agency without
the individual's consent; require agencies to notify the
individuals that they plan to start files on; and give
individuals the right to inspect their files and add
supplementary information if needed. Files relating to
- L -
PAGE 166
national security and law enforcement are excluded. The
bill is viewed by several lawmakers as a test case of
Congressional attitudes toward the protection of privacy
in computer databanks. It is much stronger than the
Credit Information Act passed last year.
*(5970)*71*ac*ai*ba*cb*cc*da*el*fl*hc*hm*ih*kc*ma*nj*x2
Lundell, E. Drake Jr. "Firm Sues Ex-Employees Over
Proprietary Programs." COMPUTERWORLD, 22 December 1971,
p. 6.
Computer Sharing Services (CSS) has filed a suit
against Computer-Time Corporation (CTC) and three former
CSS employees now with CTC. CSS has charged that the
defendants stole a least several of its proprietary
programs and were using them in CTC's operations. CSS
couldn't determine the exact programs allegedly stolen
because part of its computerized audit trail, that would
have revealed the theft, was also missing. The
defendants are challenging CSS's claim that certain of
its programs are proprietary.
*(5980)*72*ac*ai*cb*cc*cd*da*db*dc*ft*nf*nn*x3
Lundell, E. Drake Jr. "'Inflexible' DP Systems Said to
Attract Dishonesty." COMPUTERWORLD, 1 November 1972, p.
2.
Some comments made by Donn B. Parker at the First
International Conference on Computer Communication are
presented. Computer related crimes are described under
categories of conventional crime such as: fraud, theft,
larceny, forgery, conspiracy, vandalism, burglary, etc..
Typical reasons for computer criminal acts include:
revenge, competition, politics, challenge to ability,
power, wealth, avoidance of harm, sympathy to desires and
needs of others, respect, peer group acceptance, and
absence of positive motives.
Threats should not be confused with methods of
penetration such as: software trapdoors, wiretapping, and
password detection, Threats are the potential and actual
actions of people. The nature of threats includes: (1)
circumstances of peoples actions; (2) their ability to
act; (3) procedures they use; and (4) technical methods
they employ. Poking about in the system itself to find
weaknesses and theorizing points of unintended
penetration with little knowledge of the treats will only
lead to serious discontinuities and inconsistencies in
security. The owner's evaluation of the various assets
to be protected may not coincide at all with the values
placed on them by potentially dishonest people. The
author predicts that the number of computer crimes will
decrease in the future due to improved safeguards, but
the losses per crime can be expected to increase.
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*(5990)*72*ac*ai*bc*cc*dc*fw*gc*jg*na*x1
Lundell, E. Drake Jr. "Innovation Marks Efforts to Capture
'Flooded' Data." COMPUTERWORLD, 12 July 1972, p. 1.
This article describes efforts by several different
computer users to recover data from damage done by
tropical storm Agnes. The lost data, and not the
equipment, was the main worry of most DP managers because
manufacturers replaced most damaged equipment within a
week or two of the storm. Almost all of the data
salvaging involved cleaning cards and magnetic tapes of
water and mud. A typical innovative cleanup idea was
described as "wash gently with Lestoil, rinse, spin on a
tape drive for five minutes, and dry under a hair dryer".
A brief summary of physical damage done to equipment is
also included.
*(6000)*72*ac*ai*bd*cc*dd*hr*mc*nj*x2
Lundell, E. Drake Jr. "Judge Rules Against 'DP Error'
Defense." COMPUTERWORLD, 22 March 1972, p. 1.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
claimed that it was not liable for an accident involving
a policy holder who didn't renew his expired policy until
after an accident. State Farm's computer made an error
by automatically renewing the policy as effective before
the accident upon receiving the late payment. The
Colorado Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the
actual processing of the policy carried out by an
unimaginative mechanical device can have no effect on the
company's responsibilities for those errors and
oversights.
*(6010)*72*ac*ai*cb*gh*id*x3
Lundell, E. Drake Jr. "More Secure (But Vulnerable) Systems
Expected Soon." COMPUTERWORLD, 13 December 1972, p. 13.
This was the conclusion drawn by the ACM Special
Interest Group on Computer Systems Installation
Management during the Fall Joint Computer Conference.
However, there is still debate on different security
styles, including centralized versus decentralized access
authorizations, the potential affects of unauthorized
access to a firm's assets, and the population of
potential penetrators. Jerry Kennedy, president of Basic
Computing Arts, described the Data Sentinel System
Monitor manufactured by his firm. The system is
essentially a PDP-11 computer that monitors and controls
all incoming requests to access databases that a firm
wishes to keep secure. Robert Abbot, of Lawrence
Livermore Laboratories, stated that such external systems
have a place in security controls but cannot really
protect a system from systems programmers.
*(6020)*72*ac*ai*cd*dc*ga*me
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Lundell, E. Drake Jr. "State Mulls Flood Guides for Its
Sites." COMPUTERWORLD, 13 September 1972, pp. 1-2.
*(6030)*72*ac*ai*cb*cc*cd*dg*ea*ed*ft*ia*nb*no*x3
Lundell, E. Drake Jr.; and Upton, Molly. "Users Awaken to
Security Needs: Guarding Centers Primary Concern."
COMPUTERWORLD, 6 December 1972, p. 1.
This article summarizes the results of a recent
COMPUTERWORLD survey of large sophisticated computer
users. Eighty percent of these large users said they
would be willing to pay up to ten percent more on their
monthly equipment rentals for a successful and workable
data security system. All of the users indicated data
security was "extremely" important to them. However, few
have made use of scramblers or encryptors. Personnel
screening and password hierarchies were the most relied
upon methods of protecting sensitive data. They were
used by ninety percent and seventy-five percent of the
users respectively. But even with this awareness to
protect sensitive data, most users still put most of
their security efforts into physical protection. A
majority of the users do not trust operators to handle
sensitive printouts. Few of these users had strict
personnel screening procedures, but most wished that they
could have such screening.
*(6040)*73*ac*ai*bb*cc*db*hm*mk*x1
Lundell, E. Drake Jr. "Watergate Spawned Fear of 1972
Vote-Count Fraud." COMPUTERWORLD, 23 May 1973, p. 1.
With the tales of Watergate and other Republican
political sabotage tactics rampant during the late stages
of last year's Presidential campaign, officials in the
McGovern for President organization became increasingly
concerned that there would actually be tampering with the
vote-count process, especially in computerized vote
systems. An outside consultant was hired to give
seminars in several states on what to look for in
possible vote tampering. However, the effect was too
little and probably too late. No vote fraud was
uncovered.
*(6050)*73*ac*ai*cc*da*db*de*fe*ka*mb*nl*nm*x1
Lundell, E. Drake Jr. "World Group Urges Right of Inspection
of Data Banks." COMPUTERWORLD, 9 May 1973, p. 7.
A report by a subcommittee of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) recommends
that all private databanks containing personal informtion
be regulated just as credit databanks are now regulated
in the United States. OECD, which has members from
fourteen countries, noted that governments are faced with
the problem of alienating the public over personal and
societal implications of the computer, particularly in
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the area of personal privacy. The subcommittee felt
government agencies could not meet all demands that would
likely occur if everyone had unlimited access to see all
his files at any time. Therefore, a regulation similar
to the U.S.'s Fair Credit Reporting Act was suggested.
The use of security techniques in personal data bases was
not being actively considered by any country, since legal
regulations were considered to be sufficient to protect
sensitive data.
*(6060)*68*ae*cc*dc*fv*xl
Lunin, Lois F. "Protection Against Catastrophe: A Plan for
Insuring Continuity of Information." PROCEEDINGS OF THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INFORMATION SCIENCE, Greenwood
Publishing Corporation, New York, Vol. 5 Information
Transfer, 1968, pp. 295-299.
The author briefly describes a file backup plan
developed for the Information Center for Hearing, Speech,
and Disorders of Human Communication at John Hopkins
University. The backup plan was prompted by several
Baltimore riots in 1968.
*(6070)*70*ab*cc*cd*da*db*dc*gf*x1
Luther, Frederick H. "Keeping the Computer Secure."
ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, October 1970, p. 10.
Several specific physical access control procedures
are presented. All of them are well known. A few simple
suggestions on storing backup files are also given.
*(6080)*70*ab*cc*dg*eh*ff*kd*x1
Lutter, Frederick H. "Protect the Database." ADMINISTRATIVE
MANAGEMENT, November 1970, p. 10.
To prevent fraud, the following three interrelated
areas must be controlled: database protection, program
security, and application audit trails. This article
presents some interesting but very brief comments on
these three areas. File integrity checking must be kept
separate from other processing, and a senior person
should be responsible for it. Source language copies of
production programs should not be sent to the computer
room. Audit trail procedures must allow reconstruction
at any time of any master record taken at random. These
procedures must make it possible to trace any
transaction, action document, or report to the
corresponding master record as it existed at a specific
past time.
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*(6090)*67*ab*cc*ca*da*db*dc*fd*fs
MacDonald, M. B. Jr.; and Brown, J. K. "Company Security
Practices." THE CONFERENCE BOARD RECORD, October 1967, p.
40-47.
The results of a survey on industrial security
policies and procedures are presented. Visitor control,
employee indoctrination, and identification of
proprietary data are discussed.
* (6100) *69*ab*cb*dg
"Machine That Takes Secrecy in Hand." BUSINESS WEEK, 10 May
1969, p. 151.
*(6110)*73*ae*cb*ed*ei*x3
Madnick, Stuart E.; and Donovan, John J. "Application and
Analysis of the Virtual Machine Approach to Information
System Security and Isolation." Presented at ACM WORKSHOP
ON VIRTUAL COMPUTER SYSTEMS, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 26
March 1973, 15 pp.
This paper shows that a combined virtual machine
monitor - operating system (VMM/OS) approach to
information system isolation provides substantially
better software security than a conventional
multiprogramming operating system approach. This added
protection is derived from redundant security, using
independent protection mechanisms that are inherent in
the design of most virtual machine monitor - operating
system systems. The improved security applies to
complete isolation security in which no user is allowed
access to other users' information. Generalized access
control where users are allowed controlled partial access
to each other's files is not considered.
*(6120)*72*af*cd*dc*dd*gc
"Magnetic Intrusion: The 'Silent Saboteur'." ADP NEWSLETTER,
18 September 1972, pp. 1-4.
This article summarizes a National Bureau of
Standards technical note entitled "The Effect of Magnetic
Fields on Magnetic Storage Media Used in Computers".
Several commonly asked questions on the vulnerability of
magnetic storage media are answered.
*(6130)*72*ac*ai*cb*dc*gc*jf*x3
"Magnets: A Surface Issue." COMPUTERWORLD, 30 August 1972,
p. 1.
Two somewhat conflicting views are given on the
vulnerability of magnetic tapes to magnets. W. D.
Tiffany, manager of the security system research program
at Stanford Research Institute, claims that a common
"dime store" magnet of 250 gauss would affect a tape if
held on the tape's surface, but it would have no affect
if held 1/8th of an inch away or more. He believes that
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the tape canister would protect a tape from most magnets,
at least small ones. But according to L. Conroy,
director of Securitronics, relatively small magnets of
250-1000 gauss will make tapes useless, although not
completely erasing them, when run over their plastic
housing or metal container. For detailed information on
Tiffany's research, read an article in the September 1972
issue of THE OFFICE entitled "Are Computer's Files
Vulnerable to Magnets?"
*(6140)*71*ae*cb*cd*da*ep*jd*je
Maitland, P. "Data Transmission Privacy: Vulnerability and
Protection." 43rd ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY, Electrical Association, April 1971.
*(6150)*71*ac*bc*cc*cd*da*db*dc*fr*jd*jf*nd*x3
Mandell, Mel. "Computer Scare Talk: Sabotage Fears of
'Experts' Discounted." NEW YORK TIMES, 9 May 1971, Sect.
3, p. 3.
The author shows that three major computer
insecurities being widely discussed in the press and at
business and technical gatherings are largely
exaggerated. He blames security consultants who also
sell security systems for greatly exaggerating threats in
order to sell their equipment. These three threats are:
radical attacks, infiltration of saboteurs with magnets,
and "superspy" trucks that receive and process radiation
from the nearby computers. The third threat is
completely infeasible. As for sabotage by radicals, all
the attacks to date have been at universities, giant
corporations, or large banks. Mandell states that the
real threat comes "not from long-haired radicals but from
well barbered embezzlers". Embezzlement is one of the
leading causes of business failure. A lesser threat
comes from disgruntled employees. An intellegent
security program should provide: adequate protection
against well known hazards such as fire, water, and power
failures; good hiring practices; good advancement
opportunities; and proper discipline in the computer
room.
*(6160)*71*ab*bc*cc*cd*da*db*dc*fr*jd*jf*nd*x3
Mandell, Mel. "Computer Security: Sabotage Fears
Discounted." COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION, October 1971, p.
29.
This article is a reprint of another article written
by Mandell which appeared in the NEW YORK TIMES under the
title "Computer Scare Talk: Sabotage Fears of 'Experts'
Discounted".
*(6170)*71*ad*cb*dg*ed*ef*el*gh*lb
Manola, F. "An Extended Data Management Facility for a
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General-Purpose Time-Sharing System." Master's Thesis,
Moore School of Electrical Engineering, University of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; or AD-724 801,
National Technical Information Service, Springfield,
Virginia 22151, May 1971.
This thesis describes the Extended Data Management
Facility (EDMF) system developed by the Moore School.
The system had data privacy as one of its main
objectives. It implements the "authority item" concept
developed by D. K. Hsiao in 1968. Protection can be
provided at the field or record level, as well as at the
file level. Both pre- and post-analysis of data
retrieval is made. The system runs on a RCA SPECTRA
70/466 computer.
*(6180)*70*ac*ai*cb*dg*ep*lb*nk*x1
"Manufacturers' Safeguards for Data Called Inadequate."
COMPUTERWORLD, 11 November 1970, p. 3.
Discussions at a recent Advanced Management
Association Seminar are summarized. Louis Scoma, a
computer security consultant, criticized computer
manufacturers for not providing adequate hardware and
software safeguards for data transmission. The
Continental Airlines Reservations System was also
described.
*(6190)*70*ac*ai*cb*nk
"Manufacturer Has Special Responsibility for Security
Safeguards, Says FCC's Lee." COMPUTERWORLD, 16 December
1970, p. 7.
* (6200) *71*ab*cc*ni
Mariotti, J. J. "Checklists in Problem Solving." MANAGEMENT
ADVISOR, May 1971, pp. 28-37.
This is a basic article on preparation of
checklists.
*(6210)*70*aa*cc*fe*gg*nl*nm*x2
Martin, James; and Norman, Adrian R. D. THE COMPUTERIZED
SOCIETY. Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey
07623, 1970, 574 pp., $10.95.
This book attempts to explain, to the man with
little or no computer knowledge, what is happening in the
computer industry and its laboratories, and what impact
this is likely to have upon society in the next 15 years.
It is not very informative to someone interested in
security issues and knowledgeable in computers. Most of
the book is concerned with privacy issues. Only four of
the twenty-nine chapters are concerned with computer
security issues. Chapter 18, "Crime and Sabotage",
briefly discusses common problems unique to the computer
that make it quite vulnerable to crime and sabotage.
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Chapter 24, "The Laws That Are Needed", makes twelve
strong recommendations for new laws. Chapter 25, "Locks,
Guards, and Burglar Alarms", recommends 24 currently
available safeguards that can and should, in most cases,
be used to protect valuable and sensitive data. The
title of chapter 25 is misleading, since only one of
twenty-four safeguards is a physical safeguard. None of
the safeguards mentioned are unique to this book and most
can be easily found elsewhere. Chapter 26, "Systems
Controls That Are Needed", briefly discusses the
authorization problem, the user's legitimate
need-to-know, encoding data, and controlling data
collection.
*(6220)*70*ad*cb*da*ep
Massey, J. L.; Chang, J.; Geist, J.; Hartman, W.; and
Seguin, G. "Convolutional Coding Techniques for Data
Protection." NASA-CR-109773, University of Notre Dame,
Notre Dame, Indiana, March 1970, 10 pp.
This article is quite technical and probably only
useful to those familiar with coding techniques. A
modified Fano sequential decoding algorithm is described.
Also discussed is a class of complementary rate 1/2
non-systematic codes for sequential decoding.
*(6230)*72*ab*cc*fm*fn
Matheny, C. S. "Operations Planning and Scheduling." DATA
MANAGEMENT, September 1972, pp. 32-34.
*(6240)*69*aa*cb*cc*dg*ep*lb*nl*nm
Mathison, S. L.; and Walker, P. M. COMPUTERS AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ISSUES IN PUBLIC POLICY.
Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 07623,
1969.
One chapter is devoted to privacy. It discusses
possible regulatory controls.
*(6250)*72*ab*cc*fc*ff
Matson, M. C. "Systems Design and Internal Audit - An
Effective Interface." THE INTERNAL AUDITOR, March 1972.
*(6260)*73*ac*bb*cc*db*hj*if*mc*x2
Maxwell, Neil. "Voice of Experience: Lamer Hill, Embezzler,
Says Stealing is Easy." WALL STREET JOURNAL, 26 January
1973, p. 1.
Mr. Lamar B. Hill, former director and president of
First National Bank of Cartersville, recently pleaded
guilty to 60 of 180 counts of bank fraud. This article
summarizes an interview with Mr. Hill on the day before
he was to start serving a 10 year prison term. Mr. Hill
had embezzled $4,600,000 over the last 21 years, but got
tired of "remembering all those figures" and finally let
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himself get caught. He gave several reasons why bank
embezzlement is easy. Incompetent directors who don't
understand banking is one reason. Auditors who pay too
much attention to bankers' complaints that
earlier-morning audits inconvenience customers, and who
stand around for 30 minutes before they get started is
another reason. Mr. Hill said, "You give me 30 minutes
and I can hide anything so that you'll never find it".
When asked what happened to all that money, Hill appeared
genuinely puzzled. "I just don't know", he said, "I've
gambled some". He plans to write a book on embezzlement
while in jail.
*(6270)*71*ab*cc*dg*fy*nb
McCahill, F. X. Jr. "Avoid Losses Through Risk Management."
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, May 1971.
The use of insurance to provide protection is
discussed.
*(6280)*66*ac*cc*da*fj*ka*mb*nj*nl*nm
McCarthy, John. "Information." SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN,
September 1966, pp. 65-72.
The author believes that privacy invasion from a
single national information center can be controlled.
However, laws must be passed which give the individual
the right to inspect his own file and challenge its
accuracy. Unauthorized access to certain information
should be made legal grounds to bring a civil suit.
*(6290)*69*ab*cc*ff
McCollum, P. "Computer Systems Audit." MANAGEMENT
ACCOUNTING, May 1969, pp. 51-52.
*(6300)*73*ad*cc*fb*fx
McFarlan, W. F. "Management Audit of the EDP Department."
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, May 1973, pp. 131-142.
*(6310)*69*ae*ag*cb*df*dg*ed*el*lb
McGeachie, J. S. "A Flexible User Validation Language for
Time-Sharing Systems." AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS,
Spring Joint Computer Conference, Vol. 34, 1969, pp.
665-671.
It is quite important to establish reasonable limits
on the system resources available to users of a
time-sharing system. For systems with 5,000 or more
users, this task can get very complex. The article
describes a user classification scheme which greatly
simplifies resource allocation and security control for
each user. A special purpose language is used for easy
manipulation of large blocks of users as a group.
*(6320)*70*ad*cb*dg*el
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McKeeman, W. M. "Data Protection by Self-Aware Computing
Systems." Report Vol. 2, No. 6, Computer Evolution
Project, Applied Science Department, University of
California, Santa Cruz, California, June 1970.
*(6330)*72*ac*cd*dc*ga*ge*jf*x1
McLaughlin, Ed. "Set Guideline Revisions for EDP Fire
Protection." ELECTRONIC NEWS, 5 June 1972, p. 43.
Incidents of sabotage, arson, and accidental fire
damage to computers have caused the National Fire
Protection Association to begin revising its standards
for EDP equipment. New standards will call for a solid
partition surrounding computer areas, which will be
strong enough to withstand fire for an hour and a half.
The association is also recommending the addition of
Halon 1301, a freon material, as a mea-ns of extinguishing
fires.
*(6340)*73*ab*bb*db
McLaughlin, R. A. "Equity Funding: Everyone is Pointing at
the Computer." DATAMATION, June 1973, pp. 88-91.
*(6350)*70*ad*cb*da*ha*lb
McLellan, P. M. "A Survey of Privacy Considerations in
Resource-Sharing Computer Systems." Masters Project,
University of Western Ontario, May 1970.
*(6360)*62*aa*bb*cc*db*mc*nf
McNew, Bennie B.; and Prather, Charles L. FRAUD CONTROL FOR
COMMERCIAL BANKS. Richard D. Irwin., 1962.
*(6370)*73*ab*ah*cc*da*nl*nm
"Measures to Protect Personnel Privacy Increase at State
Level." COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, January 1973, pp.
65-66.
*(6380)*71*ab*cb*cc*da*nm
Medak, G. M.; and Whisenand, P. M. "Security, Justice, and
the Computer." DATAMATION, 15 June 1971, p. 24.
*(6390)*73*ae*ag*cb*da*eq*ng*x3
Mellen, G. E. "Cryptology, Computers, and Common Sense."
AFIPS NATIONAL COMPUTER CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 42,
1973, pp. 569-579.
This article is a good introduction to cryptography.
It is only mildly technical and doesn't require a great
deal of effort to understand. However, those completely
unfamiliar with the subject and having a minimal
mathematical education may find it desirable to first
read a more basic article such as "Cryptographic
Techniques for Computers" by Dennis Van Tassel.
First, several basic substitution and transposition
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cryptographic techniques are explained in detail. These
techniques were all developed fifty or more years ago and
are easily decipherable. The author then discusses
Vernam cryptographic techniques and Friedman's "index of
coincidence" which is extremely useful for breaking most
Vernam ciphers. Algebraic cryptography and
poly-dimensional transposition ciphers are also
described. They make much greater use of computer
processing capabilities than any of the preceding
techniques. As one might suspect, they also offer
considerably greater security in most cases.
Theoretically unbreakable cryptographic techniques exist,
but they are generally too expensive for most
applications.
The author also presents a brief discussion on
currently available commercial cipher systems. He
describes a few limitations of existing systems and
states what he believes are the best and worst systems
commonly available. The last section of this paper
presents a very good discussion of why nongovernment
cryptographic users can expect, at most, a very limited
effort by an enemy in deciphering their transmitted
information. Several human behavior problems which can
significantly reduce the secureness of a cryptographic
system are presented throughout the paper.
*(6400)*73*ab*cb*cc*cd*dg*ff*fh*fl*fv*gg*kd*nf*ni*x3
Menkus, Belden. "Computer Security Needs a Common Sense
Approach." ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, March 1973, pp.
28-29.
Some aspects of computer threats have been
exaggerated, and actions suggested to management for
improving security have not always been realistic. The
author presents what he believes is a more common sense
approach to computer security. Some of his
recommendations are: make the facility as inconspicuous
as possible; strengthen physical access controls; review
the facility's exposure to fire and water damage; provide
sufficient emergency power generation capacity; assure
alternative emergency computer facilities are truly
compatible and have sufficient reserve processing
cabability; copy essential master files onto duplicate
tapes and store at a remote location; design input data
editing routines to reject spurious information; design
programs to selectively restrict user access to key file
segments; maintain a log inaccessible to computer
operators that records programs processed, files used,
operator, user, and elapsed operating time; require full
documentation of all production programs and
modifications to them; give leased programs equal
protection; assign computer operators in pairs; include
intensive job completion condition checks; rotate work
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shifts and/or duties; and have procedures for destroying
carbon paper, printer ribbons, and discarded printouts
that might contain sensitive information. Most of the
above changes will not be expensive, but failure to make
these changes could prove costly.
*(6410) *71*ab*cc*dg*fk*fv
Mankus, Beldon. "Retention of Data . . . for the Long Term."
DATAMATION, 15 September 1971, pp. 30-32.
*(6420)*71*ac*ai*bb*cc*db*hl*ia*if*kb*kd*mc*x1
Merritt, Michael. "DP Figures in Bank Loss of $128,000."
COMPUTERWORLD, 3 February 1971, p. 1.
Five persons, including the bank's assistant
vice-president in charge of computer systems and the
senior computer operator, have been arrested in
connection with the alleged embezzlement of $128,000 from
the New Jersey National Bank. Money was transferred from
infrequently used savings accounts to new accounts opened
by the three embezzlers not employed by the bank. After
the exchange, the new accounts were closed out. Customer
statements of the altered savings accounts were removed
and substituted with fraudulent ones before being mailed.
The embezzlement was detected because conversion of the
bank's computer to a new system disrupted normal
operations and didn't give the embezzlers time to
substitute fraudulent customer statements before they
were mailed.
*(6430)*71*ac*ai*bb*bf*cb*cc*db*df*ep*fr*ie*jb*lb*mc*x2
Merritt, Michael. "System Sabotaged by Phone."
COMPUTERWORLD, 15 December 1971, p. 1.
The extensive computer communications network of
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company has been the victim
of sabotage, allegedly by union members striking against
Metroploitan's computer vendor, Honeywell. The striking
workers are all involved in maintenance of Metropolitan's
remote data stations. By telephoning a tape recording of
the signals used by a central computer to poll these
remote data stations, the saboteurs managed to prevent
the printout of processed data in some twenty-five remote
Metropolitan offices for over a month. No loss of data
or physical damage occurred.
*(6440)*73*ae*ag*cb*da*eq*x2
Meyer, C. H. "Design Considerations for Cryptography." AFIPS
NATIONAL COMPUTER CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Vol 42, 1973,
pp. 603-606.
One commonly publicized method (called the Vernam
method) of encrypting data is to perform an "exclusive
or" operation using the data and a long set of
pseudorandom numbers generated by a linear shift
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register. The author shows that if a shift register of
"N bits" is used, then only 2N-1 contiguous bits of the
actual unciphered text need to be known in order to break
the cipher. The location of these 2N-1 known bits in the
text does not have to be known. In a few cases,
knowledge of only 2N-1 bits will not break the cipher
because division by zero in the deciphering process
produces an indeterminate situation. However, knowledge
of 2N+10 bits will assure a solution with a high
probability. Varying the feedback switches of the shift
register as a function of its output will make the effort
to break the code more difficult, but knowledge of a
limited sequence of bits will still enable the cipher to
be broken.
For implementing good crypto schemes the author
suggests use of several mathematical operations, one
being nonlinear, in encrypting the data. A linear shift
resister approach is equivalent to only one linear
mathematical operation. A crypto system developed by
Feisel, Notz, and Smith of IBM is presented as a good
example of using multiple mathematical operations.
*(6450)*72*ab*cb*da*eq
Meyer, C. H.; and Tuchman, W. L. "Pseudorandom Codes Can Be
Cracked." ELECTRONIC DESIGN, November 1972.
This article is similar to another article by Meyer
entitled "Design Considerations for Cryptography."
* (6460) *67*ab*cc*ff
Miccio, J. V. "Use of Controls in EDP Accounting." FINANCIAL
EXECUTIVE, August 1967, p. 50.
* (6470) *70*ab*cc*ff
Milko, E. M. "Auditing Through the Computer or Around?"
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING, August 1970, pp. 45-48.
*(6480)*71*aa*cc*da*fd*fh*fj*fk*hd*ka*mb*nl*nm*nn*no*x3
Miller, Arthur R. THE ASSULT ON PRIVACY - COMPUTERS, DATA
BANKS, AND DOSSIERS. University of Michigan Press, 1971,
333 pp.
This book, along with PRIVACY AND FREEDOM by Alan
Westin, provides an authoritative and exhaustive
treatment of computers and privacy. The author, a law
professor, describes the expanding threats to individual
privacy resulting from improvements in computer
technology. Unless some positive action is taken we may
be kept under constant surveillance with computer
dossiers, and no one will be able to ever escape from his
past. A new federal regulatory agency is proposed,
because self-regulation has so far not proven successful
in protecting an individual's privacy rights.
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*(6490)*71*ae*cc*da*hd*ka*nl*nm*x2
Miller, Roger F. "Computers and Privacy: What Price Analytic
Power?" PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM, 1971, pp. 706-716.
Confidential data is extremely useful in social
science research as well as in government administrative
and private business. If the expansion of uses of
confidential data is to sufficiently exceed the expansion
of abuses, more than technical "know how" will be needed
to prevent errors and buggings. Legislation is needed to
provide essential standards for file maintenance and
disclosure, and to provide for an individual to be
informed as to what identifiable data about him is on
file, where it is, and why.
Part 1 of this article gives an example of the use
of confidential data of great practical business as well
as public policy significance. Part 2 examines some
basic issues and attempts to define some useful
distinctions in order to put the twin problems of
confidentiality and usability of data in perspective.
Part 3 contains a substantive discussion on methods of
protecting the privacy of individuals without seriously
impairing the usability of their data.
*(6500)*67*ad*bc*da*df*eb
Miller, Roger F. "Confidentiality and Usability of Complex
Data Bases." No. 6702, Systems Formulation and
Methodology Workshop, Social Systems Research Institute,
University of Wisconsin, May 1967.
*(6510)*68*ab*cc*da*fh*ka*no*nl*nm*x2
Miller, Richard I. "Computers and the Law of Privacy."
DATAMATION, September 1968, pp. 49-55.
The author looks at some dangers to personal privacy
which are a result of new inexpensive computers. A good
description is given on the evolution of the concept of
privacy in American case and statutory law. Proposals
are then made for extending the individual's legal right
to privacy. Individuals should be given notice of data
collected about them and should have the right to verify
that data. Government purchases of EDP equipment for
storing personal data should need high administrative
approval. Persons and firms engaged in collecting
personal information should be liable to injured parties
if that information is false or used for defamatory
purposes.
*(6520)*70*ab*cb*cc*cd*dg*gg
Mintz, Harold K. "Safeguard Computer Information." SOFTWARE
AGE, May 1970, pp. 23-25.
Categories of safeguards are reviewed and
suggestions are made for protecting computerized data.
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*(6530)*67*ae*cb*da*ep
Mitchell, J. F. "Communications Efficiency and Security."
74th ANNUAL CONFERENCE IACP, Kansas City, September 1967.
*(6540)*70*ad*cb*ed
Mittwede, William C. "Computer Operating Systems
Capabilities: A Source Selection and Analysis Aid."
ESD-TR-71-74, Contre Corporation, November 1970.
*(6550)*70*ad*ae*ag*cb*cc*db*dd*ec*ei*eo*fs*gh*hd*hu*id
*ie*nc*ng*nk*x4
Molho, Lee M. "Hardware Aspects of Secure Computing."
SP-3453, Systems Development Corporation, 2500 Colorado
Avenue, Santa Monica, California 90406, December 1969; or
AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Spring Joint Computer
Conference, Vol 36, 1970, pp. 135-141.
This article is essentially a condensed version of a
seventy page report by Molho entitled "Hardware
Reliability Study". The report's annotation should be
read to learn the contents of this article. The
following is a brief outline of the major topics covered
in this article and the report: weak points for logic
failure, circumventing logic failure, subversion
techniques, countermeasures to subversion, defeat of
countermeasures, administrative policy, fail-secure
versus fail-soft hardware, failure detection by faulty
system operation, data checking and control signal
errors, and conclusions.
*(6560)*69*ad*cb*cc*db*dd*ec*ei*eo*fs*gh*hd*hu*id*ie*nc
*ng*nk*x4
Molho, Lee M. "Hardware Reliability Study."
N-L-24276/126/00, Systems Development Corporation, 2500
Colorado Avenue, Santa Monica, California 90406, December
1969, 70 pp.
This paper is a detailed study of the hardware
aspects of problem/supervisor state control and storage
protection in the IBM 360/50 system. It should
definately be read by those concerned with implementing
hardware protection mechanisms in computers. The author
traced the internal operations of the IBM 360
microprograms, and discovered approximately 100
single-failure hazards. At each point in a
microprogram's operation the author asked, "If this
element fails, will the hardware required for secure
computing go dead without giving an alarm?" The author
also took the position of a would-be system subverter
looking for the easiest and best ways of using the IBM
360/50 to steal files from unsuspecting users.
Advantages and disadvantages of several different
reliability test approaches are discussed in some detail.
The author believes that security problems are mostly
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present in logic controls and not so much in data paths
which most manufacturers load with error detecting
hardware. He states that software tests can detect
almost all hardware problems, and would eliminate 85% of
the single hardware failures in SDC's ADEPT-50 system
which is implemented on an IBM 360/50. The increase in
overhead would be only .015% if the tests were
implemented in microprograms. The author also feels that
"fail-soft" systems endanger security. Interdependence
of system components can be useful because hardware
failures will be quickly detected by the resulting faulty
system operation. An overabundance of "inhibit"-type
asychronous logic is a good indicator of sloppy design or
bad design coordination. The effort required for
hardware certification of a system is briefly described.
However, real-time testing appears to be a more reliable
and inexpensive alternative. A condensed version of this
report can be found in the 1970 Spring Joint Computer
Conference proceedings under the title "Hardware Aspects
of Secure Computing".
*(6570)*68*ab*cb*da*dd*em*eo*ep*lb*x2
Moloney, Robert F. "New Generation EDP Control
Considerations." MANAGEMENT SERVICES, March 1968, pp.
15-22.
The purpose of this article is to discuss some error
and access control requirements which systems analysts,
programmers, and auditors should be aware of in designing
any real-time system. These controls are primarily
concerned with system hardware errors, system software
errors, program errors, and remote terminal access. Some
of the specific controls discussed in this article are:
on-line controls (message identification handling
procedures, message transmission verification, rerouting
procedures, parity checks); data protection controls
(preventing concurrent undating, passwords, series of
passwords, authority lists or tables, boundary
registers); diagnostic controls; emergency procedures
(re-execute faulty instructions, restart faulty programs,
transfer problems to an exception routine, initiate
switchover, initiate closedown, halt); and graceful
degradation (checkpoint/restart procedures). Although
this article is somewhat out of date, its discussion on
computer error control can be quite informative to those
not very familiar with the subject.
*(6580)*68*aa*cc*cd*dc*jb*jf
Monbousse, R. M. INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FOR STRIKES, RIOTS AND
DISASTERS. C. C. Thomas Publishers, 1968.
*(6590)*69*ab*cc*da*db*dd*de*el*fa*fc*ff*fi*fj*fp*fx*kb
*kd*nf*ni*x3
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Moore, Michael R. "EDP Audits: A Systems Approach." THE
INTERNAL AUDITOR, May 1969, pp. 9-25.
The purpose of this article is to show that a
systems approach is desirable in the auditing of
computer-based information and control systems. The
basic premise that sound management objectives and sound
audit objectives are substantially parallel is examined.
Evaluation criteria and techniques are described which
may be used to determine that an EDP system is soundly
conceived and designed. The following is a rough outline
of the criteria and techniques described: organization of
EDP groups (independence, authority, and responsibility);
programming (documentation, testing, modifications);
control over day-to-day operations; and hardware and
software (only superfically discussed). Testing
techniques required to provide assurance that the system
is, in fact, functioning as designed include: a test deck
to validate new programs; error classification; and
program modification control. The use of the computer in
EDP auditing was not discussed because the author felt
the subject was too large to be adequately covered in
this article.
Although this article was written in 1969, it is
still quite valuable, especially to those who are not
familiar with an auditor's responsibilities in assuring
that adequate data security exists. The comprehensive
and detailed lists of evaluation and testing techniques
should be quite useful for persons concerned with
implementing or updating a data security program.
*(6600)*68*ab*cc*cd*de*df*hv
Moore, Michael R. "Pitfalls in Planning an EDP
Installation." MANAGEMENT SERVICES, September 1968, pp.
25-32.
*(6610)*70*ab*bc*cc*dc*fw*jf
Moore, William C. "Riot Plan Worked." THE OFFICE, August
1970.
This article describes a riot plan which was tested
during an actual riot,
*(6620)*70*ac*ai*cb*cc*cd*da*gg*jc
"More Work Needed to Solve Problem of Data Security."
COMPUTERWORLD, 27 May 1970, p. 6.
Computerization of data make it more portable and
thus easier to steal. Some data protection safeguards
are discussed.
*(6630)*71*ab*cc*df*dg*fy*mc*x2
Morran, J. R. "How Does Your Bank Stack Up In Insurance
Against EDP Losses?" BANKING, April 1971, p. 36.
The author discusses the coverage offered by several
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different types of bank and EDP insurance. The types of
insurance discussed are: bankers blanket bond; bankers
data processing transit and extra expense insurance; cash
letter insurance; data processing errors and omissions
insurance; and electronic data processing policies which
usually offer coverage for equipment, media, extra
expenses, valuable papers and records, and business
interruption. This article should be quite useful to
banks, but not other types of businesses.
*(6640)*73*ab*ah*cb
Morris, J. H. Jr. "Protection in Programming Languages."
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, January 1973, pp. 15-21.
*(6650)*71*ac*ai*cc*fc*ff*kd*xl
Morton, Thomas J. "Auditor Must Be Involved in DP, ACM
Speaker Says." COMPUTERWORLD, 24 February 1971, p. 6.
This short article summarizes a speech made by
Robert W. London, of Brandon Applied Systems, before a
group of auditors, financial business executives, and EDP
professionals at an Association for Computing Machinery
professional development seminar. Mr. London stressed
that, "The auditor should play an ever increasing role in
data processing from the earliest stages of system
development right up through post installation
evaluation."
*(6660)*70*ac*ai*bc*cd*dc*jf*kg*mh*mj
Morton, Thomas J. "Bomb Demolishes Army Computer Complex."
COMPUTERWORLD, 2 September 1970, p. 1.
The bombing of the Army Mathematics Research Center
at the University of Wisconsin is the subject of this
article. One research employee was killed. Losses
amounted to $1.5 million for the computer complex, $5
million for the building, and 1.3 million manhours of
data.
*(6670)*70*ac*ai*bc*cd*dc*jg
Morton, Thomas J. "DP Centers Dig Out in Hurricane's Wake."
COMPUTERWORLD, 19 August 1970.
This article describes damage done to Corpus
Christi, Texas computer installations by hurricane Celia.
*(6680)*70*ac*ai*bc*cd*dc*jg
Morton, Thomas J. "DP Centers Feel the Brunt of Hurricane's
Fury." COMPUTERWORLD, 12 August 1970, p. 1.
This article describes damage done to Corpus
Christi, Texas computer installations by hurricane Celia.
*(6690)*70*ac*ai*ba*cb*da*hc*ii*lb
Morton, Thomas J. "FBI Accuses Youth of Tapping T/S Service,
Copying Data Files." COMPUTERWORLD, 19 July 1970.
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*(6700)*70*ac*ai*ba*cc*da*hc*ia*kb*kf*nj
Morton, Thomas J. "Firms Sue in Mailing List Theft."
COMPUTERWORLD, 8 July 1970, p. 1.
Three Encyclopedia Britannica computer operators
stole and sold the company's mailing list valued at
approximately $3,000,000.
*(6710)*71*ac*ai*ba*bb*cc*da*db*hk*kb*kd*mi*x2
Morton, Thomas J. "Manipulation of Penn Central Computers
Cited in Boxcar Theft." COMPUTERWORLD, 31 March 1971, p.
1.
FBI agents recently located 217 missing Penn Central
boxcars on the tracks and in the yards of the LaSalle and
Bureau County Railroad. Peter Vairce, a U.S. attorney,
hinted that there had to be some manipulation of the Penn
Central computers to obtain output necessary to allow the
boxcars to be sent to the LaSalle and Bureau County
tracks. Investigators feel that someone on the inside of
Penn Central may have been modifying the input data to
record the cars as scrapped or wrecked. They also
suspect that organized crime is taking part in boxcar
thefts. A Federal Grand Jury is beginning an
investigation of the 2,800 boxcars missing throughout the
country.
*(6720)*71*ac*ai*cb*da*ep*je*jf*x1
Morton, Thomas J. "Prevention of Public Access 'Key' to DP
Center Security." COMPUTERWORLD, 9 June 1971, p. 2.
This short article briefly summarizes some comments
made by speakers at the International Security Conference
in Chicago. A few simple recommendations are given on
data transmission security and cryptography. It was also
said that a ten by two inch pipe bomb could be made with
$10 of ingredients readily available in the commercial
market.
*(6730)*70*ac*ai*cc*de*fd*ne
Morton, Thomas J. "Psychologist Views 'Insecurity' at DP
Centers." COMPUTERWORLD, 22 July 1970.
Dr. Robert W. Varmin, a behaviorist and
psychological consultant, discusses several reasons for
computer security apathy. Computer personnel and
computer users usually do not grasp the value of the
information they are handling. They are usually unaware
of many potential threats to their data.
* (6740) *69*ae*cb*dg*ed*el*gh*lb
Motobayashi, S.; Masuda, T.; and Takahashi, N. "The Hitac
5020 Time-Sharing System." PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM'S 24TH
NATIONAL CONFERENCE, 1969, pp. 419-429.
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"Motorist Gets Stung by Small Bugs." COMPUTERWORLD, 13
January 1971, p. 6.
Errors in a motor vehicle department's computerized
information system are described.
*(6760)*70*ab*cc*dd*de*ff*fg*hp*hr
Mroz, Gene P. "Computer 'Bug' Control." JOURNAL OF DATA
MANAGEMENT, Jnauary 1970.
The author believes that internal auditors must be
very familiar with the internal workings of a computer.
*(6770) *71*ab*cc*ff
Mullarkey, J. F. "Technical Proficiency for Auditing
Computer Processed Accounting Records." JOURNAL OF
ACCOUNTANCY, October 1971.
*(6780)*71*ad*al*cb*ed*gh*lb
"The Multiplexed Information and Computing Service:
Programmer's Manual." Project MAC, MIT, Cambridge,
Massachusetts 02139, Preliminary Edition, 1971.
This article describes file access controls in MIT's
MULTICS system. Access control is associated with
branches of a tree, not with links between branches as in
MIT's CTSS system. A user's access rights are evaluated
each time a segment is made known to him. The access
modes are read, write, execute, append, and combinations
thereof. They may be assigned on the basis of users and
projects. MULTICS provides a ring structure for
protection which is a generalization of the "user
state"/"supervisor state" idea. Any attempt to access
data from an insufficiently privileged ring must take
place through a "gate" specified by the data owner via a
program of his own choosing.
*(6790)*72*ab*ba*be*cc*da*de*fp*nf
Murphey, W. E.; and Olson, D. V. "Controlling Access to
Large Tape Files." DATA PROCESSING MAGAZINE, Spring 1972,
pp. 4-6.
A system is described for preventing the physical
loss of computer tapes through rigid handling controls.
The Minnesota Hospital Service Association developed the
system after incurring large expenses from frequent tape
losses.
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*(6800)*72*ae*cb*ed*el*gh*hd*ka*lb*mg
Nakanishi, K.; and Hsiao, David. "A Cardiac Catheterization
Information System - An Application of an Advanced Data
Management Facility." PROCEEDINGS OF COMPUTER 72, IEEE
Computer Society, June 1972.
This article describes a medical information system
developed for the Cardiac Catheterization Laboratory of
the University of Pennsylvania. It also discusses the
Extended Data Management Facility that supports the
medical information system.
*(6810)*72*ae*ag*ca*dg*ee*ei*nb*ng*x3
Needham, R. M. "Protection Systems and Protection
Implementations." AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Fall
Joint Computer Conference, Vol. 41, 1972, pp. 571-578.
This paper discusses different systems for
protection of information in the central memory of a
computer, and describes the potentialities and
limitations of a varity of implementation approaches. It
is based on a current protection system project at the
University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory in Cambridge,
England. A system which is being developed to the point
of hardware implementation is also discussed. This paper
should be valuable to those investigating or designing
main memory protection schemes. However, the
non-technical reader will likely find it quite confusing.
The author first defines several concepts which
enable easier discussion and understanding of protection
systems and protection implementation. A "segment" is a
set of words whose addresses are contiguous in a virtual
address space, and whose protection status is at all
times the same. A "protection regime" is a list of those
segments accessible to a process at a particular time,
together with notes as to the kind of access permitted.
A "capability" defines the physical position and size of
a segment, and the access mode allowed. The paper is
concerned with protection systems within a process, but
not how or where a process obtains its resources.
After defining the above terms, the author focuses
on the implementation of protection as the implementation
of selection functions among capabilities. There are two
apparent ways this can be accomplished. One way is to
proceed by means of lock and key systems in which any
segment has associated with it a lock, A process is
associated with a certain key at any particular time and
access is permitted to a segment only if the current key
fits the lock of that segment. The other way to proceed
is to use indirection tables as the means of selection of
accessible segments. Addressing is much more bound up
with the protection implementation when using indirection
tables. The author concludes that powerful lock and key
systems are too difficult in practice because of the
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allocation problem, and that lock and key systems in
which one can face the allocation problem are not
powerful enough. He then discusses in some detail a
system based on use of indirection tables.
*(6820)*70*ab*bc*cd*dc*ga*gf*jf*mj*x1
Nelson, F. B. "Campus Computers - Target for Militants and
Almost Anyone Else." DATAMATION, 15 October 1970, p. 37.
The author states that almost all colleges and
universities have inadequate physical security to protect
their computers from student saboteurs. He recommends
computers be located off-campus and accessed through
remote terminals.
*(6830)*70*ab*cd*dd*gb*gc*hu*jg*x3
Neumann, E. W.; and Riley, R. "Protecting the Computer In a
Process Environment." CONTROL ENGINEERING, September
1970, pp. 72-75.
Massive investments in process plants that rely more
and more on computer control to competitively serve their
markets make shutdown caused by any form of failure
expensive and often intolerable. Moreover, methods
applied in the past to protect simpler process
instrumentation are often not adequate for today's
computer systems. The authors pass along their expertise
in contaminated environments, pointing up practical ways
to protect the computer in a variety of industrial
applications. First, typical concentrations and
potential dangers of various types of airborne pollution
are discussed. Then the following environmental
considerations are briefly examined: relative humidity,
ambient temperature, room pressure, particle filters, gas
filters, room maintenance, records and indicators, and
facility support maintenance.
*(6840)*71*ab*ba*bb*bc*cc*da*db*dc*fb*fs*ft*hb*hg*hj*if
*kb*kd*mc*x2
Neville, Haig G. "Computer Capers Herald New Crime Wave of
Embezzlement." THE NATIONAL UNDERWRITER: Property
Edition, 20 August 1971, p. 1.
The author attempts to persuade the reader that
security against embezzlement is dangerously lacking in
most organizations. Most of the article is devoted to
describing and commenting on ten recent cases of computer
related fraud. Each case shared a remarkable similarity
of circumstances in which the perpetrators, not
management, had control of the computerized accounting
system. The perpetrators almost always occupied a
position of trust in which their loyalty was
unquestioned. The author recommends that management
reexamine its attitude toward employee dishonesty, and
recognize that providing an opportunity to steal
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contributes to the crime.
*(6850)*69*ab*bc*cc*dc*fv*fw
Neville, Haig G. Letter to the Editor. HARVARD BUSINESS
REVIEW, May 1969.
Some examples are given on why planned backup sites
are often inadequate.
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Neville, Haig G. "You Can Insure against Errors and
Omissions in Data Processing." THE OFFICE, October 1964.
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"New Haven Designs City Data Bank." EDP WEEKLY, 15 May 1967,
p. 5.
New Haven, Connecticut is designing an urban
management information system that will store data on the
city's inhabitants, its traffic intersections, buildings,
crimes, population shifts, and welfare system. Access to
this data will be made available to city officials by way
of remote terminals. Some of the expected benefits of
this system are improved planning and reduced
administrative delays. The personal data will be
protected by using frequently changed passwords. This
protection scheme is viewed to be at least more safe than
the present system of storing files in unlocked cabinets.
None of New Haven's citizens have voiced any serious
objections to this new computerized system.
*(6880)*70*ab*ba*bc*cd*da*dc*gf*hc*ia*ie*jf*mc*x1
"New Threats and New Defenses." BANKING, August 1970, pp.
69-70.
The author tries to convince the reader that most
computer users, particularly banks, have very inadequate
safeguards to protect against sabotage and vandalism.
Actual and hypothetical examples are given of computer
crimes that could be performed by unhappy employees,
campus dissidents, or just plain "ding-a-lings". The
example of tape vulnerability to magnets is greatly
exaggerated. This article would be typical of those
described by Mel Mandell in a NEW TORK TIMES article
entitled "Computer Scare Talk: Sabotage Fears of
'Experts' Discounted".
*(6890)*69*ab*cc*fc*ff*mc
Newcomb, Lawrence. "The Bank Auditor's Role in EDP Design."
BANKERS MAGAZINE, 3 November 1969, pp. 61-66.
*(6900)*72*ab*cc*fb
Newlin, C. "The Changing World of the Data Processing
Administrator." DATA MANAGEMENT, February 1972, p. 38.
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*(6910)*64*ab*cc*ff
Newman, M. S. "Internal Control and Data Processing."
FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE, November 1964, p. 42.
*(6920)*70*ab*cc*ff
Nigra, A. L. "Auditing Acquisitions of Data Processing
Equipment." THE INTERNAL AUDITOR, January 1970.
*(6930) *71*ac*ai*cb*da*es*md*xl
"No Basis for Assuming Software Can Ensure Confidential
Systems." COMPUTERWORLD, 27 November 1971, p. 4.
This short article briefly summarizes some
statements made by Sol Dolleck of the Census Bureau
before the Fall Joint Computer Conference. Dolleck
believes that there is no basis for assuming that an
all-powerful software system can be designed that could
take care of the problems of a national statistical data
center if one were to be created. The problems of
indirect disclosure and priorities have not yet been
solved.
*(6940)*70*ac*ai*cb*da*eq
"'No Great Feat to Wiretap' Says Canadian Computer
Professor." COMPUTERWORLD, 25 November 1970.
John M. Carroll describes a cryptographic system for
protecting data privacy.
*(6950)*71*ad*ak*cb*eq*gh
Notz, W. A.; and Smith, J. L. "An Experimental Application
of Cryptography to a Remotely Accessed Data System."
RC-3508, IBM Corporation, White Plains, New York, 18
August 1971.
A hardware cryptographic device is described which
was experimentally attached to an IBM 360/67 time-sharing
computer. For more information see "The Design of
Lucifer, A Cryptographic Device for Data Communication"
by J. L. Smith.
*(6960)*69*ac*ai*bb*cc*db*fs*ia*mf
"Numbers Racket Used Data Cards." COMPUTERWORLD, 18 June
1969.
A computer operator used 80-column computer cards
for operating a numbers racket.
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*(6970)*68*ab*cb*cc*cd*dg*kd*mc*x1
O'Brien, James A. "The Computer and Banking's Protection."
BANKING, September 1968, pp. 115-118.
The article explains how the introduction of
computer systems has resulted in extensive changes in the
susceptibility of banks to fraud, errors, and physical
damage. It also shows how bank insurance and bank
auditing have been affected. However, the article is
largely obsolete and most of the ideas presented are now
widely known.
*(6980)71*ae*ag*cb*da*db*dc*eb
O'Connell, M. L. "A File Organization Using Multiple Keys."
AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Spring Joint Computer
Conference, Vol. 38, 1971, pp. 539-544.
*(6990)*68*ac*bb*db
"On Computer Fraud." WALL STREET JOURNAL, 5 April 1968.
*(7000)*72*aa*al*cb*dg*ed*ei*el*gh*lb*ng
Oranick, Elliot I. THE MULTICS SYSTEM: AN EXAMINATION OF ITS
STRUCTURE." MIT Press, 28 Carleton Street, Cambridge,
Massachusetts 02139, 1972.
*(7010)*70*ab*cd*df*gd*jh
Ortiz, J. V. "Constant-Power System for Computers."
ELECTRICAL CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE, January 1970,
pp. 96-97.
A power backup system is described which makes use
of kinetic energy from a flywheel.
*(7020)*71*ad*ak*cb*ea*ed*ef*ei*el*en*fd*gh*lb*nb*nc*nf
*x4
"OS/MVT With Resource Security: General Information and
Planning Manual." GH20-1058-0, IBM Corporation, White
Plains, New York, December 1971.
The Resource Security System was initially designed
for the World Wide Military Command and Control System
and is largely based on 1968 military specifications.
This manual is one of a set of four that describe the
Resource Security features to OS/MVT. The other three
manuals are listed immediately following this entry. The
system is designed to provide control over users of the
system, and the programs, data sets, and terminals to
which they may desire access. The programs, data sets,
terminals, and users are defined by a security officer as
possessing certain characteristics and capabilities such
as security level and access criteria. Characteristics
are referred to as security profiles, and the interaction
of these profiles determines the user's access to system
resources. During OS/MVT operation the system
dynamically accesses profiles, and on the basis of their
- 0 -
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comparison either allows access or terminates a user's
job and logs the circumstances surrounding the attempted
unauthorized access. The system is modular in design and
provides numerous implementation options. The minimum
security options will degrade OS/MVT Release 18 system
performance 1% to 12%, and the maximum security options
will degrade Release 18 performance 15% to 31%.
The following is a brief outline of this manual:
basic concepts; systems features; security officer
commands; identification and authorization of resources;
system statistics; system description; machine
configuration needed; performance; installation's
responsibilities; planning considerations; selection of
options; procedures for establishing security profiles
and authorizations; and system design (appendix).
*(7030)*71*ad*ak*cb*ed*ef*gh*lb*nf*x2
"OS/MVT With Resource Security: Installation and System
Programmer's Guide." GH20-1021-0, IBM Corporation, White
Plains, New York, December 1971.
The Resource Security System is designed to provide
security control over the users of a OS/MVT system and
the programs, data sets, and terminals to which they may
desire access. See the entry entitled "OS/MVT With
Resource Security: General Information and Planning
Manual" for more information.
*(7040)*71*ad*ak*cb*ed*ef*fq*gh*lb*x2
"OS/MVT With Resource Security: Security Officer's Guide."
GH20-1057-0, IBM Corporation, White Plains, New York,
December 1971.
The Resource Security System is designed to provide
security control over the users of a OS/MVT system and
the programs, data sets, and terminals to which they may
desire access. See the entry entitled "OS/MVT With
Resource Security: General Information and Planning
Manual" for more information.
*(7050)*72*ad*ak*cb*fd*ea*ed*ef*ei*el*en*gh*lb*nb*nc*nf
*x3
"OS/MVT With Resource Security: System Description Manual."
GH20-0967-0, IBM Corporation, White Plains, New York,
March 1972.
The Resource Security System is designed to provide
security control over the users of a OS/MVT system and
the programs, data sets, and terminals to which they may
desire access. See the entry entitled "OS/MVT With
Resource Security: General Information and Planning
Manual" for more information.
*(7060)*70*ac*bb*cc*db*md
Ottenburg, Miriam. "Electronic Tax Fraud Investigated at
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IRS." THE EVENING STAR, Washington D.C., 24 June 1970, p.
A-1.
Two examples of computer related tax fraud are
given.
* (7070) *70*ab*cc*ff*fm
Otto, J. W. "Operational Auditing Applied to Data Processing
Facilities." THE INTERNAL AUDITOR, May 1970.
*(7080)*71*ac*ai*bf*cd*df*jh
"Outages Rates a Leading Cause." COMPUTERWORLD, 12 May 1971,
p. 2.
*(7090)*71*ae*ca*da*fe*ee
Owens, Richard C. Jr. "Evaluation of Access Authorization
Characteristics of Derived Data Sets." ACM Special
Interest Group on File Description and Translation
(SIGFIDET) Workshop, 1971, pp. 263-278.
*(7100)*71*ad*al*ca*cd*ea*ed*ee*ef*fe*lb*ng*nn*x4
Owens, Richard C. Jr. "Primary Access Control in Large-Scale
Time-Shared Decision Systems." Master's Thesis, MAC
TR-89, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139; or AD-728
036, National Technical Information Service, Springfield,
Virginia 22151, July 1971, 93 pp.
Four primary dimensions of the access control problem
are identified. They are: the physical level at which to
apply control (files, records, individual data items);
the fineness of distinction applied to the term "access"
(yes or no, or more refined distinctions like read,
write, append, execute); the meaning of the term "user
identification" (names, passwords, signature recognition,
etc.); and the degree of sophistication employed in
automatically assigning restrictions to newly created
data files (from no restrictions to a completely
automated classification method which determines the
sensitivity of data in a new file by knowing the access
characteristics of the data input into this file).
Within the context of MIT's Project MAC Advanced
Interactive Management System (MacAIMS), the detailed
design of an "interim access control system" is presented
which takes positions along these four dimensions. The
choice of positions along these dimensions determines the
power and capabilities of the access control scheme. The
proposed interim system can be easily modified along both
the second and third dimensions of access control. The
method of access control proposed is more general than
that in any system in current use. The concepts of the
"owner" of information, the "originator" of information,
and the persons who may change access control
restrictions to information can all be separated.
The author reviews all well known existing and
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proposed access control systems and concludes that none
are adequate. He does like Hoffman's formulary model but
is not convinced that the user would be sophisticated
enough to write his own formularies. The MULTICS system
is described, and Owens concludes that it does not have
adequate access controls. Owens also concludes that
Weissman's ADEPT-50 scheme of automatic classification of
new files is too restrictive for non-military use,
However, the proposed "interim system" does not solve all
of the access control problems either. Several
limitations are described and suggestions for further
study are proposed. The author concludes that
development of a system that conveniently and completely
protects its user's rights will be a very difficult task.
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*(7110)*70*ad*cb*dg*ed*ei*ej*el*en*gh*mh
"PACER Multi-Level Security Program Design Specifications."
PRC-WPO115, Planning Research Corporation, November 1970.
This report describes the design specifications for
PACER, a military intelligence analysis system which
processes highly classified information and runs on a
Honeywell 6000 series computer.
*(7120)*70*ac*ai*bd*be*cc*dd*de*nj
"Pacific Telephone Sued for Erroneous Billing."
COMPUTERWORLD, 30 September 1970.
A California lawyer is suing Pacific Telephone
Company for $7,000,000 for erroneous billing and loss of
service when he refused to pay the incorrect bills.
*(7130)*69*ab*cc*dg*ff
Palmer, R. R.; and Duma, W. J. "Auditing with Computers."
BANKER'S MONTHLY MAGAZINE, 15 January 1969.
The authors review several approaches to auditing
and conclude that auditing must be done with the
computer.
*(7140)*72*ab*ba*bb*cc*da*db*dc*ng*no*x2
Parker, Donn B. "The Antisocial Use of Computers." COMPUTERS
AND AUTOMATION, August 1972, p. 22.
The author briefly discusses each of the following:
three criminal cases; a few factors leading to criminal
behavior; security measures being based on the value of
what is being protected with little knowledge of real
threats; misconceptions and lack of knowledge about
computers by law enforcement agencies and the courts; and
the current magnitude of computer related crime. Some
interesting statistics were given on computer crime.
Since 1966 less than eighty computer-related crimes have
been authenticated although many more have been reported.
IBM receives about three hundred reports per month of at
least unethical acts occurring among its customer
installations. The average financial loss of twenty
authenticated cases recently studied was $670,000 per
case with a range of $1,300 to $1,750,000. The author
makes six specific predictions which he feels should be
the goal of future exploratory research. The possible
impact of these six predicted research goals on computer
users, computer and software manufacturers, laws and
Congress, and professional societies is briefly
explained. However, three of these predictions appear to
be questionable and the other three don't suggest
anything unexpected.
*(7150)*72*ae*bg*cb*cc*cd*dg*ha*ja
Parker, Donn B. "The Nature of Computer Related Crime."
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER COMMUNICATION
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PROCEEDINGS, 1972, pp. 121-126.
A method of providing protection by means of threat
analysis is presented. A brief history is given on
computer-related crime. Likely future crime developments
are also briefly discussed.
*(7160)*73*ac*ai*ba*cb*cd*da*hb*hd*jd*je*mh*x2
"Passive Entry 'Good Way' to Obtain Sensitive Data."
COMPUTERWORLD, 16 May 1973, p. 4.
Commander Jan Prokop, director of the Navy's
computer selection office, stated that wiretapping,
electromagnetic pickup, and hidden transmitters can be
good techniques for obtaining sensitive computerized
information. He cited a test case in the Pentagon where
a CRT was allegedly being read from its radiation signals
by an unauthorized user several rooms away from the
computer. He also claimed that a hidden wireless
transmitter had been found inside a CPU at a security
agency.
*(7170)*70*ad*ak*cb*da*db*dc*ed
Patrick, D. K. "File-Organization Security in a Real-Time
System." IBM TECHNICAL DISCLOSURE BULLETIN, Vol. 13, No.
4, September 1970, pp. 1030-1031.
File security is achieved by matching all of the
user's available processing options against his set of
authorizations. Only if the match finds no conflicting
demands will the user be allowed to proceed.
*(7180)*70*ab*bb*cb*cc*db*ff*fi*id*kb*mk*nf*nk*x2
Patrick, Robert L.; and Dahl, Albrey. "Voting Systems: Los
Angeles Doesn't Have One." DATAMATION, May 1970, pp.
81-82.
A small team of research scientists served as "poll
watchers" during a recent Los Angeles election. After
viewing the extremely careless manner in which the
ballots were processed and becoming aware of the fact
that the IBM Votomatic system has absolutely no
safeguards to protect against any type of fraud, they
carefully and quietly raised the possibility of vote
tampering. This lead to the formation of a blue ribbon
investigation committee which unfortunately lacked
sufficient computer knowledge. The committee's
conclusions supported use of the Votomatic system in
spite of several extremely serious Votomatic flaws
pointed out in this article. Perhaps the committee's
recommendations were the only politically practical ones
since Los Angeles had just bought several million dollars
worth of Votomatic equipment. The authors conclude by
offering several recommendations for improving the
integrity of a computerized vote-count system.
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* (7190) *69*ab*cb*cc*fc*ff*nf
Pauley, Charles. "Audit Responsibilities in the Design of
Computerized Systems." THE INTERNAL AUDITOR, July 1969.
The author explains why auditors must be involved in
the design of computer systems.
*(7200)*69*ad*cb*ed*gh*lb*xl
"PDP-10 Programmer's Reference Manual: Time-Sharing
Monitors." DEC-T9-MTZA-D, Digital Equipment Corporation,
Maynard, Massachusetts, August 1969.
This manual describes one of DEC's efforts to
provide file access control. The term "user" is
separated into three categories: the file owner, persons
on the same project as the owner, and everyone else.
Access to a file may be restricted for each of these
three groups by read protection, write protection, and
protection by having the capability to change access
control information. It is also possible to name files
such that the monitor knows they are procedures. This
can be used to enforce "execute" access control.
*(7210)*72*ae*cb*cc*cd*dg*ea*ec*ed*ei*ej*el*ep*fs*gf*gg
*hd*ht*hu*hw*jd*nh*ni*nn*x2
Peck, Paul L. "Achieving Security and Privacy of Information
in an On-Line Data Processing Environment." PROCEEDINGS
OF ONLINE 72: International Conference on Online
Interactive Computing, Online Computing Systems Ltd.,
Uxbridge, Middlesex, England, September 1972, pp.
107-129.
This paper is identical to another article by Mr.
Peck entitled "Data Processing Safeguards" which was
printed in the JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT.
*(7220)*72*ab*cb*cc*cd*dg*ea*ec*ed*ei*ej*el*ep*fs*gf*gg
*hd*ht*hu*hw*jd*nh*ni*nn*x2
Peck, Paul L. "Data Processing Safeguards." JOURNAL OF
SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT, October 1972, pp. 11-17.
The author briefly discusses five general threats to
the integrity of computer information. They are:
hardware and software malfunctions; unauthorized user
attempts to examine, modify, or obtain information;
unauthorized computer center personnel actions; insecure
communications and electronic emanations; and negligence.
Two EDP environments, a basic environment and a
sophisticated environment, are then explained and
twenty-five safeguards are discussed in the context of
these two environments. The applicability of each of
these twenty-five safeguards to the five general threat
categories is shown in a summary table. The safeguards
were also grouped into five functional areas: access
controls, internal system controls, data transmission
controls, violation controls, and other controls.
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The remaining three-fourths of this article is
devoted to describing in some detail the mechanization
and capabilities of the following twenty-five safeguards:
physical access control; user system entrance control;
hardware and software terminal entrance and exit control;
hardware protection of data in main memory; software
protection of data in bulk storage; interrupt processing
software; isolating parts of the executive system in
read-only memory; restricting users to higher level
languages; software management of hardware resources;
utilization of secure communication techniques;
electromagnetic shielding of the computer center;
microprogrammed hardware checks; software integrity
checks; hardware error data checks; operating procedures;
software reaction to and procedures for responding to
potential and actual security violations; software
determination and marking of sensitive output; record
keeping; safe and vault protection; personnel security
programs; and procedures for certification and
recertification.
*(7230)*72*ae*cb*cc*cd*dg*ea*ec*ed*ei*ej*el*ep*fs*gf*gg
*hd*ht*hu*hw*jd*nh*ni*nn*x2
Peck, Paul L. "Protecting Corporate Computer Information."
IDEAS FOR MANAGEMENT: Proceedings of the ASM
International Systems Meeting, 1972, pp. 30-40.
This article is identical to another article by Mr.
Peck entitled "Data Processing Safeguards" which was
printed in the JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT.
*(7240)*71*ad*cb*cc*cd*dg*ea*ec*ed*ei*ej*el*ep*fs*gf*gg
*hd*ht*hu*hw*jd*nh*ni*nn*x2
Peck, Paul L. "Survey of Applicable Safeguards for Insuring
the Integrity of Information in the Data Processing
Environment." AD-726 571, National Technical Information
Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151, June 1971, 32 pp.
This paper is identical to another article by Mr.
Peck entitled "Data Processing Safeguards" which was
printed in the JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT.
*(7250)*71*ab*bc*cc*cd*dc*jf
Perham, John. "The Computer - A Target." DUN'S REVIEW,
January 1971, p. 34.
*(7260)*71*ab*cc*cd*dc*fs*fu
"Personal Protection Urged." DATA PROCESSING MAGAZINE, April
1971.
*(7270)*67*ae*ag*cb*cc*ec*ed*ei*el*en*hd*kb*mh*x2
Peters, Bernard. "Security Considerations in a
Multi-Programmed Computer System." AFIPS CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS, Spring Joint Computer Conference, Vol 30,
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1967, pp. 283-286.
The principles set forth in this paper have been
generalized from the specific development of a specific
military system which dealt with multiple levels of
classified information. To obtain the security level
which software can make possible, the following
principles must be followed: the security monitor must be
approved by an appropriate authority; adequate memory
protect and privileged instructions must exist; certain
key computer switches must have simple physical barriers
to prevent undetected local override; and operating
personnel must be cleared to appropriate levels and
designed out of the operation as much as possible. A log
of all significant events should be kept both by the
computer and operating personnel; every user should be
subject to common discipline and authority; and remote
terminals should be able to vary their security level.
The author briefly discusses the following attributes of
an acceptable monitor: the security aspects of a monitor
shouldn't increase overhead over ten percent; the monitor
must perform all input/output without exception; monitor
coding that can access any part of core without
restriction should be kept to a few well-tested units;
the monitor needs to be periodically tested; users'
programs must be bound by memory protect while executing;
all peripheral accesses must be authorized by the
monitor; violating requests must be completely aborted;
and security rules must not be suspended for program
testing.
*(7280)*67*ae*cb*da*ed*ei*el
Peterson, H. E. "Protecting Privacy Within the Computer
System." PROCEEDINGS OF AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INDUSTRIAL
SECURITY: 13th Annual Seminar, September 1967, pp.
99-101.
*(7290)*67*ad*ae*ag*aj*cb*cc*da*db*ei*ej*el*eq*fi*hb*hd
*jd*je*lb*nh*ni*nn*x2
Peterson, H. E.; and Turn, Rein. "System Implications of
Information Privacy." AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS,
Spring Joint Computer Conference, Vol. 30, 1967, pp.
291-300; or P-3504, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica,
California 90406, April 1967, 40 pp.
This paper was quite valuable when first published.
It is widely quoted by other authors. However, most of
the ideas in it are now commonly known. The article
still serves as a fairly good introductory paper for
those unfamiliar with hardware and software aspects of
computer security.
The paper presents a discussion of threats to
information privacy in non-military information systems,
applicable countermeasures, and system implications of
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providing privacy protection. The authors classify
threats to information privacy as accidental, deliberate
passive, and deliberate active. They then discuss each
of the following threats: accidental (user error, system
error); deliberate passive (electromagnetic pick-up,
wiretapping, waste basket); deliberate active (browsing,
masquerading, between lines entry, piggy-back entry,
entry by systems personnel, entry via trap doors, core
dumping to get residual information, and physical theft
of removable files). Four of the deliberate active
threats were originally introduced in this paper.
"Browsing" is the use of legitimate system access to
obtain unauthorized information. "Masquerading" is
posing as a legitimate user after obtaining proper
identification by subversive means. "Between-lines"
entry consists of penetrating the system when a
legitimate user is on a communications channel but not
actively using the terminal. "Piggy-back" infiltration
consists of intercepting user-processor communications
and returning messages contrived to further the
infiltrator' s purposes.
Following the discussion of threats is a discussion
of these countermeasures: access management
(authorization, identification, authentication);
processing restrictions; threat monitoring; cryptography;
and integrity management (verification of system
software, hardware, user programs, and later periodic
checks). The applicability of each of these five
countermeasures to the thirteen specific threats is shown
in a summary table. Security implications of the above
threats and countermeasures to communication lines,
terminals, computerized files, and central processors are
also presented.
*(7300)*70*ab*cb*dd*de*fh*eh*fi*na*x2
Peterson, N. D. "Error Control in EDP Systems." MANAGEMENT
ACCOUNTING, November 1970, pp. 34-36.
This article is concerned with methods of computer
detection and correction of errors in data attributable
to both human and machine sources. The following methods
were suggested for checking the validity of a data
elements: test for blank entries, zero values, and
negative values; include a check digit with each element
and require the computer to recalculate the digit; check
for data outside reasonable limits; set up an exhaustive
table of all allowable codes for certain data elements;
and determine data element reasonableness from other
associated data. For checking the validity of data
files, the following are recommended: hard copy printout
of all program selected options; control totals of record
counts and numeric entries; verify control totals between
successive processing phases; verify that file records
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are correctly sorted; and check for logical discrepancies
between similar files.
The author states that the user should not have to
depend upon any programmer when exotic errors occur. He
feels that it is desirable to consolidate most data
validation functions into one program, and that data
systems should be tested with data that includes a full
range of errors and exceptions. The implementation and
advantages of an audit trail are also briefly explained.
*(7310)*70*ab*cc*dd*fi*fz*hr
Peterson, N. D. "A Guide to Acceptance Testing of Computer
Software." BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS, June 1970,
pp. 5-11.
*(7320)*69*ae*cb*cc*cd*dg*nh
Pfoff, Alfred M. "Structuring th-e Data Security Problem."
GUIDE 29 PROCEEDINGS, GUIDE International Corporation, 1
Illinois Center, 111 East Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois
60601, 1969.
*(7330)*71*ac*ai*cb*ep*hd*ii*je*lb*x2
"Phone 'Phreaks' Just Can't Tap Data Line Alone."
COMPUTERWORLD, 20 October 1971, p. 3.
The article tries to persuade computer users that
they don't have to worry about student-types using
illegal multi-frequency tone-generators (blue boxes) to
access data-system verification trunks and detect what is
being transmitted. AT&T said that the connection of
"blue box" users to verification trunks would require
inside help. However, an ESQUIRE article claims that
inside help isn't necessary.
*(7340)*72*ac*ai*cd*gc*jf*x2
Piasta, Frank. "SRI Researcher Says Danger of Magnets to
Tape 'Hogwash'." COMPUTERWORLD, 16 February 1972, p. 1.
W. D. Tiffany, manager of the Security Research
Program at Stanford Research Institute, has tried
unsuccessfully to duplicate conditions under which tape
files have reportedly been erased. He states that a
magnetic field of 250 gauss (that of a small commercial
magnet) would be needed directly at the surface of the
tape to damage it. The strength of a magnet is inversely
proportional to the cube of the distance from it.
Tiffany concludes that even the thickness of a standard
tape reel case is enough to prevent the vast majority of
readily available magnets from affecting tapes. L.
Conroy, director of Securitronics, disagrees with
Tiffany's statements. See "Magnets: A Surface Issue" in
the August 30, 1972 issue of COMPUTERWORLD for Conroy's
counter arguments.
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*(7350)*72*ab*cc*cd*dg
Pinkerton, J. A. "Is Your Computer Safe?" COMPUTER
DECISIONS, June 1972, pp. 12-14.
*(7360)*67*ab*cd*ed*fv*kg*xl
"Plan for an Unwanted Reward." BUSINESS AUTOMATION, February
1967, pp. 36-39.
This article describes the file backup system used
by Science Information Exchange (SIE) of the Smithsonian
Institution in Washington, D.C.. For less than $3,000
annually, SIE maintains a disaster file for some 400
magnetic tapes and 15 disk packs.
*(7370)*70*ab*cc*cd*dd*df*hv
"Planning for Your New Computer." COMPUTER DECISIONS,
December 1970.
Some installation considerations are given for
installing a computer in a new facility.
*(7380)*71*ab*ba*da*hc*ii*lb*ma*nj*x1
"Plot Thickens in Plotting Program Theft." DATAMATION, 15
April 1971, p. 47.
A former Information Systems Design employee
allegedly tapped that firm's computer over telephone
lines to steal a plotting program valued at $15,000 to
$25,000. The program was needed to win over an
Information Systems Design customer to the suspect's new
employer.
*(7390)*70*ac*ai*bc*cb*dc*gc*jg
"Plug-To-Plug Combustible." COMPUTERWORLD, 14 October 1970.
An electrical short in an IBM 2260 terminal caused a
$50,000 fire loss at the Smithsonian Institution in
Washington, D.C..
*(7400)*71*ab*cb*cc*dd*de*fx*hp
Polissar, J. "Generating Errors to Reduce Errors." MODERN
DATA, May 1971, p. 60.
*(7410)*70*ac*ai*cd*dc*ga*gf*jg
"Poor Security Leaves DP Facilities Ripe for Sabotage."
COMPUTERWORLD, 17 June 1970, p. 1.
This article discusses the need for better physical
security, especially during the current period of
dissent.
*(7420)*66*aa*cc*dg*ff*kd
Porter, W. T. Jr. AUDITING ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS. Wadsworth
Publishing Company, 1966.
* (7430) *70*ab*cc*fm
Porter, W. T. Jr. "Control Considerations in Systems
- P -
PAGE 202
Operations." DATA MANAGEMENT, September 1970, pp. 29-32.
*(7440)*69*ab*cb*ek*ff
Porter, W. T. Jr. "Generalized Computer Audit Programs."
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY, January 1969.
*(7450)*65*aa*bb*cc*db*ff*hj*mc
Pratt, Lester A. BANK FRAUDS: THEIR DETECTION AND
PREVENTION. The Ronald Press Company, 1965.
*(7460)*70*ab*bb*cc*db*de*ff*fy*hj*kb*kd*mc*ni*x2
Pratt, Lester A. "Loss Exposure Hazards Under Bank
Automation." BURROUGHS CLEARING HOUSE, October 1970, p.
18.
When one realizes that scarcely a day passes without
at least one bank embezzlement being brought to light, it
becomes evident that employee dishonesty is one of the
most serious hazards of the banking industry. EDP does
not lessen in any way the need for an evaluation of the
system of internal control. On the contrary, it is
essential that internal controls be more carefully
scrutinized to ascertain that they are effective.
Throughout this seven page article, many different
vulnerabilities to embezzlement are pointed out, and
internal control recommendations are given for
safeguarding against these vulnerabilities. An eleven
item checklist is given to help the internal auditor
determine the efficiency of his audit program. Specific
problems associated with MICR inscribed numbers on checks
are also discussed. The author states that verification
of account figures is the most effective method of
detecting embezzlements or honest errors. Although most
of the internal control recommendations presented are
widely known, the article still provides a valuable
overview of the internal control problems in the banking
industry.
*(7470)*70*ac*ai*cc*da*fe*hd*ka*mj*nm
"Precautions Preclude Misuse of Student Data."
COMPUTERWORLD, 4 March 1970, p. 1.
*(7480)*70*ac*cc*dg*ff
Presnick, Walter. "Protecting Your Computer's Security."
DATA SYSTEM NEWS, February 1970.
This is a brief interview with Joseph J. Wasserman,
president of Computer Audit Systems.
*(7490)*72*ad*cb*cc*da*ea*ed*hd*he*ka*mb*md*mf*mg*mj*nd
*ng*nm*no*x4
"The Privacy and Computer Task Force Report." Communications
Canada, Information Services, 100 Metcalfe Street,
Ottawa, Ontario, 1972, $2.50.
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This report was prepared for the Canadian
Departments of Communications and Justice. It presents
the findings of an eighteen month study on the
relationship of the computer and personal privacy. For a
short summary of its contents read either "Snapshop 1971
- How Canada Organizes Information About People" by John
M. Carroll or "Canadian Study Sees Role for United
Nations in Privacy Issue" by E. Drake Lundell Jr.
*(7500)*70*ac*ai*cc*da*ka*nl*nm
"Privacy Commission Chairman Suggests Licensing Plan."
COMPUTERWORLD, 11 November 1970.
*(7510)*71*ab*cc*da*ka*nm
"The Privacy Thing." BUSINESS AUTOMATION, May 1971.
*(7520)*69*ab*cc*dg*ff
"Problems and Potential Solutions in Computer Control."
INDUSTRIAL SECURITY, April 1969.
*(7530)*70*ab*cc*df*dg*fz*ma*nj
"Problems of Liability for the EDP Security Industry."
COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION, September 1970.
*(7540)*68*ab*ba*da*hc*mi
"Program Plagiarism Alleged in U.K. Case." DATAMATION, June
1968, p. 91.
The case involves a BOAC airline reservation system
program.
*(7550)*65*ab*ba*cc*da*fs*fl*hc*kb
"Proprietary Programs Progress: Ten Copyrights, One Jail
Sentence." DATAMATION, October 1965, p. 11.
*(7560)*66*ab*cc*da*db*hb
"Protect Your Business Secrets." MODERN OFFICE PROCEDURES,
May 1966.
*(7570)*00*af*cd*da*dc*gf
"Protecting Company Property Against Vandalism and Theft."
Briefing No. 761, Retail Research Institute.
Various types of access control and alarm devices
are described. Their advantages and disadvantages are
discussed, and certain devices are recommended. A
"where-to-purchase" guide is given for all the devices.
* (7580) *68*ad*cd*dc*ge
"Protection of Electronic Computer/Data Processing Equipment
1968." NFPA No. 75, National Fire Protection Association,
60 Batterymarch Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02110,
1968, 32 pp., $.75.
This pamphlet outlines the preplanning stage of fire
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protection for the computer room. Details of design,
types of materials required, construction of hardware,
air conditioning, coolant systems, and emergency power
controls are discussed. Water, carbon dioxide, and Halon
1301 extinguishing systems are also discussed.
Other N.F.P.A. pamphlets include: #10 - Portable
Fire Extinguishers ($1.00), #12 - Carbon Dioxide
Extinguisher Systems ($1.50), #13 - Sprinkler Systems
($2.00), and #232 - Protection of Records ($1.00).
*(7590) *70*ad*cd*dc*ge
"Protection of Records 1970," No. 232, National Fire
Protection Association, 60 Batterymarch Street, Boston,
Massachusetts 02110, $1.00.
This pamphlet contains complete information on
protection of paper-type records. Other NFPA pamphlets
include: #75 - Protection of Electronic/Data Processing
Equipment 1968 ($.75), #10 - Portable Fire Extinguishers
($1.00), #12 - Carbon Dioxide Extinguisher Systems
($1.50), and #13 - Sprinkler Systems ($2.00).
*(7600)*69*ab*cd*dc*dd*ga
"Providing the Right Environment." ELECTRONIC REVIEW, 28
November 1969.
*(7610) *66*ab*ba*da*je*x2
Purgslove, S. D. "The Eavesdroppers: 'Fallout' from R & D."
ELECTRONIC DESIGN, 21 June 1966, pp. 35-43.
The placing of wiretaps on telephone lines, terminal
boards, in manholes, or directly inside a telephone or
data modem has become a sophisticated art. Detection of
a tap on the external wires is extremely difficult by
other than visual inspection.
*(7620)*71*ab*cd*da*gf*xl
"A Pushbotton Lock for Computer Room Security." THE OFFICE,
March 1971, p. 161-163.
The article describes a pushbotton lock manufactured
and sold by Simplex Lock Corporation in Collinsville,
Connecticut. The lock offers two advantages. First, no
control of keys is needed, and second, the combination
can be easily and cheaply changed when an employee leaves
or when the threat of labor trouble occurs. The lock is
completely mechanical with prices starting at $35.00.
- P -
PAGE 205
*(7630)*73*af*cc*cd*nm*np*x4
QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY OF COMPUTERS AND DATA PROCESSING.
Applied Computer Research, 8900 North Central Avenue,
Phoenix, Arizona 85020, 1971-, (Quarterly, with annual
and semi-annual cumulations).
This subject-indexed annotated bibliography is
designed primarily for individuals engaged in the
practicing end of the computer profession, including
computer users, consultants, time-sharing users and
suppliers, software houses, etc.. The periodicals
reviewed are primarily computer-related trade
publications, general business and management
periodicals, and computer-oriented and
management-oriented professional societies. The more
esoteric and academic literature is not reviewed.
The bibliography is intended to be thorough, but
newspaper items are not included. 126 security articles
were listed from January 1968 to January 1973. The first
issue, April 1971, covers January 1968 to March 1971.
Approximately 175 periodicals are reviewed along with
pertinent books and reports. Because "security" is one
of the bibliography's subject indices, relevant articles
are easy to find. Almost all periodicals are annotated
in one sentence. This bibliography is currently (May
1973) the best periodically-published reference work on
computer security.
*(7640)*68*ab*cc*da*db*dd*de*ff*ni
"Questionnaire for Evaluation of Internal Control in Data
Processing." AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTS, 1968.
Although interesting, this article is somewhat
out-of-date. For a more up-to-date publication see
COMPUTER CONTROL GUIDELINES by the Canadian Institute of
Chartered Accountants, or "AFIPS System Certification
Would Help Protect Public" by Edward J. Bride.
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*(7650)*70*ac*ai*cd*dc*gf
"Radical Rumblings Heeded, Centers Increase Security."
COMPUTERWORLD, 14 October 1970.
Many midwest EDP installations are adding closed
circuit TV, additional guards, etc., to provide
additional protection against violent demonstrations and
sabotage.
*(7660)*71*ab*cc*cd*fv*ge*gf*mi*no*x2
"Railroads Outline Their Approaches to Computer Security."
RAILWAY AGE, 13 September 1971, p. 68.
This article summarizes the findings of a computer
security survey taken by RAILWAY AGE. The survey was
only concerned with physical access control, data file
protection, and data file backup. Some of the safeguards
taken by Louisville & Nashville, Seaboard Coast Line,
Union Pacific, Southern, and Southern Pacific are briefly
described. Unfortunately, the article only presents the
positive aspects of the survey. It appears that most of
these railroads use extensive physical access control
procedures and provide quite satisfactory off-site file
backup where frequently updated files are stored in large
secure safes. However, most of the railroads did not
have any standby computer hardware or equipment backup
facilities. They planned to utilize service-bureaus in
case of equipment failures.
*(7670)*68*ad*cb*dg*ed*ef*ei*el*fe*gh
Ramirez, J. "Problems in Protection of Information in a
Multiuser On-Line System." Master's Thesis, Moore School
of Electrical Engineering, University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, May 1968.
The Moore School's Problem Solving Facility is
described in detail. Methods of preventing
"conflict-request" problems when two or more users are
simultaneously sharing a file are discussed. For more
information read "A File System for a Problem Solving
Facility" by David K. Hsiao.
*(7680)*71*ab*cc*dg*fx*ni
Ramsgard, W. C. "Evaluate Your Computer Installation."
MANAGEMENT SERVICES, January 1971, pp. 37-41.
* (7690) *73*ab*cb*dg
Rapoport, R. "Electronic Alligators." SATURDAY REVIEW OF THE
SCIENCES, March 1973, pp. 35-38.
* (7700) *72*ab*cc*ff*fx
Rau, P. "Evaluating the EDP Function." DATAMATION, September
1972, pp. 72-73.
* (7710) *aa*cc*ff*fp*fv*xl
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Rauseo, Michael J. MANAGEMENT CONTROLS FOR COMPUTER
PROCESSING. American Management Association Inc., 135
West 50th Street, New York, New York 10020, 1970, 272
pp., $12.00.
The main purpose of this book is to present
fundamental technical concepts and applications of basic
management principles that apply to the computer systems
area. The book doesn't presume the reader has any
understanding of general EDP methods or computer
techniques. The five chapters are entitled: (1) How to
Identify Potential Computer Applications, (2) What a
Manager Should Know About Computer Programming, (3)
Management Methods and Feasibility Studies, (4)
Management Control of Computer Processed Information, and
(5) Organizing and Managing the Computer Department.
Only chapter 4 is concerned with computer security.
Controls are mentioned for programming errors, operator
errors, hardware errors, and protection of files. Tape
library control systems, retention plans, reconstruction
plans, and the effect of the computer on the audit trail
are also discussed.
*(7720)*73*af*cc*np*xl
READERS' GUIDE TO PERIODICAL LITERATURE. The H. W. Wilson
Company, New York, 1900-, (Monthly, with annual
cumulations).
This guide is a cumulative author/subject index to
periodicals of general interest published in the United
States. Desired articles can be found under the subject
index "Electronic Data Processing (now 'Computers') -
Security Measures". Each annual publication contains
several computer security articles, but most of these,
plus additional security articles, can be easily located
in the BUSINESS PERIODICALS INDEX.
* (7730) *70*ac*ai*bg*dg
"Real DP Crime May Blossom." COMPUTERWORLD, 25 November
1970.
*(7740)*72*af*cc*df*fm
"Recognition of EDP Operational Problems." LYBRAND
NEWSLETTER, September 1972.
*(7750)*70*ad*bc*cc*cd*dc*fs*ga*gd*ge*jg
"Recommended Good Practices for the Protection of Electronic
Data Processing and Industrial Automation." Factory
Insurance Association, Hartford, Connecticut, 1970.
This is a good comprehensive booklet on physical
security and fire prevention. Some of the safeguards
discussed are: location selection, elimination of
combustibles, control of ignition sources, smoke removal
systems, fire detection and extinguishment, backup power,
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and operating procedures. Several checklists on
construction details are also given.
*(7760)*68*ab*cc*cd*da*dc*fp*fv
"Records Protection in the Age of EDP." THE OFFICE, October
1968.
*(7770) *67*ab*cc*fk
"Record Retention Timetable." MODERN OFFICE PROCEDURES,
April 1967.
This article discusses the length of time that
records should be kept before they are destroyed.
*(7780)*73*ae*ag*ca*da*ep*er*es*x2
Reed, I. S. "Information Theory and Privacy in Data Banks."
AFIPS NATIONAL COMPUTER CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 42,
1973, pp. 581-587.
This paper relates the security of data records in
computerized retrieval systems with Shannon's
information-theoretic treatment of secrecy systems for
natural language messages in communication systems. The
reader must be familiar with the mathematics of
communication theory to adequately understand this paper.
First, the analogy between retrieval systems and certain
communication channels is explained. The requirements of
a privacy system are not as stringent as those of a
secrecy system, because personal records can be
sufficiently distorted to make inferences about them
nonunique and yet allow their use in statistical
analysis. Distortion measures are presented which will
achieve maximum privacy (although less than perfect) for
a given allowable degree of distortion.
*(7790)*69*ab*cb*ep*eq
Reed, I. S.; and Turn, Rein. "A Generalization of
Shift-Register Sequences." P-3698, RAND Corporation,
Santa Monica, California 90406, January 1969; or JOURNAL
OF THE ACM, July 1969, pp. 461-473.
Circuits based on the feedback shift-register
concept appear especially suitable for cryptology
applications.
*(7800)*71*af*cc*fu
Reeder, James A. "Security Education and Training:
Prevention Against Compromise." DEFENSE INDUSTRY
BULLETIN, Winter 1971.
*(7810)*69*ab*cc*ff
Reeve, J. T.; and Johnson, R. E. "Practical Use of Computer
in Auditing." THE INTERNAL AUDITOR, January 1969, p. 15.
*(7820)*71*ab*cb*ek*ff
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Reid, G. F.; and Demcak, L. A. "Audit Implementation with
General Purpose Software." JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY, July
1971, pp. 35-36.
*(7830)*70*ab*cc*fm
Reid, H. V. "Problems in Managing the Data Processing
Department." JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT, May 1970, pp.
8-11.
*(7840)*71*ab*cc*cd*dg*fa*fb*ff*fh*fo*fg*fv*nf*x3
Reider, Harry R. "Maintaining the Security of Computer
Records." BURROUGHS CLEARING HOUSE, February 1971, p. 28.
Many desirable control procedures are presented for
use in data processing installations. The same control
procedures that were exercised over clerks, bookkeepers,
and accountants in conventional systems, must be
exercised over programmers, systems analysts, and
computer operators in computer systems. In the design of
an effective EDP organization plan, the following factors
should be considered: definition of individual
responsibilities for all functions; preparation of formal
job descriptions; separation of functions and duties;
installation of internal processing control and external
checking functions; and establishment of standards of
performance for personnel. Data Processing documentation
can serve to provide material for supervisory review,
system and program revision, inquiry response, new
personnel instruction, and internal control evaluation.
Documentation should include an installation standards
manual, system documentation, program run books,
operators run books, keypunch manuals, and clerical
procedures manuals. Input controls must be established
where data are: created; converted to machine form;
entered into the computer; handled, moved, or transmitted
in the organization; and rejected in processing. Output
controls must assure only those authorized to see the
data receive it, and feedback mechanisms must exist for
reporting errors. Processing controls should include:
overflow condition error tests; operator message
controls; check-point controls; and reasonable limit,
crossfooting, control total, and edit tests. File
protection involves a combination of: physical controls
(environment control, fireproof vaults); procedural
controls (tape and disk labeling, off-site storage); and
a retention plan (grandfather-father-son concept).
*(7850)*72*ab*cc*cd*dg*fa*fb*ff*fh*fo*fq*fv*nf*x3
Reider, Harry R. "Safeguarding Computer Records." MANAGEMENT
CONTROL, October 1972, pp. 245-248.
This article is identical to another article by
Reider entitled "Maintaining the Security of Computer
Records" in the February 1971 issue of BURROUGHS CLEARING
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HOUSE.
*(7860)*70*ac*ai*cd*ge
"Reservations Center Prefers 'Wet Look'." COMPUTERWORLD, 14
October 1970,
Pacific Southwest Airlines has installed a water
sprinkler system in its computer center.
*(7870)*72*ac*cb*nb*ng*nk*x2
"Responsibilities Assigned in IBM Security Study."
ELECTRONIC NEWS, 21 August 1972, p. 26.
IBM's $40 million, five year research program to
develop hardware and software data access safeguards in
computer systems is briefly outlined. The following four
sites were selected to participate in the study: the
Federal Systems Division in Gaithersburg, Maryland; MIT
in Cambridge; the State of Illinois in Springfield; and
TRW Systems in Redondo Beach, California. The Federal
Systems Division will coordinate and integrate activities
of the other sites, provide programming support, and
train personnel involved in the study. MIT will check
out various hardware through which information can be
shared, determine how access can be controlled, and study
the effect of the user environment to control access to
systems. Illinois will investigate the cost to users of
achieving different levels of data security. TRW will
attempt to develop definitions of systems security and
measurement techniques needed to determine levels of
security.
*(7880)*68*ab*cb*cc*em*na
"Restart and Recovery." EDP ANALYZER, October 1968.
*(7890)*72*ab*ak*cc*fm
Rettus, R. C.; and Smith, R. A. "Accounting Control of Data
Processing." IBM SYSTEMS JOURNAL, January 1972, pp.
72-92.
*(7900)*70*ac*ai*bc*dc*jf
Revolutionary-Force Bombs IBM Office." COMPUTERWORLD, 18
March 1970, p. 1.
*(7910)*71*ab*bb*cd*da*db*dc*ga*gf*hk*ho*if*ii*mc*x1
Reynolds, Jayne H. "Computer Misuse: A look at Vulnerable
Areas." BEST'S REVIEW: Life/Health Edition, May 1971, p.
76; or BEST'S REIVEW: Property/Liability Edition, May
1971, p. 70.
This article is primarily concerned with physical
security. It attempts to persuade the reader that most
organizations have very inadequate safeguards. Several
actual and hypothetical examples of computer misuse by
disgruntled employees and saboteurs are discussed. In
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one example, a supervisor, who was passed over for
department head when his boss retired, spent several
months trying to discredit his new boss by feeding
misinformation into the computer. Physical security
safeguards implemented by several unnamed insurance
companies are also described.
* (7920) *71*ab*cc*da*hd*ka*nm
Robinson, Stanley. "The National Crime Information Center
(NCIC) of the FBI: Do We Want It?" COMPUTERS AND
AUTOMATION, June 1971, pp. 16-19.
The author has doubts about the NCIC. He feels it
may contain the ingredients of a police state.
*(7930)*68*ae*cb*cc*fv*gf
Rofes, William. "Disaster Recovery." PROCEEDINGS OF SHARE 31
AND GUIDE 27; SHARE Inc., 25 Broadway, Suite 750, New
York, New York 10004; or GUIDE International Corporation,
1 Illinois Center, 111 East Wacker Drive, Chicago,
Illinois 60601, October 1968, Sect. 5, pp. 55-70.
The protection needed for vital computerized
business records is discussed.
*(7940)*70*ae*cb*cc*fv*gf
Rofes, William. "Vital Records Protection." GUIDE 30
PROCEEDINGS, GUIDE International Corporation, 1 Illinois
Center, 111 East Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60601,
1970.
*(7950)*72*ab*cc*df*fm*ni
Romberg, B. W. "Eyeball Your Computer Operations Today."
INFOSYSTEMS, December 1972, pp. 30-31.
*(7960)*69*aa*cc*da*de*fe*fh*fk*fj*hd*ka*mb*md*nl*nm
Rosenburg, Jerry Martin. THE DEATH OF PRIVACY. Random House,
New York, New York, 1969, 236 pp.
The capability of the computer to control huge data
banks and to pose as a threat to personal privacy are
examined. The author believes that the individual should
have the opportunity to: refute stored personal
information, determine what is collected, and maintain a
permanent check on how data on him is used. Other data
privacy laws and regulations are also proposed. The book
is only remotely concerned with technical and operating
procedure safeguards for data security.
*(7970)*68*ab*cc*fa
Rosner, M. N. "Organizing for Management Information."
SYSTEMS & PROCEDURES, November 1968, pp. 35-37.
* (7980) *65*ab*cc*ff
Ross, F. E. "Internal Control and the Audit of Real-Time
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Digital Systems." JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY, April 1965, pp.
46-55.
*(7990)*72*ab*cc*de*df*fb*hv*x2
Ross, Joel E. "Computers: Their Use and Misuse." BUSINESS
HORIZONS, April 1972, pp. 55-60.
The problem of how to make computers pay off is
analyzed. Most failures can be traced to four mistakes:
thinking an information system can substitute for a
management system; lack of top-management involvement; a
communications gap between management and computer
personnel; and failure to organize properly.
Here is a list of recommendations suggested by the
author: design your own turnkey operation; save some
money for new applications and development; don't let DP
managers make all computer decisions; don't install a
management information system without a management
system; scrap systems that don't perform; don't
underestimate development costs; eyeball output reports
for outrageous mistakes; check the technical, economical,
and operational feasibility of proposed projects;
determine what you want MIS to do; set objectives,
identify constraints, determine information needs,
specify all output; and avoid automatic bill payment.
* (8000) *68*ab*cc*fa
Rossner, M. N. "Organizing for Management Information."
SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES JOURNAL, November 1968, pp. 35-37.
*(8010)*66*ab*cc*ff
Rothery, B. "Information and the Auditor." DATA PROCESSING
MAGAZINE, August 1966, pp. 58-59.
*(8020)*72*ae*ag*cb*cc*dg*hd*ig*ih*ka*lb*mf*nl*nm*x2
Rothman, Stanley. "The Protection of Privacy and Security in
Criminal Offender Record Information Systems." AFIPS
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Fall Joint Computer Conference,
Vol. 41, 1972, pp. 423-424.
This paper singles out those aspects of the problem
of protecting privacy and security in information systems
that are special to law enforcement. The rule that any
computer participating in the FBI's remote access
National Crime Information System must be either
dedicated to law enforcement or under law enforcement
control is causing considerable debate. The development
of a commercially available secure operating system is
vital to resolving this debate. By far the most common
threat is bribery of systems employees and police
officers by private detectives, bank officers, newspaper
reporters, employees, etc.. Since most law enforcement
agencies must manage personnel within civil service
regulations, proper pre-employment screening and firing
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employees for security violations are difficult. The Law
Enforcement Assistance Act has developed through project
SEARCH, a model act for state government, and
administrative regulations for the protection of privacy
in computerized criminal-history systems. However, there
is no guarantee that the states will approve this
recommended model act.
* (8030) *68*ae*cb*ed*gh*mh
"RYE, CAPRI, COINS, OCTOPUS, SADIE, Systems." Network of
Computers Workshop, National Security Agency, October
1968.
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*(8040)*70*ac*ai*dc*hg*jf
"Sabotage Course Shows Action May Have Bad Effect on
Society." COMPUTERWORLD, 25 November 1970, p. 1.
A humanities course at Syracuse University on
nonviolent sabotage of computers has discovered that
society as a whole can be hurt by computer sabotage.
* (8050) *70*ac*ai*cb*dc*gc
"Safe Source Says Some Safes are Safer." COMPUTERWORLD, 21
October 1970.
The differences between EDP media storage and
regular paper storage are discussed. One difference is
that paper can withstand a 350 degree temperature while
magnetic tape starts to deteriorate at less than 200
degrees. The information on magnetic tape vulnerability
may now be somewhat obsolete.
*(8060)*68*ad*cc*cd*dc*fw*gd*ge*jf*no
"Safeguard Data Processing Files and Programs." RETAIL
RESEARCH INSTITUTE - EDP INFORMATION SERVICE, July 1968.
This article presents the results of a survey of 20
large retail stores regarding their practices in
safeguarding data processing files and programs, and in
preventing serious disruption of computer operations in
the event of serious urban riots. The survey questioned
the stores on: storage, updating, microfilming, source
data storage, alarm systems for fire and smoke, backup
agreements, auxiliary power, alternatives to phone
service, employee safety, skeleton staff in time of riot,
and receipt of mailed data.
*(8070)*67*ab*cb*cc*ea*lb
"Safeguarding Time-Sharing Privacy - An All-Out War on Data
Snooping." ELECTRONICS, 17 April 1967.
A large part of this article is devoted to a
discussion of the 1967 Spring Joint Computer Conference
on data security.
*(8080)*00*ad*dc*jg*na
"Salvaging and Restoring Records Damaged by Fire and Water."
RP-2, Federal Fire Council, Washington, D.C. 20405.
*(8090)*67*ab*cb*eq
Savage, J. E. "Some Simple Self-Synchronizing Digital Data
Scramblers." BELL SYSTEMS TECHNICAL JOURNAL, February
1967, pp. 448-487.
* (8100) *70*ab*cc*mf*xl
Scaletta, Phillip J. Jr. "The Computer and the
Administration of Justice." DATA MANAGEMENT, December
1970, pp. 34-39.
The use of computers in the field of law is
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discussed. This article is the third part of a four part
series on the legal ramifications of the computer age.
Although this article isn't concerned with computer
security considerations, the other three parts of the
series are concerned with security.
Courts are now using computers for: accounting,
sorting, scheduling, and printing of material; collecting
parking violation fines, maintaining case name indexes,
automatic case docketing, calendar control, and jury
selection. Law firms are beginning to use computers for:
timekeeping; fee billing; payroll and expense accounting;
attorney productivity reports; attorney availability
reports; unbilled time analysis; and financial condition
analysis. Legislators are using computers to store and
display existing laws and proposed bills, and for
legislative redistricting. The use of computers for
retrieving relevant case and statuate law is also
discussed.
*(8110)*71*ab*cc*da*de*hd*ka*nm*x1
Scaletta, Phillip J. Jr. "The Computer as a Threat to
Individual Privacy." DATA MANAGEMENT, January 1971, pp.
18-23.
This article is a basic introduction to computers
and the privacy problem. Some general problems
associated with the Federal Data Center proposal are
discussed. Although the U.S. Constitution does not
specifically guarantee the right to privacy, the courts
are more frequently taking the position that an
individual has the right to control information about
himself. A number of common ways that information could
be illegally obtained from time-sharing computers are
presented. out of carelessness, maliciousness, or sheer
stupidity, much damage can be done by administrators who
introduce errors into records. The author feels that
Congress must pass some privacy legislation, but he
doesn't give any specific recommendations.
*(8120)*70*ab*cc*dd*de*nj*x2
Scaletta, Phillip J. Jr. "The Legal Ramifications of the
Computer Age: Part 1 - Suing a Computer: Printout as
Evidence." DATA MANAGEMENT, October 1970, pp. 12-15.
This article discusses legal problems that have
resulted from the unique characteristics and uses of
computers. In most computer cases there will probably be
no witnesses. Assuming a malfunction is found, what is
the standard of conduct against which the defendant's
conduct may be measured? How does one resolve a common
jury misconception that computers are nearly infallible?
What happens if the computer retrieves the wrong credit
reference from its memory and a customer is wrongfully
denied credit? Should the injured plaintiff bear the
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burden of proving specific acts of negligence? Do
accidents involving computers normally occur in the
absence of negligence? Under what circumstances can the
board of directors be sued for not using a computer to
stay competitive or for using a computer in untested and
potentially dangerous situations?
The author doesn't want to wait for a case-by-case
development of tort law to answer these questions. He
recommends legislation placing strict liability on the
user and the manufacturer of computers for any damage or
injury caused by computer malfunction or mishap.
*(8130)*70*ab*cc*df*dg*fz*ma*x2
Scaletta, Phillip J. Jr. "The Legal Ramifications of the
Computer Age: Part 2 - Contracts, Patents, and
Copyrights." DATA MANAGEMENT, November 1970, pp. 20-22.
The following problems should be resolved in an
agreement for computer services. The written contract
should carefully spell out an obligation of the data
processor to provide for security of the data entrusted
to him. Liquidated damages should be mutually agreed
upon which would compensate the user for loss which he
would have if his data or its secrecy was lost, The
contract should clearly specify who is responsible for
errors and what error detecting procedures the processor
must use. Requirements for service availability under
unexpected circumstances also need consideration. A
lawyer must carefully word the contract since many
computer words and terms have no precise legal
definition.
The discussion on copyrights and patents is
obsolete. See "Legal Protection of EDP Software" by
David Goldberg for a more recent and more informative
discussion of copyrights and patents.
* (8140) *70*ac*ai*ba*da*ma
"Scandinavia's First Data Theft Occurs at Service Bureau."
COMPUTERWORLD, 18 November 1970.
*(8150)*72*ab*cc*fm
Schefer, E. A. "Management Control of the Corporate Computer
Activity." DATA MANAGEMENT, September 1972, pp. 45-56.
*(8160)*72*ae*cb*ed*ei
Schell, Roger R. "Summary of Remarks for Panel Discussion on
Privacy and Protection in Operating Systems." ACM
NATIONAL CONFERENCE, 1972.
*(8170)*70*ab*cc*da*db*ft*nm
Schiedermayer, P. L. "The Many Aspects of Computer
Security." THE POLICE CHIEF, July 1970, p. 20.
This article describes various aspects of computer
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theft, fraud, and privacy invasion. Its purpose is to
acquaint police personnel with computer related crimes.
The author believes that honest EDP personnel are the
best insurance against computer crimes.
*(8180)*73*ac*cc*da*ka*nl*nm*x4
Schmeck, Harold M. Jr. "A Federal Panel Urges New Laws to
Protect the Privacy of Personal Records." NEW YORK TIMES,
1 August 1973, p. 17.
A government advisory committee has just recommended
a new code for "fair information practice", backed up by
law, to protect individual privacy in this age of
computers. The committee's panel of experts presented a
346 page report which is the result of their year-long
study. Casper Weinburger, current Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare, said that he agrees with the
general principles of the report. The report advocates
strong criminal and civil laws for the following five
principles: there must be no secret personal data
record-keeping systems; there must be a way for an
individual to find out what information is kept on him
and how it is used; there must be a way for an individual
to prevent information about him obtained for one purpose
from being used for other purposes without his consent;
there must be a way for an individual to correct or amend
a record about himself; and any organization creating,
maintaining, using, or disseminating personal records
must insure the reliability of these records for their
intended use, and take precautions to prevent misuse.
The report opposes the establishment of a standard
universal identifier, and recommends that constraints be
placed on the use of Social Security numbers as
identifiers.
*(8190)*72*ad*aj*al*ca*dg*ee*eh*ng
Schroeder, Michael D. "Cooperation of Mutually Suspicious
Subsystems in a Computer Utility." Ph.D. Dissertation,
MAC TR-102, Electrical Engineering Department, MIT,
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139, September 1972.
Practical protection mechanisms are described that
allow mutually suspicious subsystems (like independently
compiled programs and databases) to cooperate in a single
computation and still be protected from each other.
These mechanisms are based on the division of a
computation into independent domains of access privilege,
each of which may encapsulate a protected subsystem.
*(8200)*72*ab*ae*ah*cb*dg*ec*ee*ef*ei*lb*x2
Schroeder, Michael D.; and Saltzer, Jerome H. "A Hardware
Architecture for Implementing Protection Rings."
PROCEEDINGS - THIRD ANNUAL ACM SYMPOSIUM ON OPERATING
SYSTEMS PRINCIPLES, October 1971; or COMMUNICATIONS OF
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THE ACM, 3 March 1972, pp. 157-170.
This paper describes a set of hardware precessor
access control mechanisms that were devised as part of
the second iteration of the hardware base for the MULTICS
system. MULTICS is a general purpose, multiple user,
interactive computer system developed by Project MAC of
MIT in a joint effort with the Cambridge Information
Systems Laboratory of Honeywell Information Systems Inc.
and, until 1969, the Bell Telephone Laboratories.
MULTICS in currently implemented on a modified Honeywell
645 computer system. The 645 computer was the first
attempt to define a suitable hardware base for a computer
utility. It was recently modified to include an improved
and expanded set of access control mechanisms which
implement protection "rings" almost completely in
hardware.
In a system which uses segmentation as a memory
addressing scheme, protection can be achieved in part by
associating concentric rings of decreasing access
privilege with a computation. The hardware processor
mechanisms for implementing these rings of protection are
described in detail in this paper. They allow cross-ring
calls and subsequent returns to occur without trapping to
the supervisor. Automatic hardware validation of
references across ring boundaries is also performed. A
call by a user procedure to a protected subsystem
(including the supervisor) is identical to a call to a
companion user procedure. A segment is the smallest unit
of information that can be protected.
The paper begins by establishing the general need to
control access to stored information in a computer
utility and by presenting several criteria for comparing
different sets of access control mechanisms. Relevant
aspects of the organization of segmented memories were
then sketched, and the processor mechanisms for
implementing protection rings were described. The paper
concludes by illustrating how rings can be used and by
evaluating the impact of a hardware system.
*(8210)*70*ab*bb*cc*db*fq*hj*kb*kd*mc*x1
Schweisheimer, W. "Embezzlement by Computer." BANKERS
MONTHLY, June 1970, pp. 291-292.
A few examples of embezzlement by computer are
described. Many executives have the misconception that
they must throughly understand computers before they can
ask intelligent questions concerning computer operations
and security worthiness. The author states that
executives can and must ask questions about a computer's
security even though they don't understand computers.
Most computer experts believe that implementation of the
following four steps will prevent a large majority of all
embezzlements: don't let programmers operate the
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computer; segregate check authorizing and check writing
operations; frequently rotate the duties of programmers
and operators; and frequently perform computer audits of
the financial records.
*(8220)*69*ad*ae*cd*dc*ga
Scoma, Louis Jr. "Catastrophe Prevention in the Computer
Complex. Environmental Factors: How Vulnerable Are You?"
American Management Association Conference on Security
and Catastrophe Prevention Management of the Computer
Complex, November 1969; or Data Security Inc., 15
Spinning Road, Hinsdale, Illinois 60521.
* (8230) *71*ae*cc*cd
Scoma, Louis Jr. "Protecting the Cost of Technology:
Security and the Data Center." AMA 17TH ANNUAL SYSTEMS
MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE, American Management Association,
New York, New York, March 1971, 5 pp.
Several basic considerations are discussed for
operating a secure computer center.
*(8240)*71*ab*bc*cd*dc*xl
Scoma, Louis Jr. "Protecting Your EDP." THE OFFICE,
September 1971, pp. 53-54.
The author briefly lists twelve actual examples of
computer destruction by disgruntled employees or
saboteurs, and the resulting losses. His statement that
a small quarter-size magnet can erase 50,000 tapes in
minutes is preposterous. Other security experts claim
such a magnet would be lucky to erase one tape. (Read an
article entitled "Magnets: A Surface Issue" in the August
30, 1970 issue of COMPUTERWORLD.) Scoma lists the
following ten commandmends of EDP security. Thou shalt:
not take security for granted, provide for adequate
personal clearances, establish restricted areas, provide
fire control and prevention measures, provide for theft
detection, provide for sabotage detection, establish riot
and mob controls, not overlook backup equipment
requirements, generate backup databases, and be security
minded in the physical planning of computers.
* (8250) *70*ab*bc*cd*dc*xl
Scoma, Louis Jr. "Security in the Computer Complex."
COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION, November 1970, p. 10.
The author cites six examples of computer and
computerized data destruction caused by student saboteurs
and disgruntled employees. He then briefly makes the
following recommendations: take time to adequately plan
your facility and regularly review your existing
facility; plan the complex to meet the particular neeeds
of your firm; train all operating personnel in fire
reporting and fire fighting procedures; be prepared for
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the disgruntled employee; security check all new DP
personnel; and provide adequate air-conditioning and
power backup to avoid a major business interruption.
However, Scoma's statement that a quarter-size magnet can
destroy up to 50,000 tapes in a matter of minutes is
preposterous. Some authors doubt that a quarter-size
magnet can destroy anything. (See "Magnets: A Surface
Issue" in the August 30, 1072 issue of COMPUTERWORLD.)
Scoma's articles are typical of those discussed by Mel
Mandell in an article entitled "Computer Scare Talk:
Sabotage Fears of 'Experts' Discounted" in the May 9,
1971 issue of the NEW YORK TIMES.
* (8260) *72*ad*cb*da*eq*nn
"Scrambling and Unscrambling Files for Security." PB-213
899/3, National Technical Information Service,
Springfield, Virginia 22151, November 1972, 102 pp.,
$12.50.
The article proposes a method for encoding and
decoding data files based on a one-time pad used just
before and after transmission. This method supposedly
gives better protection than previous data scrambling
techniques. A short survey on previously attempted
scrambling techniques is also given,
*(8270)*67*ab*ad*cb*cc*cd*dg*nm
SDC MAGAZINE: July 1967. System Development Corporation,
2500 Colorado Avenue, Santa Monica, California 90406.
The entire issue of the magazine is concerned with
computer security and data privacy. The privacy issue is
discussed at length, but the security issue is given much
less coverage.
*(8280)*69*ab*cb*cc*db*mc*nl*xl
"SEC Closes in on Computers." BUSINESS WEEK, 9 August 1969,
p. 82.
Up until recently, the Securities and Exchange
Commission hasn't stretched its authority to cover Wall
Street's new computer networks serving giant
institutional traders. However, the commission has now
proposed rules that could require automated trading
system users to submit details on how they plan to guard
against price-rigging, fraud, and manipulation, and how
they intend to keep unauthorized interests out while
giving the SEC access. Two trading systems that will be
most affected, Autex and Instinet, are briefly described.
The New York Stock Exchange's block automation system and
the National Association of Securities Dealer's automated
quote system will be exempt from the proposed rules.
* (8290) *71 *ab*cb*da*ep
"Secure Communications." THE COMMUNICATIONS USER, January
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1971.
* (8300) *73*ac*ai*cb*cc*db*dd*de*mk*ne*no*x3
"Secure and Accurate? Most Vote Officials Seem Content."
COMPUTERWORLD, 9 May 1973, p. 1.
Although there have been many recent stories about
inaccuracies and security breaches in computerized vote
counting systems, most county election officials seem to
be unconcerned about the problem. This was the
conclusion drawn from a survey of county election systems
prepared a year ago and just released by Systems Research
Inc.. County election officials using punched card
systems rated their equipment as 100% accurate and
secure, while those using paper ballots rated their
system as only 83% accurate and 75% secure. Officials
apparently still find it easy to have blind faith in the
computer.
The survey also found that punched card voting
systems are more expensive than lever-type voting
systems. The average cost per registrant for lever,
punched card, and paper ballot systems was found to be
$1.39, $1.90, and $2.05 respectively. Only 7% of the
counties presently use punched card systems, although 16%
use computers to maintain registration lists.
*(8310)*70*ad*cb*cc*da*ed*gh*ka*mf*nm
"Security and Privacy Considerations in Criminal History
Information Systems." Report No. 2, Project SEARCH,
California Crime Technological Research Foundation,
Sacramento, California, July 1970.
*(8320)*70*ac*ai*bc*cc*cd*dc*jf*mj
"Security Cut Damage from DP Center Blast." COMPUTERWORLD,
23 December 1970, p. 1.
A bomb explosion at the University of Kansas
Computer Center caused minor damage thanks to recent
security improvements at the center.
*(8330)*69*ab*cd*da*ep*gf*hb*kb*x1
"Security Defenses for the Computer Room." OCCUPATIONAL
HAZARDS MAGAZINE, December 1968; or MANAGEMENT REVIEW,
May 1969, pp. 67-68.
This article briefly summarizes a few techniques
that can be used to provide safeguards against espionage.
They are: guard patrols, ultrasonic alarms, scrambling of
telephone transmitted information, and cables that sound
an alarm if punctured.
* (8340) *70*ab*cb*da*ep
"Security in Communications, Excerpts from 15th Annual
Seminar." INDUSTRIAL SECURITY, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 20-29.
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*(8350)*73*ab*ak*cc*dg
"Security in Data Processing." DATA PROCESSOR, IBM
Corporation, February 1973, pp. 12-14.
* (8360) *73*af*bg*cc*cd*dg*gg
SECURITY LETTER. 475 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10017,
(Biweekly Newsletter).
This is a biweekly newsletter about security
problems. The letter often mentions problems associated
with computers. In the August 9, 1971 issue, a two page
supplement listed forty commonly found deficiencies in
the security of computer centers.
*(8370)*70*ab*bc*cd*da*dc*gf*jf*nd*x1
"Security Men Thrive on the Wages of Fear." BUSINESS WEEK,
20 June 1970, pp. 112-114.
Security service companies and security equipment
manufacturers are doing a booming business despite the
current business slump. Large corporations such as
Westinghouse have entered the market, but so have some
questionable fast-buck operators. The article is
primarily concerned with security alarms for commercial
and home use, and the companies that manufacture or sell
them. A few computer security problems and a doublerdoor
access control device, marketed by Louis Scoma of Data
Processing Security Inc., are briefly discussed.
*(8380)*69*ad*cb*dg*ed*gh*hb*kb*mh*nq
"Security of Classified Information in the DIS ANSRS
System." DIA: C-3663/MS5, Defense Intelligence Agency, 14
February 1969, (Classified).
*(8390)*70*af*cb*cc*cd*dg*lb
"Security of Computer Systems as Major Problem for 1970's."
GOVERNMENT SECURITY AND LOYALTY, Bureau of National
Affairs, Washington, D.C., 25 September 1970.
Dr. Maurice Hellmer, of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, discusses six major threats to time-shared
computers. They are: personnel, physical security,
software, hardware, remote terminals, and administrative
procedures.
*(8400)*71*ab*cd*da*dc*fg*fk*fz*ge*gf*ii*jf*jg*jh*x2
"Security of the Computer Center." EDP ANALYZER, December
1971, pp. 1-13.
This report focuses on the following physical
protection aspects of the computer complex: physical
access control (guard system, man-trap entrance, color
coded and magnetic badges, keys, electronic push-button
locks, building design); automatic smoke detection
(under-floor and above-ceiling sensor arguments, air flow
considerations); automatic fire suppression (Halon 1301,
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carbon dioxide, and water system advantages and
disadvantages); building design and maintenance (limit
room size, water drainage, water-proof ceilings);
magnetic and radar interference (destructive
capabilities); air conditioning, electrical power, and
lighting backup (power blackout frequencies, protection
alternatives); and bomb threat procedures, evacuation
plans, and security training of personnel (bomb threat
emergency procedure checklist, fire drills). Although
nothing new is presented, this report gives a good brief
summary on most aspects of physical protection.
*(8410)*71*ad*cb*cc*cd*dg*gg*gh*nb*ng*nh*no*x4
"Security of the TACC Data Base Study (Description of
Automatic Data Base Security Techniques)."
ESD-TR-71-370-vol-1, Hughes Aircraft Company, Fullerton,
California; or AD-735 728, National Technical Information
Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151, October 1971, 149
pp., $3.00.
The results of a survey of hardware, software, and
procedural techniques used in current and proposed
computer systems are presented. The security
requirements, system environment and function, and
safeguards used are described for each of the 20
government and 14 commercial systems that were examined.
A total of 35 hardware, 41 software, and 20 procedural
safeguard techniques were found. Some data is also given
on the relative cost of developing, using, and
maintaining each of these 96 techniques. Qualitative
cost estimates were made for some techniques when
quantitive estimates were not obtainable. An attempt was
made to categorize the 34 systems by their security
requirements and the 96 techniques by their applicability
to the security requirements."
*(8420)*70*ab*cb*cd*gf*gh
"Security Products Survey." THE OFFICE, August 1970, pp.
44-45.
A wide variety of security devices are briefly
mentioned.
*(8430)*70*ac*ai*cc*cd*da*dc*fp*gc*jf*jg
"Security Protection for EDP Files Seen Crucial."
COMPUTERWORLD, 26 August 1970, p. S-6,
*(8440)*00*ad*cb*cc*mh
"Security Requirements for Automatic Data Processing."
5200.28, Department of Defense, Arlington, Virginia.
*(8450)*00*ad*cd*ge*gf*nd
"Security Systems." Predicasts Inc., 1101 Cedar Avenue,
Cleveland, Ohio 44106, $250.00.
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This is a study on firms specializing in providing
security services and on security products designed for
financial investors. Each product is analyzed as to its
advantages, disadvantages, and value. (That's right! It
can be yours for only $250.00.)
*(8460)*70*ac*ai*be*cc*de*ma*mc*nj
"Service Bureau Head Gets $85,000 in Bank Suit."
COMPUTERWORLD, 11 November 1970, p. 12.
A Minnesota service bureau was awarded $85,000 in
its suit against American National Bank. The suit was
filed against the bank because the bank failed to provide
the bureau with a general ledger bookkeeping system.
*(8470)*49*ab*ca*ep*eq*x2
Shannon, C. E. "Communications Theory of Secrecy Systems."
BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEMS TECHNICAL JOURNAL, October 1949,
pp. 656-715.
In this classic paper, a mathematical theory of
secrecy systems is developed, as well as methods for
measuring secrecy system effectiveness. Examples of
different types of ciphers are shown. The basic weak
points and desirable characteristics of secrecy systems
are discussed. Incompatibility among the desirable
characteristics are also analyzed. Shannon proved that
the necessary and sufficient condition for a
cryptographic transformation to be totally unbreakable is
that the key must be truly random, at least the same
length as the message, and only used once. The theory of
cryptology has been significantly improved since this
article was written . The paper is highly mathematical
and requires a good knowledge of probability theory and
modern algebra to be understood.
*(8480)*69*ab*cc*ff
Sheffield, R. J. "EDP Audit Techniques." THE INTERNAL
AUDITOR, November 1969.
*(8490)*69*ab*cb*cc*db*fm
Shelton, L. B.; and Reid, E. W. "Unauthorized Intervention
in Computer Processing." THE INTERNAL AUDITOR, July 1969,
p. 59.
*(8500)*69*ab*ah*cb*ec*ed
Shoshani, A.; and Bernstein, A. J. "Synchronization in
Parallel Accessed Data Base." COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM,
November 1969, pp. 604-607.
* (8510) *72*ac*cc*da*nl*nm*x1
Shuster, Alvin. "British Panel Calls for Legislation to
Protect Privacy." NEW YORK TIMES, 13 July 1972, p. 4.
A British government committee proposed a series of
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measures to safeguard individual privacy. Their 10,000
word report dealt with bugging, computers, secret
dossiers, private detectives, and industrial espionage.
On computers, the committee recommended a voluntary code
by users to guard against abuses. These recommendations
were judged inadequate by the National Council on Civil
Liberties. The government plans to hear the public's
reaction before it acts on the proposal.
*(8520)*00*ad*bc*cd*dc*jf*kb*mh
Siler, James W. "Data Center Disaster." Business Information
Services, 690 Building, Dow Chemical Company, Midland,
Michigan.
This article describes the computer center disaster
experienced by Dow Chemical Company when war protestors
invaded its computer complex. Over 1,000 tapes were
permanently destroyed.
* (8530) *68*aa*cb*eq
Sinkov, A. ELEMENTARY CRYPTANALYSIS, A MATHEMATICAL
APPROACH. Random House, New York, 1968.
*(8540)*70*af*cb*eq
Skatrud, Ralph 0. "Computers and Cryptography." In- PRIVACY:
LEGAL AND TECHNICAL PROTECTION IN THE COMPUTER AGE,
University of California, Berkeley, California, October
1970, 26 pp.
This article gives a basic description of the terms,
history, and techniques of cryptography. Many of the
techniques described take advantage of computer
processing. It is similar to another article by Skatrud
entitled "A Consideration of the Application of
Cryptographic Techniques to Data Processing" in the 1969
Fall Joint Computer Conference proceedings.
*(8550)*69*ae*ag*cb*da*eq*x3
Skatrud, Ralph 0. "A Consideration of the Application of
Cryptographic Techniques to Data Processing." AFIPS
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Fall Joint Computer Conference,
Vol 35, 1969, pp. 111-117.
First, a brief history is given on the development
of cryptographic techniques from the 15th thru the 20th
centuries. Then two digital cryptographic techniques
which may have potential applications in data processing
systems are described in detail. The first is a method
of digital substitution analogous to a Vernan double tape
system. It uses a controlled combination of data and the
contents of two memories. The second method uses a
digital route transposition matrix that employs a
combination of row and column transposition under memory
control.
The author describes these two cryptographic
- S -
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techniques in sufficient detail to enable the reader to
clearly understand how they would be implemented in
hardware or software. He presents in mathematical terms
the probability of each method being deciphered without
knowledge of the cryptographic key or contents of the
message. Both methods are theoretically unbreakable if
one follows the author's restrictions on maximum message
length and maximum time between necessary changes of the
keyword. Possible ways of achieving key leverage in each
ciphering process are also explained.
*(8560)*70*ab*cb*da*eq*x3
Skatrud, Ralph O. "Cryptographic Techniques in Data
Processing." COMPUTER SERVICES, July 1970, p. 13.
This article is similar to another article by
Skatrud entitled "A Consideration of the Application of
Cryptographic Techniques to Data Processing" in the 1969
Fall Joint Computer Conference proceedings.
*(8570)*73*ac*ai*bb*bd*cc*db*dd*mk*x3
Smalheiser, Marvin. "Accuracy of L.A. Vote System
Challenged." COMPUTERWORLD, 9 May 1973, p. 5.
The accuracy of the Los Angeles computer punched
card voting system has been challenged by Baxter Ward,
who was elected to the L.A. County election board of
supervisors last fall. He wants an extensive manual
recount to check against the computer count. Ward became
suspicious when a check of the votes he received in the
primary election last year showed thirty-four instances
where identical vote totals were reported for successive
precincts by the computer. In some cases, he said, two
precincts in a row reported an identical total for him or
his opponent. In some cases three precincts in a row and
in one case four in a row reported the same figures. The
mathemetical probability of a four in a row sequence was
determined to be less than one in a million. A check of
another contest in an earlier 1970 election showed a
similar unique coincidence of identical figures.
*(8580)*73*ac*ai*cc*dg*fc*ff*kd*x2
Smalheiser, Marvin. "Auditors Get Word - Gain Management's
Confidence." COMPUTERWORLD, 20 June 1973, p. 3.
This article presents some of the recommendations
made at the first National EDP Auditor's Conference.
Joseph J. Wasserman of Computer Audit Systems called EDP
auditors "the world's worst salesmen". He told them they
must start selling themselves to management, and get
needed resources to work with, or else continue to be
severely inhibited in their efforts to monitor computer
operations. The need for standards for EDP auditors was
another basic theme of the conference. William H. Murry
of IBM urged auditors to independently access the risk of
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fraud, recommend action, and provide visibility of the
level of risk. Another speaker warned auditors against
getting too technically involved.
*(8590)*73*ac*ai*ba*cb*cc*cd*dg*fx*x2
Smalheiser, Marvin. "Be Safe - Try to Break Your System."
COMPUTERWORLD, 6 June 1973, p. 1.
Last year Jerry N. Schneider stole more than $1
million worth of electronic equipment from Pacific
Telephone and Telegraph Company simply by pushing the
right beep-tones on his touch tone telephone, and picking
up the equipment at PT&T's shipping docks early in the
morning before warehouse crews arrived. He pleaded
guilty to one count of grand theft (other charges were
dropped), served forty days of a sixty day sentence, was
released on probation for three years, and is now a
systems consultant for EDP Security Inc., a company he
helped organize. Schneider believes that the best way to
develop confidence in a system is to try to break it. He
recommends the following precautions: establish a frame
of mind that you are going to tighten security; look
around, talk less, and listen more; make sure there is
adequate physical security; be assured of the integrity
of employees; provide a system of checks and balances to
insure the integrity of both the input and output data;
and use a data scrambler to stop unauthorized data taps.
Schneider also suggests the use of host computers or
minicomputers, set up alongside a computer, to watch the
programs and control accesses.
*(8600)*72*ac*ai*ba*cb*cc*cd*da*hn*ii*kf*lb*x1
Smalheiser, Marvin. "Computer 'Accomplice' in Thefts."
COMPUTERWORLD, 16 February 1972, p. 1.
Jerry Schneider, a 21-year-old UCLA engineering
student, studied Pacific Telephone and Telegraph's
computer system and learned enough to place commercial
orders for equipment simply by punching the right
beep-tones on his own touch tone phone. He then
illegally ordered over $1 million worth of electronic
equipment and sold it through a dummy firm operated by
ten associates. The equipment and bills of lading were
picked up at PT&T's shipping docks early in the morning
before warehouse crews arrived.
*(8610)*73*ac*ai*ba*bb*bf*da*db*df*hd*hj*ic*ih*kd*md*me
*no*x2
Smalheiser, Marvin. "DP Crime - Who Does It?" COMPUTERWORLD,
30 May 1973, p. 2.
This article quotes testimony by Donn B. Parker of
Stanford Research Institute before a State Assembly
committee hearing. Parker did a study on 24 recent
computer crime cases involving local, state, and federal
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governments. The study indicates that the computer
criminal is likely to be a white collar male, 18 to 30
years old, highly rational, and deviating only in small
ways from his peers. A high frequency of collusion among
perpetrators was also found. The type of crimes that
were studied are: vandalism - 4, address list theft - 5,
check manipulation - 4, payroll manipulation - 3,
confidentiality violation -4, illegal sale of EDP
services - 2, and vote counting fraud - 2. The
perpetrators were: 16 EDP employees, 2 elected officials,
2 citizens, a private businessman, a claims manager, a
welfare employee, and a policeman.
*(8620)*73*ac*ai*bb*cc*db*mc*nj*x1
Smalheiser, Marvin. "Equity Investor Suit Says IBM
Safeguards Lacking." COMPUTERWORLD, 16 May 1973, p. 1.
This article presents some of the charges made in a
class action suit, filed by five Los Angeles residents,
which seeks over $4 billion in damages resulting from the
Equity Funding scandal. The suit charges that IBM
contributed to the Equity Funding scandal by failing to
design mechanical and procedural means of detecting
fraudulent inputs into their equipment. Alvin B. Green,
the attorney who filed the suit said, "Were it not for
the equipment being manufactured as presently constituted
and IBM failing to advise the public of the problem,
fraud would never have arisen."
Almost every charge in this suit is preposterious.
Either the plaintiffs are incredibly ignorant, or they
are hoping the jury who decides their suit can be
convinced to believe these absurd charges. For some
actual facts on the scandal, read two articles by Alan
Taylor in the April 25 issue of COMPUTERWORLD.
*(8630)*73*ac*ai*cc*db*fs*kd*nl*x2
Smalheiser, Marvin. "Safford Summons User Group to Rally
Against DP Fraud." COMPUTERWORLD, 20 June 1973, p. 1.
Herbert B. Safford, international president of the
Data Processing Management Association (DPMA), believes
that the time has arrived for computer professional
associations to speak out on computer assisted fraud and
promote efforts to prevent it. Enforcement will have to
come either through a strongly enforced code of ethics,
where members found responsible for fraud are censured by
all associations throughout the industry, or through
licensing of DP personnel backed by legal prosecution.
Safford favors the latter approach providing it is well
thought-out. He also suggested that computer user
associations can assist EDP auditors by advising them on
how to protect computers, programs, and data. These
associations should also develop guidelines for top
management review of EDP installations.
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*(8640)*73*ac*ai*bc*cd*fv*gc*jg*me*na*x2
Smalheiser, Marvin. "Water Damage Avoided: Plastic
Protection Proves Worth in Fire." COMPUTERWORLD, 10
January 1973, p. 1.
A $1,200 investment in plastic covers protected
about $15 million worth of computer equipment during a
fire which partially destroyed a block-square building in
Sacramento, California. The building was occupied by the
California National Guard and the State Department of
Motor Vehicles. The computer equipment was located on
the second floor. Covers were put on the equipment
before water was able to seep through the ceiling. The
fire was on the fifth floor of the six-story building.
Computer data files were removed from the building when
it appeared that the entire building might be lost. Four
days after the fire normal operations resumed.
*(8650)*73*ab*cc*fm*nb
Smith, Hendrick S. "Cost Control for Computers, Applying
Bread-and-Butter Principles." BUSINESS HORIZONS, February
1973, p. 73.
* (8660) *71*ad*ak*cb*eq*gh
Smith, J. L. "The Design of Lucifer, A Cryptographic Device
for Data Communications." RC-3326, IBM Corporation, White
Plains, New York, 15 April 1971.
For more information See "An Experimental
Application of Cryptography to a remotely Accessed Data
System" by W. A. Notz and J. L. Smith.
*(8670)*71*ad*ak*cb*ep
Smith, J. L. "Hardware Implementation of a Cryptographic
System." IBM TECHNICAL DISCLOSURE BULLETIN, Vol. 14, No.
3, August 1971, pp. 1004-1008.
This article describes a cryptographic system
developed by IBM. It is designed to provide enciphering
and deciphering of messages between a remote terminal and
the computer. Both software and specially designed
hardware are used to mechanize the system.
*(8680)*72*ae*ak*cb*ep
Smith, J. L.; Notz, W. A.; and Osseck, P. R. "An
Experimental Application of Cryptography to a Remotely
Accessed Data System." PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM, 1972, pp.
282-298.
A cryptographic system developed by IBM is
described. It is designed to provide enciphering and
deciphering of messages between a remote terminal and the
computer. Both software and specially designed hardware
are used to mechanize the system.
*(8690)*68*ab*cc*df*dg*ff*fg*fh*fk*fl*fu*fo*fp*fq*kd*x3
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Smith, Troy J. "Internal Auditing of Controls for Data
Processing Department." THE INTERNAL AUDITOR, May 1968,
pp. 44-50.
This paper discusses balancing controls for off-line
computer systems. Balancing controls are essential
internal controls needed to assure receipt of all data,
accuracy of processing, reliability of completed reports,
reduction of rerun costs, and efficiency of operations.
There are two significant control features: physical
control over the physical movement of data, and record
(paper) control over the movement of data. With respect
to physical movement of data, controls should include: a
record of input data received from source, issued to
operations, returned from operations, returned to source;
and a record of output data received from operations and
distributed to users. Some commonly used types of
program controls for output are: columnar totals, hash
totals, and record counts. For error controls: cross
footing, limit checks, check points, zero balances,
sequence checks, and audit checks are commonly used.
Document counts, and control totals of hours, rates, etc.
are most frequently used for data input control.
Working from the above externally established
controls, an independent data control center should:
develop complementary records which will trace physical
and machine movement of data; develop methods of
verifying the accuracy of data as it is processed from
program to program; schedule and release source data to
operations for processing; verify return of source data,
output data, records, and reports from operations when
processing has been completed; maintain records of output
users and verify delivery of output to these users;
maintain complete documentation records of machine
programs and operations; release programmed computer
instructions, punched card files, and magnetic tape files
to operations only when needed to process current data;
index, label, and sort all card files, tape files, and
programmed instructions in a secure library facility;
develop retention schedules for all tape and card files;
and provide personnel to assist operations in resolving
machine, program, or data difficulties. The author also
presents a list of ten questions that should be answered
to test whether or not a data control system provides
adequate protection. Although this article is somewhat
out-of-date, most of the controls discussed are still
very useful.
*(8700)*69*ab*cc*dg*ff*hk*hp*kb*kd
Smith, Troy J. "Internal Controls for Data Processing."
COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION, November 1969.
Audit and control methods for input data, and
optimal check points for controlling work flow are
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discussed.
*(8710) *69*ab*cc
Smith, Troy J. "Workable DP Controls." COMPUTERS AND
AUTOMATION, November 1969.
*(8720)*70*ac*bb*be*cc*dg*ff*hm*kd*ne*x1
Smith, William D. "Controls Haven't Caught Up to Boom in
Computers." NEW YORK TIMES, 22 February 1970, Sect. 3, p.
11.
When the celebration of the New York Mets baseball
championship had passed, many businessmen discovered that
enthusiastic employees had tossed valuable computer tapes
and punched cards out office windows in a tribute to
their heros. This and other examples demonstrate
inadequate control over most business computers. One
reason for the gap between desire and performance is that
most traditional auditing personnel have no knowledge of
computers while most computer personnel are ignorant of
auditing. Joseph Wasserman, president of Computer Audit
Systems, recommends: keeping unauthorized personnel out
of the computer room, off-site file backup, and definite
separation of duties among employees.
*(8730)*71*ac*cc*da*fl*hc
"Software Protection: Trade Secret Laws, Not Patents, May Be
Way." ELECTRONIC NEWS, 15 November 1971, Sect. 2, p. 34.
*(8740)*70*ab*cc*da*db*de*ft
Sohn, D. "Screening for Drug Addiction." PERSONNEL, July
1970.
*(8750)*71*ab*cd*df*gd*jh
"Some Quick Tips for Surviving Brownouts." FACTORY, May
1971, p. 26.
*(8760)*70*ab*cc*cd*xl
"Some Tips on Computer Security." INDUSTRY WEEK, 3 August
1970, p. 22.
This brief article presents several security
recommendations by Richard F. Cross, security officer of
Bank of New York. They are: be certain that remote
terminals have controlled access to the computer; install
self-contained air conditioning; only allow authorized
personnel in the computer room; conduct extensive
pre-employment interviews; set up an emergency plan for
immediate securing of all tapes, programs, and other
valuables; and review your insurance coverage to consider
insuring against business losses resulting from computer
problems.
*(8770)*72*ab*cb*cc*cd*dg*eh*fv*fw*hc*nb*nf*x3
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Sorensen, J. L. "Common Sense in Computer Security." JOURNAL
OF SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT, April 1972, pp. 12-14.
Suddenly everyone is concerned about computer
security. The risk is very real, but more common sense
and less panic on the part of management are needed
today. It's almost impossible to protect against
intentional destruction of computer equipment and
computerized data files. It is beginning to appear that
employees are becoming the biggest security risk.
Unfortunately, most of the steps toward greater security
involve significant cost. For large computer
installations, substantial expenditures are appropriate,
but for. the majority of small and medium size
installations less expensive alternatives are needed.
The author suggests a two step approach for
implementing a security program. First, assess the
installation's security status; identify measures needed
to provide fairly complete security; evaluate each in
relation to the risk protected against and the cost
involved; and select those with obvious justification on
a common sense approach. Second, develop detailed
contingency procedures for quick recovery in the event
computer equipment or files are destroyed. Recovery
procedures do not have to be expensive. Usually it is
not difficult to locate other installations in the
vicinity with compatible equipment and work out a backup
agreement. However, this is not enough. A backup system
must be periodically tested to insure that it is truly
compatible, and that it can handle the extra workload.
The author also made a few flexible recommendations
to prevent and detect theft. A file owner should
scramble information in valuable data files that have a
significant risk of being stolen. It is useful to insert
"decoy" names in important name and address files.
Unauthorized direct mail solicitations to the "decoy"
addresses will indicate that the file was stolen.
*(8780)*72*ac*ai*bb*cc*db*fh*hk*if*ka*mf*nj*nl*nm*x2
Sorkin, Michael D. "State Sued on Data Bank: Privacy
Invasion Charged." COMPUTERWORLD, 27 September 1972, p.
1.
A class action lawsuit has been filed in Des Moines,
Iowa aimed at prohibiting all Iowa law enforcement
officials from keeping either computerized or manual
identification files on arrested persons with no criminal
convictions. The suit claims that Iowa criminal
identification records are sent to the FBI where they are
classified and exchanged with law enforcement agencies,
other government agencies, and several classifications of
private employers including railroads, banks, and
insurance companies. Once the identification records
leave the. FBI's possession, there is no restriction on
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their use. Computerization of Iowa's criminal records
has become controversial because LENCIR, a Des Moines
subsystem of the state computer network, has been keeping
secret files on "persons of interest" and labeling the
suspects as "known criminals" even though many have never
been convicted or charged with a crime.
*(8790)*72*ac*ai*cc*da*db*hd*ka*nl*nm*x3
Sorkin, Michael D.; Lundell, E. Drake; and Bride, Edward J.
"Privacy Issues Grow More Lively." COMPUTERWORLD, 20
December 1972, pp. 1-2.
This is one of the most recent articles describing
what is occurring in the areas of personal privacy and
government regulation of computer data banks. Sorkin
discusses a freeze asked on LEAA funds, Lundell describes
a newly formed Canandian Data Bank Committee, and Bride
reveals that the use of the Social Security number as a
universal identifier is doubtful.
A report by the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law, said the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration (LEAA) of the U.S. Justice Department
should halt its spending on criminal justice information
systems until legislation providing privacy safeguards is
adopted. Several serious privacy abuses by the LEAA are
revealed.
The Canadian government has established a special
interdepartmental committee charged with drawing up
privacy-protection rules for computerized databanks and
is considering use of an ombudsman to make sure that
these rules are enforced. The rules will first be
applied to the government's own databanks.
A U.S. government committee is leaning toward the
conclusion that the Social Security number would not make
a good universal identifier number. It is neither unique
or universal. Many migratory people have several SS
numbers and cases of two or more people having the same
number aren't that uncommon. The very existence of a
universal identifier being in the public's interest is
also being questioned.
* (8800) *68*ab*cc*ff
Soudler, I. J. "Plain Talk About Auditing in an ADPS
Environment." JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY, April 1968, pp.
43-47.
*(8810)*68*ab*cc*da*es*ka*mb*nm
Sprague, C. R.; and Ness, David N. "Privacy and a National
Data Bank." BANKING, June 1968, pp. 50-51.
The authors discuss how databanks do not necessarily
entail an invasion of privacy.
*(8820)*68*ab*cc*da*es*ka*mb*nm
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Sprague, Richard E. "Personalized Data Systems." BUSINESS
AUTOMATION, October 1969, p. 47.
*(8830)*70*ab*cc*da*ka*mb*nm
Sprague, Richard E. "The Invasion of Privacy and a National
Information Utility for Individuals." COMPUTERS AND
AUTOMATION, January 1970, pp. 48-49.
The author concludes that the invasion of privacy
problem can only be prevented by forming a national
information utility for individuals.
*(8840)*00*af*cc*dg*fy
"The St. Paul Data Processing Policy." St. Paul Insurance
Companies, 385 Washington Street, St. Paul, Minnesota
55102.
*(8850)*73*ae*ag*cb*da*eq*x3
Stahl, Fred A. "A Homophonic Cipher for Computational
Cryptography." AFIPS NATIONAL COMPUTER CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 42, 1973, pp. 565-568.
Computational cryptography, which deals with the
storage and processing of sensitive information in
computers, is distinguished from communication
cryptography. The major difference between these two
types of cryptography is that computational cryptography
must allow the normal editing functions of deleting,
inserting, and moving strings of information to occur
within the enciphered file without going through a
deciphering and reenciphering process for the entire file
after every edit. Because computational cryptography
techniques must have this additional editing capability,
they can't provide the extremely high security of
communication cryptography techniques.
The author states that most computation cryptography
techniques are either too computationally complex to be
implemented or provide ciphers that are too easily
broken. He then describes a homophonic cipher that is
extremely easy to implement and provides good security by
destroying almost all frequency information of the
message. The security of the cipher can easily be
varied, but more securely encoded messages require
greater amounts of storage space. Unfortunately, the
homophonic cipher is quite vulnerable to the problems of
limited message syntax and partially known messages.
*(8860)*70*ac*ai*bd*be*cc*dd*de*hv*me*mk*nj
"State Bans Punched Card Voting as City Sues Vendor, Even
Weather a Problem." COMPUTERWORLD, 30 December 1970, p.
3.
* (8870) *70*ab*cc*fs
Stephan, R. W. "Setting Up a Manual of Policies and
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Procedures." DATA MANAGEMENT, September 1970, pp. 93-95.
*(8880)*69*ab*cb*cc*cd*da*hw
"Sticking Up a Computer." INNOVATION MAGAZINE, No. 7, 1969.
Rapid growth in the computerization of business
operations has caused EDP personnel to give little
concern to the security of their systems.
*(8890)*70*ab*cb*cc*da*db*mc*ng
Stiefel, Rudy C. "A 'Checkless' Society or an 'Unchecked'
Society?" COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION, October 1970, pp.
32-25.
It will be very difficult for computers to automate
the monetary aspects of our lives. It is now technically
feasible to build a system that would make a cashless and
checkless society possible, but inadequate computer
safeguards against theft and fraud will probably prevent
such a system from being developed.
*(8900)*70*ad*cb*cc*da*db*mc*ng
Stiefel, Rudy C. "Proceedings of Carnahan Conference on
Electronic Crime Countermeasures." PB-190 589, National
Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia
22151, 16 April 1970.
The author believes that it will be very difficult
for computers to automate the monetary aspects of our
lives. It is now technically feasible to build a system
that would make a cashless and checkless society
possible, but inadequate computer safeguards against
theft and fraud will probably prevent such a system from
being developed.
*(8910)*71*ab*cc*ff
Stolle, C. D. "Computer-Based Audits." MANAGEMENT ADVISOR,
May 1971, pp. 38-43.
*(8920)*68*ad*cb*ed*ef*gh*xl
Stone, M. G. "TERPS: File Independent Inquiries." THE
COMPUTER BULLETIN, March 1968, pp. 286-289.
This article describes the TERPS system which allows
protection at the record level within files. A
descriptor with each file contains a security code for
the fields. The term "access" is divided only into "yes"
or "no" capabilities, Access restrictions are based on
terminal location, security level, and password.
*(8930)*71*ae*ca*cb*eb
Strnad, Alois J. "The Relational Approach to the Management
of Data Bases." IFIP Congress, 1971.
*(8940)*69*ac*ai*bc*cc*cd*dc*jf*mj
"Students Demolish Computer Center." COMPUTERWORLD, 26
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February 1969, p. 1.
The destruction of the Sir George Williams
University's computer center is described.
*(8950)*71*ac*ai*bc*cd*dc*jf*mj
"Students Protest Lads, Occupy Center." COMPUTERWORLD, 24
February 1971, p. 4.
*(8960)*70*ad*cb*da*ep*md
"Study of Electronic Handling of Mail." AD-715 124, National
Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia
22151, June 1970, 83 pp.
Possible security techniques in transmitting
information electronically from one site to another are
analyzed.
*(8970)*72*ab*cc*df*dg*nb*nf*x3
"Subtle Problems - Human Error, Accidents, Responsive
Controls - May Be the Most Critical for EDP Installation,
Says Diebold Executive." MANAGEMENT ADVISOR, September
1972, pp. 10-11.
Theodore J. Freiser, senior vice president of John
Diebold & Associates (a management consulting firm),
believes that human error, accidents, and lack of
responsive controls are just as lethal security problems
as are the well publicized examples of sabotage,
embezzlement, and theft. He recommends the following
procedure for implementing or improving a security
program. First, determine what inherent risks exist.
Second, establish the company's potential vulnerability
to these risks. Third, estimate the cost and business
implications of the materialization of these risks. The
money spent to reduce a particular risk should be closely
related to the product of the above two steps. Fourth,
determine the practical opportunities that exist to
reduce the vulnerability to these risks. This last step
includes estimating the cost implications of proposed
measures to increase security, and the development of a
time-phased implementation plan specifying action,
personnel, and equipment involved.
* (8980) *70*ac*ai*cc*da*nj
"Suit Hinges on Programs." COMPUTERWORLD, 16 December 1970.
*(8990)*70*ab*cb*cc*da*hd*nm
"Summary of Recommendations on operation of Data Banks re
Privacy." DATA PROCESSING DIGEST, October 1970, p. 34.
*(9000)*71*ab*cd*df*gd
Summers, Garth E. "Providing Reliable Power for Computer
Systems." PLANT ENGINEERING, 7 January 1971.
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*(9010) *70*ae*cc*dc*fv*fw
Supp, Robert J. "Catastrophe Prevention Management of the
Computer Complex." 6373-60, American Management
Association Briefing Session, 13 April 1970.
A disaster protection program for protecting data
records is described.
*(9020)*70*ad*cb*ed*ei*el*gh*no
"Survey and Analysis of Major Computing Operating Systems."
Comtre Corporation, AD-704 138, National Technical
Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151, January
1970.
*(9030)*69*ad*cb*eb*ed*gh*no
"A Survey of Generalized Data Base Management Systems."
CODASYL Systems Committee Report, May 1969.
*(9040)*73*ac*ai*cc*dg*fa*ff*fg*fi*kd*x1
"System Protection Depends on Well Educated Auditor."
COMPUTERWORLD, 28 March 1973, p. 8.
This article presents some comments made by Harvey
S. Gellman, president of DCF Systems Ltd., in a speech
before the Toronto chapter of the Institute of Internal
Auditors. It is necessary to provide good education for
the internal auditor to equip him for his role in
protecting the security of computer systems. In addition
to fraud, the internal auditor must protect his company
from loss of availability of its computer. He can best
meet his responsibilities if he can review computer
programs in the design stage. He should also perform a
cost versus benefit analysis to determine the appropriate
security for different sets of data. Gellman maintains
that a separate audit control group, not under the EDP
department, is necessary for adequate separation of
duties and controls.
*(9050)*70*ad*cb*cc*dg*ed*ej*el*em*ff*fi*fn*kb*kd*nf*ni
"Systems Auditing and Control: Software and Management
Series." S10, Diebold Computer Planning and Management
Service, April 1970, 77 pp.
The following four main audit areas are discussed in
detail: editing routines to check input validity;
controls to disallow concurrent updating of files;
logging accesses to files; and restart procedures.
Detailed recommendations are also given for developing a
good systems and procedures manual. The appendix
includes a comprehensive auditing checklist which has
many interesting and valuable questions.
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*(9060)*70*ab*cc*ff*fu
Tagen, W. G. "Educating the Internal Auditor in EDP." THE
INTERNAL AUDITOR, January 1970.
*(9070)*69*ab*cb*cc*dg
Tassel, Coleman J. "Information Security in a Computer
Environment." COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION, July 1969.
*(9080)*73*ac*ai*bb*cb*cc*db*ff*hj*hk*hm*if*kd*mc*x3
Taylor, Alan. "Auditor Negligence, Fear of DP Called Keys to
Fraud." COMPUTERWORLD, 25 April 1973, p. 3.
This article and another article in this issue, also
by Taylor, provide an excellent detailed description of
the computer's role in the great Equity Funding Life
Insurance fraud. A few highlights are presented below.
Four separate sets of fraudulent actions were being
routinely entered on the computerized books, but none of
them involved the production of specialized programming
by the DP staff until a final attempt to stave off
rediscovery was made. These four fraudlent uses were:
(1) reopening the previous year's books and adding new
input to match corporate aims; (2) accepting falsified
input from user departments which created and maintained
bogus policies; (3) preparing test files at the
instructions of the actuarial department, officially for
use in insurance-selling simulation studies, but actually
used to create falsified input describing bogus policies;
and (4) accepting about thirty-five sets of falsified
input documents which resulted in dead policies being
revived and their $3,000 to $5,000 value being cashed in
through dummy accounts. The last of the above four
fraudulent actions was apparently the work of some
unknown independent entrepreneur, and not related to the
big company-sponsored fraud.
The computer played two important roles in making
the fraud possible. It assisted in implementing the
fraudulent figures, and the auditor's fear of the
computer was used by the conspirators to prevent the
normal level of auditing from taking place. Equity
encouraged auditors to request hard copies of
computerized records they wanted to inspect the next day.
The auditors turned over these lists the preceeding
evening which gave the conspirators overnight to produce
fake documents. The fraud had been in successful
operation for over three years. An employee finally
exposed the fraud which auditors were never able to
detect. Over $1 billion in bogus insurance policies was
involved.
*(9090)*70*ac*ai*cc*fz*nj
Taylor, Alan. "Directors' Fortunes Being Risked by DP
Department." COMPUTERWORLD, 23 December 1970.
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This article reports on a discussion between the
author and Roy Freed and Robert Bigelow, two lawyers who
specialize in the computer field. The increase in legal
suits between manufacturers and users, legal contract
forms, and the liability of management and corporate
directors are briefly discussed.
*(9100)*73*ac*ai*bb*cb*cc*db*ff*hj*kd*mc*x3
Taylor, Alan. "The Great Fraud: DP or Not DP?"
COMPUTERWORLD, 25 April 1973, p. 1,
This article and another article in this
COMPUTERWORLD issue, also by Taylor, provide an excellent
detailed description of the computer's role in the great
Equity Funding Life Insurance fraud. The purpose of this
article is to show that the fraud, which has been called
the "first great computer fraud in history", is really
not a computer fraud. Many stories in several national
journals implicitly or explicitly condemned the data
processing department as guilty of fraud and/or
criminally incompetent. This article analyzes the WALL
STREET JOURNAL and NEWSWEEK stories in detail, and
convincingly shows that the Equity DP department was most
likely not guilty of any fraudulent activity. It appears
that inadequate auditing procedures were mostly
responsible for the fraud's success. The handling of
major bogus insurance policies was not integrated into
the computer operations until two years after the fraud
started. Special programming to support the fraud was
only used to stave off the fraud's rediscovery.
Although, the DP department could have easily been used
to support and promote the fraud, the roof had fallen in
on Equity before this occurred.
*(9110)*73*ac*ai*cc*db*fb*fs*kd*nl*x2
Taylor, Alan. "Must In-House DP Be Banned as Too Open to
Fraud?" COMPUTERWORLD, 13 June 1973, p. 19.
The author is concerned about the possibilities of
computer fraud initiated and controlled by corporate
executives who oversee the DP operations. He is
especially concerned because he feels that
executive-controlled computer fraud is extremely
difficult to detect, The Equity Funding fraud is an
excellent example. Taylor states that DP personnel must
become more professional and not let their loyalty to the
firm affect the way data processing is handled. The only
other alternative, and a less desirable one, is to ban
in-house DP and require all DP to be done by service
bureaus or some other independent DP organizations.
*(9120)*73*ac*ai*cb*cc*dg*el*ff*kd*ng*x3
Taylor, Alan. "Two Instruction Streams Can Enhance
Auditability." COMPUTERWORLD, 11 July 1973, p. 11.
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Computers with two instruction streams (Burroughs
5000 and Control Data 6600) can provide better managed
and controlled programs. The second instruction stream
can be used to provide an audit trail of the first
stream, which is used for executing programs. Until
recently, the cost of devoting one of the instruction
streams solely to providing an audit trail was
prohibitive. However, about a month ago Control Logic
Inc. introduced a mini-computer, based upon a central
processor on a chip, which can provide the needed second
instruction stream for only $2,000. This mini-computer
instruction stream can provide audit trails on a
program's instruction sequence without interfering with
the program's functions in any way.
*(9130)*70*ab*cb*cc*gg*lb*mb
Taylor, R. L.; and Feingold, R. S. "Computer Data
Protection." INDUSTRIAL SECURITY, August 1970, pp. 20-29.
The authors discuss the lack of data security,
particularly that related to remote-access, time-shared
computers. They conclude that these security problems
will be technically solved within the next five years,
and that the solution will lead to the establishment of a
national databank.
* (9140) *00*ad*cb*cc*dg*fx*mh
"Techniques and Procedures for Implementing, Deactivating,
Testing and Evaluating Secure Resource-Sharing ADP
Systems." 5200.28-M, Department of Defense, Arlington,
Virginia.
*(9150)*71*ab*ba*cb*da
"Telephone Used in Computer Theft." BUSINESS AUTOMATION, 1
April 1971.
*(9160) *70*ab*bb*cc*db*hj*kd
"The Thief Inside." THE OFFICE, August 1970, pp. 12-15.
Common types of embezzlement are discussed, and a
program of preventative measures is given for both small
and large companies. Many actual embezzlement cases are
presented. However, there is little material on
computer-related embezzlements.
*(9170)*70*ab*cb*cc*cd*da*hb*kb*mf
"The Thief Outside." THE OFFICE, August 1970, pp. 35-38.
The security program at Sargent and Greenleaf, a
lock manufacturer, is discussed. This company uses very
elaborate precautions to protect their files, records,
and computer. Some security recommendations are given.
*(9180)*69*ab*cc*df*nc
Thomas, D. R. "On Reliability Strategy in Electronic Data
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Processing," MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING, January 1969, pp.
39-42.
*(9190)*71*ab*cc*dg*ed*eh*ej*el*ff*fh*fl*kd*lb*ni*x3
Thorne, Jack F. "Internal Control of Real-Time Systems."
DATA MANAGEMENT, January 1971, pp. 34-37.
This article discusses aspects of internal control
which relate to input controls, processing controls,
stored data controls, and output controls, and are
peculiar to real-time processing. The author suggests
the following data input controls: each terminal user has
his own key, code, or card for access control and
identification; all transactions are checked for validity
by the computer and all errors are reported; and a
listing of all transactions is sent to a supervisor for
his review and approval. Programmed checks may be used
to: detect loss or nonprocessing of data; determine that
arithmetic functions are performed correctly; determine
that all transactions are posted to the proper record;
and ensure that all detected errors are corrected.
Stored data controls should include: periodic printing of
files on a surprise basis; documentation of all file
changes; restriction of file changes to specified
terminals; use of test transactions to establish the
integrity of files; and verification of data in files by
checking appropriate data maintained outside the system.
For output control, a permanent record of all types of
output created (an output log) is desirable. This also
applies to data displayed on terminal cathode ray tubes.
The author concludes by presenting an internal control
checklist applicable to real-time systems only. The
checklist contains sixteen questions which imply similar
to the ones described throughout this article. The
checklist is to be used in conjunction with, rather than
a replacement for, checklists on batch processing
systems.
* (9200) *72*ab*cb*dc*gc*jf*x3
Tiffany, W. D. "Are Computer's Files Vulnerable to Magnets?"
THE OFFICE, September 1972, p. 51.
The author, manager of the security systems research
program at Stanford Research Institute, presents his
research findings on the vulnerability of magnetic tapes
to magnets. The results show that all small magnets
(200-2000 gauss) and almost all large magnets must be
held within one inch of a magnetic tape to sufficiently
distort data to cause computer malfunctions. Even the
smallest magnets can destroy magnetic tapes, but only if
held at the surface of a tape. A magnet's field of
intensity varies inversely with the cube of the distance
from the magnet. For these reasons, the author believes
that the tape's canister will protect it from all but
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quite large magnets. The stories about small magnets
being able to quickly erase entire tape libraries are
definitely untrue.
* (9210) *67*ab*ah*cb*cc*da*mf*nm*x1
Titus, James P. "Security and Privacy." COMMUNICATIONS OF
THE ACM, June 1967, pp. 379-380.
Highlights of the 1967 Spring Joint Computer
Conference are presented. However, many of the problems
discussed at this conference are now obsolete or require
additional considerations. The protection of
communication lines was considered to be the number one
technical problem. (Today's major technical problem is
access control of shared files.) Harold E. Peterson and
Rein Turn, of RAND Corporation, presented an interesting
paper describing various methods of penetrating a
time-shared computer system. Bernard Peters, of the
National Security Agency, described a software security
system that was just being implemented in NSA's
multiple-access message-switching system. Robert Galati,
director of the New York State Identification and
Intelligence System, discussed problems of protecting
individual privacy in criminal information systems. Alan
Westin also discussed problems of individual privacy
protection.
*(9220)*71*ae*cb*dc*dd*em*fv*lb
Tonik, A. B. "Recovery of On-Line Data Bases." PROCEEDINGS
OF THE ACM, 1971, pp. 103-111.
*(9230)*69*ad*ak*cb*ed*gh*lb*xl
"TSS/360 Quick Guide for Users." X28-6400-0, IBM
Corporation, White Plains, New York, May 1969.
One of IBM's efforts to provide file access control
is presented. The system allows specification of access
restrictions on a user-by-user basis with modes: read,
read/write, unlimited, and restricts.
*(9240)*70*ad*ak*ca*da*eq
Tuckerman, Bryant. "A Study of the Vigenere-Vernam Single
and Multiple Loop Enciphering Systems." RC 2879, IBM
Corporation, White Plains, New York, 14 May 1970.
*(9250)*72*ad*aj*ca*cb*cc*nn*xl
Turn, Rein. "A Brief History of Computer Privacy/Security
Research at RAND." AD-748-917, National Technical
Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151; or
P-4798, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California 90406,
March 1972, 9 pp.
This report briefly describes the research efforts
of RAND employees in computer security and privacy since
1953. RAND scientists made significant pioneering
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contributions in 1963 to 1967 by delineating the data
security/privacy problem and formulating technical
safeguards. Mr. Ware organized the first session on data
privacy/security ever held at a computer conference
(AFIPS - 1967 SJCC). Peterson and Turn presented one of
the first papers on technical aspects and systems
implications of data security. RAND also established
much on the vocabulary of this subject. Harrison
produced two well known annotated bibliographies on
computers and privacy. Other researchers demonstrated
the practicality of system-penetration as a tool for
evaluating security safeguards. Currently, theoretical
and technical aspects on the protection of privacy in
"personal information" databanks are being investigated,
*(9260)*73*ae*ag*cb*da*ep*eq*er*nb*x3
Turn, Rein. "Privacy Transformations for Databank Systems."
AFIPS NATIONAL COMPUTER CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 42,
1973, pp. 589-601.
This paper briefly reviews relevant characteristics
of the following classes of privacy transformations:
compression, monoalphabetic substitution, polyalphabetic
substitution, transposition, and composite
transformations. Irreversible privacy transformations
for statistical databank systems are also briefly
described. The suitability of a particular class of
privacy transformations for application in a
communication network or in the files of a databank
depends upon: the relevant characteristics of the
particular application; the inherent characteristics of
the class of privacy transformations used; and the
technical characteristics of the system that implements
the application and the privacy transformation. All
these characteristics are listed and briefly discussed.
Characteristics of different natural languages and
computer languages which affect the security of privacy
transformations are also presented.
Next, a brief discussion is given on determining the
secureness of a given privacy transformation. This is
followed by a discussion on initial and recurring cost
considerations. Major differences are shown in the
application of privacy transformations to communication
links and to data files. The author concludes by stating
that, "Measures of the amount of security provided by
different mechanisms, measures of the value of
information, and the tools for tradeoff analysis, are now
beginning to crystalize into a discipline of data
security engineering. It is likely that in the next few
years the design of data security systems will be much
less of an art." Although this paper discusses many
privacy transformation considerations in detail, it is
not mathematical and is easily readable.
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*(9270)*70*ad*aj*cb*da*ea*el*ep*eq*ha*ii*je*lb*x2
Turn, Rein; and Peterson H. E. "Security of Computerized
Information Systems." P-4405, RAND Corporation, Santa
Monica, California 90406, July 1970, 9 pp.; or AD-709
366, National Technical Information Service, Springfield,
Virginia 22151.
The first half of this paper discusses the
vulnerabilities of remotely accessed computers, while the
second half presents a good brief discussion on
cryptographic techniques for protecting information
stored in files or transmitted over telephone lines.
First, each of the following are discussed in a few
paragraphs: basic tasks of the operating system; persons
masquerading as authorized users; wiretapping;
circumvention of operating system controls; physical
penetration of computer center; improving the operating
system; real-time monitoring; positive identification;
and protected communication lines. Then two types of
cryptographic transformations are described, followed by
discussions on: the needed hardware for encoding or
decoding; weak points that enable encrypted messages to
be broken; properties of computer languages that make
breaking the encrypted message easier or more difficult;
work factors; and synchronization and communication
control-word problems.
*(9280)*72*ad*ae*ag*aj*cb*cc*da*db*dc*eq*fd*ka*lb*nb*nc
*nf*ng*nh*x4
Turn, Rein; and Shapiro, Norman. "Privacy and Security in
Databank Systems - Measures of Effectiveness, Costs, and
Protector-Intruder Interactions." AFIPS CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS, Fall Joint Computer Conference, Vol 41,
1972, pp. 435-444; or P-4871, RAND Corporation, Santa
Monica, California 90406, July 1972, 36 pp.
During the last several years a variety of
techniques have been developed for protecting sensitive
information against unauthorized access or modification.
However, systematic procedures for cost-effective
implementation of these safeguards are still lacking.
This paper attempts to contribute to the formulation of
"data security engineering" in the area of personal
information databank systems. A model is presented for a
personal information databank system which includes the
following elements: databank, subject, controller,
custodian, collector, user, intruder, and society. The
elements of this model need not be unique since multiple
roles and overlap in functions are common. Arrows are
drawn between certain elements to show that some form of
interaction normally occurs between these elements. The
right of privacy involves interaction between the subject
and the collector or controller elements, while data
security involves interaction between the intruder and
- T -
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the databank elements. Threats to data privacy,
confidentiality, and security may arise from all elements
of this model.
The authors state that databanks can be classified
along the following dimensions: public-private,
statistical-dossier, centralized-decentralized,
dedicated-shared, and off-line/on-line. These
classifications permit ranking of databank systems in
order of the complexity of their security problems. The
authors then develop a rather simple mathematical model
which describes economic considerations for database
protectors and intruders. The analytic or empirical
expressions for this mathematical model are presently
difficult to determine, and are often quite sensitive to
the particulars of a databank security system and the
information protected. However, some advice is given for
determining the needed expressions for: the value of
information to the potential intruder, -to the subject,
and -to the protector.
The objectives of a security system are: to deter a
profit-seeking intruder by raising the intrusion cost to
a level that reduces his expected profits to an
unacceptable level, and to prevent access by intruders
not economically motivated through effective access and
threat monitoring. Design criteria for security systems
must include effectiveness, economy, simplicity, and
reliability. Security techniques can be functionally
classified as: denying information about the security
system (not always desirable), preventing physical or
electronic access, detecting intrusion attempts, and
maintaining databank integrity. The article concludes by
presenting a short discussion on several cryptographic
methods, and giving some representative cost figures on a
few data access and cryptographic protection techniques.
*(9290)*70*ac*ai*bc*cd*dc*jf*mj
"Twenty Students Take Over DP Center, Promise They Don't
Plan Any Damage." COMPUTERWORLD, 25 November 1970.
Twenty students took over the Salem State College
computer center in Massachusetts. They held it for
ransom until obtaining a satisfactory response from the
administration to their list of forty-two demands.
*(9300)*72*ab*cb*da*eq*gh
Twigg, T. "Need to Keep Digital Data Secure?" ELECTRONIC
DESIGN, 9 November 1972, pp. 68-71.
A three stage code generator which produces
pseudorandom bit sequences is described. The device can
provide numerous, easily changed codes, and is easily
mechanized with integrated circuits.
*(9310)*70*ac*ai*bc*cd*dc*jf*mj
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"Two Arrested in Threat to Destroy DP Center."
COMPUTERWORLD, 12 August 1970, p. 1.
Two New York University faculty members were
arrested for allegedly threatening to destroy the
school's computer center if they were not paid $100,000.
Shortly before the threat was made, 150 students had
taken over the center. The money was allegedly to be
used for bail to free a member of the Black Panther
organization.
*(9320)*71*ab*cc*ff
Tyrnauer, S. "Computerized Auditing Methods: An Evaluation."
THE INTERNAL AUDITOR, January 1971.
*(9330)*72*ab*cc*dd*de*em*fm
Tyrnauer, S. "Information Processing: Management Control of
Job Failures and Related Reruns." THE INTERNAL AUDITOR,
May 1972.
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**(9340)*71*ac*ai*bc*dc*gc*jg*mj*x2
"University Fire: Terminals Beat Heat." COMPUTERWORLD, 21
April 1971, p. 1.
Five Sycor computer terminals survived fire, smoke
and water in a University of California administration
building at Santa Cruz. The units were taken from the
scene of fallen timbers, water, and total destruction to
the computer center where they were plugged in and
worked. All units had their paint blistered from the
heat.
*(9350) *70*ac*ai*bc*cd*dc*jf*mj
"University of Wisconsin Computer Center Bombed; Damage
Studied." COMPUTERWORLD, 9 September 1970, p. 6.
*(9360)*71*ac*ai*bd*be*cc*dd*de*ka*mf
"U.S. Marshall Releases Federal Fugitive Because of
Incomplete Data in Computer." COMPUTERWORLD, 20 January
1971, p. 2.
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*(9370)*69*ad*al*ca*dg*eb*ee
Vanderbilt, D. "Controlled Information Sharing in a Computer
Utility." AD-699 503, National Technical Information
Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151; or MAC-TR-67,
Project MAC, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139, October
1969, 172 pp.
An abstract model for structuring and controlling
shared information is described. Much of this model is
based on work by Jack B. Dennis and E. C. Van Horn
discussed in an article by them entitled "Programming
Semantics for Multiprogrammed Computation".
*(9380)*69*ab*ah*cb*da*eq*x2
Van Tassel, Dennis. "Advanced Cryptographic Techniques for
Computers." COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, December 1969, pp.
664-665.
Several unique characteristics of computer files are
briefly described which make cryptographic methods of
little use. Computer files usually offer an enemy
cryptanalyst a large amount of data to work on; in
computer files all records are usually similar; and
supposedly the enemy would know what type of information
is in the stolen file. The article then discusses some
basic advantages and disadvantages of transposition,
substitution, and addition cryptographic methods.
*(9390)*70*ae*ag*ba*bb*da*db*ha*hc*hj*ic*if*ig*kd*kf*mc
*md*x2
Van Tassel, Dennis. "Computer Crime." AFIPS CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS, Fall Joint Computer Conference, Vol. 37,
1970, pp. 445-450.
Twenty actual, well publicized cases of computer
related fraud are described. About half of the cases are
the result of criminals modifying old embezzlement
techniques to cope with computer processing. The other
half are unique to the computer field. The resulting
losses varied from $1,500 to $2,700,000 with the average
being over $200,000. Examples of computer sabotage,
accidents, and errors were not discussed.
*(9400)*72*aa*bg*cc*cd*dg*ea*ej*el*eq*ff*fg*fk*fo*fp*fq
*ft*fu*fv*fx*fy*fz*gg*ha*hk*hl*hm*hq*hr*ja*jc*jf*jg*kb
*kd*la*lb*ma*nf*ni*nl*nm*nn*np*x4
Van Tassel, Dennis. COMPUTER SECURITY MANAGEMENT.
Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 17632,
April 1972, 220 pp., $10.50.
This book covers computer security in a fairly
complete and easily readable manner. It is especially
ideal for the individual who knows little about computers
or computer security and would like to become broadly
acquainted with the subject without having to read many
separate sources. Because the book is quite
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comprehensive, it should also be valuable to a firm's
security personnel in determining any missing links or
weak spots. A checklist of security questions is
included at the end of most chapters.
The book is essentially an attempt by the author to
integrate about 200 magazine articles dealing with
various aspects of computer security. Although the book
is fairly comprehensive, it does not go into much depth
on any particular aspect of computer security. Most of
the book is concerned with management controls and
operating procedures. Only one chapter is concerned with
physical aspects of computer security. Methods of
designing security into production-accounting type
programs are discussed in some detail. Except for
several basic requirements, little is said about the
safeguard needs of an operating system security monitor.
No technical aspects of hardware or software are
discussed.
The book is divided into seventeen chapters with the
following titles: Computer Crime, Computer Security,
Embezzlement: Detection and Control, EDP Control,
Auditing, Programmer Error, Operator Error, Operator
Fraud, Programmer Fraud, Software Protection, Fire
Protection, Disaster and Catastrophe Protection,
Insurance, Cryptographic Techniques, Service Bureaus,
Time Sharing, and Computer Privacy. There are four
appendices: a list of four computer security firms, a
record retention time-table, a sample data processing
insurance policy, and an annotated bibliography of 190
articles. The bibliography is valuable, but it is
limited in scope. Most of the articles in the
bibliography are annotated in one sentence, and almost
all are primarily concerned with management controls and
operating procedures.
*(9410)*71*ab*bc*cc*fc*fv*fw*x2
Van Tassel, Dennis. "A Contingency Plan for Catastrophe."
DATAMATION, 1 July 1971, pp. 30-33.
The author first discusses the need for contingency
plans and gives four examples of actual computer
disasters. Because many accidents and disasters occur
when critical personnel are unavailable, the
implementation of preplanned wait periods is recommended
where the amount of time delay before initiating
expensive recovery action depends on the seriousness of
the problem. Organizations that are highly dependent on
their computer's continued operation for survival should
have at least one full-time person with responsibility
for developing emergency guidelines. Off-site backup is
usually very desirable. Backup hardware and software
need periodic checking to assure that they will meet the
requirements specified in the contingency plans. Some
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backup arrangements can also be made when negotiating the
normal maintenance contract with a vendor. Insurance for
the actual information, the value of supporting software,
the cost of reconstructing destroyed files, the loss of
revenue, and the cost of carrying on normal business
while files are being reconstructed should be
investigated by all computer users. Although well
planned bombings and hurricanes are almost impossible to
defend against, a good backup and contingency plan will
lessen the resulting recovery expenses.
*(9420)*69*ae*ag*cb*da*eq*x2
Van Tassel, Dennis. "Cryptographic Techniques for
Computers." AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Spring Joint
Computer Conference, Vol. 34, 1969, pp. 367-372.
This article provides a brief and easily readable
introduction to cryptography. It should be especially
useful for those completely unfamiliar with the subject.
Several cryptographic terms are defined, and some basic
methods are presented for using transposition and
substitution encoding schemes. The article concludes by
noting the following advanced cryptographic schemes:
combining two or more cryptographic encoding schemes;
transmitting random digits when the system is not being
used; sending an encoded message over two or more
transmission paths; and combining bits with a string of
random numbers.
* (9430) *70*ab*cb*da*eq
Van Tassel, Dennis. "Cryptographic Techniques for Computers:
Substitution Methods." INFORMATION AND STORAGE RETRIEVAL
(Great Britain), June 1970, pp. 241-249.
Substitution cryptographic techniques such as the
Caesar, bilinear, homophonic, Vigenere, and playfair
methods are discussed in this article. An example is
given of each method as well as information on the
securness of each. Although some of the methods could be
used to protect computer files, it is generally
recognized that binary number strings are more efficient,
secure, and flexible.
*(9440)*69*ab*cb*cc*da*db*ej*fd*fl*ft*x1
Van Tassel, Dennis. "Information Security in a Computer
Environment." COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION, July 1969, pp.
24-28.
The author briefly discusses a wide range for
safeguards to protect sensitive information from
unauthorized access, Some of his recommendations are:
classify information according to its sensitivity value;
keep audit lists on all sensitive information in
controlled storage areas; dispose of obsolete, sensitive
information in a secure manner using paper shredders or
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multiple write-over procedures for magnetic media; on
every operating shift there must be at least one
appropriately cleared individual who is able to enforce
all security regulations; insure that adequate memory
protect and privileged instructions exist; keep a
computer generated log on all significant events; use
frequently changed or one-time passwords for remote user
identification; if possible restrict users to high level
languages; periodically test the security system by
trying to break it; and use cryptographic techniques if a
significant amount of sensitive information is
periodically transmitted over outside telephone lines.
*(9450)*69*ab*cb*da*eq*xl
Van Tassel, Dennis. "Keeping Confidential Information
Confidential." JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT, February
1969, pp. 14-15.
The following recommendations are made for keeping
information confidential: decide what information is to
be kept confidential and concentrate protection efforts
on this information; inform employees as to what
information is confidential and what is expected of them;
give confidential information to only those with a
definite need-to-know; have special storage facilities
for safeguarding confidential information; and have well
planned procedures for destroying obsolete confidential
information. The author states that very simple
cryptographic techniques are adequate for protecting most
stored data from unauthorized use. He then briefly
describes three basic cryptographic techniques. They are
addition, table look-up, and sorting.
*(9460)*70*ab*cc*dc*fy*x2
Verba, Joseph. "Protecting Your EDP Investment." MANAGEMENT
SERVICES, September 1970, pp. 37-40.
Management's first step should be the elimination or
reduction of the risk of loss resulting from damage to
EDP equipment and records. The following protective
measures are recommended: keeping vital records in
fireproof safes, duplicating valuable records, developing
a disaster plan, and working out backup arrangements with
users of similar equipment. The author then explains
coverage offered by the following, currently available
types of business insurance: standard fire contents form,
office contents special form, valuable papers and records
form, accounts receivable form, special data processing
policy - equipment, special data processing policy -
media, business interrupting insurance, extra expense
insurance, and data processing extra expense form.
Coverage offered by the special forms is considerably
broader than that offered by the standard forms.
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* (9470) *71*ab*cc*ff*fu
Vergari, J. V. "EDP and the Internal Audit Function." THE
MAGAZINE OF BANK ADMINISTRATION, March 1971, pp. 26-39.
* (9480) *71*ab*cc*dg*ff
Verger, J. V. "EDP and the Internal Audit." BANK
ADMINISTRATION, March 1971.
*(9490)*70*ac*ai*bc*cd*dc*jf*x2
"Violence by Rebels Threatens Centers." COMPUTERWORLD, 7
October 1970, p. 1.
FBI reports indicate that in the last 15 months,
4,330 bombings resulted in 40 deaths, 380 injuries, and
$25 million in physical damage. The Students for
Democratic Society organization is now advocating the
destruction of computer centers,
*(9500)*71*ab*ah*cb*da*db*dc*ea*gf
"Voiceprint Concept Supported by Government Sponsored
Tests." COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, June 1971, pp.
434-435.
*(9510)*71*ac*ai*bf*cd*df*gd*jh
"Voltage Unit Solves Firm's DP Troubles." COMPUTERWORLD, 13
January 1971, p. 24.
*(9520)*65*ae*ag*cb*el*gh*ht*hu*lb*x1
Vyssotsky, V. A.; Corbato, F. J.; and Graham, R. M.
"Structure of the MULTICS Supervisor." AFIPS CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS, Fall Joint Computer Conference, Vol. 27,
1965, pp. 203-212.
This paper is a preliminary report and was written
before the MULTICS system was implemented. Several
desirable "supervisor" capabilities are discussed. The
operating system was written in PL-1, so it could be
easily modified and also be largely machine independent.
The system is designed to automatically compensate for
temporary loss of one or more hardware modules. The
system assumes that it is more efficient to serve a few
users at a time, and do it well, than it is to serve all
users poorly at once. Dynamic linking; trap handling;
creation, blocking, and termination of files; and
protection against machine errors are also briefly
discussed.
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*(9530)*69*ab*cc*fc*ff
Wagner, J. W. "EDP and the Auditor of the 1970's." THE
ACCOUNTING REVIEW, July 1969, pp. 600-604.
*(9540)*72*ac*ai*be*de*fh*hp*mf*x2
"Wales Nabs Wrong Man." COMPUTERWORLD, 12 January 1972, p.
2.
James H. Gray was held for ten days by Washington,
D.C. police because he was confused with another James
Gray wanted on a burglary charge. The error occurred
because someone had not entered enough identification
information into the District's computer system. Before
he was able to convince a probation officer of the error,
Gray lost his job and was evicted from his apartment.
*(9550)*72*ac*ai*bb*db*hc
"Ward Pleads Guilty to Trade Secret Theft." COMPUTERWORLD,
15 November 1972, p. 1.
Mr. Hugh J. Ward of University Computing Company
pleaded guilty to stealing a trade secret after being
charged with illegally accessing Information Systems
Design's time-sharing computer and stealing a proprietary
program. Ward was able to access ISD's computer because
both ISD and UCC had a common customer who was assigned
the same password by both companies.
*(9560)*70*ad*aj*cb*cc*da*dd*de*eh*el*gh*hd*ka*lb*mb*md
*nl*nm*x4
Ware, Willis H. "Computer Data Banks and Security Controls."
P-4329, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California 90406,
17 pp.; or AD-703 281, National Technical Information
Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151, March 1970.
The author believes that there is no substantial
intrinsic motivation for a database operator to surround
his databank with a complete set of information
safeguards. Moreover, an operator may be technically
ignorant of the risks in his system or may be unaware of
the ease with which it can be penetrated. For these
reasons, the author argues that strong government
intervention and control is necessary to protect the
privacy of individuals. First, the following suggestions
for controls are made: adequate physical protection,
ideally - encrypted communications, bounds registers,
interrupt and memory protect features, privileged
instructions, software access control, audit trails,
unusual event alarms, self-test mechanisms, and
administrative and management controls. Then the
following government rules and regulations are proposed:
(1) databank licensing where the operator must state:
purpose of databank, source of information, user of
information, all safeguards used, validity checks used,
audit trails used, mechanisms where individuals can
PAGE 254
review their dossiers, and tests used to insure the
system is operating correctly; (2) periodic audit by
government; (3) database operator or user made liable for
willfully or negligently handling an individual's
information; (4) no anonymous data sources; and (5)
positive written certification, to those affected, that
errors have been corrected.
*(9570)*67*ad*ae*ag*aj*db*dd*hl*hm*hn*hu*id*ie*ih*ii*lb
*nh*ni*x2
Ware, Willis H. "Security and Privacy in Computer Systems."
AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Spring Joint Computer
Conference, Vol. 30, 1967, pp. 279-282; or P-3544, RAND
Corporation, Santa Monica, California 90406; or AD-650
810, National Technical Information Service, Springfield,
Virginia 22151, April 1967,
This article outlines some of the major
vulnerabilities which exist in modern time-sharing
computer systems. The following vulnerabilities were
briefly discussed: processor (radiation; failure of
hardware protection circuits such as bound registers,
memory read/write protects, and privileged mode; failure
of software protection features such as access control,
bounds control, and user identification) ; communication
lines (radiation, wiretaps, crosstalk); switching center
(failure to connect proper line, cross coupling between
lines); remote terminals (attachment of bugs or
recorders); files (theft, copying, unauthorized access);
operator (replace the protection monitor with
non-protective one, reveal protective measures);
maintenance man (disable hardware protective devices, use
stand-alone utility programs to access files); systems
programmer (disable software protective features, provide
private "ins", reveal protective measures); and user
(identification, authentication, and subtle modifications
to software system).
*(9580)*67*ad*ae*ag*aj*cb*cc*dg*mh*x3
Ware, Willis H. "Security and Privacy: Similarities and
Differences." AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Spring Joint
Computer Conference, Vol 30, 1967, pp. 287-290; or
P-3544, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California 90406.
The title of this article is deceiving because the
author gives the terms "security" and "privacy" special
meanings which are different from their most common
meanings. "Security" is used to refer to computer
systems which handle classified military information, and
"privacy" is used to refer to computer systems which
handle only non-military information. The purpose to
this paper is to identify and briefly discuss the
differences and similarities between computer systems
operating with classified military information and
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computer systems handling private or sensitive
information.
The following nine conclusions are discussed: (1)
the problem of controlling user access to the
time-sharing computer system is similar in both
situations; (2) the incentive to penetrate the system is
present in both situations; (3) the computer hardware
requirements appear to be the same in both situations;
(4) the file access and protection problem is similar
under both circumstances; (5) the philosophy of the
overall system organization will probably have to be
different in the non-military situation; (6) the
certifying authority is certainly different in the two
situations; (7) deliberate penetrations must be
anticipated in both situations, but the military
espionage threat is more serious; (8) both situations
require secure communication circuits; and (9) the level
of communication protection needed will usually be
greater for the military situation, The author concludes
by noting the all important difference that users of
non-military systems may not be subject to a common
authority or discipline. This difference indicates that
a computer network designed to safely protect classified
military information will not automatically provide
adequate protection for non-military information systems.
*(9590)*70*ad*aj*cb*cc*cd*fx*nn*nq
Ware, Willis H. (ed). "Security Controls for Computer
Systems." R-607, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica,
California 90406, February 1970, (Classified
Confidential).
The report is supposedly very comprehensive. It
includes a checklist on how to test the security of a
computer installation.
*(9600)*70*aa*da*mb*md*mg*nl*nm*np*x2
Warner, Malcolm; and Stone, Michael. THE DATA BANK SOCIETY:
ORGANIZATIONS, COMPUTERS, AND SOCIAL FREEDOM. George
Allen and Unwin Ltd., Ruskin House, Museum Street,
London, England, 1970, 244 pp.
This book studied the effects on private citizens of
the concentration of massive information by large
organizations. The problem is examined from a social and
broadly political standpoint in the knowledge of
technical potentials and limitations. Only one sixteen
page chapter of this book deals with computer security
issues. In this chapter, several protective measures are
discussed and recommended both for the computer
manufacturer and computer user. That chapter, like the
rest, is very non-technical and can be easily understood
by those who know nothing or very little about computers.
The book is more valuable to those interested in the
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computer's affect on individual privacy. An annotated
bibliography of sixty articles is included, but only ten
of these entries are concerned with security issues.
*(9610)*70*ac*ai*bf*cc*df*kd*mi*nj
"Washington Airport Shuttle Crippled by Driver Strike."
COMPUTERWORLD, 5 August 1970, p. 1.
Washington, D.C. bus drivers went on strike when
their paychecks were forty-five minutes late. The bus
firm has its paper tape reader repossessed by a service
bureau which it was having financial difficulties with.
No other automatic means of payroll processing were
available for backup, so the checks had to be manually
processed.
* (9620) *68*ab*cc*dg*ff*kd
Wasserman, Joseph J. "Auditing the Computer." MANAGEMENT
REVIEW, October 1968.
This article discusses changes that are occurring in
audit trails due to electronic data processing. It is a
condensed version of another article by Wasserman
entitled "The Vanishing Trail" and published in BELL
TELEPHONE MAGAZINE.
*(9630)*69*ab*cc*ff*kd
Wasserman, Joseph J. "Bridging the Computer-Auditor Gap."
BANKING, December 1969, pp. 83-85.
*(9640)*72*ab*cc*dg*ff*kd
Wassermen, Joseph J. "Computer Audit Packages." DATA
MANAGEMENT, September 1972, pp. 71-72.
This paper discusses several audit functions which
should be considered when evaluating a generalized audit
program. Some of these functions are: extraction,
surveying, mathematics, totaling, sampling, aging, bypass
invalid data, and user exit.
*(9650) *70*ab*cc
Wasserman, Joseph J. "Control in an EDP Environment." THE
INTERNAL AUDITOR, September 1970.
*(9660)*69*ab*bd*be*cb*cc*db*dd*de*en*fc*ff*fg*fh*fj*fm
*fp*fq*fv*fx*hp*hq*hr*kd*x2
Wasserman, Joseph J. "Plugging the Leaks in Computer
Security." HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, September 1969, pp.
119-129.
This article describes many computer auditing and
control concepts, and shows how a company can use them
for detecting and preventing unintentional human errors.
Fraud and natural disaster threats are only very briefly
discussed because losses from them are dwarfed by losses
resulting from honest mistakes. Some error control
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concepts discussed are: parallel testing of old and new
systems; checking by using a test deck of fictitious
transactions; checking control totals as records are
converted; establishing a quality control unit to sample
the accuracy of data both before and after computer
processing; an input section which maintains positive
controls over all transactions it receives; an output
section which controls the distribution of data and
ensures its reasonableness, timeliness, and completeness;
a built-in method of error analysis; complete and current
written instructions for all machine operations; an EDP
library which requires authorized access for removal of
tapes; limiting the number of personnel who are
authorized to change production programs and data files;
classifying information as to its sensitivity; allowing
only authorized personnel access to the computer room;
duplicating all vital files and storing them in a remote
location; using recovery/restart procedures for large
processing jobs; file reconstruction and disaster
insurance; separation and rotation of duties; ensuring
computer systems are auditable; using a "mini-company"
testing procedure which passes fictitious test
transactions through the computer system simultaneously
with regular live data; 100% comparison of program
calculations; statistical sampling of records; extracting
specific records for analysis; and checking mathematical
calculations made by the computer.
*(9670) *70*ab*cc*fc*xl
Wasserman, Joseph J. "Protecting Your Computer's Security."
DATA SYSTEMS NEWS, February 1970, p. 17.
The author states that security is a problem because
most users ignore the subject until it becomes a problem.
He believes that auditors should have enough
understanding of data processing to be able to
participate in system design. Programmers and operations
personnel should view their jobs in relation to the goals
of the business - one of which is security.
*(9680)*68*ab*cc*dg*ff*kd
Wasserman, Joseph J. "The Vanishing Trail." BELL TELEPHONE
MAGAZINE, July 1968.
Changes that are occurring in audit trails due to
electronic data processing are discussed.
*(9690) *68*ab*cc*da*ka*nm*xl
Watterson, Lynn. "Data Banks Can Protect Privacy." BANKING,
January 1968, p. 56.
The author believes, but does not convincingly
prove, that current computer technology is capable of
preventing unauthorized access to sensitive data. She
feels that the real problems are in developing standards
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and laws to control what information is to be collected
and who is to have authorized access to this information.
A consumer credit system is proposed where files are kept
only on individuals that wish to participate in the
system. A business can access an individual's credit
file only by getting the individual's permission. All
individuals would have the right to review their complete
file if they pay a small fee.
*(9700)*70*ab*cc*cd*fw*ga*gf*mc*x1
Wearstler, Earl W. "Computer Center is for Safety, Not for
Show." BANKING, April 1971, p. 70.
Continuous operation of the computer center is
essential for most banks. Therefore, the computer center
needs good physical protection from fire, storms, and
sabotage. Several common methods are briefly described
for controlling physical access to the computer room and
providing protection from fire. Off-site storage for
duplicates of master and grandfather files, and a
disaster plan with detailed procedures for all
contingencies are recommended.
*(9710)*70*ab*cb*ek*ff*gh
Webb, R. "Audassist." JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY, November 1970,
pp. 53-58.
*(9720)*00*ad*ca*da*db*dc*ea
Wegstein, J. H. "A Computer Oriented Single Fingerprint
Identification System." NBS Technical Note 443, National
Bureau of Standards.
*(9730)*68*ad*ca*da*db*dc*ea
Wegstein, J. H. "Matching Fingerprints by Computers." NBS
Technical Note 466, National Bureau of Standards, July
1968.
*(9740)*73*ac*ai*cd*df*gd*jh*x2
Weinstein, Michael. "Backup Power: Who Needs It and at What
Price?" COMPUTERWORLD, 23 May 1973, p. 21.
The initial cost of installing an uninterruptible
power supply system can be estimated with the simple rule
of $1 for every watt of power required. Most
battery-based systems are designed to keep the computer
operating for one hour or less while motor generator
backup systems are used to provide power for periods from
one hour to several days. Short term battery systems are
always used in conjunction with motor generator systems
because the generators can not be started instanteously
when a power fault occurs.
*(9750)*72*ac*ai*cb*db*dc*ea*ih*x1
Weinstein, Michael. "Who Accesses What on Remote Terminal?
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DP Managers Must Have Stricter Control." COMPUTERWORLD, 6
December 1972, p. 24.
Some common methods of identifying and
authenticating remote terminals and remote terminal users
are briefly discussed. The computer must be able to
identify all terminal addresses. Privileged terminals
should have terminal addresses preceding each input and
output. Various password schemes, badges, cards, keys,
and voice and fingerprint identification may be used to
identify individual terminal users. Unattended terminal
problems can be solved by requiring identification if
terminal communication has not occurred for a specified
time.
*(9760)*69*ab*cd*dc
Weiser, A. L. "ADP Physical Installation Considerations."
COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION, November 1969, pp. 44-49.
*(9765)*70*ab*cc*ff
Weiss, Harold. "Computers and Auditing - A Conference
Report." DATAMATION, 15 July 1970, pp. 108-113.
*(9770)*69*ab*bc*cc*cd*dc*ga*jg*x2
Weiss, Harold. "Danger of Total Corporate Amnesia."
FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE, June 1969, pp. 63-68.
The author feels that most organizations are
dangerously lax in their disaster prevention and recovery
planning. He attempts to throughly convince the reader
that the high concentration of vital computerized
information in a small area makes possible the total
destruction of corporate records by natural disaster or
sabotage. The problems of equipment unavailability, file
and program protection, and fire detection and prevention
are discussed in some detail. Various types of data
processing insurance are also briefly described. The
author concludes by recommending that higher level
management review its organization's vulnerability to
data processing disaster and initiate a crash program to
reduce risk and assure the capability of efficient
recovery.
*(9775)*72*ab*cc*fm
Weiss, Harold. "EDP Operations: The Forgotten Third."
JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT, July 1972, pp. 18-21.
*(9780)*69*ae*cc*cd*dc*hg*jf*jg
Weiss, Harold. "Reducing the Risk of Destruction." DATA
PROCESSING MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS,
Vol. 141, 1969, p. 417.
Several methods for reducing the possibility of
destruction to critical data and equipment are discussed.
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* (9785) *71*ab*cc*fc*ff
Weiss, Harold. "Reflections on Computers and Auditing in the
1970's." THE INTERNAL AUDITOR, July 1971.
*(9790)*67*ab*cb*cc*cd*dg
Weiss, Harold. "The Week the Computers Stopped." DATAMATION,
April 1967.
The vulnerability of typical computer installations
is described.
*(9795)*67*ab*cc*fy*nb
Weissman, Clark. "Programming Protection: What Do You Want
to Pay?" SDC MAGAZINE, Systems Development Corporation,
2500 Colorado Avenue, Santa Monica, California 90406,
July 1967, pp. 30-31.
The author believes that adequate security for
computing systems is available with today's technology.
All that is needed is an informed market with the
willingness to put its money where it wants its privacy
and protection. A system can have adequate protection if
the cost to subvert the security system is significantly
greater than the cost to maintain the needed protection.
Where this cost relationship can not adequately be met,
an insurance policy may be the most economical means of
protection.
*(9800)*69*ad*ae*ag*ca*da*db*ea*ee*ei*el*gh*hb*he*hi*ih
*lb*mh*nc*x3
Weissman, Clark. "Security Controls in the ADEPT-50
Time-Sharing System." AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, Fall
Joint Computer Conference, Vol. 35, 1969, pp. 119-133; or
SP-3342, Systems Development Corporation, Santa Monica,
California 90406, 29 May 1969.
Implementation of security in the ADEPT-50
Time-Sharing System is described in detail, as are other
features such as: initialization of security profiles;
the LOGIN decision procedure; security audit trails;
security integrity checks; security residue control;
automatic file classification based on the cumulative
security history of referenced files; once-only
passwords; and the "security umbrella" of the ADEPT job.
Approximate design and operation costs, and a list of
security command words are also discussed.
The ADEPT-50 system identifies four types of
security objects - users, terminals, jobs, and files; and
three types of security properties - authority,
franchise, and category. The authority property relates
to levels of security classification such as:
unclassified, confidential, secret, and top secret. The
category property restricts access by project and area.
It can have up to sixteen values assigned by the using
agency. The franchise property corresponds to a
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need-to-know constraint, There are three types of files:
public, private, and semi-private. Only the semi-private
files have need-to-know lists. Control at the file level
also includes: read only, write only, read and write, and
read and write with ability to override lockout of
simultaneous use. The ADEPT-50 security system overhead
cost is approximately two percent. It was implemented on
an IBM 360/50 computer with no special hardware
modifications.
*(9805)*70*ab*ad*cb*cc*nb*ng*x3
Weissman, Clark. "Trade-Off Considerations in Security
System Design." DATA MANAGEMENT, April 1972, pp. 14-19;
or SP-3548, System Development Corporation, 2500 Colorade
Avenue, Santa Monica, California 90406, 10 September
1970.
The major difficulty in security system design is
the inability to quantify trade-off considerations. This
article concentrates on system software aspects of
security. The security goals, strategies, and safeguards
selected for the ADEPT-50 Time-Sharing System are
discussed throughout this article.
Security goals can be selected by carefully looking
at the security problem, the issues surrounding it, the
user community, the goals of the system itself, and
seeing if security goals are implied. Another method of
goal selection, called threat analysis, is to hypothesize
system failures and resulting consequences, and then
envision ways of reducing system vulnerability. System
software security design involves a trade-off between
granting the user different levels of access to raw
computer power, and providing different levels of
sophisticated and expensive safeguards to protect against
the user's capability to subvert the system. Several
different levels of access control, residue control, and
integrity control are presented and discussed in some
detail. The control levels designed into the ADEPT-50
system are also noted. The author also identifies and
briefly discusses five common protection strategies used
in modern society: isolation (isolating the valuable
object and controlling access to it); confusion
(camouflage, disguise, cryptography); deterrence
(profit/loss relation, laws); wager (insurance); and
delegation (use of service bureaus). The article
concludes by briefly discussing two major problem areas
of the future - metrics and certification.
*(9810)*71*ab*cb*cc*cd*dg
Welke, L. A. "What About Security? - On Centers." MODERN
DATA, September 1971, p. 34.
*(9815) *72*ab*cc*ff
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Welke, W. R.; and King, K. G. "Using the Computer as an
Audit Tool." THE CPA JOURNAL, November 1972, pp. 930-935.
*(9820)*70*ab*cc*df*dg*fz*ma*nj
Wessel, Milton R. "Computer Services and the Law." BUSINESS
AUTOMATION, November 1971, pp. 48-50.
The liability problems for EDP service bureaus will
significantly increase during the next ten years. Those
service bureaus that fail to recognize their expanding
liabilities will face a much larger risk of not remaining
in business. This article is exactly the same as another
article by Wessel entitled "Problems of Liability for EDP
Service Industry" which appeared in COMPUTERS AND
AUTOMATION.
* (9825) *65*ab*cc*da*fy*f 1
Wessel, Milton R. "Legal Protection of Computer Programs."
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, March 1965.
*(9830)*70*ab*cc*df*dg*fz*ma*nj
Wessel, Milton R. "Problems of Liability for EDP Service
Industry." COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION, September 1970.
The liability problems for EDP service bureaus will
significantly increase during the next ten years. Those
service bureaus that fail to recognize their expanding
liabilities will face a much larger risk of not remaining
in business. This article is exactly the same as another
article by Wessel entitled "Computer Services and the
Law" which later appeared in BUSINESS AUTOMATION.
*(9835)*71*ab*cd*dc*fv*ga*ge*gf*gh*jf*nd*x2
Wessler, John; Myers, Edith; and Gardner, W. David.
"Physical Security - Facts and Fancies." DATAMATION, 1
July 1971, pp. 34-37.
The article describes physical security measures
taken by these organizations: RCA, New England Telephone,
Bank of California, City of Los Angeles, an unnamed
midwest machine tool manufacturer, GTE's Sylvania
Lighting Products Group, and MIT. The protection
provided ranged from poor to excellent. Several well
known companies that offer computer security consulting
services are also mentioned.
*(9840)*67*ae*ag*cc*da*ka*mb*nl*nm
Westin, Alan F. "Legal Safeguards to Insure Privacy in a
Computer Society." Speech Presented at AFIPS CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS, Spring Joint Computer Conference, 18 April
1967.
The author discusses the problem of data
surveillance, where an individual's behavior is kept
track of by periodically collecting data on him and
monitoring it with a computer. Current American law is
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not very adequate for controlling misuse of personal
information. Technological safeguards and legal controls
are recommended to balance the conflicting demands
between the right to individual privacy and society's
right-to-know. Positive action must begin now if
rational solutions are to be developed.
*(9845)*69*ab*ad*ak*cb*cc*da*ka*md*nl*nm
Westin, Alan F. "New Laws Will Protect Your Privacy." THINK:
An IBM Corporation Magazine, May 1969, pp. 27-31.
This article discusses general trends and events in
the development of technical, administrative, and legal
means to protect individual privacy. Two recent Supreme
Court decisions are cited which broke the legal stalemate
in the privacy area and resulted in federal legislation
on wiretapping and eavesdropping. However, a lot of
events have occurred in the last four years to make this
article somewhat obsolete.
*(9850)*67*aa*cc*da*hd*ka*md*nl*nm*nn*np*x4
Westin, Alan F. PRIVACY AND FREEDOM. Atheneum Press, New
York, 1967, 487 pp.
This is a classic book on privacy. It is an
in-depth analysis of the history of privacy since 1776.
However, it was written in 1967 and is somewaht
out-of-date on current computer activity. The book is
divided into four parts entitled: The Functions of
Privacy and Surveillance in Society, New Tools for
Invading Privacy, American Society's Struggle for
Controls - Five Case Studies, and Policy Choices for the
1970's. Each part is copiously documented. The first
part analyzes the sociological, psychological, and
political dimensions of privacy. The second part
describes present surveillance techniques and what the
future is likely to bring. The last part discusses the
history of law relating to privacy and makes specific
legal recommendations to insure the right to privacy in
the future. An extensive bibliography is also included.
This book should definately be read by those seriously
interested in the general problem of privacy.
*(9855)*72*aa*cb*cc*cd*da*dd*de*fd*fe*fh*fp*fs*hd*ka*ng
*nl*nm*no*x4
Westin, Alan F.; and Baker, Michael A. DATABANKS IN A FREE
SOCIETY. Quadrangle Books, 330 Madison Avenue, New York,
New York 10017, 1972, 522 pp., $12.50.
This book is the most ambitious study of
record-keeping and privacy to date. It is the result of
a three year effort by a team of scholars drawn from the
social sciences, computer sciences, law, psychology, and
mathematics, and led by Alan F. Westin, a Columbia
University professor who is the ranking authority on
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constitutional aspects of data collection and civil
liberties. The study was conducted for the National
Academy of Sciences. Its major conclusion is that vast,
centralized computer databanks simply do not exist,
despite a widespread conviction to the contrary by the
public and press. Most of the mid-1960 databank plans
later proved either impossible to achieve, economically
bankrupting, or useless from a business or administrative
viewpoint. The study is based on questionnaires from
more than 1,500 organizations, both public and private,
and site visits to 55 of the most advanced users of
computerized information. These site visits were made in
1970 and 1971. Another major conclusion of the study is
that social and legal policies with built-in safeguards
need to be hammered out before the inevitable development
of vast, centralized computer databases does occur.
The book is written with scholarly rigor and avoids
dramatizing the material. Fourteen very detailed
profiles are given on the following computerized
organizations: The Social Security Administration; The
FBI's National Crime Information Center; New York State's
Department of Motor Vehicles; Kansas City Police
Department; New Haven, Connecticut; Santa Clara County,
California; Bank of America; TRW - Credit Data
Corporation; Mutual of Omaha; R. L. Polk and Company;
MIT; The American Council on Education; The Church of the
Latter-Day Saints; and The Kaiser-Permanente Care
Program. The book is organized into five sections: a
brief introductory chapter on records, computers, and
civil liberties; the previously mentioned 14 profiles;
site findings of the 55 organizations visited; and two
summary chapters entitled "Future Directions in Computer
Technology" and "Implications for Public Policy".
Before purchasing or reading this book, one may want
to read one or both of the following 1300-word reviews:
"A Myth-Destroying study of Computers" by Ephraim A.
Lewis in the January 13, 1973 issue of BUSINESS WEEK, or
the book review section in the April 1973 issue of DATA
PROCESSING DIGEST. A similar study of Canadian
Organizations can be found in an article by John M.
Carroll entitled "Snapshot 1971 - How Canada Organizes
Information About People" in the 1972 Fall Joint Computer
Conference Proceedings.
*(9860)*71*ab*cd*dd*df*jh
"Westinghouse Warns of Power Fluctuations' Effect on EDP
Units." MANAGEMENT ADVISER, July 1971, p. 13.
*(9865)*69*ae*cc*dg*em*fi*fp*fx*fl*hc*hm*hr*nj
Whelan, Thomas. "Software Security." American Management
Association Session Briefing on Catastrophe Prevention
and Security Management of the Computer Complex, 17
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November 1969.
Program design, program changes, testing procedures,
checkpoint recovery routines, environmental protection,
and legal protection of software are all discussed.
* (9870) *70*ab*cc*da*nm
"Who Watches the Watchers." DATA SYSTEMS NEWS, December
1970.
*(9875) *71*ab*cc*da*fs*ft*hc*jc
"Why Employees Steal." U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 3 May
1971, pp. 78-82.
*(9880) *71*ab*cc*dd*de*nm
"Why the Public Dislikes Computers." COMPUTERS AND
AUTOMATION, May 1971, p. 7.
*(9885)*71*ab*cc*da*fh*ka*nl*nm*x2
Wiesner, J. B. "The Information Revolution and the Bill of
Rights." COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION, May 1971, p. 8.
The author, President of MIT, feels there is a great
danger that we, the public, could become "information
bound" because each step in the development of an
"information tyranny" appeared to be constructive and
useful. Data-centralization and manipulation can be
expected to grow at an ever increasing rate. At the same
time, effective information gathering, record keeping,
and data processing are essential to a modern society.
To keep modern technology from dominating the public,
very strict legal controls must be adopted on - who can
do what with private information. These controls must be
adopted soon, before their deployment is contrary to the
special interests of large groups of people. Technology
alone cannot provide adequate safeguards.
The author outlines several specific needs: the
establishment of a watchdog authority to review
information gathering and processing activities and to
report to Congress; the setting of rigid limitations on
permissible surveillance activities, perhaps by amending
the constitution; the outlawing of free exchange of
information and requiring disclosure to individuals of
data kept on them; and the development and required use
of technical means of safeguarding data.
*(9890)*68*ab*cb*ec*lb
Wilkes, M. V. "Time-Sharing Computer Systems." AMERICAN
ELSEVIER, 1968.
* (9895) *72*ab*cc*ff
Will, H. J. "Computer Based Auditing." CANADIAN CHARTERED
ACCOUNTANT, February 1972.
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*(9900)*72*ab*cd*dc*ga*ge*nd*x2
Willis, John A. "Is Your Computer Center Safe?" COMPUTER
DECISIONS, June 1972, pp. 12-14.
A few basic suggestions are given concerning proper
location of the computer room, physical access control,
and fire detection and prevention. A sample checklist of
fifteen questions is also presented. The article
concludes by presenting a list of names, addresses, and
telephone numbers of twelve companies offering computer
security surveys.
*(9905)*69*ab*cd*dd*gb*jh
Wilson, T. "Air Conditioning in the Computer Room." DATA
PROCESSING, March 1969, pp. 167-168.
*(9910)*71*ab*ak*cb*cc*dg*fe*em*ff*ma
Wimbrow, J. H. "A Large-Scale Interactive Administrative
System." IBM SYSTEMS JOURNAL, November 1971, pp. 260-282.
This article describes a nationwide network of
terminals used by over 20 major businesses which share a
single large and varied data base. Part of the article
discusses user authorization, data-base reconstruction
considerations, and auditing.
*(9915)*69*ac*ai*bc*cd*dc*gc*jf*mj
"Wirecutters, Acid Used on Computer." COMPUTERWORLD, 9 April
1969, p. 7.
Student destruction of the Boston University
computer center is described.
*(9920)*71*ad*cc*cd*np*x2
Witzer, Harold. "Computer Security Bibliography." AVCO
Computer Services, 201 Lowell Street, Wilmington,
Massachusetts 01887, January 1971, 133 pp., $3.50.
This partially annotated bibliography contains 330
entries. 120 of these are primarily concerned with
privacy issues. The annotations are short and average
about 30 to 40 words. Approximately 30 of the security
entries and 90 of the privacy entries are not annotated,
and approximately 60 of the entries are from
COMPUTERWORLD newspaper. Almost all of the entries are
concerned with physical security, or management controls
and operating procedures. Entry numbers 144 through 164
are a list of 20 pre-1968 books dealing with privacy
issues. Keyword and author indices are provided for
accessing the 330 entries. Also included is a list of 66
firms that sell locks, surveillance systems, alarms, and
guard services.
*(9925)*71*ab*cc*fm
Wofsey, Marvin M. "EDP Systems Controls." DATA MANAGEMENT,
September 1971, pp. 71-76.
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*(9930)*72*ab*bf*bg*cc*cd*df*dg*eg*el*fb*fw*fz*ga*ge*gf
*nb*nf*nj*x2
Wofsey, Marvin M. "Data Security." DATA MANAGEMENT:
Conference Issue, September 1972, pp. 80-86.
First, the need for data security is demonstrated by
a brief discussion of these threats: fire; explosion;
natural disaster; sabotage; social protests;
environmental problems; power difficulties; loss of
programs and data due to misoperation or environment
difficulties; external radiation; operator error; data
theft; fraud; illegal selling of computer time; and law
suits for computer errors or poor service. Over twenty
actual cases were cited when discussing these threats.
Next, a large number of very common physical, procedural,
and legal preventive measures are listed.
The author states that the computer manager should
recognize potential dangers and prepare a cost/value
analysis which includes the following elements: hazard,
degree of damage, probability of occurrence,
consequences, possible dollar damages, measures
recommended, cost comparison of probable damages and
costs of measures recommended, alternative measures
considered, and costs of alternative measures considered.
The completed cost/value analysis should be given to top
management who must make the final decision as to what
security measures are to be implemented.
* (9935) *71*ab*cd*dc*ge*nb
Wood, J. A. "Fire Protection for Computer Installations: A
Cost-Effective Comparison." INSTRUMENTS AND CONTROL
SYSTEMS, June 1971, pp. 129-131.
*(9940)*73*ac*ai*be*de*hp*kd*me*x1
Wright, Bob. "Human Error Found Cause of Overpayment in
Weekly Paycheck." COMPUTERWORLD, 18 April 1973, p. 9.
A data input error resulted in a Durham, North
Carolina city employee receiving a salary of $31 per hour
when he was authorized to receive only $3.12 per hour.
The error went undetected for two months until a year-end
annual audit found the error. The computer did not check
hourly rates because the city employed many daily and
part-time workers who were not paid hourly rates.
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*(9945)*71*ac*ai*bc*cd*dc*jf
"Yippies Convene, Discuss Methods of DP Sabotage."
COMPUTERWORLD, 14 April 1971, p. 2.
*(9950)*72*ab*cc*da*f1*nj*nl
Young, M. L. "Precarious Path to Adequate Legal Protection
of Software." DATA MANAGEMENT, August 1972, pp. 10-13.
*(9955)*67*ab*cc*ff
Young, R. "Internal Control in Electronic Data Processing."
CPA JOURNAL, January 1967, pp. 45-50.
*(9960)*70*ab*cc*cd*dg
"Your Computer: How Secure?" CHEMICAL ENGINEERING, November
1970.
*(9965)*71*ab*bd*dd*nj*xl
"Your Firm Could Pay for a Computer Error." INSURANCE, 15
March 1971, P. 72.
This short article describes a case involving Ford
Motor Credit Company and one of its customers. On three
separate occasions the company's computer refused to
acknowledge prompt automobile installment payments by a
customer. The customer proved he had made the payments
on the first two occasions but refused to go through the
troublesome procedure on the third occasion. Ford
promptly repossessed his automobile. A lawsuit followed,
and Ford Credit Company was required to pay $5,000 in
punitive damages plus the fair market value of the car.
The judge held that a business is responsible to its
customers for correct operation of its computer system.
*(9970)*72*ab*cb*dg*ha*lb
Yourdon, Edward. Reliability of Real-Time Systems." MODERN
DATA, (A six part series of articles), January-June 1972.
This series of articles explores why and how systems
fail. A book with the same title also exists.
* (9975) *70*ac*ai*ba*da*hd
"Youth Indicated in Data File Copying." COMPUTERWORLD, 11
November 1970, p. 3.
An 18-year-old was indicted on charges of interstate
transmission of stolen property by wire, and unauthorized
access on a time-shared computer network.
*(9980)*72*ab*cc*df*dg*fz*x2
Zaiden, Dennis J. "Some Legal Aspects of EDP." MANAGEMENT
ACCOUNTING, July 1972, pp. 51-52.
The author discusses several items that should be
included in a contract with a equipment vendor or service
bureau. For a equipment vendor the contract should
include: detailed specifications of the system telling
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what the system can and cannot do; physical requirements
of the installation; details as to what programs and
compilers will be provided; details of implementation
assistance including technical personnel of vendor,
employee training, user's manuals to be furnished, and
period of assistance; and details as to who will do what,
with specific roles stated for vendor and customer
personnel. For contracts with service bureaus, a
different set of items must be considered. They are: the
bureau's responsibility for training, instruction
manuals, etc.; maximum acceptable turn-around time;
required provisions for assuring the integrity and
privacy of programs and data; hardware and software
maintenance; and insurance responsibilities.
*(9985)*72*ab*cc*df*dg*fy*x2
Zaiden, Dennis J. "Special EDP Insurance: Who Needs It."
DATA PROCESSING MAGAZINE, Spring 1972, pp. 31-34.
The article first shows that conventional insurance
policies do not provide adequate protection for EDP
equipment and operations. It is suggested that a company
prepare a complete list of all hazards it is exposed to,
estimate the dollar value of probable losses resulting
from these hazards, and then see an insurance
representative. Since the St, Paul Fire and Marine
Insurance Company currently provides one of the most
versatile multiple peril data processing policies, its
policy is discussed and analyzed in detail. The article
concludes by giving some advice on avoiding coverage of
equipment in both general insurance policies and special
EDP policies, and on determining whether any deficiencies
in coverage exist which should be compensated for.
*(9990)*72*ab*cc*cd*dg*ni
Zaiden, Dennis J. "Steps You Can Take to Protect Your
Computer Operation." LKHH ACCOUNTANT, No. 2, 1972, pp.
29-35.
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IV. FIRMS SELLING COMPUTER SECURITY SERVICES OR EQUIPMENT.
Of the thirty-four firms listed below, only about eight
(numbers 50,60,100,120,160,170,230, abd 250) are service
companies specializing in the field of computer security.
Six are primarily manufacturers of security equipment, and
the rest offer computer security investigations along with
many other services. Source number 2010 in the annotated
bibliography was used to obtain information on about half of
these firms. The other firms were found from sundry
sources.
10. ANALYTICS INC., 179 Washington Lane, Jenkintown,
Pennsylvania 19046, (215) 885-9424.
Performs computer security surveys.
20. ASSOCIATED COMPUTING SERVICES INC., 12011 San Vicente
Boulevard, Suite 350, Los Angeles, California 90049,
(213) 476-6515.
Provides services in consulting, auditing, and
data processing standards. Established in 1966. Had
eighteen employees in 1972.
30. BAKER INDUSTRIES INC., 8 Ridgedale Avenue, Cedar
Knolls, New Jersey 07927, (201) 267-1600.
Performs computer security surveys.
40. BELDEN MENKUS: CONSULTANT, 7 Blauvelt Avenue,
Bergenfield, New Jersey 07621, (201) 385-0383.
Provides services in computer security evaluation,
and design or improvement of information systems.
Established in 1971. Had two employees in 1972.
50. BRADFORD SECURITY SYSTEMS INC., 300 East 52nd Street,
New York, New York 10022, (212) 832-0459.
Provides consulting services in the area of
computer security, reliabibity, and integrity. The
firm will determine: specific computer system security
requirements; vulnerability to fire, flooding, human
errors, vandalism, fraud, sabotage, etc.; and cost
effective safeguards to satisfy requirements.
Established in 1969. Robert V. Jacobson is the firm's
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president.
60. BURNS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SERVICES INC., Briarcliff
Manor, New York 10510, (914) 762-1000.
Will survey computer for security requirements.
70. CERTIFIED MANAGEMENT SERVICES INC., 3810 Wilshire
Boulevard, Suite 1405, Los Angeles, California 90010,
(213) 388-3415.
Offers systems and procedures services, and
performs feasibility studies. Established in 1968.
Had six employees in 1972.
80. COLLEGE COMPUTER CORPORATION, College Plaza,
Collegedale, Tennessee 37315, (615) 396-2950.
Manufactures and sells security systems and
related equipment. Also provides batch and
time-sharing computing services, systems analysis,
communications conuslting, and courses in computer
science. Established in 1967. Had ten employees in
1972.
90. COMPUTER ASSISTANCE INC., 298 Park Road, West Hartford,
Connecticut 06119, (203) 233-9848.
Provides services in facilities management,
security audits, proprietary software, programming, and
systems analysis. Established in 1967. Had forty
employees in 1972.
100. COMPUTER AUDIT SYSTEMS INC., 725 Park Avenue, East
Orange, New Jersey 07017, (201) 676-8320.
Specializes in computer auditing, controls, and
security. Established in 1969. Had five employees in
1972. Joseph J. Wasserman is the firm's president.
110. COMPUTER MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, 3121 Euclid Avenue,
Cleveland, Ohio 44115, (216) 881-9180.
Provides services in facilities management,
systems design, software development, data input,
documentation, and general consulting. Also
manufactures and sells microfilm supplies and viewers.
Established in 1969. Had thirty-five employees in
1972.
120. COMPUTER SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, 7315 Wisconsin
Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland, (301) 656-1144.
Offers security surveys and investigations.
130. CRAMER DIVISION OF CONRAC CORPORATION, Mill Rock Road,
Old Saybrook, Connecticut 06475, (203) 388-3574.
Manufactures and sells security systems and
equipment, digital cassettes, and cassette tape
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transports. Established in 1936. Had approximately
400 employees in 1972.
140. DAN B. McDEVITT AND ASSOCIATES, 5019 East 38th Place,
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74135, (918) 627-1181.
Provides services in facilities management,
programming, systems design, debugging, and cost
reduction. Established in 1962. Had twenty-nine
employees in 1972.
150. DATA DEVELOPMENT INC., 1090 Highway AlA, P.O. Box 2089,
Satellite Beach, Florida 32937, (305) 773-0332.
Provides services in academic, scientific,
financial, bank data processing, and management areas.
Also provides programming and general consulting
services. Had twenty-five employees in 1972.
160. DATA PROCESSING SECURITY INC., 15 Spring Wheel Road,
Hinsdale, Illinois 60521, (312) 325-2105.
Provides consulting services in areas of fire
protection, electrical power backup, theft, sabotage,
off-site record storage recovery plans, facilities,
personnel, and physical hardware. Lewis Scoma Jr. is
the firm's president.
170. DATAGUARD SYSTEMS, 700 West Campbell Avenue, Phoenix,
Arizona 85013, (602) 277-7434.
Specializes in the field of computer security.
180. DATALOCK ELECTRONICS CORPORATION, 2550 Oaks Boulevard,
Sacramento, California 95825, (916) 488-0180.
Sells electronic access controls for computer
rooms. Established in 1970. Had eight employees in
1972.
190. DIEBOLD INC., 818 Mulberry Road, Canton, Ohio 44711,
(216) 453-4592.
Manufactures and sells: alarms for protecting
computer installations; information storage and
retrieval systems; and protection and storage devices
for EDP data. Established in 1859. Had 6000 employees
in 1972.
200. FENWAL INC., 400 Main Street, Ashland, Massachusetts
01721, (617) 881-2000.
Manufactures fire detection and suppression
systems. Will analyze your computer center for fire
protection. Established in 1935. Had 700 employees in
1972.
210. ICM COMPUTER CORPORATION, P.O. Box 7220, Tulsa,
Oklahoma 74105, (918) 587-2333.
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Sells complete operating systems. Also designs
and operates communications systems and management
information systems. Established in 1969. Had 100
employees in 1972.
220. ICM INDUSTRIES, 4141 North Miami Avenue, Miami, Flordia
33127, (305) 758-1528.
Provides services in facilities management, batch
processing, data communications, and customized
programming. Also leases EDP equipment. Established
in 1969. Had fifty employees in 1972.
230. INTELLIGENCE SERVICES INC., 6500 Jericho Turnpike,
Syosset, New York 11791, (516) 433-0122.
Will Perform computer security surveys.
240. KELTRAN CORPORATION, 225 Crescent Street, Waltham,
Massachusetts 02154, (617) 394-0525.
Manufactures and sells monitoring systems,
security alarms, and digital printers. Established in
1960. Had forty-five employees in 1972.
250. MANAGEMATICS INC., 2 Penn Plaza, New York, New York
10001, (212) 594-7199.
Provides services in systems and facilities
security, recovery procedures, preformance evaluation,
management information systems development, and
mathematical modeling. Established in 1968. Had ten
employees in 1972.
260. PERMALOC SECURITY DEVICES INC., 627 Sligo Avenue,
Silver Spring, Maryland 20910, (301) 589-9318.
Manufactures and sells access control systems for
computer rooms. Established in 1968. Had four
employees in 1972.
270. PINKERTON'S INC., 100 Church Street, New York, New York
10007, (212) 233-3144,
Will analyze computer installations for security
requirements.
280. PYROTRONICS INC., 8 Ridgedale Avenue, Cedar Knolls, New
Jersey 07927, (201) 267-1300.
Manufactures and sells fire and smoke detection
systems for computers. Will analyze your computer room
for fire protection needs. Had 200 employees in 1972.
290. RETAIL OPERATING SYSTEMS COMPANY, P.O. Box 7220, Tulsa,
Oklahoma 74105, (918) 587-2333.
Designs, implements, and operates retail operating
systems. Also offers software, hardware, and personnel
services.
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300. RICHARD L. BERRY: MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS, 714 Landmark
Two, Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08034, (609) 423-7542.
Provides services in systems consulting, personnel
testing, recruitment evaluation, and staffing.
Established in 1959. Had ten employees in 1972.
310. SABER LABORATORIES, 1150 Bryant Street, San Francisco,
California.
Provides information security consulting services.
320. SIERRA RESEARCH CORPORATION: DATA SYSTEMS DIVISION, 217
Middlesex Turnpike, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803,
(617) 273-0900.
Provides systems for machine monitoring and
control, and data collection. Also manufactures and
sells terminals. Established in 1960. Had sixty-nine
employees in 1972.
330. URBAN SYSTEMS AND SERVICES COMPANY, 3400 Montrose
Boulevard, Suite 216, Houston, Texas 77006, (713)
526-6243.
Provides services and consulting in facilities
management for municipal governments, law enforcement
systems, tax systems, and municipal water systems.
Also manufactures and sells communication equipment.
Established in 1969. Had twenty-five employees in
1972.
340. WESTINGHOUSE SECURITY SYSTEMS, 1725 Washington Road,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15241, (412) 341-7672.
Offers datacenter security surveys.
